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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In  n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry  Bengal a sm all s e c t io n  o f Hindu s o c ie ty ,  
e d u c a te d , o f  h ig h - c a s te ,  and w ith  an economy Based upon lan d ed  r e n ts  
and p ro fe s s io n a l  employment, evo lved  from  i t s  c o n ta c t  w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  
a d i s t i n c t i v e  c u l tu r e .  T h is gave i t s  members a sen se  o f community and 
s e t  them a p a r t  from th e  mass o f  B e n g a lis . They c a l le d  them selves 
b h a d ra lo k ; ’th e  r e s p e c ta b le  p e o p le ’ .
As an e x p re s s io n  o f t h e i r  i d e n t i t y  th e y  produced a f in e  l i t e r a t u r e  
i n  th e  B en g a li lan g u ag e . They a lso  tu rn e d  to  p o l i t i c s ,  b u t h e re  t h e i r  
o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  s e l f - e x p r e s s io n  were r e s t r i c t e d  by B r i t i s h  im p e r ia l  
r u l e .  The B r i t i s h  d en ied  them a c c e ss  to  th e  s u p e r io r  o f f ic e s  i n  th e  
Government and excluded  them from a sh a re  i n  th e  p ro cess  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .  
I t  became a q u e s tio n  o f honour fo r  them to  b re a k  down th e s e  b a r r i e r s ,  
and , i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e y  co v e ted  p a r lia m e n ta ry  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  By 
a c q u ir in g  th e s e ,  th ey  f e l t ,  th e y  would p rove th a t  th e y  were th e  E n g lis h ­
man’ s eq u a l. A ccep ting  th e  Whig i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f E n g lish  h i s to r y ,  
th e y  in s i s t e d  t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  in  In d ia  would be t r u e  to  t h e i r  p r in c i p le s  
o n ly  i f  th e y  developed  p a r lia m e n ta ry  governm ent.
T h e ir  c la im  was r e j e c te d  by th e  schoo l o f th o u g h t most i n f l u e n t i a l  
i n  th e  Government o f  I n d ia ,  on th e  ground th a t  In d ia n s  were n o t as 
c a p a b le  as E nglishm en o f  r u l i n g  th e m se lv es . By th e  tu r n  o f th e  c e n tu ry ,  
t h i s  schoo l was a lso  conv inced  t h a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a s p i r a t io n s  o f  th e
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bhadralok were a danger to the maintenance of British rule, and the 
Government of India therefore struck at the unity of the bhadralok by 
partitioning- Bengal.
This attack on their identity, shook the faith of the bhadralok 
in the beneficence of British intentions, and, from that time onwards, 
distrust and enmity for the Government characterised bhadralok politics. 
In protest against the partition of the province, the bhadralok leaders 
organised a violent agitation, but this was met with repression by the 
British and it also provoked a hostile counter-action from other 
sections of Bengali society, particularly from the Muslim majority.
These reactions shook the bhadralok*s confidence, and, when the British 
introduced Representative Government and reunited the province in 1912 
in an attempt to allay the discontent of the bhadralok, an influential 
section of their politicians were willing' to resume constitutional 
methods as a more secure course of action.
There remained, however, widespread scepticism among the bhadralok 
as to the value of participation in British-sponsored institutions, 
and this was heightened by the frustrations suffered by the elected 
members of the Legislative Council under a system which enabled them to 
criticise but not control the actions of the Government. The Council 
members saw that the bhadralok*s faith in constitutional methods of 
political action would be destroyed unless there were a rapid advance 
to Responsible Government, but this was a step which the British were 
reluctant to take, for they were not convinced that their brown empire
Vwas fit to follow the lead of their white colonies. They acted hesitantly, 
and what they finally gave was partial responsibility to a Legislative 
Council constructed to the bhadralok1s disadvantage. Nearly every 
detail of the settlement gave evidence of the British distrust of the 
bhadralok, and, in consequence, most of the community rejected the new 
constitution.
The bhadralok leaders were then faced with the problem of devising 
some other form of political action for their community. A lead was 
offered by Gandhi, who wanted the Congress to organise a mass agitation 
against the British, but this suggestion was unattractive to the 
bhadralok politicians. Their experience of the anti-partition agitation 
had left them apprehensive of the social repercussions of an appeal 
for wider support. The bhadralok were only five per cent of the total 
population of Bengal, and they were separated from the masses by creed 
and caste, and by a strong class consciousness, which was reinforced by 
exclusive historical and cultural traditions. They had little in 
common with either the urban labouring classes or the peasantry, and 
their politicians felt no confidence in their ability to lead a mass 
movement. They were reluctant to jeopardise their social and cultural 
superiority in what they regarded as a revolutionary adventure. Their 
apprehension of the consequences of mass agitation was reinforced by 
the evidence of a new political awareness among- the lower classes of 
Bengali society, and the attempts made by Muslim politicians to take 
advantage of this for communal ends.
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G andhi’ s id e a s  o f n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n , how ever, ap pea led  s tro n g ly  
to  th e  p o o re r  s e c t io n s  o f th e  b h a d ra lo k , who were e x c i te d  by th e  p ro sp e c t 
o f  t h e i r  d i r e c t  involvem ent i n  p o l i t i c s  f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e. As a 
consequence, i n  1921 th e  b h a d ra lo k  le a d e r s  were fo rc e d , a g a in s t  t h e i r  
w i l l ,  in to  th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  movement i n  an a tte m p t to  r e t a i n  t h e i r  
ho ld  o v e r  th e se  low er s e c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  community. T h e ir  f e a r s  t h a t  
d i r e c t  a c t io n  would a ro u se  th e  m asses, were f u l l y  r e a l i s e d ,  and , a f t e r  
l i t t l e  more th a n  a y e a r ,  th e y  abandoned n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  in  fa v o u r  o f 
r e - e n t r y  to  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls .
They had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  d e f e a t in g  th e  d i s c r e d i te d  m oderate 
p o l i t i c i a n s  who had r e fu s e d  in  1921 to  jo i n  G andhi’ s cam paign, b u t th e y  
found i t  a h a rd  t a s k  to  c o n tro l  th e  reform ed  L e g i s la t iv e  C o u n c il, d iv id e d  
a s  i t  was in to  communal b lo c s .  The a g i t a t i o n  o f  1921 had d is tu rb e d  
communal r e l a t i o n s  i n  B engal, and d is s e n s io n  betw een b h a d ra lo k  and 
Muslim p o l i t i c i a n s  was encouraged  by th e  Government o f  Bengal i n  th e  
hope o f  securing - f o r  i t s e l f  a t a c t i c a l  advan tage i n  th e  L e g i s la t iv e  
C o u n c il. The Government a lso  a s s i s t e d  th e  M uslims to  o rg a n is e  th e  
p e a s a n try ,  in  o rd e r  to  g iv e  th e  Muslim p o l i t i c i a n s  an e l e c to r a l  s t r e n g th  
w ith  w hich to  a t ta c k  th e  p r iv i le g e d  p o s i t io n  o f th e  b h a d ra lo k . The 
im m ediate r e s u l t  was some months o f b i t t e r  communal r i o t i n g  th ro u g h o u t 
B engal i n  1926, and th e  lo n g  te rm  r e s u l t  was th e  dom ination  o f  th e  
L e g i s l a t i v e  C ouncil by a M u s lim -B ritish  a l l i a n c e ,  to  th e  d isa d v a n ta g e
o f  th e  b h ad ra lo k ,
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PREFACE
"History as High Adventure" was the title which Walter Prescott 
Webb gave to a delightful account of his years as an academic historian. 
History as High Adventure describes very aptly my experience in writing 
this thesis. I set out to study an institution - the Bengal Legislative 
Council - with the hope that I could put to some good purpose my 
experience of eighteenth-century English parliamentary history. As a 
good "Hamierite” I was resolved to count heads and discount legends.
I thought I had stolen a march on my former colleagues by moving into a 
century where I would be able to talk with my politicians in person, 
but I was in for a shock to which no eighteenth-century Namierite has 
ever been subjected, even by the most unfriendly Whig reviewer. I was 
told by some of my politicians that the legislature was unimportant; 
that I should look elsewhere if I wished to understand Bengali politics.
This was disturbing-, but it was also perplexing, for all the 
documentary evidence that I had seen pointed in the opposite directions 
to the importance of the Legislative Council in pre-Independence Bengal. 
How could I reconcile what I saw with what I was told? This started me 
on a chase which took me cross-country away from the Council through 
the unexplored tracts of Bengali social history and the slightly better- 
known paths of its cultural history. I arrived back weary but 
exhilarated, for I had found the answer to my problem. The Legislative 
Council was important, desperately important, to the most influential
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section of Bengali society, and it -was only "because the institution 
had failed to fulfil the high hopes of these people that they had turned 
away from it in disgust. Far from wasting my time "by looking in the 
wrong place, I had (I was convinced) made a discovery which helps to 
explain many other aspects of modern Bengali history apart from its 
legislative politics. I hope the reader of this thesis will be of the 
same opinion.
To give an idea of some of the thickets through which the hare was 
chased before being run to ground, I have appended to the thesis copies 
of three articles which I published during my period of research.
Like all good adventures, this one has left me with lots of 
interesting exploring to do in the future. There are, for instance, 
aspects of the present study at which I want to look in more detail, 
particularly at the emergence of the urban lower middle-class in Bengal 
and the effects of the 1905 partition on its political development.
A word about the use which I have made of my sources might be 
helpful. My interviews with former politicians and administrators in 
India and Pakistan were invaluable for the light which they threw on 
personalities, and for the ideas which they gave me of likely avenues 
of enquiry. '.Vhere possible, however, I did not rely upon them for 
facts. I always attempted to find documentary evidence to verify any 
details I was given; hence there are relatively few references in the 
footnotes to these interviews.
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The collection of biographical data has been of fundamental 
importance to the research. Information on all public men in Bengal 
in the first three decades of this century was collected from a 
variety of sources and carded. Comments in the text based on this 
material have not been individually footnoted, as in most cases it has 
been impossible to ’‘unscramble the egg”. This explains why the analyses 
of election contests are often unaccompanied by particular documentation. 
The bibliography lists the memoirs, autobiographies, biographies, 
biographical dictionaries and personal interviews from which most of 
the information came.
In the transliteration of Indian words, I can claim nothing more 
than consistency. The spelling- of personal names posed a special 
problem, for the owners themselves were often inconsistent in the form 
which they used. My solution was to select one spelling for each name 
and to force all my politicians to conform. Thus all Banerjeas, 
Banerjees, and Banarjis appear here as Banerjea.
As further aids to the reader, I have provided a glossary and a 
map of Bengal, and my bibliography is annotated.
I am indebted to the Australian National University for the 
Scholarship which made possible this study, and for financing two periods 
of field work in India and Pakistan. I am also indebted to those with 
whom I have worked in the Research School of Social Sciences of the 
University. In particular I wish to thank most sincerely my supervisors, 
Br D.A. Low and Br B.D. Graham, for their enthusiasm, guidance and
Xfriendship, and for the hours of hard work which they put in on my 
behalf throughout my three and a half years in Canberra. To Mr P.D. 
Reeves, with whom I set out on this adventure, goes my gratitude for 
making easier my early days as a raw recruit to Indian studies, and 
for his cheerful companionship. My visits to India were made pleasant 
and profitable by the ever-ready assistance and friendly advice of 
Sri A.R. Mukherjea, Secretary of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, 
to whom I am deeply indebted.
I should also like to thank the Librarians and staff of the 
Australian National University Library, the Commonwealth National Library 
of Australia, the National Library of India, and the Indian Association 
and British Indian Association, Calcutta; the Curator and staff of 
Rabindra-Sadana, Santiniketan; the Keeper of Records, West Bengal 
Government, Calcutta; the Keeper of Records, East Pakistan Government, 
Dacca; and the Director and staff of the National Archives of India,
New Delhi.
My sincere thanks go to my typist, Mrs Margaret Hobbs, for her 
patience and painstaking attention to detail. Finally, for the help 
given me by my wife, Jenni, at every stage of my work, in Canberra and 
India, and for her loyalty and self-sacrifice, I am deeply grateful.
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GLOSSARY
Anjuman A  communal assembly or association. In Bengal 
applied only to Muslim organisations.
Babu In nineteenth and early twentieth-century Bengali 
society, a title of respect for an English-speaking 
Hindu. Applied derogatorily by the British to 
semi-educated bhadralok clerks, and, by extension, 
to any member of the bhadralok. Bow usually used 
only in reference to a clerk who can write English.
Bania The name of a caste, or an individual of that 
caste, which is numerous in Gujerat. Divided into 
two main groups, Vaisnavas and Jains, the members 
of both of which are engaged chiefly in trade and 
banking’.
Baqr-Id A  festival observed by Muslims on the 10th of the 
month Zulha.ia - the feast of the ox, in commemoration 
of the offering of Ismail (according to Muslim 
tradition) by Abraham.
Brahmo A  member of the Brahmo Sarna.i, a monotheistic 
religious body founded in Calcutta by  Raja Rammohun 
Roy in 1828.
Bustee A slum in an Indian industrial city, consisting of 
a chaotic jumble of huts to which narrow winding 
lanes provide the only approach.
Chaukidar A watchman. A  chaukidari tax is a tax levied to 
defray the cost of a town or village watch.
Crore Ten millions.
Dacoity Gang robbery. A  dacoit is a member of a robber gang.
Durbar A  court, audience or levee of a king or man of rank.
Durga Pu ja The worship of the goddess Durga, celebrated for 
ten days in the month of Aswin (October). The 
main Hindu festival in Bengal.
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Durwan A gate-keeper.
Goonda The Indian equivalent of a gangster.
Hartal Suspension of work or business as a mark of 
indignation.
Joatdar A  farmer or cultivator.
Khadi Cloth hand-woven from hand-spun thread.
Lakh One hundred thousand.
Lascar A  sailor.
Lathi A stick, sometimes tipped with metal, used as a 
weapon.
Mofussil The country, or towns in the country, as opposed to 
the Sadar, the principal town. Its usual application 
in Bengal is to the country in general, as distinct 
from Calcutta.
M o hunt The head of a temple.
Mullah A Muslim lawyer or learned man, who, in the absence 
of a priesthood in Islam, customarily expounds the 
teachings of the Koran to the faithful.
Pandal A temporary structure of cloth or basket-work 
supported on posts, to give shelter to an assembly.
Purdah A v e i l , screen or curtain which excludes the women 
of a Muslim family from the gaze of the men. The 
purdah quarters are the area of the house from 
which the men are excluded.
Raiyat A peasant.
ßaj Rule or dominion. Ruling power. Ruling family. 
Kingdom or principality.
Sah ha An assembly or a place of assembly.
Sadar Also Sadr or Sudder.
The highest or foremost of anything. Hence the 
chief seat of government or the Government itself.
xvi
Samiti An association.
Satyagraha Passive resistance. A coinage of Gandhi’s from: 
Sat = truth 
Agraha = firmness
Swadeshi Of one's own country. The swadeshi movement was 
the encouragement of indigenous manufactures to 
the exclusion of imported articles.
Swami A  Hindu holy man.
Swaraj Self-government. Freedom.
Taluqdar In Bengal a small landed proprietor, usually inferior 
to a zamindar. In Oudh, however, the term is 
applied to members of the great landed aristocracy.
Thana A  police station, or the area under its authority.
Vaisnavism The worship of Vishnu, the second of the three 
principle deities of the Hindus.
Vakil An authorised public pleader in a court of justice.
Zamindar Under the Mughal administration in Bengal: an 
hereditary collector of Government revenues. Under 
the Eritish: an hereditary landholder.
CHAPTER I
THE BHADRALOK AED THE BRITISH
The Thesis
This thesis tells of the search by a culture group in a colonial 
society for a satisfying means of political self-expression. It 
traces the group’s attempt to find this in an institution provided by 
the imperial rulers. It is a tragic story for the search was unsuccess­
ful. The culture gToup with which it is concerned was a section of 
Bengali society in the India of the British, but the story has a 
universal significance for India and for the whole colonial world, which 
has been involved in this century in the same struggle for political 
self-expression. The institution with which it deals is the provincial 
Legislative Council and its story is part of the wider story of the 
introduction by the British of parliamentary institutions throughout 
their empire. The tragedy of the group's failure in its quest is a 
tragedy which lives on in India today in the frustration of the 
educated Bengali. ’To the memory of Bengal that was by one who has 
the misfortune to live in Bengal that is’. This dedication to a 
recent book of essays on nineteenth-century Bengal^ is a true reflection
_
R.C. Majumdar; Glimpses of Bengal in the Nineteenth Century.
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of the sadness in the hearts of Bengali intellectuals for a time that 
has gone and a land that is lost. This thesis offers an explanation 
of the causes of that despondency.
The argument of the work has been given in the precis which precedes 
the text and the reader is referred to this as his guide through the 
narrative. That narrative begins in 1912 with the reunification of 
Bengal, but as an introduction we must look briefly at the historical 
geography of Bengal; at the origins of the bhadralok, the culture 
group with which we are primarily concerned; at the British reception 
of their demands for political rights, and its corollary the partition 
of Bengal; and, finally, at the reforms of 1907-11*
Historical Geography
Bengal lies astride the tropic of Cancer. It has a monsoon&l
climate, with an adequate and reliable rainfall. Bounded in the south
by the Bay of Bengal and in the north by the Himalaya, it encompasses
the linked deltas of the great Ganges and Brahamaputra rivers - a
rich land of ’new mud, old mud, and marsh' in which paddy and other
agricultural crops thrive. With an area of 85,000 square miles
(slightly smaller than the United Kingdom) it had a population at the
2beginning of this century of 40 millions. Its people shared a common
1
O.H.K. Spates India and Pakistan, p. 524*
2
Census of India« 1911« vol. V, pt. i, pp. 150-2.
language, Bengali, but were divided into two major religious communities: 
Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus, who had a numerical majority in West 
Bengal, were in a slight overall minority to the Muslims (Hindus 1
4
millions, Muslims 21 millions), who were most numerous in the eastern 
districts.
It appears that this preponderance of Muslims in Eastern Bengal 
resulted from the isolation of that area during- the Hindu period of 
ancient Indian history. 'Whereas West Bengal was included in most of 
the great Hindu empires based on the Indo-Gangetic plain and was 
therefore in the main stream of the Hindu tradition, Eastern Bengal 
was isolated behind its immense river barriers and its people retained 
much of their primitive culture until the Muslims penetrated the region.
Muslim armies from the north-west first entered Bengal in the 
thirteenth century of the Christian era and for the following five 
hundred years the region had Islamic rulers. Pew of the princes 
reigning at Delhi had the power to control this distant and difficult 
land, and, until Bengal became a province of the Mughal empire in the 
sixteenth century, it was the sport of military adventurers who rode 
in at the head of an army across the easier rivers in Northern Bihar, 
established a kingdom for a time, and then retreated into the wilds 
of Eastern Bengal when a new and more powerful soldier appeared from 
the north.
1
Census of India, 1911» vol. V, pt. i, pp. 199 & 203*
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The Mughals put an end to this period of disorder and for the 
first time brought the whole of Bengal into a north Indian empire.
The peace which accompanied their rule facilitated travel and trade, 
and in the seventeenth century European companies established factories 
along the rivers of West Bengal to secure silk stuffs, indigo and fine 
cotton goods which were being produced in increasing quantities. For 
the first time in centuries Bengal was open to the influence of the 
cultural life of north-western India and at the same time through her 
ports she came into contact with the expanding maritime peoples of 
Europe. In exchange for goods the Europeans brought silver, which the 
Mughals minted to give their empire a monetary economy. This develop­
ment, combined with the expanding opportunities in trade and in the 
new Mughal administration, facilitated social mobility in Bengal. At 
the same time the Hindu religion in the area was transformed by the 
spread of Vaisnavism as a result of the teachings of Chaitanya 
(1486-1533) and there was a revival in Bengali Islam.
As the power of the Mughal emperors declined in the early 
eighteenth century under the dual pressures of Maratha and Afghan 
attack, Bengal shared the fate of the other outlying areas of the 
empire. Her governors set themselves up as autonomous rulers and then 
found that they lacked sufficient force to resist the ravages of the 
marauding Maratha and Afghan cavalrymen. By the middle of the
1
R.C. Majumdar & J. Sarkar eds.* The History of Bengal, vol. II, 
chpt. XII.
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eighteenth century they were faced with another threat: from the 
British and French who had graduated from trade to conquest.
The British and the Permanent Settlement
In 1757 at Plassey and 1764 at Buxar the army of the British East 
India Company inflicted convincing defeats on the troops of the Mughal 
Nawab of Bengal. British suzerainty over the area was recognised in 
1765 with the emperor's grant of the Diwani, the right to collect the 
land revenue. This financial gain was very welcome to the British 
but they were reluctant to undertake the burdensome tasks of organising 
the collection of the revenue and providing government for the region. 
It was seven years before they assumed direct control of Bengal and 
their main concern then was to reduce the complexity of the revenue 
system which they had inherited from the Mughals. After a number of 
unsuccessful experiments, it was decided in 1793 to fix the land 
revenue at a permanent sum and to recognise the Mughal tax farmers 
(the zamindars) as proprietors of the land with responsibility for 
revenue payment. The Permanent Settlement was of profound importance 
for it was the determining factor in the development of modern Bengali 
society. We must therefore look in some detail at its effects.
The British had hoped by this measure to relieve the Government 
of the burden of periodic resettlements of the revenue and of the 
staff required for its collection. They also hoped that the new 
arrangement would restore order to rural society which, to their eyes,
appeared to  be in  c h ao tic  d is a r ra y . The re c o g n itio n  of the  zamindars 
as p ro p r ie to r s  would su re ly  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  estab lish m en t o f a firm  
nexus between lan d h o ld er and te n a n t .  The B r i t i s h  r e a l is e d  th a t  fu tu re  
increm ents in  land  v a lu es  would b e n e f i t  th e  zamindars in s te a d  o f th e  
S ta te  bu t th ey  thought th a t  th i s  m argin o f p r o f i t  would encourage land  
improvement and th a t  the  S ta te  would g a in  in  th e  long  run  from a r i s e  
in  g en era l p ro s p e r i ty .
N early every ex p ec ta tio n  proved f a l s e .  C e r ta in ly  the  Permanent
S e ttlem en t lig h te n e d  the  a d m in is tra tiv e  lo ad  bu t the  absence of survey
and se ttle m e n t work, which in  o th e r  a re as  o f In d ia  gave employment to
a la rg e  cadre  o f sub o rd in a te  o f f ic e r s  and took them in to  the  h e a r t  o f
v i l la g e  l i f e ,  denied to  the  Bengal a d m in is tra tio n  an in tim a te  knowledge
2o f i t s  p rov ince  and severed i t s  c o n ta c ts  w ith  th e  people. Par from 
b rin g in g  an e r a  of s t a b i l i t y ,  th e  Permanent S e ttlem en t shook ru r a l  
s o c ie ty  to  i t s  ro o ts . Many a reas  had been h e a v ily  o v e r-a sse ssed  and, 
as a r e s u l t ,  in  the  f i r s t  20 y e a rs  alm ost h a l f  th e  o r ig in a l  zamindars 
were d isp o sse ssed  fo r  f a i lu r e  to  pay t h e i r  revenue dues prom ptly. The
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See S. Gopals The Permanent S ettlem en t in  Bengal and i t s  R e s u lts .
2
‘In  Bengal . . .  th e re  i s  no . . .  o rg a n iz a tio n  e f f e c t iv e ly  l in k in g  the  
D i s t r i c t  O ff ic e r  and th e  S u b -d iv is io n a l O ff ic e r  to  the  v i l la g e s  in  
t h e i r  charge. The only fu n c tio n a ry  in  th e  Bengal v i l la g e  i s  the  
v i l la g e  chowkidar who c a r r ie s  out p o lic e  d u t ie s .  He i s  poorly  p a id , 
u s u a lly  i l l i t e r a t e ,  and in  no way comparable w ith  the  v i l la g e  o f f ic e r s  
of the  ry o tw ari a reas  who a re  persons o f e s ta b lis h e d  s tan d in g  w ith  
c o n sid e ra b le  lo c a l  in f lu e n c e . ' (Report o f Famine Enquiry Commission, 
1945» quoted R.L. Park* The R ise o f M ili ta n t  N ationalism  in  B engal,
P. 7 0 .)
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pressure was eased as large areas of waste were brought under cultivation 
but by then many of the old landed families had been ruined and their 
places taken by nouveaux riches.
The raiyats also suffered. When the floodgates of change were 
opened most of their traditional privileges and occupancy rights were 
swept away in the deluge, and, with the increased demand for land in 
the nineteenth century, they were at the mercy of their landlords and 
moneylenders. The Government had to come to their rescue with a series 
of Tenancy Acts which were to occupy an important position in the 
subsequent legislative history of the province.
The hope of creating a firm relationship between proprietor and 
tenant was perhaps the saddest delusion of all. As the original 
zamindars fell into debt, they were forced to auction portions of their 
rents. At the same time British trade and British government were 
providing new means to acquire wealth and most of those who prospered 
invested in rents, for there were few other opportunities in a non­
industrial colonial society, and traditionally the possession of land 
carried status and security. The result was an extraordinary multip­
lication of intermediate estates between the zamindar and the actual 
cultivator. There is no more important factor in the history of Bengal 
than this process of subinfeudation. Economically its effect was to 
swallow that margin of profit which the advocates of a permanent 
settlement expected to be used for improving the land. Socially 
subinfeudation broke any personal bond between landlord and cultivator,
8
and was accompanied by a l l  the  e v i ls  o f  absen teeism . As a Bengal
I .C .S . o f f ic e r  remarked: ’Zamindari in  f a c t  has become more o f a
p ro fe s s io n  and le s s  of a p o s i t i o n .* For an a d m in is tra tio n  a lre ad y
out of touch  w ith  i t s  peop le , i t  heaped con fusion  upon co n fu s io n , fo r
i t  became im possib le  to  gauge th e  re a l  e f f e c t  of le g a l o r a d m in is tra tiv e  
2m easures. The Government was no t a lone in  i t s  p e rp le x ity . R eporting
on h is  se ttlem e n t work in  the  Bakarganj D i s t r i c t  a t  the  beg inn ing  of
th i s  c en tu ry , J.G . Jack  observed:
. . .  i t  was found th a t  th e  system was too  com plicated  fo r  th e  
people who liv e d  under i t .  Those who owned land  very  o f te n  
d id  not know what land  i t  was they  owned and those who c u l­
t iv a te d  very o f te n  d id  not know th e  t i t l e  o r e s ta te  o f t h e i r  
la n d lo rd s . The se ttlem e n t camps were indeed regarded  somewhat 
as lo s t  p ro p e rty  o f f ic e s .  Landlords came to  f in d  th e i r  lan d s  
and te n a n ts  came to  f in d  t h e i r  la n d lo rd s .
He was su re ly  j u s t i f i e d  in  d e sc r ib in g  t h i s  as ’th e  most amazing
c a r ic a tu re  o f an ordered system of land  ten u re  in  th e  w o rld .'
For th e  p o l i t i c a l  h i s to r ia n  the  most im portan t r e s u l t  o f th e
su b in feu d a tio n  was the  landed m id d le -c la ss  which i t  c re a te d . Given the
degree of frag m en ta tio n , i t  can re a d i ly  be a p p re c ia te d  th a t  t h i s  c la s s
became e x tr a o rd in a r i ly  la rg e .  By the  l a t e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  th e re
1
Quoted, N.K. Bose: "Social & C u ltu ra l L ife  o f C a lc u tta " , G eographical 
Review of In d ia , v o l. XX, Dec 1958» P* 4*
2
A s im ila r  d i f f i c u l ty  was experienced  in  I r e la n d  as a r e s u l t  of 
B r i t i s h  c o lo n is a tio n  in  th e  sev en teen th  cen tu ry . See S. S tra u s s :
I r i s h  R ationalism  and B r i t i s h  Democracy, pp. 9“ 10.
3
J .C . Jack : F in a l Report on the  Survey and S e ttlem en t O perations in  
the  Bakargan.j D is tr ic t«  1900-1908, pp. 43 & 58*
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were indeed  few m id d le -c la s s  f a m i l ie s  ( th e  fa m ily , no t th e  in d iv id u a l ,
•j
b e in g  th e  economic u n i t )  w ith o u t an  i n t e r e s t  i n  lan d ed  r e n t s .  The 
p ie  was b ig  enough f o r  many f in g e r s ,  b u t th e  more f in g e r s  th e r e  were 
th e  s m a lle r  th e  p ie c e s  becam e, and members o f  th e  m id d le -c la s s  had to  
tu r n  to  th e  le a rn e d  p r o f e s s io n s ,  to  c l e r i c a l  work and , l e s s  f r e q u e n t ly ,  
to  t r a d e  in  o rd e r  to  supplem ent t h e i r  incom e. In  B en g a l, how ever, 
th e r e  was never th e  dichotom y w hich e x is te d  i n  o th e r  p a r t s  o f  I n d ia  
betw een th e  la n d h o ld in g  c la s s e s  and th e  p ro fe s s io n a l  m id d le - c la s s ,  
f o r  th e  g r e a t  b u lk  o f  th e  Bengal m id d le -c la s s  were r e n t  r e c e iv e r s  and 
th e  c l a s s  as a whole n ev er ceased  to  re g a rd  i t s e l f  as ’lan d ed * . H ere 
i s  a s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  phenomenon o f  f i r s t  im p o rtan ce .
The S in h as  o f  R aipur
I n  o rd e r  to  g a in  an understand ing- o f  th e  developm ent and th e  n a tu re  
o f t h i s  c l a s s ,  we may fo llo w  th e  f o r tu n e s  o f  f iv e  g e n e ra tio n s  o f  one 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  though d is t in g u is h e d ,  fa m ily : th e  S in h as  o f  R a ip u r.
R a ip u r i s  a v i l l a g e  in  -Vest Bengal on th e  Ajay R iv e r  c lo s e  to  th e  
p re s e n t  u n iv e r s i ty  o f V isv a -B h a ra ti a t  S a n t in ik e ta n .  The A jay , now 
a modest s tre a m , was once n a v ig a b le  to  s e a -g o in g  v e s s e ls  and i t s  banks 
were l in e d  w ith  p ro sp e ro u s  t r a d in g  and r e l i g i o u s  c e n t r e s .  A ttr a c te d  
by t h i s  a c t i v i t y ,  L alchand  S in h a , by c a s te  a K ay as th a , m ig ra ted  from 
h is  n a t iv e  v i l l a g e  o f Chandrakona in  th e  D i s t r i c t  o f  M idnapore,
1
B.B. M isra : The In d ia n  K id d le  G la s s e s , pp. 276-7» R eport of th e  
Land Revenue Commission, B en g a l, 1940< v o l .  I ,  pp. 36-7*
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accompanied, (so the legend goes) by a thousand weavers. His son,
Shyamkishore, amassed a fortune as an East India Company agent, 
supplying textiles for export to Europe. He became the creditor of 
the ruling Muslim family of the District, whose fortunes, like so 
many of the great landed families of the time, were declining' rapidly.
To meet their debts they were forced to transfer their zamindari to 
Shyamkishore and thus the Sinhas became landholders.
Shyamkishore had four sons, the eldest taking charge of the 
zamindari while the third managed his father’s office. The youngest, 
Manomohan, was fond of music and literature and devoted most of his 
time to these arts. One of his four sons, Sitikantha, however, had a 
commercial bent. In the early nineteenth century a number of silk and 
indigo factories had been established in the area by enterprising 
Englishmen, and in about 1840 Sitikantha went into partnership with a 
Henry Erskine who owned an indigo factory near the family zamindari 
at Raipur. Following in the footsteps of his grandfather and father, 
Sitikantha became a considerable Persian scholar but he broke new 
ground by learning English as well. He had his sons, Narendra and 
Satyendra, educated at the local Anglo-vernacular school and then at 
Presidency College, Calcutta. With the help of his partner, Erskine, 
he arranged for them to go to England and there Satyendra, in particular, 
distinguished himself. He was called to the Bar in 1886 and returned 
to Calcutta to establish himself as one of India's leading barristers.
In 1903 he was appointed as Standing-Counsel to the Government of
11
B engal and l a t e r  as p ro v in c ia l  A d v o ca te -G en era l. From t h a t  p o in t h is  
c a r e e r  was a s u c c e s s io n  o f  triu m p h s: f i r s t  In d ia n  member o f  th e  
G o v ern o r-G en era l’ s E x ecu tiv e  C o u n c il; member o f  th e  Im p e ria l War 
C onference; B r i t i s h  P a r lia m e n ta ry  U n d e r-S e c re ta ry  f o r  In d ia ;  f i r s t  
and on ly  In d ia n  member o f  th e  B r i t i s h  House o f  L ords; and f i n a l l y  
L ieu te n a n t-G o v e rn o r o f  B ih a r  and O r is s a .
The house o f th e  S in h as  a t  R a ip u r i s  in  r u in s .  Most members o f 
th e  fa m ily  a re  now to  be found in  th e  le a rn e d  p ro fe s s io n s  i n  C a lc u tta  
and o th e r  c i t i e s  o f n o r th e rn  I n d ia ,  f o r  th e  r i v e r s  o f  West Bengal have 
d r ie d  up and w ith  them has gone th e  p r o s p e r i ty  o f th e  c o u n try s id e .
The s to r y  o f th e  S in h as  i s  th e  s to r y  o f th e  Bengal landed  and 
p ro fe s s io n a l  m id d le -c la s s .  L a rg e ly  as  a r e s u l t  o f  th o se  l i b e r a l i s i n g  
in f lu e n c e s  o f  th e  Mughal p e r io d  w hich we have a lre a d y  n o te d , members 
o f  th e  e d u ca ted  h ig h -c a s te s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  Brahmins -  p r i e s t s ;  
th e  B aidyas -  p h y s ic ia n s ; and th e  K hyasthas -  w r i te r s  and a c c o u n ta n ts )  
were p re p a re d  to  seek  advancem ent o u ts id e  t h e i r  h e r e d i ta r y  p ro fe s s io n s  
and were th u s  a b le  to  ta k e  advan tage  o f  th e  new o p p o r tu n i t ie s  fo r  
t r a d e  and s e rv ic e  w ith  th e  adven t o f th e  B r i t i s h  E a s t In d ia  Company. 
They p ro sp e re d  as  th e  lan d ed  a r i s to c r a c y  d e c l in e d  and hence were 
a b le  to  g a in  a sh a re  in  la n d . With each  g e n e ra t io n  th e  demands upon 
th e  fa m ily  b u s in e s s  and th e  fa m ily  zam indari became g r e a t e r  -  th e
_
The s to r y  o f  th e  S inhas i s  to ld  by N.K. Bose in  h is  s t im u la t in g  
e ssa y s  on Modern B en g a l, pp. 20-3.
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four sons of Shyamkishore were followed by the 15 grandsons - and the 
young men had to look elsewhere for a livelihood. British trade had 
provided the grandfather’s chance; British government was to provide 
theirs. As the Imperial armies marched triumphantly westward through 
northern India they were followed by administrators and judges.
Indian assistants and clerks were needed. As courts, hospitals and 
schools were established there were openings for lawyers, doctors and 
teachers. The Bengali middle-class was quick to grasp these opportunities. 
The road from Raipur and from the thousands of other villages throughout 
Bengal ran to all parts of India.
To set foot on that road, however, the young Bengali had first to 
learn English and, if he wished to go far, he had to have an advanced 
English-language education. Lai Behari Bey, recalling- his father’s 
reasons for taking him from their village in Burdwan in 1834 to find 
a place in a Calcutta school, wrote: 'A knowledge of English education, 
he said, was necessary to enable a man to earn a competence in life.
People ignorant of English no doubt got berths, but berths to which 
only paltry salaries were attached. He felt his want of English 
every day, and was therefore resolved to remedy that defect in the 
education of his son.’ There were many fathers in Bengal equally 
ambitious for their sons, and English-language schools sprang up like
1
Quoted, B.T. McCully: English Education and the Origins of Indian 
Nationalism, p. 44» McCully pp. 20-166 is also the source for what 
follows.
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mushrooms, f i r s t  in  C a lcu tta  and then  in  every D is t r i c t  o f the  p rov ince . 
The General Committee o f P ub lic  I n s t r u c t io n ,  which had been e s ta b lis h e d  
in  1823 and which had g iven  Bengal a head s t a r t  in  th e  ed u ca tio n a l 
ra c e , found no d i f f i c u l ty  in  o b ta in in g  f in a n c ia l  support fo r  schools 
in  th e  m o fu ss il. Many in s t i t u t i o n s  were a lso  p r iv a te ly  endowed. This 
eager response  from the  landed and p ro fe s s io n a l c la s s e s  was in  marked 
c o n tra s t  to  what occurred  in  th e  o th e r  p rov inces of n o rth e rn  In d ia , 
f o r  th e re  th e  la n d h o ld e rs , in  p a r t i c u la r ,  s e t  no s to re  by E n g lish - 
language ed u ca tio n  as they  were not a t t r a c t e d  to  th e  occupations to  
which i t  gave adm ittance. The f i e l d  was l e f t  c le a r  fo r  th e  B en g a lis .
The D i s t r i c t  school gave a grounding b u t fo r  h ig h e r ed u ca tio n  i t  
was to  C a lc u tta  th a t  th e  young man must go. The famous Hindu College 
opened in  1816 was the  fo re ru n n e r of dozens of C a lcu tta  c o lle g e s  founded 
in  th e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  and th e re  were always more can d id a te s  crowding 
to  t h e i r  doors th an  th e re  were p lace s  a v a ila b le . With th e  fo u n dation  
o f th e  U n iv e rs ity  in  C a lcu tta  in  1857> p ro v is io n  was made fo r  
a f f i l i a t e d  c o lle g e s  o u ts id e  th e  c i ty  b u t r e l a t iv e ly  few were e s ta b lis h e d . 
In  e d u ca tio n , as in  p o l i t i c s ,  law , commerce and s o c ia l  in te rc o u rs e , 
C a lc u tta  was a g re a t magnet to  which a l l  Bengal was drawn. Vle must 
pause to  c o n sid e r t h i s  phenomenon fo r  i t  has profoundly  in flu en ced  
B engali so c ie ty  and p o l i t i c s .
The M etropo lis
The le ad in g  c i t i e s  of Bengal in  Mughal tim es were Murshidabad 
and Dacca, p o l i t i c a l  and commercial o u tp o s ts  o f a land  em pire. The
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B r i t i s h  came by sea to  tra d e  and they  b u i l t  a p o rt on th e  Hooghly to  
g ive them access to  th e  re so u rce s  of th e  h in te r la n d . They stayed  to  
ru le  and C a lc u tta  became th e  c a p i ta l  o f th e i r  In d ian  em pire.
Mushidabad and Dacca had lo s t  t h e i r  ra iso n  d ’e t r e  and they  dwindled 
to  th e  in s ig n if ic a n c e  of D is t r i c t  towns, w hile C a lcu tta  became a 
co lo ssu s  second in  th e  B r i t i s h  Empire only to  London. Bengal and 
the  p rov inces f la n k in g  i t  o ffe re d  th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  p rospect o f a 
f e r t i l e  and densely  populated  t e r r i t o r y  more than  250,000 m iles  square 
w ith  only one major c i ty .
The economic reason  i s  obvious enough. Once the Bengal t e x t i l e  
in d u s try , which f lo u r ish e d  under th e  Mughals, had been ru in ed  by 
u n r e s t r ic te d  co m petition  from the  power looms o f Europe, no in d u s t r ia l  
c e n tre s  rem ained o u ts id e  th e  c a p i t a l .  The B r i t i s h  i n i t i a l l y  wanted 
produce fo r  exports  f i r s t  t e x t i l e s ,  th en  in d ig o , opium, te a ,  ju te  
and m in e ra ls , and they  saw to  i t  th a t  c an a ls  and ra ilw ay s were con­
s tru c te d  to  draw th e se  goods to  C a lc u tta . When i t  became convenient 
to  p rocess some a r t i c l e s  in  In d ia ,  C a lc u tta  was th e  obvious p lace  fo r  
th e re  the raw m a te r ia ls  and th e  fu e l could  most e a s i ly  be brought 
to g e th e r .^
But why, i t  may w ell be asked , d id  co n sid e rab le  c i t i e s  no t sp rin g  
up a t  th e  D iv is io n a l a d m in is tra tiv e  h ead q u a rte rs?  Why was th e re  such
1
The 1911 census rev ea led  th a t  41$ of B engal’ s urban  p o p u la tio n  was 
in  C a lc u tta . ( Census o f In d ia , 1911» v o l. I ,  p. 31.)
2
O.H.K. S p a te : In d ia  and P a k is ta n , pp. 282-3»
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a c o n tra s t  w ith  the  U nited Prov inces which could b o ast h a lf-a -d o z e n
c i t i e s  of th i s  kind? One answ er, i t  seems, was th e  n a tu re  of th e
Bengal A d m in is tra tio n : i t  was e x tr a o rd in a r i ly  c e n tr a l i s e d ,  w ith  an
overgrown s e c r e ta r i a t  in  C a lcu tta  in s t r u c t in g  th e  D is t r i c t  o f f ic e r s
on t h e i r  everyday d u t ie s .  The Permanent S e ttlem en t made unnecessary
th e  army of c le rk s  and accoun tan ts  which was employed a t  th e  D iv is io n a l
and D is t r i c t  h ead q u arte rs  of th e  n o n -re g u la tio n  prov inces to  keep
tra c k  of the revenue s e tt le m e n t. M oreover, those  B engalis who d id  g a in
a p ost a t a m ofussil h ead q u arte rs  r a r e ly  took  th e i r  fa m ilie s  w ith  them,
p referring - to  leav e  them in  th e  a n c e s tra l  v i l la g e  to  which they  would
2them selves r e tu rn  fo r  ho lid ay s  and in  t h e i r  y ea rs  of re tire m e n t.
T h is , in c id e n ta l ly ,  ex p la in s  b o th  the  demand fo r  lo c a l elem entary  
schoo ls and, in  p a r t ,  th e  absence o f s iz e a b le  towns o u ts id e  C a lcu tta  
which might support u n iv e r s i ty  c o lle g e s .
C a lc u t ta 's  a t t r a c t io n  can be re a d i ly  understood . Here was th e  
locus o f commercial and p o l i t i c a l  power fo r  the  whole of n o rth e rn  
In d ia . In  C a lcu tta  fo r tu n es  were to  be won or l o s t .  This was th e  
foun ta inhead  of pa tro n ag e , whence flowed c o n tr a c ts ,  appoin tm ents, honours 
and the  lo c a l  concessions which could  make a man g re a t in  h is  d i s t r i c t .  
The law c o u rts  of C a lcu tta  e x e rc ise d  s u p e r io r  ju r i s d ic t io n  over th e  
whole o f n o rth e rn  In d ia  and i t s  co u n c ils  l e g i s la te d  fo r  a l l  th e
7
C a r s ta i r s ,  pp. 309“ 18 • J* Beames: Memoirs of a Bengal C iv i l ia n , 
pp. 128-34*
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Empire. Calcutta was the centre of social life and of fashion for here 
was a court - the court of the Viceroy. British planters and traders, 
great zamindars and wealthy middle-class professional men, merchants 
and lawyers flocked to the city 'to he at the heart of politics'
(as Professor Neale wrote of Elizabethan London) 'and listen to famous 
men speaking in the House; to gather news from all quarters of the
kingdom and the world. Such a one stood a tip-toe among his neighbours
1on his return home.'
For the idle and the curious Calcutta presented fascinating- 
glimpses of a strange and powerful civilisation half a world away, but 
for the intellectual and the seeker-after-knowledge it had something 
far more exciting and challenging to offer. A door had been thrown 
open through which came men bearing- a vital new culture, as disturbing 
as it was attractive. If you joined the crowd clustered around that 
doorway, you could hear startling ideas on the rights and duties of 
man; on the organisation of society; on the attributes of god; and 
you could meet men who were glad to talk of these things and willing to 
teach.^
The three Presidency cities - Calcutta, Madras and Bombay - were 
all points of early and intensive culture contact, but it was the 
Bengali middle-class above all others who grasped the new ideas most
1
J.E. Nealej The Elizabethan House of Commons, p. 150.
2
It was no coincidence that in 1911 Calcutta had 25,0 of all Bengal's 
literates in English. (Census of India, 1911  ^ vol. V, pt. i, p. 361.)
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enthusiastically and who exerted themselves to produce a synthesis.
Prom the schools and colleges of Calcutta came a small but growing 
group of intellectuals who, whether attracted or repelled by European 
values, felt a compulsion to reexamine the philosophic basis of their 
society. An intellectual ferment spread through educated Bengal*
English studies flourished; Bengali was refashioned as a rich literary 
language; the rational philosophy of the West was weighed against 
Indian traditionalism; under the influence of Christianity and often 
in protest against it reform movements were attempted in Hinduism.
From the second quarter of the nineteenth century the small English- 
speaking elite in Calcutta was afire with a revival of learning.
One important aspect of this new learning was a growth of historical 
consciousness. This is directly attributable to contact with the 
historicism of European culture for such historicism was absent from 
the Hindu tradition. The Bengali intellectual in search of a new 
identity turned to the past of his people and tried to construct a 
history which ha might set against that of Europe. The manner of 
approach was important for, going with the European example in mind, 
the enquirer looked particularly at political activity and even for 
the concept of nationalism. Moreover his quest was as much a reaction 
against the richness of European history as it was a response to it 
and so he was determined to discover an Indian past, or if necessary
_
See A. Gupta ed.: Studies in the Bengal Renaissance.
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to  c r e a te  th e  myth o f  such  a p a s t , which m ight compare w ith  t h a t  o f  
E urope. T here were s ig n i f i c a n t  consequences from b o th  th e  re sp o n se  
and th e  r e a c t io n .  Prom th e  a c q u a in ta n c e  w ith  European h i s to r y  flow ed 
a s tream  o f  p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g  and p o l i t i c a l  a s p i r a t io n  w hich grew to  
f u l l  s p a te  in  th e  s e c u la r  n a t io n a lis m  o f th e  In d ia n  N a tio n a l C ongress. 
The r e a c t io n ,  on th e  o th e r  hand , b ro u g h t a h e ig h ten ed  aw areness o f  
th e  Hindu i d e n t i t y ,  and , when r e in fo rc e d  by movements f o r  r e l i g io u s  
re fo rm , was a m a tr ix  o f  Hindu re v iv a lis m .
What m ust be em phasised (and t h i s  i s  a p o in t which i s  f r e q u e n t ly  
o v e rlo o k ed ) i s  th a t  th e  s e a rc h  f o r  a Hindu p a s t  was as much th e  outcome 
o f  th e  new le a r n in g  as was th e  grow th  o f p o l i t i c a l  aw areness and 
s e c u la r  n a t io n a lis m . The h i s t o r i c a l  c o n sc io u sn e ss  which u n d e r la y  b o th  
was p a r t  o f  th e  new s y n th e t ic  c u l tu r e .  The p r a c t i c a l  im portance  o f  
t h i s  i s  t h a t  th e  E n g lish -e d u c a te d  B en g a li co u ld  draw i n s p i r a t i o n  from 
b o th  s tre a m s; and he cou ld  move from  one s tream  to  th e  o th e r  w ith o u t 
a s e r io u s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  w rench. The h i s to r y  o f B en g a li p o l i t i c s  and
1
'T h e re  i s  no Hindu h i s to r y .  Vifho w i l l  p r a is e  ou r nob le  q u a l i t i e s  i f  
we do n o t p r a i s e  them o u rs e lv e s ?  I t  i s  a r u l e  o f  l i f e  th a t  a man who 
does no t l e t  i t  be known th a t  he i s  g r e a t  i s  co n s id e re d  o f  no acco u n t 
by h is  f e l lo w s .  When has th e  g lo ry  o f  any n a t io n  ev e r been p ro cla im ed  
by a n o th e r  n a t io n ?  The p ro o f of th e  w a rlik e  prow ess o f  th e  Romans i s  
to  be found in  Roman h i s t o r i e s .  The s to r y  o f  th e  hero ism  o f  th e  
Greeks i s  c o n ta in e d  in  G reek w r i t in g s .  The case  f o r  Mussulman v a lo u r  
in  b a t t l e  r e s t s  o n ly  on t h e i r  own re c o rd s .  The Hindus have no such  
g lo r io u s  q u a l i t i e s  s im ply  because  th e r e  i s  no w r i t t e n  e v id e n c e . ' 
(Bankim Chandra C h a t te r je a ,  q u o te d , T.W. C la rk : "The Role o f 
Bankim candra i n  th e  Bevelopm ent o f  N a tio n a lism " , H is to r ia n s  o f I n d ia ,  
P a k is ta n  and C eylon , (e d . C.H. P h i l i p s ) ,  p. 4 3 6 .)
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literature (these two activities were closely related) in the second 
half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries 
reveals many examples of such easy transition; examples which would 
he inexplicable had the Hindu revival been rooted in traditionalism."'
The importance of this will be evident when we discuss the relationship 
of terrorism and constitutional nationalism.
The Bhadralok
It will have been observed that all references have been to 
Hinduism and this underlines the exclusiveness of the new learning. It 
was the product of one section of Bengali society and it became both a 
bond of unity and the distinguishing characteristic of a self-conscious 
culture group: the bhadralok - ’the respectable people', as they called 
themselves.
The reader has already been given clues as to the origins of the 
bhadralok: they were that landed and professional middle-class, drawn 
chiefly from the three upper-castes of Bengal Hinduism which, under 
the impetus of the European contact, had moved so rapidly and so far 
from their traditional ways. We have observed that this class at its 
upper levels merged with the larger landholders. Except for those 
few families, such as the Burdwan ra.j, descended from the princely 
Rajputs, and the aristocratic remnants of Muslim rule like the
1
For information on the growth of historical consciousness I am indebted 
to Warren M. Gunderson, University of Chicago.
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M urshidabad Jifawabs, i t  was e x t r a o r d in a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  to  d i s t i n g u is h  
la n d h o ld e rs  p u re -an d -s im p le  from th e  b h a d ra lo k . At th e  o th e r  end o f 
th e  s c a le ,  how ever, th e  d iv id ing - l i n e  was c l e a r l y  marked. The c r i t e r i o n  
was no t w ea lth  -  many b h a d ra lo k  were d e s p e r a te ly  poor -  i t  was c a s te  
and c u l tu r e .^
For many c e n tu r ie s  th e re  ap p ea rs  to  have been  an u n u su a lly  la rg e
gap betw een th e  h ig h  and low c a s te s  i n  B en g a l, f o r  th e re  were few of
th e  r e s p e c ta b le  in te rm e d ia te  c a s te s  w hich e x is te d  in  o th e r  a re a s  to
a c t  as a b r id g e .  U nlike th e  h ig h  c a s te s  o f some p a r t s  o f I n d ia ,  th o se
o f Bengal d id  no t t i l l  th e  s o i l .  I f  th e y  were engaged in  a g r ic u l tu r e
th e y  employed o th e rs  to  work t h e i r  f i e l d s ,  f o r  manual la b o u r  was
2
co n s id e re d  d eg rad in g .
Amongst th e  H indus /w ro te  J .C . Jack7  . . .  lan d o w n ers , c l e r k s ,  
p ro f e s s io n a l  men such  as d o c to r s ,  la w y e rs  and p r i e s t s ,  form a 
c l a s s  a p a r t .  They a re  o f  th e  th r e e  h ig h e r  c a s te s  in  th e  Hindu 
c a s te  system  and have f o r  c e n tu r ie s  l iv e d  in  a d i f f e r e n t  
manner from th e  o rd in a ry  p o p u la tio n . They have more w ants and 
more ways o f  spend ing  t h e i r  money; th e y  e a t  l e s s  b u t b e t t e r  
food w ith  g r e a te r  v a r ie ty ;  t h e i r  houses a re  b u i l t  on a d i f f e r e n t  
p la n  and a re  b e t t e r  fu rn is h e d ; t h e i r  c lo th e s  a lth o u g h  th e  same 
in  c u t d is p la y  more v a r i e ty  in  q u a l i ty  and colour.^
W ith th e  g re a t  s o c ia l  changes o f th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  c a s te
b a r r i e r s  became l e s s  fo rm id ab le  and i t  was p o s s ib le  in  Bengal f o r  a man
1
F or a d is c u s s io n  o f where th e  b h a d ra lo k  drew th e  l i n e  betw een th e  
’r e s p e c ta b le  p e o p le ’ and th e  o th e rs  see  N.C. C haudhuri: The A utobiography 
o f an Unknown I n d ia n , pp. 30-40*
2
C a r s t a i r s ,  p. 88. Bengal D i s t r i c t  A d m in is tra tio n  Com m ittee, 1913—
1914, H e p o rt, pp.
J .C . Jacks The Economic L i f e  o f  a Bengal D i s t r i c t , p. 6 9 *
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o f low c a s te  to  r i s e  provided he had th e  r ig h t  educa tion . As a Government
committee once remarked: ’We must remember th a t  in  Bengal th e  s o c ia l
1
o rd e r i s  a despotism  of c a s te ,  tempered by m a tr ic u la t io n '.  To o b ta in  
th e  n ecessary  edu ca tio n  was not easy , however, because of th e  ed u ca tio n a l 
p o licy  which th e  B r i t i s h  ap p lied  in  Bengal from the  e a r ly  n in e te e n th  
cen tu ry . This was the  p r in c ip le  o f th e  downward f i l t r a t i o n  o f knowledge. 
I t s  a p p lic a t io n  was d esc rib ed  by th e  General Committee o f P u b lic  
I n s t r u c t io n  as fo llow s:
. . .  our e f f o r t s  should be a t  f i r s t  co n cen tra ted  to  the  c h ie f  
towns and Sudder S ta tio n s  of d i s t r i c t s ,  and to  the  improvement 
o f edu ca tio n  among the  h ig h e r and m idd ling  c la s s e s  o f th e  
p o p u la tio n ; in  th e  e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  th rough  the  agency o f th e se  
sch o la rs  an ed u ca tio n a l reform  w ill  descend to  the ru r a l  
v e rn a c u la r  sch o o ls , and i t s  b e n e f i ts  be ra p id ly  tra n s fu se d  
among a l l  those excluded in  the  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  by a b je c t 
want from p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  i t s  advantages.^
As we have seen , th e  i n i t i a l  s tag e  o f the  scheme was a s t a r t l i n g  su cc e ss ,
and i t  was the  bhadra lok  who b e n e f i te d , but th e  f i l t r a t i o n  downwards
d id  not tak e  p lace . E n g lish  ed u ca tio n  became a je a lo u sly -g u ard ed
bhadra lok  p o ssess io n . I t  took  the  Government a long  w hile to  rec o g n ise
i t s  e r ro r  and the  e f f o r t s  which i t  then  made to  encourage mass ed u ca tio n
met w ith  vehement o p p o s itio n  from th e  educated men. T heir lo g ic  was
c le a r  enough: why educate r iv a ls ? ^  W ithout mass ed u ca tio n , th e  mass
1
Bengal D is t r i c t  A d m in is tra tio n  Committee, 1913-—1914» R eo o rt, p. 176.
2
B.T. McCully: E ng lish  Education  and th e  O rig in s  o f In d ian  N a tio n a lism , 
p. 76.
3
I b id ,  pp. 193-4 & 229-31
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could not rise. A few could struggle over the harriers which had been 
erected against them, but not many.
It was this need for an English-language education which kept most 
Muslims out of the middle-class. The overwhelming majority of the 
Muslim community in Bengal were cultivators, scarcely distinguishable 
in their ways of life from lower-caste Hindus, and regarded no more 
favourably by the upper castes nor enjoying any better chance of gaining 
an education. Of the Muslim landholders, who had enjoyed great wealth 
and power under Mughal rule, few survived the difficult years following 
the Permanent Settlement. The significant factor, however, was the 
reaction of educated Muslims to the new learning. Unlike their Hindu 
counterparts, they were not attracted to English-language education.
They clung tenaciously to their traditional studies in Persian and 
Arabic. Many, no doubt, were at first unconvinced that Persian could 
be replaced by English as the language of administration but, even 
when the hard fact could no longer be disputed, they were reluctant 
to forsake the learning which was so intimately associated with both 
their religion and their past temporal glory. For the Muslims, as a 
dispossessed ruling race, English culture was a much more bitter pill 
to swallow than it was for the twice-conquered Hindus.
This initial inability to adapt severely handicapped the Muslims 
and they found themselves outdistanced by the Hindus in every profitable
_
J. G. Jacks The Economic Life of a Bengal District, chpt. I.
endeavour. In  the  p ro fe s s io n s , in  Government and p r iv a te  s e rv ic e , 
in  t r a d e ,  commerce and in d u s try , and even in  landholding ' the  Muslims 
were fo rced  in to  a secondary p o s i t io n . C a lc u tta , th e  c e n tre  o f  power, 
became an overwhelmingly Hindu c i t y ,  and even Dacca -  ’c i ty  o f mosques* -  
in  th e  h e a r t  o f  one o f the  most den se ly  populated  Muslim a reas  in  the  
w orld , had a dominant Hindu m a jo r ity .
There was one im portan t and, a t  f i r s t  s ig h t ,  ap p aren tly  anomalous 
c h a r a c te r i s t i c  o f bhadralok  a t t i tu d e s  which r e s u l te d ,  in  p a r t ,  from the  
dominance which they h e ld . This was t h e i r  la c k  of emphasis upon c a s te . 
W ithin th e  m id d le -c la ss  as a group, c a s te  d if f e re n c e s  had r e l a t i v e ly  
l i t t l e  im portance. There was n ev er, fo r  example, th a t  antagonism  which 
e x is te d  in  Madras between Brahmins and h ig h -c a s te  non-Brahm ins. Nor 
was th e re  in  Bengal th e  same e x p l ic i t  h o s t i l i t y  between h igh  c a s te s  
and low c a s te s ,  a lthough , as we have a lre ad y  shown, they  were sh arp ly  
d iv id e d . This may be a t t r ib u te d  in  some degree to  the  acceptance by 
th e  b h ad ra lok  of European s o c ia l  va lu es  bu t th a t  i s  not in  i t s e l f  a 
s u f f ic ie n t  ex p lan a tio n . More im portan t was the  d i s t in c t iv e  and 
proudly  ch erish ed  bhadralok  c u l tu re  which, as a common p o sse ss io n , 
subsumed d if fe re n c e s  o f c a s te  and occupation  w ith in  the  group, and which 
gave the  bhadra lok  a sense o f co rp o ra te  u n ity  in  i t s  r e la t io n s  w ith  
o th e r  s e c t io n s  of s o c ie ty . As a r e s u l t  they  thought o f them selves as 
a s in g le  s ta tu s  group r a th e r  th an  as a c o l le c t io n  of c a s te s .  T h e ir
1
See Census o f In d ia , 1911» v o l. V, p t .  i ,  p. 551*
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use o f th e  terra bhadra lok  i s  in  i t s e l f  evidence o f t h i s .  This 
d i s t in c t iv e n e s s ,  when combined w ith  t h e i r  d is ta n c e  from the  low er o rd ers  
and t h e i r  dominance over those  o rd e rs , gave them a sense of s e c u r i ty  
which enabled them to  fo rg e t (o r  a t  l e a s t  to  appear to  fo rg e t)  th e  
c a s te  fo u n d a tio n  on which t h e i r  p o s i t io n  re s te d .  Once l e t  a ch a llen g e
1
to  th a t  dominance appear, however, and caste ism  would r e a s s e r t  i t s e l f .  
The B hadralok and P o l i t i c s
L et us t r y  to  b r in g  to g e th e r  th e se  v a rio u s  a sp ec ts  to  g ive  us a 
com posite p ic tu re  o f the  bhad ra lok  in ,  s h a l l  we say , 1880. By an 
i n i t i a l  adven ture  in to  t r a d e ,  th e  group had secured money to  in v e s t  in  
land  and by making th e  most o f i t s  ed u ca tio n a l o p p o rtu n itie s  i t  had 
gained  a commanding p o s i t io n  in  government s e rv ic e  and the  le a rn ed  
p ro fe s s io n s . With th e  improvement o f i t s  economic p o s i t io n  and i t s  
s o c ia l  s t a t u s ,  i t  had transm uted i t s  achievem ent in to  a code o f s o c ia l  
p ro p r ie ty . The ’re sp e c ta b le  p eo p le ' d id  not indu lge in  manual labou r 
and they  no lo n g e r engaged in  tr a d e . They should have a p o r tio n  of 
landed r e n t s ,  an E ng lish -language ed u ca tio n , and th e i r  am bition  should 
be a p ro fe s s io n a l post in  C a lc u tta .
1
Every w itn ess  b e fo re  th e  p a rliam en ta ry  J o in t  S e le c t Committee in  
1919 could a s s e r t  w ith  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  th a t  c a s te  played l i t t l e  p a r t  
in  B engali p o l i t i c s .  (PP, 1919» (203)» v o l. IV .) Yet w ith in  a 
decade, as a r e s u l t  of Muslim and lo w -caste  Hindu a s s e r t iv e n e s s ,
B engali h ig h -c a s te  men were le a d e rs  o f th e  Hindu Mahasabha.
The hhadralok were no more than five per cent of the total
1population of Bengal. They were a proud, exclusive little group 
which derived its sense of community and separateness from its dis­
tinctive culture. In the development of that culture, Calcutta had 
played a vital role, for it was there that the hhadralok intellectuals 
had been brought into contact with European philosophy and history, 
and it v;as there that they had evolved a synthesis. Yet the culture 
they produced had not remained an exclusively urban phenomenon, for 
the hhadralok had their roots deep in the soil of rural Bengal and the 
man who went to the city customarily returned to his village to share 
his experiences with his community. Thus their culture was a common 
bond for the hhadralok, whether rural or urban, and it provided them 
with a bridge between their two worlds: Calcutta and the mofussil.
The hhadralok were proud but they were not self-assured. They 
were a new group with a young' culture and they were still establishing 
their identity. Their chief means of self-expression were literature 
and politics, and in both of these activities they manifested their 
lack of self-confidence. It was most marked in their ambivalence 
towards Europeans - an ambivalence which was the result of their 
cultural debt to Europe and their colonial situation. At one and the 
same time they desired to reject Europeans and things European, and
1
The author's estimate based on the population figures of Brahmans, 
Baidyas and Kayasthas at the census. (Census of India, 1911»
vol. V, pt. i, p. 521.)
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yet desperately needed European recognition of their achievements.
For instance, the father of Bengali prose, Bankim Chandra Chatterjea, 
stirred his bhadralok readers with his dramatised appeals for a 
reappraisal of their Hindu heritage. Yet those same readers delighted 
in the praise which Bankim Chandra’s works drew from the British and 
it was their proudest boast that Bengali had, as a consequence, been 
described as a literary medium fit to be compared with English.
In politics the effect of this ambivalence - this love-hate 
relationship - was to make possible violent swings in attitudes, even 
within a single individual, from a ready acceptance of British political 
forms and a willingness to work with the British, to an out-and-out 
repudiation of the British contact.
In the 1880s the bhadralok as a group were eager to have a share 
in the administration of British India and to acquire British political 
institutions. A visiting Russian observer remarked in 1885: 'young 
reformers of India believe, just as their comrades-at-arms in Europe 
do, that the salvation and success lie in the acquisition of political 
rights. Grant a man his rights and everything thereafter will go on 
excellently well.' The reference to 'their comrades-at-arms in Europe' 
is significant for at this time the bhadralok consciously looked to 
Europe for models for their political action. They were attracted 
particularly by the story of the Risorgimento and Mazzini's passionate
I.P. Minayeff: Travels in and Diaries of India and Burma, p. 111.
1
te ac h in g s  on p a tr io t is m  provided th e i r  le a d e rs  w ith  an example. 'Upon 
my mind the  w r it in g s  of M azzini had c re a te d  a profound im p re ss io n ,' 
w rote S urendranath  B anerjea , th e  f i r s t  o f th e  g re a t bhadralok  p o l i t i c a l  
f ig u r e s .
I t  was M azzin i, the  in c a rn a tio n  of th e  h ig h e s t moral fo rc e s  in  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  arena -  M azzin i, th e  a p o s tle  o f I t a l i a n  u n i ty ,  
th e  f r ie n d  o f th e  human ra c e , th a t  I  p resen ted  to  th e  youth  of 
B engal. M azzini had tau g h t I t a l i a n  u n ity . We wanted In d ian  
u n i ty .  M azzini had worked th rough the young. I  wanted the  
young men o f Bengal to  r e a l iz e  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  and to  
q u a lify  them selves to  work fo r  th e  s a lv a t io n  of t h e i r  countxy. 
bu t upon l in e s  in s t in c t  w ith  th e  s p i r i t  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l i s m . '
A movement fo r  n a tio n a l u n ity  would be th e  v e h ic le  o f bhadralok
s e lf -e x p re s s io n  -  'th e  young men' would 'r e a l i z e  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ’ .
This phrase i s  c r u c ia l .  So too  i s  B a n e r je a 's  concluding  phrase: 'b u t
upon l in e s  i n s t i n c t  w ith  the  s p i r i t  of c o n s t i tu t io n a l is m '.  This
r e f l e c t s  th e  o th e r  g re a t in flu en ce  upon bhadra lok  p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g :
th e  B r i t i s h  Whig t r a d i t io n .  S teeped in  th e  w ritin g s  o f Burke, M acaulay,
James M ill and John S tu a r t M ill ,  th e  bhad ra lok  of B a n e rje a 's  g e n e ra tio n
firm ly  b e lie v e d  th a t  tru e  p ro g ress  would come only th rough the
a c q u is i t io n  o f  p a rliam en tary  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  'G rant a man h is  r ig h t s
and ev ery th in g  th e r e a f te r  w il l  go e x c e lle n tly  w e l l . ' C o n s ti tu tio n a l
advance was no t only the  b e s t way fo rw ard , i t  was th e  proper way. ' I
d isca rd e d  h is  / l la z z in i ’s /  re v o lu tio n a ry  te a c h in g s , ' observed B anerjea ,
'a s  u n su ite d  to  th e  c ircum stances o f In d ia  and as f a t a l  to  i t s  normal
ITation in  Making, p. 43«
1
28
developm ent, along th e  l in e s  of p eacefu l and o rd e rly  p ro g r e s s '.  For 
In d ia  to  develop 'n o rm a lly ',  i t  should fo llow  th e  course o f B r i ta in  
and th e  ’w h ite ' co lo n ie s  through the  p rocess o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  advance.
P ursu ing  t h i s  t r a i n  of th ough t, i t  can be seen why th e  a c q u is i t io n  
o f p a rliam en ta ry  in s t i t u t i o n s  was so im portan t to  th e  b h ad ra lok . They 
wished to  be m asters o f th e i r  own d e s t in y ,  b u t ,  a t  th e  same tim e , i t  
was e s s e n t ia l  to  the  growth of t h e i r  s e lf -c o n fid e n c e  th a t  they  should 
be recogn ised  as the p o l i t i c a l  equals o f t h e i r  m entors, the  E n g lish .
I f  they  gained  fo r  In d ia  the  p a rliam en ta ry  self-governm ent th a t  had 
been  secured by B r i t a in ’s w hite  c o lo n ie s , th en  t h e i r  s ta tu s  and t h e i r  
id e n t i t y  would be e s ta b lis h e d .
The A u s tra lia n  p o l i t i c i a n ,  A lfred  D eakin, who tou red  In d ia  in  
1890-91» has l e f t  in v a lu ab le  evidence of t h i s  v iew point in  an account 
o f a co n v e rsa tio n  which he had w ith  ’a Brahman, a w earer o f th e  sac red  
th re a d , engaged as a ra ilw ay  c le r k ,  speaking- E ng lish  f lu e n t ly ,  and 
whose l i b e r a l  ten d en c ies  were in d ic a te d  by th e  very  fa c t  th a t  he was 
ta k in g  h is  son, an in te r e s t in g  and handsome la d ,  to  see th e  wonders o f 
J a i p u r . '
P o l i t i c a l l y  /co n tin u ed  Deakin7, he was a warm su p p o rte r of th e  
demands o f the  N ative Congress fo r  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of 
r e p re s e n ta t iv e  in s t i t u t i o n s  throughout In d ia , b u t was p repared  
to  accep t th e  boon by d eg rees. A fte r e a rn e s t ly  en q u irin g  in to  
th e  powers o f self-governm ent enjoyed by A u s tra lia n s , he 
remarked w ith  a s ig h  th a t  i t  would probab ly  be a cen tu ry  b e fo re  
h is  countrymen would be f i t  to  enjoy such p r iv i le g e s .  That they
Emphasis added. N ation  in  Making, p. 43*
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would hereafter be enabled to exercise the fullest rights of the 
franchise and maintain responsible government he had no doubt, 
his assumption being that what was good for the white man must 
be equally good in time for the brown. The power was coveted, 
and so also was the equality with the white, which its possession 
would ultimately secure.^
For this reason, British parliamentary institutions assumed an 
extraordinary importance in bhadralok thinking. As a potential means 
of the group’s self-realisation they became the focus of a powerful 
emotional attachment. Given this attachment and given also the group's 
lack of certainty in its attitude towards Europeans, it is evident 
that the British would wound the bhadralok deeply if they refused to 
admit them to the process of constitutional advance or even if they 
simply exhibited an insensitivity to their involvement with parliamentary 
institutions. In either case the result was bound to be a violent 
reaction against British political forms and, very likely, this would 
be manifested in racial and cultural extremism.
The British and the Bhadralok
Considering the difficulties faced by foreigners who attempt to
rule an alien people, James Stuart Mill wrote: 'Their danger is of
despising the natives; that of the natives is of disbelieving that
2anything the strangers do can be intended for their good.’ This is 
1
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an ap t te x t fo r  a d is c u ss io n  of the  a t t i tu d e  o f th e  B r i t i s h  in  In d ia  
to  th e  hhadra lok  in  th e  th re e  decades a f t e r  1880.
In  the  opening y ea rs  of th a t  p e riod  a sm all group of L ib e ra ls  in  
th e  I .C .S . ,  most n o tab ly  Henry C otton , A.O. Hume, George Yule and 
W illiam  Wedderburn, recogn ised  the  im portance o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  a s p ir a t io n s  
o f the  bhadra lok  and s im ila r  E n g lish -ed u ca ted  groups in  o th e r  p a r ts  
o f In d ia . They a s s is te d  t h e i r  le a d e rs  w ith  the  fo rm ation  of re g io n a l 
p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c ia tio n s  and in  th e  o rg a n is a tio n  o f an annual a l l - I n d i a  
convention , th e  In d ia n  N ational C ongress, which from 1885 was the  main 
p la tfo rm  fo r  th e  advocacy o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  advance.
The movement had rece iv ed  a g re a t f i l l i p  from th e  v ic e ro y a lty  o f 
th e  L ib e ra l Marquess o f Ripon, who had been sen t out by G ladstone 
a f t e r  h is  e le c to r a l  v ic to ry  in  i860 to  re v e rse  the  E arl of L y t to n 's  
p o lic y  of ag g ress iv e  im p eria lism . Ripon was convinced of ’ the  h o u rly  
in c re a s in g  im portance, nay I  w ill  say th e  n e c e s s i ty , o f making the
2educated n a tiv e s  th e  f r ie n d s ,  in s te a d  o f th e  enem ies, of our r u l e ' .
To t h i s  end th ey  should be g iv en  a sh are  in  a d m in is tra tio n  and provided
w ith  an o p p o rtu n ity  to  in flu en c e  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Ripon argued th a t  i t
was 'n o t only  bad p o lic y , bu t sh eer w aste of power, to  f a i l  to  u t i l i z e '
3
th e  new 'i n t e l l i g e n t  c la s s  of p u b lic  s p i r i t e d  m en'. In  th e  p reced in g
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quarter century there had been a spectacular extension in the activities 
of government in India, accompanied by an equally profound change in 
the general notions of the proper spheres of governmental responsibility. 
The regular agencies of administration were already over-taxed and to 
Ripon it seemed no more than common sense to take advantage of the 
able non-official assistance that was now offering from English-educated
Indians. ‘We have made them, let us use them for their good and our
,1own. '
With this in mind he urged the provincial Governments to transfer
a large share of the work of local government to elected non-official
committees. In his now famous resolution of 18 May 1882 he emphasised
that his aim was not primarily to improve the administration but to
2foster ’the small beginnings of independent political life'. Earlier 
he had also suggested the inclusion of a few elected Indian members in 
the legislative councils as a development in ’extended freedom and 
cautious confidence’,'’ but his proposal was not favoured in either 
Calcutta or London and it was left to his successor, Lord Dufferin, 
to frame a scheme for the reform of these institutions.
Prior to 1857 there had been a single legislative council in 
Calcutta legislating for all of British India and it was composed
1
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wholly o f o f f i c i a l  B r i t i s h  members. As a r e s u l t  o f th e  shock o f the  
M utiny, the system had been reform ed to  provide th e  Government w ith  
a means of c o n s u lta t io n  w ith  le a d in g  In d ia n s , so th a t  i t  might avoid 
'th e  p e rilo u s  experim ent of co n tin u in g  to  l e g i s l a t e  fo r  m illio n s  of 
peop le , w ith  few means o f knowing, except by r e b e l l io n ,  w hether the  
laws s u i t  them o r n o t’ . In  1361 sep a ra te  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c ils  were 
s e t  up in  the  th re e  P re s id e n c ie s  -  Bombay, Madras and Bengal -  and a 
few nominated In d ian  members were inc luded  in  th e se  bod ies and in  th e  
Im p eria l L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil.^
In  1886 D u ffe rin  suggested  th e  e x ten s io n  o f th i s  c o n su lta tiv e  
system to  g iv e  th e  new c la s s  o f educated In d ian s  a g re a te r  o p p o rtu n ity  
to  in flu en c e  p o lic y  fo rm ation . He recommended to  the  Home Government 
th a t  th e  co u n c ils  be en larged  to  in c lu d e  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  chosen by 
lo c a l  bodies and p u b lic  o rg a n is a t io n s , and th a t  t h e i r  members be g iven  
w ider powers o f d is c u s s io n .^  The r e s u l t  was th e  reform ing Act o f 1892.
L ib e ra ls  such as C otton , Ripon and D u ffe rin  were n o t, however, 
re p re s e n ta t iv e  of the  main body o f B r i t i s h  a d m in is tra to rs  in  In d ia  
in  the  l a s t  q u a r te r  o f the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  and t h e i r  id e a l o f 
In d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  development was not g e n e ra lly  accep ted . The main
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trends were towards authoritarianism and centralisation. This can he 
understood if we appreciate the nature of the British sense of imperial 
mission.
Of all the traditions of the Indian Civil Service, none was stronger
than its paternalism. It saw itself as a wise and benevolent body of
rulers, keeping the peace between the irreconcilable races, religions
and castes of a huge sub-continent; a corps of dedicated men, giving
their knowledge and their energies to improve, however slowly, the
material well-being- of an ignorant but warm-hearted and grateful people;
protecting the weak and the down-trodden against the strong, minorities
against majorities - a faction of order (as one officer wrote) in a 
1
factious society. This was a tradition which newcomers to the Service 
inherited from their predecessors and upon which their years in their 
first districts - healthy, exciting and impressionable years of youth - 
put the stamp of personal conviction. They learnt of the hardships 
of Indian village life; the sufferings which followed natural calamities, 
so often made worse for the poor by the oppression of landlord, money­
lender or priest. They saw the misery which could be inflicted in a 
traditional society with the sharp weapon of social boycott. They 
enjoyed the gratitude which rewarded their efforts to free a peasant 
from an illegal cess, or to provide good drinking water for a village. 
They believed that they were meant to rule and they were confident that
1
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th e y  ruled, w is e ly , f o r  th e y  knew I n d ia  and In d ia n s  ' a t  l e a s t  as w ell
as any body o f men in  th e  c o u n try ’ .
P a te rn a lis m  was an ad m irab le  t r a d i t i o n  f o r  an a l l-p o w e r fu l  s e rv ic e
o f  fo r e ig n  a u to c r a t s ,  b u t i t  f i t t e d  them i l l  to  r e c e iv e  th e  s u g g e s tio n
th a t  th e y  shou ld  fo reg o  some o f  t h e i r  pow er, so th a t  In d ia n s  m ight
le a r n  a few b a s ic  le s s o n s  i n  s e lf-g o v e rn m e n t. At i t s  most ex trem e,
t h e i r  r e a c t io n  was a f l a t  d e n ia l  t h a t  In d ia n s  were cap a b le  o f e x e rc is in g
any power p ro p e r ly .  I f  th e  B r i t i s h  d id  n o t w ish to  see  j u s t  governm ent
2
g iv e  way to  'governm ent by s o c ia l  o s ta c is m ’ ; i f  th e y  w ere u n w ill in g
to  have In d ia  r e la p s e  in to  th e  f r i g h t f u l  d is o r d e r  from which t h e i r  r u le
had re sc u e d  i t ,  th e n  t h e i r  s ta te sm e n  shou ld  r e a l i s e  th a t  th e  powers
o f th e  I .C .S .  had to  be k ep t i n t a c t .  F itz ja m e s  S tep h en , a fo rm er Law
Member o f  th e  Government o f I n d ia ,  w rote in  1883:
No c o u n try  in  th e  w orld  i s  more o r d e r ly ,  more q u i e t ,  o r  more 
p e a c e fu l th a n  B r i t i s h  I n d ia  a s  i t  i s ,  b u t i f  th e  v ig o u r  o f th e  
governm ent shou ld  ev e r  be r e la x e d ,  i f  i t  shou ld  lo s e  i t s  
e s s e n t i a l  u n i ty  o f p u rp o se , and f a l l  in to  hands e i t h e r  weak o r 
u n f a i t h f u l ,  chaos would come a g a in  l i k e  a f lo o d . No road  i s  
so sm ooth, h a rd , un ifo rm  and le v e l  a s  a f ro z e n  r i v e r ,  b u t 
n o th in g  so h o p e le s s ly  unm anageable a s  a thaw co m p lica ted  w ith  
a f lo o d . 3
W ritin g  l a t e r  a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  M orley-M into re fo rm s , when th e  thaw 
had begun, S i r  Bampfylde F u l l e r ,  a fo rm er L ieu ten a n t-G o v e rn o r o f E a s te rn
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Bengal & Assam, asked:
British interests apart, will this change he for the general 
good? It will undoubtedly stimulate what is called "political 
activity" amongst the educated classes of India. But its 
effects will invariably be to the disadvantage of the poor.
However distasteful the idea may be to the many kind-hearted 
men who in politics take the Liberal side, we are sacrificing, 
in this case, philanthropy to politics.^
The distaste among I.C.S. officers for politics and politicians,
which this reflects, was a corollary of their paternalistic outlook.
As so often to the administrator, to many of them politics seemed a
sordid affair of petty faction and personal aggrandisement. Politicians
in Britain did harm enough, in their opinion, but to hand India over
to the local breed - the sharp Western-educated lawyers, journalists
and landholders, who were already a thorn in the side of the District
Officer - would be to undo generations of painstaking work. Explaining
the reluctance of his fellow officers to develop local self-government
as Ripon had urged, a Bengal Civilian wrote: 'Considering ... that the
Government had now for twenty years been endeavouring, so far in vain,
to untwist the fingers of the landlord from the tenant's throat, it
was not unnatural to suspect that he might use any local body we
2appointed as an instrument of oppression.'
The I.C.S. officer's attitude to the bhadralok and similar groups 
was strongly coloured by this belief that they belonged to the exploiting
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c la s s e s .  V/hat they meant hy se lf-g o v ern m en t, the C iv il ia n  a s s e r te d ,  
was freedom to  e x p lo it  the  p easan t. M oreover, he asked, why should 
th e se  few u n re p re se n ta tiv e  c u l tu r a l  h y b rid s  -  th ese  babus o f th e  
c o a s ta l  c i t i e s  -  be g iven  power over the  mass of t h e i r  fe llo w s?  They 
were not ’ t ru e  Indians*' l ik e  th e  b rav e , lo y a l m a rtia l ra c e s  o f th e  
n o rth -w est or th e  sim ple , honest p e a sa n ts . 'Such a re  the  town B en g a lis , 
o f whom d isp a ra g in g  op in ions a re  e x p re s s e d , ' w rote Deakin on h is  to u r  
o f In d ia . *Ihe Baboo produces no th ing  bu t words. The coun try  p eop le , 
though debased by th e  tyranny o f in iq u ito u s  lan d lo rd s  under an in iq u ito u s  
law , a re  of a b e t t e r  type; they  a re  the  c u l t iv a to r s ,  the  i r r i g a t o r s ,  
and th e  p ro d u ce rs , and they  a re  cared  fo r  as much as p o ss ib le  by
*]
European o f f i c i a l s ,  who p ro te c t them as f a r  as l i e s  in  t h e i r  pow er.'
To th e  m a jo rity  o f C iv i l ia n s ,  th e  bhadra lok  seemed a n o isy , e f f e te  
and co n tem ptib le  peop le , who were s c a rc e ly  re le v a n t to  the  'im portan t*  
work o f a d m in is te r in g  In d ia . The p re v a il in g  id e a l  in  the  I .C .S . was 
e f f i c i e n t  c e n tr a l i s e d  bureaucracy  and th e  s tro n g h o ld  o f th i s  m e n ta lity  
was C a lc u tta , th e  c h ie f  c en tre  of B r i t i s h  In d ia n  commerce, the  s e a t  of 
the  Government of In d ia , and th e  h ead q u a rte rs  o f the  s e c r e ta r i a t  fo r  
th e  huge t r a c t  of p e rm a n en tly -se ttle d  t e r r i t o r y  which was adm in is te red  
under th e  name o f Bengal. The b h ad ra lo k *s c i ty  was a lso  the  ’Anglo- 
I n d ia n 's  * c i ty .  The s ig n if ic a n c e  of t h i s  w ill  be im m ediately ap p aren t. 
The most p o l i t i c a l l y  advanced group in  In d ia  was hereby fo rced  to
A. Deakin: I r r ig a te d  I n d ia , p. 85.
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experience  d i r e c t ly  th e  c o n s tr ic t io n s  imposed upon In d ian  p o l i t i c a l
s e lf -e x p re s s io n  hy B r i t i s h  im p eria lism . I t  was f r u s t r a te d  by the  la c k
of room fo r  expansion. I t  was h u m ilia ted  by the  haughty in d if fe re n c e
d isp lay ed  towards i t s  a s p ir a t io n s .  I t  was m o rtif ie d  by the  contemptuous
d ism issa l o f i t s  achievem ents. The p o te n t ia l  danger in  th i s  s i tu a t io n
was recogn ised  by the  Aga Khan when he went to  C a lcu tta  in  1903 to
serve  on th e  Im peria l L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. He w rote:
I  . . .  saw how rem ote th e  Government had become from the  people 
o f In d ia , not the  masses on ly , but th e  in c re a s in g  and ev er more 
a r t i c u l a t e  and a c tiv e  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  I  saw a t c lo se  q u a r te rs  
how fo re ig n  the  Government was in  s p i r i t  and in  atm osphere.
On th e  o th e r  s id e ,  I  saw th a t  I n d ia ’s p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r s ,  d i s ­
s a t i s f i e d  a t  not having succeeded in  o b ta in in g  th e i r  e a r l i e r  
m oderate demands, began to  seek no t m erely a d m in is tra tiv e  
reform s bu t the  f u l l  co n tro l o f t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  d e s tin y .^
Lord Curzon and the  P a r t i t io n  o f Bengal
The smouldering' f i r e  o f b h ad ra lok  d isc o n te n t was fanned to  a b laze
by the  p rovoca tive  a c tio n s  of Lord Curzon, V iceroy from 1898 to  1905«
In  th e  decade p receding  h is  appointm ent ro u tin e  had tak en  hold  of th e
bureaucracy  and the  machine had become s te a d i ly  more ponderous and
le s s  a d a p ta b le . Curzon came w ith  a p a ss io n a te  b e l i e f  in  B r i t a in ’ s
im p eria l m ission  and he made an h e ro ic  personal e f f o r t  to  p lace  th e
a d m in is tra tio n  once more on the  o f fe n s iv e . His c reed : ’I f  I  were asked
to  sum i t  up in  a s in g le  word, I  would say " E ff ic ie n c y ”. That has been
2
our g o sp e l, th e  keynote o f our a d m in is tr a t io n . '
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'/Then he a rr iv e d  in  In d ia  he saw in e f f ic ie n c y  a l l  about him. He
s e t  out to  remedy th i s  and B engal, h is  h ead q u arte rs  p ro v in ce , re ce iv ed
h is  immediate a t te n t io n .  A B i l l  to  r e c o n s t i tu te  th e  C orpora tion  o f
C a lc u tta , which was under c o n s id e ra tio n  by th e  Bengal L e g is la t iv e
C ouncil, seemed to  him in ad eq u a te . So he brushed asid e  the  p ro v in c ia l
Government and d ra f te d  a new m easure, under which th e  e le c te d  elem ent
on th e  C orpora tion  was reduced and ex ecu tiv e  fu n c tio n s  were e n tru s te d
to  a committee w ith  a European m a jo r ity . These refo rm s, he d e c la re d ,
2were e s s e n t ia l  fo r  e f f i c i e n t  1ocal-governm ent.
He a lso  b e liev ed  th a t  th e  In d ian  u n iv e r s i ty  system was in  need o f 
an overhau l and in  1902 he appoin ted  a commission to  frame a scheme 
o f refo rm s. As a r e s u l t  o f i t s  re p o r t o f f i c i a l  c o n tro l of a l l  h ig h e r 
ed u ca tio n  was tig h ten ed  and th e  governing  bodies o f the  th re e  u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  
C a lc u tta , Bombay and Madras, were re o rg a n ise d , w ith  a la rg e  p ro p o rtio n  
of Government nominated members.^
These m easures g re a t ly  p e rtu rb ed  th e  bhadra lok  fo r  t h e i r  e f f e c t  
was to  r e s t r i c t  s t i l l  f u r th e r  th e  g roup1s means o f  p o l i t i c a l  s e l f -  
e x p re ss io n . In  the absence o f o th e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  which to  a c t ,  the  
bhad ra lo k  had come to  a t ta c h  an e x tra o rd in a ry  im portance to  t h e i r  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  c iv ic  and ed u ca tio n a l a f f a i r s .  What wounded them
1
Lord Ronaldshay: The L ife  of Lord Curzon, v o l. I I ,  pp. 26-7.
2
I b id ,  pp. 28-30 & 73-5.
3
I b id ,  pp. 187-94*
most d e e p ly  was C urzon’s contem ptuous d is m is s a l  o f  t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  as
i l l - f o u n d e d  and f a c t io u s .  He had no sym pathy fo r  t h e i r  a s p i r a t io n s ,
n o r d id  he c o n ce a l h i s  d i s l i k e  f o r  them as a c l a s s .  He was b i t t e r l y
a t ta c k e d  in  th e  b h a d ra lo k  p re s s  and S u ren d ran a th  B an e rjea  le d  28
In d ia n  members ou t o f th e  C o rp o ra tio n , sw earin g  n ever to  r e tu r n  u n t i l
2
n o n o f f ic i a l  c o n tro l  was r e s to r e d .
The r e a l  s to rm , how ever, b u r s t  o v e r  C u rzo n 's  d e c is io n  to  p a r t i t i o n  
B en g a l, f o r  t h i s  was a d i r e c t  and c a lc u la te d  a t t a c k  on b h a d ra lo k  u n i ty .  
The s iz e  o f  B engal had been a problem  f o r  th e  B r i t i s h  th ro u g h o u t most 
o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry . At one tim e th e  whole o f  n o r th e rn  In d ia  
from  Assam in  th e  e a s t  to  th e  r i v e r  S u t l e j  i n  th e  w est had been  u n d er 
a s in g le  a d m in is t r a t io n  in  C a lc u t ta ,  b u t by 1874 i t s  charge had been 
reduced  to  B engal p ro p e r , B ih a r  and O r is s a .  I t  was g e n e r a l ly  ag reed  
th a t  t h i s  a re a  was s t i l l  too  la r g e  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  a d m in is t r a t io n  b u t th e  
Government o f  I n d ia  cou ld  n o t d e c id e  on how to  d iv id e  th e se  o ld  
p e rm a n e n tly - s e t t le d  p ro v in c e s .
The q u e s tio n  was s t i l l  undecided  when Curzon a r r iv e d  and i t  came 
to  h i s  n o t ic e  in c id e n ta l l y  i n  1902  b ecau se  o f th e  im pending in c o rp o ra t io n
_
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For a f u l l  d is c u s s io n  o f th e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  a sp e c t o f th e  p a r t i t i o n  
see  th e  a u th o r ’s papers ’’The P a r t i t i o n  o f B engal: a problem  in  
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of Berar in British India. He considered that the occasion was
opportune for a general readjustment of the boundaries of Assam, Bengal,
Madras, the Central Provinces, Bombay and the Punjab, and he instructed
his subordinates to consider the matter. The first suggestion that
was submitted to him was for the transfer of Berar to Bombay province,
but he rejected this on political grounds. He wrote on 6 March 1903*
I cannot contemplate any proposal which would add to the strength 
or solidarity of the Maratha community with anything- but dismay .... 
How there are already over two millions of Marathas in the 
Central Provinces; but so far as I have always heard they are 
neither in close sympathy nor in close communication with the 
Marathas of the Bombay Deccan - the most able and the most 
dangerous of the opponents of our rule in India.
I believe the Marathas of Berar in general to reproduce the 
attitude of their fellow-countrymen in the Central Provinces, 
not of those in Bombay. Why then should we go and gratuitously 
make a present to Poona of this enormous accretion of political 
strength ... 1
In the same month Sir Andrew Fraser, the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Bengal, suggested that the Chittagong and Dacca Divisions of his province 
should be transferred to Assam, primarily to weaken the bhadralok.
Curzon accepted his proposal;
He has represented to me that the advantage of severing these 
Eastern districts of Bengal, which are a hotbed of the purely 
Bengali movement, unfriendly if not seditious in character, 
and dominating the whole tone of Bengal administration, will 
immeasurably outweigh any possible drawbacks, and not only does 
he urge the severance of these tracts from Bengal because of the 
character of the educated section of their inhabitants, but he 
has also returned from his enquiries in those parts in connection 
with the Police Commission with the conviction that nowhere in 
India are the officers of Government more ignorant of, or more
Minute, GI, Home Public, A149-160, Dec 1903»
1
d iv o rc e d  from , th e  p e o p le . He has a c q u a in te d  me w ith  d e t a i l s  
w hich t e s t i f y  to  t h i s  d iv o rc e  i n  a rem ark ab le  d e g re e . He th in k s  
t h a t  i t  would be an u n q u a l if ie d  ad v an tag e  to  Bengal to  lo s e  
th e se  e lem en ts  o f w eakness and d is s e n s io n ,  and he o p in es  th a t  
th e y  would be more e a s i l y  reduced  to  t h e i r  p ro p er l e v e l  o f 
im po rtan ce  i f  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  a n o th e r  a d m in is t r a t io n . 1
I t  was dec id ed  tow ards th e  end o f 1903 to  make p u b lic  t h i s
p ro p o sa l b u t Curzon was c a r e fu l  to  co n cea l h i s  r e a l  m o tiv e , b o th  from
th e  In d ia n  p u b lic  and th e  B r i t i s h  Government. 'What I  cou ld  s a f e ly  say
i n  th e  p r iv a c y  o f th e  C ouncil Chamber i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  s u i t a b le  f o r
2
p ro c la m a tio n  on th e  h o u s e - to p s . ' ' The b h a d ra lo k , how ever, were u nder 
no i l l u s i o n  as to  th e  G overnm ent's pu rpose  and th e y  p r o te s te d  vehem en tly . 
T h is  d id  them no good f o r  t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  m ere ly  confirm ed th e  o f f i c i a l  
o p in io n  th a t  th e y  were grow ing too  s tro n g .  Review ing th e  grounds o f 
t h e i r  c o m p la in ts , H.H. R is le y ,  Home Llember o f  th e  Government o f  I n d ia ,  
w ro te  on 7 F eb ruary  1904s ' Loss o f n a t io n a l  u n i t y . -  T h is  i s  th e  C ongress 
p o in t .  B engal u n ite d  i s  a power; Bengal d iv id e d  w i l l  p u l l  s e v e ra l  
d i f f e r e n t  w ays. That i s  p e r f e c t ly  t r u e  and i s  one o f th e  g r e a t  m e r i ts
3,
o f  th e  sc h e m e '.
L a te r  i n  th e  y e a r ,  a g a in  a t  F r a s e r 's  s u g g e s tio n , i t  was dec id ed  to  
ex ten d  th e  scheme to  in c lu d e  th e  whole o f  E a s te rn  B engal, w hich , w ith  
Assam, would th e n  form a M u slim -m ajo rity  p ro v in c e . I t  was hoped in
1
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this way to prevent the ’clique of Congress wire-pullers' in Calcutta 
from sowing disaffection among the Eastern Bengal Muslims. 'Their 
constant effort, hitherto defeated mainly by the influence of the 
Dacca Nawab, has been to induce the leading Muhammadans to submit to 
their influence. If Dacca is made the capital of the new province, 
these chances of capturing the Bengal Muhammadans will become still 
more remote.'^
By December 1904 the scheme was finalised and the Government of 
India's only remaining- concern was to disguise its political purpose. 
Risley complained of the difficulty of concealing the truth from the 
publics 'It is not altogether easy to reply in a despatch which is sure 
to be published without disclosing the fact that in this scheme as in 
the matter of the amalgamation of Behar [sic] to the Central Provinces 
one of our main objects is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body 
of opponents to our r u l e . B e n g a l  was partitioned on 16 October 19^5»
The Bhadralok Reaction
For the bhadralok this was the ultimate betrayal. They had been 
stabbed in the back by the very people whom they had been striving to 
emulate. Their attempts to realise their liberal aspirations, to gain 
a legitimate outlet for their political energies, were treated as
1
Risley, minute, 6 Dec 1904> GI, Home Public, A155~^7> Feb 19^5*
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s u b v e rs iv e  and a danger to  B r i t i s h  r u l e .  They had hoped to  w in B r i t i s h  
r e c o g n i t io n  a s  an  a b le  and advanced community w orthy o f  th e  g ra n t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s .  In s te a d  th e y  were reg a rd ed  as  t r a i t o r s ,  to  be 
d iv id e d  and b ro k en  in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f B r i t i s h  im p e ria lism . W orst o f  
a l l  C u rzo n 's  Government had n e i th e r  th e  courage nor th e  h o n es ty  to  
adm it i t s  r e a l  u rp o se  in  d iv id in g  B engal. I t  had l i e d  and i t  had 
u sed  th a t  l i e  a g a in s t  th e  b h a d ra lo k . The m easure , i t  had s a id ,  was 
d es ig n ed  m ere ly  to  f a c i l i t a t e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y .  O bv iously  
th o se  who opposed i t  must be f a c t io u s  and s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d .
' I  t h i n k , ’ s a id  F itz ja m e s  S tephen  in  1872, ' t h a t  one d i s t i n c t  a c t  
o f  i n j u s t i c e ,  one c le a r  in s ta n c e  o f  u n f a i th f u ln e s s  to  th e  p r in c ip le s  
upon w hich o u r government o f  I n d ia  dep en d s, one p o s i t iv e  p ro o f t h a t  we 
canno t o r  w i l l  n o t do ju s t i c e  to  a l l  c l a s s e s ,  r a c e s ,  c re e d s , o r  no­
c r e e d s ,  in  E r i t i s h  In d ia  would in  th e  lo n g  ru n  shake our power more
2
d e e p ly  th a n  even  f in a n c ia l  o r  m i l i t a r y  d i s a s t e r . ' The p a r t i t i o n  o f  
B engal was a d i s t i n c t  a c t  o f  i n j u s t i c e  and i t  d e s tro y e d  fo r  a l l  tim e 
th e  b h a d ra lo k ' s  f a i t h  in  th e  b e n e f ic e n c e  o f B r i t i s h  i n t e n t io n s .  From 
t h i s  p o in t ,  d i s t r u s t  and enm ity  f o r  th e  Government c h a r a c te r i s e d  
b h a d ra lo k  p o l i t i c s .
1
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Curzon’ s r e c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  th e  C a lc u t ta  C o rp o ra tio n  and U niversity - 
had a f f e c te d  d i r e c t l y  on ly  l im i te d  s e c t io n s  o f  hhad ra .lck  s o c ie ty  -  th e  
C a lc u tta  p ro fe s s io n a l  men and th e  u n iv e r s i ty  g ra d u a te s  -  h u t th e  
p a r t i t i o n  o f  th e  p ro v in ce  was an is s u e  o f  im portance  f o r  every  
h h a d ra lo k  fa m ily , f o r  i t  d iv id e d  t h e i r  two c u l tu r a l  w orld s: C a lc u tta  
and th e  m o fu s s i l . The sm all g roup  o f  h h a d ra lo k  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  s t r u g g l in g
m an fu lly  a g a in s t  C u rzon 's  p o l i c i e s ,  su dden ly  found th a t  th e y  had th e
1su p p o rt o f  a lm ost th e  whole o f  t h e i r  community th ro u g h o u t B engal. The
in te n s e  f e e l in g  aroused  hy th e  q u e s tio n  and th e  d e s i r e  to  make some
a c t iv e  p r o te s t  d isp la y e d  hy s e c t io n s  o f th e  h h a d ra lo k  which had no '
p re v io u s  invo lvem ent i n  p o l i t i c s ,  s u r p r is e d  th e  h h ad ra lo k  le a d e r s  and
2dism ayed th e  B r i t i s h .
I t  i s  f a i r l y  c e r t a i n  t h a t  th e r e  were economic as w ell as  p o l i t i c a l  
re a so n s  f o r  t h i s  o u tb u rs t  o f  a n g e r . The p a r t i t i o n  c o in c id e d  w ith  a 
sh a rp  r i s e  i n  th e  p r ic e  o f r i c e ,  B e n g a l i  s t a p l e ,  due m ain ly  to  th e  
f a i l u r e  o f th e  c ro p s  in  1905* The h a r v e s ts  in  th e  fo llo w in g  th r e e  y e a rs
1
The new i n t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c s  g e n e ra te d  hy  th e  p a r t i t i o n  can he 
i l l u s t r a t e d  hy a  com parison o f  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n  f ig u r e s  fo r  1904 and 
1905 o f  th e  new spapers which opposed th e  m easure:
1904 1905
A m rita  B azar P a t r ik a 2,000 7 ,500
B engalee 3,000 11,000
Epiphany 1,000 5,000
H ita v a d i 16,000 20,000
Sandhya 500 7 ,000
(G I, Home P u b l ic ,  B200 , Jun  1906.)
2
GI, Home P u b l ic ,  A137- 138 , Sep 1907.
were a l l  p o o re r  th a n  normal and by 1907 th e  c o s t  o f r i c e  had r i s e n  by 
58 p e r  c e n t .  The a g r i c u l tu r a l  c l a s s e s  b e n e f i te d ,  i f  anything-, from 
t h i s ,  and u rb an  la b o u re rs  were com pensated by in c re a se d  w ages, b u t th e  
b h a d ra lo k  were s e v e re ly  h i t .
As has been shown, most b h a d ra lo k  f a m i l ie s  d e r iv e d  t h e i r  incom es 
p a r t l y  from la n d  r e n t s  and p a r t l y  from  p r o f e s s io n a l  s a l a r i e s  and f e e s .  
N e ith e r  o f  th e s e  so u rc e s  was s u f f i c i e n t l y  f l e x i b l e  to  meet such  an 
abnorm ally  sh a rp  r i s e  i n  th e  b a s ic  c o s t o f  l i v i n g  as o ccu rred  in  1905- 6. 
A lready  th e  economic p re s s u re  on th e  b h a d ra lo k  was c o n s id e ra b le  f o r  
th e  le a rn e d  p ro fe s s io n s  were becom ing over-crow ded and th e  c o m p e tit io n  
f o r  ap p o in tm en ts  in  governm ent and p r iv a te  s e r v ic e  in te n s e .  Whereas 
many o f  th e  o ld e r  g e n e ra tio n  had been  a b le  to  f in d  employment o u ts id e  
B en g a l, th e  young men a t  th e  b eg in n in g  o f  th e  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry  d i s ­
covered  th a t  th e  advancement o f  e d u c a tio n  in  o th e r  p a r t s  o f  I n d ia  was 
producing- lo c a l  c a n d id a te s  f o r  c l e r i c a l  and p ro fe s s io n a l  jo b s . T here 
cou ld  b e  no q u e s tio n  o f  tu rn in g  f o r  r e l i e f  to  any form o f manual la b o u r  
o r  even  t r a d e .  So many b h a d ra lo k  f a m i l ie s  were fo rc e d  d eep e r and 
d eep e r in to  d e b t as th e y  s tru g g le d  to  m a in ta in  th e  outw ard s t y l e  o f
l i v i n g  a p p ro p r ia te  to  t h e i r  s t a t i o n  and to  p ro v id e  th e  s o c i a l l y -
2
in d is p e n s a b le  E n g lish - la n g u a g e  e d u c a tio n  fo r  t h e i r  so n s. At th e  tim e
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th e r e  was w idesp read  b e l i e f  in  th e  th e o ry  t h a t  w e a lth  was being- 
d ra in e d  from In d ia  by th e  Im p e ria l r u l e r s ,  and v e ry  n a tu r a l ly  th e  
im poverished  b h ad ra lo k  blamed t h e i r  p l ig h t  upon t h e i r  B r i t i s h
1 e x p l o i t e r s * .
Economic h a rd sh ip  was compounded w ith  in ju r e d  p r id e  and th e  
f r u s t r a t i o n s  o f  a v i t a l  c o lo n ia l  peo p le  who had in a d eq u a te  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  
f o r  c o n s t r u c t iv e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y .  The s i t u a t i o n  was r ip e  f o r  
v io le n c e  and i t  was no t lo n g  i n  coming-. The a g i t a t i o n  a g a in s t  th e  
p a r t i t i o n  had been  launched  by S u ren d ran a th  B a n e r je a , w ith  a l im i te d  
cam paign o f  m e e tin g s , p u b lic  p r o te s t  m arches, th e  w ithdraw al o f 
b h a d ra lo k  members from Government i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  th e  b o y c o tt  o f  B r i t i s h  
m a n u fa c tu re s , and th e  encouragem ent o f  a programme o f  'n a t i o n a l  
e d u c a tio n ' and sw ad esh i, as a d e m o n s tra tio n  o f  B e n g a l 's  d e te rm in a tio n  
to  s ta n d  a p a r t  from th e  B r i t i s h .  B a n e rje a  had , how ever, s t a r t e d  
som eth ing  w hich he cou ld  no t c o n tro l  and w ith in  a m a tte r  o f weeks he 
had l o s t  h is  aud ience  to  th e  ad v o ca tes  o f  v io le n c e .
B epin  Chandra P a l to u re d  th e  p ro v in ce  c a llin g -  upon th e  young 
b h a d ra lo k  to  p rove t h e i r  manhood by p i t t i n g  th em se lv es  a g a in s t  th e
2
B r i t i s h .  * . . .  we shou ld  now r e tu r n  l a t h i s  f o r  l a t h i s , '  he t o ld  them . 
B a r in  and A urobindo Ghose d i s t r i b u t e d  pam phlets g lo r i f y in g  te r r o r i s m  
as a r e l i g io u s  d u ty  f o r  th e  b h a d ra lo k . They rem inded t h e i r  r e a d e rs
1
I a t i o n  in  M aking, c h p ts .  X V III-X X II.
2
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t h a t  K a l i ,  th e  Goddess o f D e s tru c t io n ,  th e  M other o f S tr e n g th ,  was 
c r e a te d  "by th e  gods to  d e s tro y  th e  demons who had u su rp ed  t h e i r  
kingdom . K a l i ,  th e  avenger whose many hands d rip p e d  w ith  "blood, was 
n o t a symbol o f  savagery  bu t o f s e l f l e s s n e s s ,  th e y  ta u g h t .  As K a li 
d ro v e  ou t th e  demons so shou ld  th e  b h a d ra lo k , s tre n g th e n e d  by th e  
w o rsh ip  o f  K a l i ,  d r iv e  out th e  B r i t i s h .  ’Are n o t te n  thousand  sons 
o f  B engal p re p a re d  to  embrace d e a th  to  avenge th e  h u m il ia t io n  o f  t h e i r  
m o th e rlan d ?  The number o f  Englishm en in  th e  e n t i r e  c o u n try  i s  n o t 
more th a n  a l a c  and h a l f ,  and what i s  th e  number o f E n g lish  o f f i c i a l s  
i n  each  d i s t r i c t ?  With a f irm  r e s o lv e  you can  b r in g  E n g lis h  r u le  to  
an end in  a s in g le  d a y . ' T h is  te a c h in g  evoked an e n t h u s i a s t i c  re sp o n se  
from  th e  young b h ad ra lo k  and th e re  was no sh o r ta g e  o f v o lu n te e r s  f o r  
th e  t e r r o r i s t  s a m it is  which th e  Ghose b r o th e r s  and t h e i r  a s s o c ia te s  
founded to  o rg a n is e  p o l i t i c a l  a s s a s s in a t io n s .  The sw ing from  l i b e r a l  
c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i s m  to  r a c i a l  and c u l tu r a l  ex trem ism  had been  r a p id  and 
co m p le te .
E a n e r je a  and h is  fe llo w  m odera tes  were h o r r i f i e d  by th e s e  d ev e lo p ­
m ents w hich were d eep ly  o f fe n s iv e  to  t h e i r  l i b e r a l  i d e a l s .  They cou ld  
see  n o th in g  b u t p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  d i s a s t e r  r e s u l t i n g  from t h i s  
r e s o r t  to  v io le n c e .  P o in t was g iv e n  to  t h e i r  f e a r s  by th e  r e p r e s s iv e  
m e asu re s , im prisonm ent w ith o u t t r i a l  and a s t r i c t  c e n s o rs h ip  o f th e  
p r e s s ,  w ith  w hich th e  Government h i t  back  a t  th e  t e r r o r i s t s ,  and by th e
J u g a n ta r , Mar 1907? q u o te d , C. T e g a rtj  T e rro rism  i n  I n d i a , p . 8 .
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hostile reaction against the hhadralok which the anti-partition agitation 
provoked from the Muslims and low-caste Hindu groups. They did not 
share the hhadralok1s concern over the partition and were determined
•jnot to he dragged into the agitation by them.
The moderates greatest fear was that this extremism would alienate
the sympathy of the British Liberals for the Indian nationalist movement,
and, by delaying constitutional advance for an indefinite period,
contribute to the frustration of the hhadralok» This was a matter of
immediate significance, for the Liberal party had defeated the Conservatives
at a British General election in January 1906 and formed a Government.
It was ten years since the Liberals had last held power and it would
be a tragedy if this opportunity for advance were lost because of the
outbreak of terrorism. 'Nov/ is the time for work, - now or never,'
v/rote R.C. Butt, one of the leading Bengali moderates, on 24 May 1906.
'If this Liberal Govt fails to give a more representative character to
the Indian Administration, we shall never get anything by peaceful
methods, and England will be teaching us to pursue Irish methods in a
2country which has more than fifty times the population of Ireland.'
A Hew .Era
Curson had resigned the Viceroyalty in August 1905 following a 
difference of opinion with his Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of
1
GI, Home Police, A140-148, May 1906.
Butt to G.K. Gokhale, 24 May 19O6, Gokhale papers.
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S ta te .  His su cc e sso r, Lord M into, a lthough  a lso  a C o n serva tive , d id  
not agree w ith  a l l  th a t  Curzon had done nor d id  he co n sid er th a t  h is  
p red ecesso r had been wise in  r id in g  roughshod over In d ian  o p p o s itio n .
He saw th a t  the  tren d  towards a u th o r ita r ia n is m  and c e n t r a l i s a t io n  had 
been c a r r ie d  so f a r  th a t  th e  Government of In d ia  had been burdened w ith  
an immense load  of d e ta i le d  a d m in is tra tiv e  work which preven ted  i t  from 
ta k in g  a broad view of ev en ts . I t  had lo s t  touch w ith  In d ia n  o p in ion , 
and, as a consequence, th e  governm ental s t r u c tu r e  o f B r i t i s h  In d ia  was 
dangerously  is o la te d  and top-heavy.
Minto b e liev ed  th a t  th e re  was an u rg en t need to  reduce th e  
v u ln e r a b i l i ty  o f th e  Government o f In d ia  by d e c e n tr a l is in g  power and 
opening new channels f o r  th e  ex p ress io n  o f In d ia n  op in ion . He was 
f u l ly  supported  in  th i s  view by th e  new L ib e ra l S ec re ta ry  of S ta te ,
John M orley, who was convinced th a t  th e re  had to  be a fundam ental 
change in  th e  n a tu re  of B r i t i s h  government in  In d ia . ’C a s t- iro n  
bureaucracy  w on 't go on fo r  e v e r , we may be q u i te  su re  o f t h a t , ’ he 
remarked to  M into.
M orley saw the  danger o f f a i l in g  to  s a t i s f y  the  a s p ir a t io n s  o f the  
m oderate In d ia n  n a t io n a l i s t s  fo r  a g re a te r  sh are  in  th e  government of 
t h e i r  co u n try , and he proposed reform s o f  th e  execu tiv e  and l e g i s l a t i v e  
co u n c ils  to  p rov ide  new o p p o r tu n itie s  fo r  th i s  group. He p laced 
p a r t i c u la r  im portance upon th e  adm ission of In d ian s  to  th e  execu tive
49
M orley to  M into, 6 Jun 1906, J . Morley: R e c o lle c tio n s , v o l. I I ,  p. 141*
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c o u n c ils , f o r  th e se  were th e  b a s tio n s  of au to cracy . For th a t  very  
reaso n  the  p roposal scan d a lised  the  I .C .S . M orley, however, in s is te d  
th a t  i f  the  B r i t i s h  were to  re g a in  th e  confidence of th e  moderate 
n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  they  must g ive  an e a rn e s t o f t h e i r  good f a i t h  by opening
•j
th e se  je a lo u sly -g u ard ed  doors to  them. In  August 1907 he appointed
2
K.G. Gupta and S a iy id  Husain B ilgram i to  h is  Council in  London, and, 
two y e a rs  l a t e r  a f t e r  a hard s tru g g le  w ith  th e  o f f i c i a l s ,  he got 
S .P . S inha in to  the  Viceroy*s Council as law member. The Governments 
o f B engal, Bombay and Madras were in s tru c te d  to  fo llow  s u i t  w ith  t h e i r  
E x e c u tiv e s .^
The n a tu re  o f the  l e g i s l a t i v e  co u n c il reform s was worked out 
betw een Morley and Minto in  a long  correspondence ex tend ing  over fo u r 
y e a rs  from 1906 to  1909. The two men were agreed th a t  th e  purpose 
should be to  r a l l y  support fo r  a Government which had become dangerously  
i s o la te d ;  to  a s s o c ia te  n o n -o f f ic ia ls  w ith  an over-tax ed  A dm in istra tion ; 
and to  prov ide th a t  A d m in is tra tio n  w ith  a means o f f e e l in g  th e  pu lse  
o f p u b lic  o p in io n , thereby  en ab lin g  i t  to  avoid ano ther misjudgment 
such as had occurred  over th e  p a r t i t i o n  o f Bengal. They a lso  agreed 
th a t  w hile  th e  e le c t iv e  p r in c ip le  should be in tro d u ced , the  l e g is la tu r e s  
should  not have power over th e  Government. They were to  be responsive  
not re s p o n s ib le .
1
M orley to  M into, 2 Aug 1906, J . M orley: R e c o lle c tio n s , v o l. I I ,  p. 149«
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Where th e  two men d is a g re e d  was over th e  r e l a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
im p o rtan ce  o f v a r io u s  In d ia n  com m unities and th e  manner in  w hich th e y  
sho u ld  he re p re s e n te d  in  th e  c o u n c i ls .  M orley m a in ta in ed  th a t  th e  
e s s e n t i a l  pu rpose  o f th e  refo rm s must he to  s a t i s f y  groups such  as  th e  
h h a d ra lo k  -  th e  new w e s te rn -e d u c a te d  In d ia n s  -  and to  p ro v id e  t h e i r  
l e a d e r s  w ith  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  w orthw hile  p o l i t i c a l  s e r v ic e .  We must 
'do  o u r b e s t  to  make E n g lish  r u l e r s  f r ie n d s  w ith  In d ia n  l e a d e r s , '  he 
w ro te  to  M in to , 'and  a t  th e  same tim e . . .  to  t r a i n  them in  h a h i t s  o f 
p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ' He a lso  r e a l i s e d  th a t  th e  form o f th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  co n cess io n s  had an i n t r i n s i c  im portance  fo r  th e  In d ia n  
n a t i o n a l i s t s .  They wanted to  fo llo w  th e  same p a th  a s  B r i t a in  and th e  
w h ite  c o lo n ie s .  With t h i s  i n  m ind, M orley u rg ed  th a t  th e  b a s is  o f
2
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  in  th e  new c o u n c ils  shou ld  be t e r r i t o r i a l ,  no t communal.
M into d id  no t ag ree  w ith  t h i s .  He i n s i s t e d  th a t  th e r e  were o th e r  
com m unities q u i te  as im p o rta n t as th e  w e s te rn is e d  u rb an  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  
and th a t  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  would be t r u l y  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  on ly  i f  a l l  
th e s e  com m unities were in c lu d e d . 'P e r s o n a l ly  my o b je c t  has been  in  th e  
p roposed  re fo rm s to  secu re  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  lan d ed  p r o p r ie t o r s ,  
and o f  th o se  who have a s ta k e  in  th e  c o u n try , and o f co m m u n itie s ,' he 
e x p la in e d ."  S upported  by h is  su b o rd in a te s  i n  th e  Government o f I n d ia ,
1
M orley to  M in to , 2 Apr 19(^ 9> q u o te d , J .  Buchan: Lord M into. A M emoir,
p. 289 .”
2
GI, Home P u b l ic ,  A205-244, Feb 1909.
3
I b i d ,  A11 6-48 , Oct 1908.
C OD u
he em phasised th a t  th e  g r e a t  la n d h o ld e rs  and th e  Muslims shou ld  he
g iv e n  s p e c ia l  c o n s id e ra t io n  b ecause  o f  t h e i r  im portance as c o n s e rv a t iv e
and lo y a l  g roups on w hich th e  B r i t i s h  in  In d ia  cou ld  r e l y  f o r  s u p p o r t.
M orley was to ld  th a t  th e s e  g roups would be swamped u n le s s  th e y  were
p ro v id ed  w ith  s e p a ra te  communal r e p r e s e n ta t io n .  He f i n a l l y  gave in
on t h i s  p o in t ,  to  th e  d is g u s t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  who c o n s id e re d  th a t
communal r e p r e s e n ta t io n  was a c a lc u la te d  a tte m p t to  keep  th e  In d ia n  
2n a t io n  d iv id e d .
The l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls  as  r e c o n s t i tu te d  u nder th e  In d ia n  C ouncils  
Act o f 1909 had n o n - o f f ic i a l  m a jo r i t i e s ,  w ith  a l a r g e  p ro p o r tio n  o f  
e le c te d  members re tu rn e d  from communal and s e c t io n a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s .
I n  r e c o g n i t io n  o f i t s  p o l i t i c a l  m a tu r i ty ,  Bengal a lo n e  was g iv e n  
R e p re se n ta tiv e  Government. The c o u n c i l lo r s  were now empowered to  
d is c u s s  ’ any m a tte r  o f  g e n e ra l p u b lic  i n t e r e s t '  and to  move r e s o lu t io n s  
on th e  b u d g e t .“'
To g u id e  them in  t h e i r  work o f re fo rm , M orley and M into had 
ap p o in te d  a Royal Commission in  1907 "to a d v ise  upon d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n .
1
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'The Moslems have sung to  th e  tu n e  w hich h a s  been  p lay ed  to  them , and 
th in k  a s e p a r a t io n  from t h e i r  own countrym en w il l  r a i s e  them in  power 
and d ig n i ty  . . . .  7/hen th e  h i s to r y  o f  t h i s  c leav ag e  w i l l  come to  be 
w r i t t e n ,  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f th o se  who fom ented i t ,  and th e  f o l l y  o f  
th o se  who a cc ep ted  i t ,  w i l l  be r e c o rd e d . ' (R .C . B u tt to  G.K. G okhale, 
28 Jun  1909> Gokhale p a p e r s .)
3
In d ia n  C ouncils  A ct, 1909. PP, 1910, /C d. 49877» v o l.  LXVII,
pp. 617- 1101.
Its report was presented in the following year. As a result of its
recommendations, the institutions of local self-government were re- 
■)fashioned. It was also severely critical of the concentration of
power in the hands of the Government of India, and it insisted upon a
devolution to the provinces. The larger of these should all have
2non-i.C.S. Governors assisted hy executive councils. Acting upon its 
advice, Morley in 1909 provided an Executive Council for Bengal, which 
previously had been ruled by a lone Lieutenant-Governor.^
Because of the trouble over the partition, Bengal occupied a 
disproportionate amount of Morley and Minto’s time. They both regarded 
the partition as a mistake. 1 2345 ... from start to finish the thing* has 
been badly managed,’ complained Minto in March 1906.^ In an attempt to 
smooth things over, he removed from office Curzon’s protege, the impulsive 
Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal & Assam, Bampfylde Puller.
Morley heartily approved of this action. ’Partition is a disagreeable 
pill,’ he wrote. ’Well, that is all the more reason why we should take 
any chance of gilding it. Fuller and his like seem to think that the 
best plan is to gild the pill with w o r m w o o d . T h i s  policy of appeasement
1
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was a f a i l u r e .  The a n t i - p a r t i t i o n  a g i ta t io n  grew in  s tre n g th  and 
v io le n c e , and Minto f i n a l ly  re s o r te d  to  imprisonment w ithout t r i a l  
and to  p re ss  censorship* This a t  l e a s t  re s to re d  an appearance o f o rd e r  
hu t i t  was no permanent s o lu tio n . ’ . . .  nobody w ill  be more ready 
th an  you to  agree th a t  the  fo rc e s  w ith  which we are  contending a re  f a r
too s u b t le ,  deep, and d iv e r s i f ie d ,  to  be abated  by making s e d it io u s
1
le a d in g  a r t i c l e s  e x p e n s iv e ,1 remarked M orley to  M into. Both men
2favoured  the  r e u n if ic a t io n  of B engal, b u t i t  was l e f t  to  t h e i r  
su c c e sso rs , Lord Crewe and Lord H ardinge, to  e f f e c t  i t .
Crewe succeeded Morley as S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  in  O ctober 1910 and 
Hardinge took over from Minto a month l a t e r .  Together they  p repared  a 
bo ld  p lan  to  complete th e  work of reform  begun by th e i r  p red ecesso rs . 
T h e ir purpose was th e  same: to  d e c e n tra l is e  power and to  o f f e r  to  
p o l i t i c a l  In d ia  new scope fo r  in flu en c e  in  a f f a i r s  of s t a t e .  Again 
Bengal loomed la rg e  in  t h e i r  arrangem ents. The Government of In d ia  
would be s h i f te d  away from troublesom e C a lc u tta  to  D elh i. At th e  same 
tim e , Bengal would be re u n ite d  under a G overnor-in -C ouncil, w ith  B ihar 
& O ris sa  form ing a sep a ra te  province on one s id e  and Assam on th e  
o th e r . These rearrangem ents, i t  was to  be made c le a r ,  were to  enab le  
th e  Government o f In d ia  to  de tach  i t s e l f  from the  p ro v in ces, which
3 Feb 1910, J .  Morley: R e c o lle c tio n s , v o l. I I ,  p. 282.
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might then gain a greater measure of autonomy and enjoy increasing
non-official influence in their administration.
King George V visited India in 1911 and at a spectacular durbar
at Delhi on 12 December he announced the scheme to an incredulous India.
1 April 1912 was chosen as the date for the reunification of Bengal and
Crewe was careful to select as the first Governor a man of liberal
sympathies. His choice was Lord Carmichael of Skirling, who had
succeeded Gladstone as Liberal member of Parliament for Midlothian and
who had later been a popular Governor of both Victoria and Madras.
Crewe sent him to Bengal with a special charge to exercise 'fine tact'
in an effort to convince his subjects and, no less important, his
2subordinates that a new era had opened.
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CHAPTER I I
A MAN WITH A MISSION
The G overnor1 2s Task
In  th e  opening weeks o f 1912, th e  Bengal newspapers were busy 
w ith  th a t  tim e-honoured B r i t i s h  In d ian  s p o r t :  p ick in g  the  new Governor. 
T h e ir innum erable e d i to r i a l  t i p s  were d e liv e re d  w ith  the  u su a l a i r  o f 
a u th o r i ty  b u t fo r  once a l l  were wrong. 'Lord Carmichael i s  th e  s tee d  
we d id  no t fancy  fo r  th e  G overno rsh ip ,1 remarked one paper. *He had 
ju s t  won th e  Madras Cup, and i t  i s  very  r a r e  fo r  such h o rses to  run
•j
tw ic e  in  one month. * Carm ichael had been  ap p o in ted  Governor o f  Madras
in  November 1911, a f t e r  th re e  su cc e ss fu l y e a rs  in  V ic to r ia . By h is
f r ie n d ly  in fo rm a lity  and h is  l ib e r a l  speeches, he had achieved ra p id
p o p u la r ity  i n  h is  new p o s t, and i t  was obvious th a t  h is  prem ature
t r a n s f e r  to  Bengal was in tended  as a p u b lic  dem onstration  o f the  B r i t i s h
2
G overn m en ts d e te r m in a tio n  to  pursue a new p o l ic y  th e r e .
He went to  Bengal w ith  a m ission : to  appease the  anger o f th a t  
u n s e t t le d  p rov ince . By h is  l i b e r a l  in flu en c e  on th e  A d m in is tra tio n , he
1
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was to  prove th a t  the  r e u n if ic a t io n  betokened a change of h e a r t ,  no t 
m erely a m o d ifica tio n  o f i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and he was to  seek a s im ila r  
change of h e a r t  in  Bengal p o l i t i c s .  I t  was hoped in  th i s  way to  
re c o n c ile  th e  d is se n s io u s  communities and to  put an end to  te r ro r is m .
The S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te ,  Lord Crewe, w rote to  Carmichael on 
15 January  1912 o u tl in in g  h is  ta s k  and su g g es tin g  p o ss ib le  cou rses  o f 
a c tio n . The l e t t e r  rev ealed  a s o p h is tic a te d  and sym pathetic under­
s tan d in g  o f Bengal p o l i t i c s .  In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , Crewe emphasised 
th a t  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  Bengal had d i s t in c t iv e  fe a tu re s  which marked 
th e  p rovince out from th e  r e s t  o f In d ia  and which made unusual demands 
on i t s  Government fo r  th e  e x e rc ise  o f p o l i t i c a l  f in e s s e .  Comparing 
C arm ichae l's  new post w ith  th e  o f f ic e  he had ju s t  l e f t  in  M adras,
Crewe wrote*
There can be no doubt in  y o u r, o r in  any o th e r ,  mind th a t  th e  
f i e ld  o f work in  which you w il l  now move i s  bo th  w ider and more 
s tre n u o u s , g iv in g  scope bo th  fo r  f u l l e r  energy and f in e r  t a c t .
As to  t h i s ,  I  can only t e l l  you th a t  Hardinge and I  f ra n k ly  
agreed t h a t ,  had we been f r e e  from o th e r  o b lig a t io n s , th e  
f i r s t  governorsh ip  o f Bengal would have been a p est which e i th e r  
o f us might have u n d ertak en , had i t  been o ffe re d  to  u s , w ith  a 
f u l l  r e a l i s a t i o n  of i t s  g re a t im portance, and w ith  no i l l u s i o n  
th a t  th e  d u tie s  would be sim p ler o r e a s ie r  th an  o th e rs  which 
we have, or have had, to  perform .
' I f  I  were going to  C a lcu tta  m y se lf , ' he co n tinued , *1 should draw 
a rough sk e tch  in  my own mind o f th e  th re e  main c la s s e s  o f my fu tu re  
s u b je c ts ,  w ith  a p ro v is io n a l o u tl in e  of th e  reaso n ab le  way to  t r e a t  each.
1
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Crewe’s ’three main classes' were the European non-officials, the 
Muslims and the bhadralok.
The first of these - the European non-officials - were more 
numerous in Bengal than in any other part of India. They numbered 
20£ thousand, of whom twelve thousand were in Calcutta, for this was 
the headquarters of British Indian trade. Through the Bengal Chamber 
of Commerce and through private influence, the community had always 
been able to put strong pressure on the Government, and, if checked, 
its displeasure found expression in the columns of the Englishman, the 
Statesman, Capital and Commerce, Calcutta’s four main British-owned 
newspapers. The community had a powerful lobby both in Whitehall and 
at Westminster, and its opinion was normally sought by the officials 
on matters of importance.
In 1912 it was smarting from the blow to its influence and pride
which had been dealt by the transfer of the capital to Delhi. Its
leaders had not been consulted about this move and it confirmed them
in their belief, born of the admission of Indians in greater numbers
to the councils, that the Government was giving way ’before the attacks
of a democracy of literati, who have a sense of nothing beyond their 
1own importance.' The Government of India, they feared, had put its 
foot on a slippery decline which might slide British rule, and with 
it British commerce, into the sea. Crewe was confident that Carmichael
Englishman, 25 Dec 1913* Cf* ibid, 6 Mar 1913*
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would handle them t a c t f u l ly .  He wrote*
The C a lcu tta  E n g lish  seem to  he d isp o sed , many of them, to  ta k e  
a more s e n s ib le  view o f th e  changes th an  they  d id  a t  f i r s t ;  bu t 
th e re  seems l ik e ly  to  rem ain a no isy  and v io le n t  m in o r ity , 
re p re se n te d  by The Englishm an, who w ill  more probably expend 
t h e i r  w rath  on H ardinge, m oreover, th an  on the  new Governor.
The community in c lu d e s , I  am su re , a number of h o n est, cap ab le , 
and l ik e a b le  people* but I  am not le s s  su re  th a t  th ey  a re  
s p o i l t  c h ild re n  in  many re s p e c ts ,  f u l l  o f t h e i r  h i s to r i c a l  and 
s o c ia l  im portance, a n t i - In d ia n  au fond , and keen to  scen t out 
" d is lo y a lty "  in  any independent ex p ress io n  of o p in io n , h id e ­
bound too in  c la s s  p re ju d ic e s . You w ill  have to  r id e  them 
w ith  a l i g h t  hand, as you a re  w ell competent to  do -  a l l  the  
more as t h e i r  mouths a re  so re  fo r  th e  tim e being*.
The second of Crewe's 'c l a s s e s ' ,  th e  E a s te rn  Bengal Muslims were
a lso  up in  arms over the r e u n i f ic a t io n .  The 1905 arrangem ent had s u ite d
them very  w ell fo r  i t  had g iven  them a m a jo rity  in  th e  new prov ince
o f E a s te rn  Bengal & Assam and a sh are  in  p u b lic  a f f a i r s  which th e y  had
p re v io u s ly  been den ied . There had been a b ia s  among th e  I .C .S . o f f ic e r s
in  E a s te rn  Bengal & Assam in  t h e i r  favour^ and th e i r  le a d e r ,  th e  Nawab
o f Dacca, had ex erc ised  g re a t in flu en c e  on th e  Government. Dacca and
C h ittagong , th e  c a p i ta l  and p o rt r e s p e c tiv e ly  of th e  new p ro v in ce , had 
2
boomed. There had been more jobs fo r  th e  members of th e  sm all Muslim
1
' . . .  i t  may have been unconsc ious, bu t th e  b ia s  among o f f i c i a l s  in  
favou r o f Mohammedans was s tro n g . A ll Hindus thought t h i s . ' 
(Carm ichael to  Crewe, 21 Aug 1912, C arm ichael, p. 169•)
2
In  th e  decade I9O I-H  th e  p o p u la tio n  o f Dacca ro se  by 21$ and th a t  
o f  C hittagong by 30$. The in c re a se  fo r  G rea te r C a lcu tta  was only  
11.9$ and fo r  Bengal as a whole only  8$. ( Census of In d ia . 1911« 
v o l. I ,  p. 31; v o l. V, p t .  i ,  pp. 37 & 152.X ”
m id d le -c la ss . I t  was an In d ian  summer which came to  a sudden and
f r o s ty  end w ith  the  D elhi announcement in  December 1911* This cut
th e  Muslims to  th e  quick . The B r i t i s h ,  i t  seemed, had perform ed a
v o l te - f a c e  to  p ac ify  th e  Hindu e x tre m is ts . Muslim resentm ent was
tem pered only  by the d e te rm in a tio n  to  g a in  as many concessions as
p o s s ib le  as indem nity fo r  B r i t i s h  tre a c h e ry .
Crewe adv ised  Carmichael to  ta k e  a firm  l in e  w ith  them:
As reg a rd s  the  Mohammadans, e s p e c ia l ly  th o se  of E as te rn  Bengal,
I  am g lad  th a t  Hardinge agreed w ith  me th a t  we ought not to  delay  
in  going  to  Dacca and having  i t  out w ith  them on th e  sp o t. They 
a re  try ing-, as one would suppose was l i k e l y ,  to  e x tra c t  every 
s o r t  o f " fa v o u r i te 1s"  trea tm en t from Government on th e  s tre n g th  
o f lo s in g  th e i r  v a s t num erical predominance. There i s  a g re a t 
deal th a t  they cannot have, and I  am c le a r  th a t  th e  r ig h t  road 
i s  to  h e lp  them as a community by ed u ca tio n a l f a c i l i t ie s  and the
l i k e ,  to  run a t even w eights w ith  th e  H indus, r a th e r  th an  to
con tinue  in d e f in i te ly  the  p ra c t ic e  which has been found necessary  
a t  f i r s t ,  o f g iv in g  them an advantage in  th e  handicap . They 
have a r a th e r  c le v e r  paper in  C a lc u tta , e d ite d  by one Mohamed 
A li , a sharp  fe llow  who used to  be in  th e  Baroda s e rv ic e ; and I  
a n t ic ip a te  th a t  th e re  w ill  be a good deal o f t a lk  and w ritin g  
b e fo re  th e  new machine beg ins to  g rin d  corn . But I  fe e l  
co n fid en t th a t  the  t o t a l  r e s u l t  w ill  be an a l l e v ia t i o n ,  not an 
ex ac e rb a tio n , o f f e e l in g  in  Bengal between Moslem and Hindu, 
and th a t  th e  ta s k  of th e  p o lic e  w il l  thus be f a r  e a s ie r .
Among th e  th i r d  ‘c l a s s ' ,  th e  b h ad ra lo k , th e re  was ju b i la t io n  over
the  r e u n i f ic a t io n  of th e  p rov ince . The Moderate p o l i t i c i a n s ,  le d  by
S urendranath  B an erjea , claim ed th i s  as t h e i r  v ic to ry .  The d isp u te  in
th e  n a t io n a l i s t  movement between th e  M oderates, who favoured c o n s t i tu t io n a l
1
Large in c re a s e s  in  th e  P ro v in c ia l and S ubord inate  S erv ices f o r  both  
Bengal and E a s te rn  Bengal & Assam were approved in  Ju ly  1906. In  
th e  l a t t e r  p rov ince th e  Muslims were g iven  p re fe ren ce  fo r  appointm ent 
to  th e se  v acan c ies . (G I, Home P u b lic , A29-31> Ju l 1906.)
m ethods, and th e  E x trem is ts , who advocated v io le n c e , had come to  a head 
a t  the  1907 a l l - I n d i a  Congress se s s io n  a t  S u ra t , where th e  M oderates 
had succeeded in  o u s tin g  the  E x trem ists  from th e  o rg a n is a tio n . In  
Bengal many of the  E x trem ists  had been a r re s te d  and deported  under th e  
Government's severe a n t i - t e r r o r i s t  m easures in  19O8 , and th o se  who 
re ta in e d  th e i r  freedom had been fo rced  e i th e r  to  leav e  p o l i t i c s  o r to  
o p e ra te  s e c re t ly .  The f i e ld  was th u s  c le a re d  f o r  th e  Moderates who 
continued  th e i r  a g i ta t io n  a g a in s t th e  p a r t i t i o n  through th e  l i b e r a l  
In d ian  A sso c ia tio n . In  1911 they  sen t Bhupendranath Basu to  p re s s  t h e i r
•j
case in  England and t h e i r  memorial to  th e  Government o f In d ia  on th e
su b je c t provided much of th e  wording fo r  H ard in g e 's  despatch  recommending 
2
the  r e u n if ic a t io n .  B anerjea  and h is  men were w e ll-p leased  w ith  th e  
f r u i t s  o f t h e i r  lab o u rs  and they  le d  the  b h ad ra lo k 's  r e jo ic in g  f o r  th e  
p rovince reg a in ed .
Crewe, however, r e a l is e d  th a t  th i s  one m easure, no m a tte r  how
sp e c ta c u la r  o r welcome, was no t on i t s  own s u f f ic ie n t  to  r e p a i r  th e
breach  between th e  bhadralok  and th e  B r i t i s h ,  and he warned Carm ichael
a g a in s t a h a s ty  assum ption th a t  the  c u rre n t mood would l a s t .  He wrote*
You w ill  fin d  th e  B engalis^  immensely c i v i l ,  and e ffu s iv e  to  a 
degree over the new p ro v in ce . I  th in k  i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th e  p a r ty
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IA, General m eeting p ro ceed in g s , Apr 1911«
2
IA, Annual Report 1911> appendix E, pp. 19-42. PP, 1911» /Cd. 59797» 
v o l . LV, pp. 582- 98.
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At th i s  tim e the  B r i t i s h  cu sto m arily  r e s t r i c t e d  th e  term  'B engali*  to  
th e  B engali Hindus.
led by Surendra Nath Banerji has won the day, and that the 
orders are that the loss of the capital is not to be treated 
as a public grievance, in view of the benefits actually conferred. 
In conversation, therefore, one finds little but outpoured 
gratitude. But there are certainly some sulks in Calcutta 
itself, particularly as some leading people are owners of 
house property. Had one of our friends gone there who would 
be likely, however, able he might be, to take too literally 
the underlined expressions of Bengali feeling, I should have 
looked forward with some nervousness to the future, not so 
much because I should have feared his becoming enthralled by 
the Bengalis, as because I should have dreaded the subsequent 
disillusionment and its possible results. But in your case 
I have no such fears, because I know you won’t be tempted to 
begin by too much credulity, and then break off into a 
completely unsympathetic course.
Communities & Colleagues
Armed with Crewe’s good advice, Carmichael approached his new work 
with optimism. By disposition an amiable and easy-going man, he 
believed that others would always respond to goodwill and he saw no 
reason to think that, in this respect, human nature in India was any 
different from elsewhere. He was encouraged in his optimism by the
2enthusiasm with which his appointment was greeted in the Bengal press, 
and, upon arrival in Calcutta in April 1912, he immediately set out to 
establish contact with leading members of the various communities.
In his efforts to win the friendship of the non-official Europeans, 
he enjoyed the inestimable advantage of being a Scot, for both the
_
See his first speech in Bengal, 1 Apr 1912, Carmichael, p. 157» 
Carmichael to Crewe, 14 May 1913) ibid, pp. 181—2.
2
Selections from all major papers published in Statesman, 23 & 24 
Jan 1912.
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commercial and planting communities were led by Scots. He made it 
clear that he was eager to learn all he could about the needs of Bengal 
industry, and when he deserted his desk at Government House to inspect 
the port facilities along the Hooghly or to examine the neglected 
canals in Eastern Bengal, the non-officials were quick to contrast this 
with the reluctance of former I.C.S. Lieutenant-Governors to leave 
their files. *
Carmichael was a keen and knowledgeable agriculturalist and on
his first tours he was horrified by the state of rural Bengal. He
believed that, for any improvement to be effected, the Government had
2to gain the co-operation of the great zamindars. He was soon on 
intimate terms with their leader, the young Maharajadhiraja of Burdwan, 
who, for his part, was merely renewing the position of gubernatorial 
confidant, which he had maintained for the preceding nine years.
Carmichael, however, was not to be satisfied with courtiers. He 
was determined to understand all sections of Bengali society, including 
those who were regarded as his Government’s opponents. He caused a 
stir by inviting the leading nationalists to Government House and by 
letting it be known that he would learn Bengali. His humility and
1
Capital, 12 Dec 1912. Carmichael to Crewe, 21 Aug 1912, Carmichael,
pp. 170-1.
2
Carmichael to Crewe, ibid, pp. 168-70.
Author’s interview with Hemendra Prasad Ghose, Calcutta, 19 Nov i960.
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h is  d e s ire  to  keep in  touch w ith  In d ia n  o p in io n , can be i l l u s t r a t e d
w ith a l e t t e r  which he wrote on 18 May 1912 to  M o tila l Ghose, th e
v e te ra n  n a t io n a l i s t  e d i to r  o f a le a d in g  C a lcu tta  S nglish -language
d a i ly ,  th e  Amrita Bazar P a t r ik a .
I  want to  t e l l  you th a t  I  s h a l l  always be more than  g ra te fu l  to  
you, i f  you d i r e c t ly  or i n d i r e c t ly  l e t  me know of any th ing  to  
which you th in k  I  ought to  a tte n d . I  d a re  say I  s h a ll  o f te n  
le a r n  o f  such th in g s  from th e  Amrita Bazar P a t r ik a . I  have done 
so a lre a d y . I  am s in c e re ly  anxious to  h e lp  any one who i s  
try in g  to  make Bengal a h ap p ier p lace  fo r  i t s  people to  l iv e  
in .  I  know th a t  many people must be d isap p o in ted  w ith  me, fo r  
I  know I  s h a l l  never be ab le  to  do as much as many people expect. 
They may even be angry w ith  me. I  sh an ’ t  blame them, fo r  people 
ought to  expect more than  i s  p o s s ib le  from every  one put in  
a u th o r i ty . I t  i s  only by doing so th a t  th ey  a re  ab le  g rad u a lly  
to  g e t what i s  p o ss ib le . And in  th e  case  o f a Governor i t  i s  
o f te n  I  fancy  only because he i s  blamed th a t  he i s  ab le  to  ge t 
o th e rs  whose advice he must o f te n  l i s t e n  to  even when sometimes 
he l e a s t  t r u s t s  i t  to  agree to  t r y  th in g s  w o rth - try in g . But I  
do want to  do a l l  I  can and th a t  a l l  must be g re a te r  o r le s s  
acco rd ing  as those  who know where th e  need l i e s  t e l l  me what 
they  know. I  do not suppose th a t  even i f  a Governor came here  
f u l l  o f lo c a l  knowledge in s te a d  o f coming here  as I  do ig n o ran t 
of even th e  language of my neighbours he could do a te n th  p a rt 
o f what he would l ik e  to  do. There a re  many th in g s  to  hamper 
one. 1
He could have chosen no b e t t e r  way of g a in in g  bhadra lok  goodw ill 
th an  by em phasising th a t  he valued t h e i r  o p in io n s . His h in t  th a t  he 
would no t fo llow  b lin d ly  a f t e r  th e  o f f i c i a l s  was c e r ta in  to  be noted 
w ith  favou r and h is  apology fo r  h is  ignorance  o f B engali was a m aste rly  
touch .
04
C arm ichae l's  g re a te s t  i n i t i a l  problem was w ith  th e  Muslims. He 
had to  t r y  to  win th e i r  goodw ill w hile a t  th e  same tim e making i t  c le a r
Quoted P. B utts Memoirs o f M o tila l Ghose, pp. 196-7«
1
th a t  the  Government f e l t  i t s e l f  under no o b lig a tio n  to  recompense them
fo r  t h e i r  lo s t  p rov ince . A cting on Crewe's ad v ice , he took  th e  b u ll
by th e  h o rn s . Three days a f t e r  h is  a r r iv a l  in  C a lc u tta , in  re p ly  to
an add ress o f welcome from th e  Muslim League, he made h is  p o s i t io n
c le a r .  ' I  am not here to  uphold th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f one r e l ig io n  o r  one
body of p e o p le , ' he s a id . ' I  am here  to  do what I  can fo r  a l l ,  and
no body w ill  f e e l  th a t  more th an  the  Mohammedans.'^
His ta sk  was made e a s ie r  by th e  a t t i tu d e  o f th e  Nawab o f Dacca.
This pow erful Muslim le a d e r  was as determ ined as any o f h is  fo llo w ers
th a t  th e  Muslim community should g a in  a l l  i t  co u ld , but he was a lso
convinced th a t  i t  would be a m istake to  o ffend  th e  Government by p re s s in g
too hard . The Muslims had to  m a in ta in  th e  r ig h t  balance  betw een t h e i r
2demands and t h e i r  ex p ress io n s  o f lo y a l ty .  I t  was e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  
success of t h i s  scheme th a t  th e re  shou ld , a t  a l l  tim es , be Muslims 
c lo se  enough to  the  Government to  sense when i t  was time to  t i p  the 
seesaw one way or th e  o th e r . The Nawab found Carmichael eag er to  
re c e iv e  him as a f r ie n d  and he was soon e s ta b lis h e d  as the  G overnor’ s 
c lo s e s t  n o n -o f f ic ia l  In d ia n  a d v is e r .^  The Muslims had an o th er l in k  
w ith  th e  Government in  th e  person  o f Nawab Shamsul Huda, a High Court
_
C arm ichael, p. 159»
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For an example o f h is  a p p lic a t io n  o f th i s  s t r a te g y  see h is  speech in  
th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, 3 Apr 1914« (BLCP, v o l. XLVI, pp. 619-21.)
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Carmichael to  Crewe, 25 Feb 1915> C arm ichael, p. 204. BLCP, 19 Jan 
1915» vol* XLVII, pp. 3-8.
lawyer and a member of a leading Eastern Bengal landholding family, 
whom Carmichael appointed as the third member of his Executive Council. 
As a Muslim representative in both the Eastern Bengal & Assam and 
Imperial Legislative Councils, he had proved himself an adept exponent 
of the Dacca Nawab's game of balance.
Carmichael had got off to a good start. His initial contacts with 
the European non-officials, the great zamindars , the bhadralok and 
the Muslims were encouraging. The success of his mission, however, 
would depend as much on the attitudes of his colleagues with whom he 
was to work in the provincial Government as on the response from the 
Bengal communities. Unless they were men of liberal sympathies he 
could hope to achieve little. His good fortune was remarkable, for 
although he had no say in their appointment his two I.C.S. Executive 
Councillors, Sir William Duke and Percy Lyon, were well disposed 
towards his plans.
Duke had officiated as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in the eight 
months preceding Carmichael's arrival and his experience was invaluable 
in the difficult period of transition following the reunification. He 
was a reserved man, severe of countenance, and to the casual observer 
he appeared to have little time for the critics of Government, Indian 
or British. His intimate acquaintances, however, knew him as a man 
of scrupulous fairness, and, what was less usual in a Civilian, of 
political imagination. Lyon came to the Bengal Executive Council from 
Eastern Bengal & Assam, where he had been Chief Secretary during the
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p a r t i t i o n  p e rio d , inhere Duke was c au tio u s  and re se rv e d , he was
outspoken. At th is  tim e he made no s e c re t  of h is  sympathy fo r  the
E a s te rn  Bengal Muslims, and l a t e r  he was to  sc a n d a lise  the  Government
o f In d ia  by speaking  to  bhadra lok  s tu d e n ts  o f ’ the  in h e re n t r ig h t  of
2
the  In d ian  n a tio n  to  govern i t s e l f . ’
The L e g is la t iv e  Council
The ra p p o rt which Carmichael had achieved w ith  h is  co lleag u es  and 
th e  le a d e rs  o f th e  major communities would a s s i s t  him g re a t ly  in  h is  
ta s k  o f e f f e c t in g  a rapprochem ent between th e  Government and the  
peop le . He was under no i l l u s io n ,  however, as to  th e  d i f f i c u l ty  o f 
th a t  ta s k ,  b u t he pinned h is  hopes o f success on th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. 
A ll th e  main communities would be rep re sen ted  in  th i s  body and th e re  
they  would have an o p p o rtu n ity  to  th ra s h  out t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  
th e  Government and w ith  one an o th er. Moreover, th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council 
m ight prov ide the bhadra lok  w ith  a means of s a t i s f y in g  th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
a s p i r a t io n s .  Carmichael understood the  im portance to  th e  bhadra lok  o f 
p a rliam en ta ry  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and he was aware o f t h e i r  need fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
’ elbow-room’ .^  He was determ ined to  g ive  them t h i s  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  
C ouncil. He would ensure  th a t  the  new powers o f the  members were
1
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Amrita Bazar P a t r ik a ,* 19 Jan 1916.
Carmichael to Crewe, 14 May 1913> C arm ichael, pp. 181-2.
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c ircum scribed  in  no way. He would in v i te  t h e i r  op in ions on a l l  
im portan t m a tte rs , and dem onstrate by h is  subsequent a c tio n s  th a t  he 
valued th e  adv ice  they  gave. In  r e tu r n  he would ask  fo r  t h e i r  co­
o p e ra tio n  in  in te r p r e t in g  h is  p o l ic ie s  to  the  people."*
In  t h i s  th e re  was no d issem b lin g . Carmichael was a devoted adm irer 
o f the  p a rliam en ta ry  system and was convinced th a t  th e  Morley-Minto 
reform s had been a s te p  in  th e  r ig h t  d i r e c t io n .  He b e liev ed  th a t  fo r  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e  in s t i t u t i o n s  to  develop  in  In d ia  as they  should , th e  
Government had to  encourage th e  Council members to  e x e rc ise  t h e i r
s ta tu to r y  powers of d is c u ss io n  and s u rv e i l la n c e ,  and in  th i s  way
2
a s s o c ia te  them c lo s e ly  w ith  i t s  d e c is io n s .
There were many te c h n ic a l problems to  be d e a l t  w ith  b e fo re  the  new 
Council could m eet. E le c to ra te s  had to  be formed which would s a t i s f y  
the  groups which had sen t r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  to  th e  two o ld  C ouncils of 
Bengal and E as te rn  Bengal & Assam. M oreover, in  the  l i g h t  o f th e  
experience  gained  a t  th e  1909 e le c t io n s  and subsequen tly  in  th e  conduct 
o f l e g i s l a t i v e  b u s in e ss , i t  seemed a d v isa b le  to  amend b o th  th e  Council 
re g u la tio n s  and th e  ru le s  of b u s in e ss .^
_
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Under the statutory regulations of 1909 the Bengal Council had
50 members, of whom four (the Governor and his Executive Councillors)
sat ex officio, and 20 were nominated. The other 26 were elected.^
In 1912 the Government decided to reduce the number of seats reserved
for nomination, thus allowing for two additional elected members.
One of these new seats was given to the non-official members of the
Calcutta Corporation. The other was to be filled at alternate elections
by the local bodies of the Presidency and Burdwan Divisions, the two
2Divisions most strongly influenced by Calcutta. This was obviously
an effort to increase bhadralok representation on the Council and it
was in keeping with the Government of India's declared policy of
encouraging greater non-official influence in provincial administration.
A similar spirit of liberality was shown in redrafting the rules
of business. This was particularly significant, for the work was done
by the Bengal secretariat under Duke's guidance, and, as Duke himself
pointed out, the Government on this occasion had a free hand to frame
the rules as it wished, without the necessity of submitting them for
the approval of the Legislative Council. That no attempt was made in
such circumstances to restrict the Council, certainly suggests a
3
measure of goodwill on the officials’ part.
T
PP, 1910, /Üd. 49877» vol. LXVII, p. 883.
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The R eturn of the  Moderates
One o f th e  most s ig n if ic a n t  fe a tu re s  o f the  d isc u ss io n s  over the
new Council re g u la tio n s  was th e  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  them of the M oderate
n a t io n a l i s t s .  E arly  in  1912 the  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  had subm itted  a
1
memorial o u t l in in g  th e  changes which i t  d e s ired  and in  June Surendranath
S an e rjea  and Bhupendranath Basu had gone to  D a rje e lin g  fo r  a d is c u s s io n
2w ith  Carmichael o f th e se  p ro p o sa ls . They had emphasised t h e i r  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith an arrangem ent which provided the  Muslims w ith  
sep a ra te  communal e le c to ra te s  and y e t r e s t r i c t e d  th e  bhadra lok  to  th e  
r e p re s e n ta t io n  they  could secu re  th rough th e  u n iv e r s i ty  and lo ca l-b o d y  
s e a ts .  'The members o f th e  middle c la s s  as such , who form the  backbone
3
o f In d ia n  s o c ie ty , have no v o t e s , ’ th ey  had com plained. They had
asked fo r  th e  fo rm ation  of a g e n e ra l e l e c to r a te ,  w ith  a f r a n c h is e  based
4
on incom e-tax  o r  lo c a l - r a te  payment.
Carmichael was not p repared  to  go as f a r  as th i s  bu t he was w il l in g
to  concede th e  M oderates' l e s s e r  demands -  an in c re a se  in  the  e le c te d
5
membership of th e  Council and in  C a lc u t ta 's  r e p re s e n ta t io n  -  fo r  he 
ap p re c ia te d  th e  im portance of sec u rin g  th e  M oderates' w ill in g  p a r t i c ip a t io n
1
IA, Annual Report 1912, appendix E, pp. 19-24.
2
S tatesm an , 5 Jun 1912.
3
IA, Annual R eport 1912, appendix E, p . 23«
4
Ib id .
5
Ib id ,  p. 22. S tatesm an, 5 Jun 1912.
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in  th e  new C ouncil. In  1909 "both wings o f th e  Congress in  B engal, 
E x trem ist and M oderate, had re fu sed  to  e n te r  th e  reform ed le g i s l a t i v e  
c o u n c ils  as a p ro te s t  a g a in s t th e  B r i t i s h  f a i lu r e  to  re u n ify  the  
p ro v in ce .^ T his a b s te n tio n  had d e fea ted  M orley1s aim o f b r in g in g  
‘B r i t i s h  r u le r s  and In d ian  le a d e r s ' to g e th e r ,  and i t  had prolonged th e  
dangerous s i tu a t io n  c rea ted  by the  absence o f i n s t i t u t i o n s  to  co n ta in  
b h ad ra lok  p o l i t i c a l  e n e rg ie s . Carmichael knew th a t  he had to  have th e  
M oderates in  h is  Council i f  he were to  have any hope of checking 
te r ro r is m , and r e l ie v in g  r a c i a l  and communal te n s io n . Indeed the  
su rv iv a l o f th e  l i b e r a l ,  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  id e a l among the  bhadralok  
depended upon th e  M oderates e n te r in g  th e  Council and p lay in g  a 
s ig n i f ic a n t  ro le  in  i t s  a f f a i r s .
S u rendranath  B anerjea and th e  group which had heeded h is  in ju n c tio n  
to  b o yco tt th e  1909 c o u n c ils , were aware of the  im portance of t h e i r  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  the new le g i s l a tu r e .  As a sim ple m a tte r  o f p o l i t i c a l  
expediency th ey  could not a f fo rd  to  n eg lec t th e  o p p o rtu n ity , which 
th e  r e u n i f ic a t io n  p rov ided , of r e tu rn in g  to  th e  Council w ithout any 
lo s s  o f f a c e . Excluded fo r  th re e  y ears  by t h e i r  se lf-d e n y in g  ord inance 
from a l l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  they had found i t  in c re a s in g ly  
d i f f i c u l t  to  m ain ta in  t h e i r  in f lu e n c e , and, more p a r t i c u la r ly ,  they 
had been h a rd -p re ssed  to  o f f e r  any w orthw hile a l te r n a t iv e  to  th e  
E x tre m is ts ' campaign o f v io le n c e . T heir s ty le  was c o n s ti tu tio n a lism
N ation  in  Making, pp. 254- 5*
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and it was high-time that they got hack into legislative politics to 
show that it had some value.
There was more at stake here than the future of one political 
party. The bhadralokfs faith in liberal, secural nationalism had 
been severely shaken by British actions in Bengal in the period 1903 
to 190Ö, and the alternative offered by eloquent Extremists like 
Bepin Chandra Pal and Aurobindo Ghose had appeared correspondingly 
attractive. The vernacular press, which found many of its readers 
among those sections of the bhadralok which had been drawn into politics 
for the first time by the partition agitation, had played on the themes 
of racial and cultural extremism, and in doing so had attacked British 
political forms and British institutions. These, it asserted, would 
distort Hindu society, and, for that reason, their advocates - the 
Moderates - were to be seen as enemies of the country. It reminded 
its readers of the patriots who had been deported by the British in 
1908 and it asked them to consider why none of the Moderates had 
suffered exile in the Andamans.
The following example of this line of reasoning is taken from an
article which appeared during the election campaign of December 1912
in the influential Calcutta Bengali daily, Nayak:
The right of voting is one of the serious evils which, in the 
guise of boons, English rule has introduced into this country.
The Municipalities and District Boards and similar institutions 
have really nothing to do with the country and with society, 
either Hindu or Moslem. They do not represent the country and 
the people, and have nothing to do with the people's religion 
or society. Only men who have money and possess influence and
r? r>
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can m anipu late  th e  v o te rs  ge t in to  th ese  b o d ie s , which 
again  r e tu r n  members to  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council • • • •  These 
Babus who a re  b r is k ly  canvassing  f o r  v o te s , whom do th ey  
re p re se n t?  There i s  no t e l l i n g  what would have been the  
outcome o f Mr Basu’s M arriage B i l l ,  bu t fo r  the  p resence of 
th e  M aharaja of Burdwan on th e  C o u n c il.1 Why should such 
ic o n o c la s t  Babus be p e rm itted  to  pass as r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  
o f th e  Hindus? These Babus, who a re  u t t e r l y  w ithout r e l ig io n ,  
may be lik e n e d  to  poison thrown out by th e  churning o f Hindu 
s o c ie ty  by the  E n g lish , and i t  i s  fo r  th e  E n g lish  l ik e  
an o th er N ilkan tha  must g rap p le  w ith  them. Why, in s te a d  o f 
doing t h a t ,  do Englishmen allow  t h i s  poison  to  s c a t t e r  i t s e l f  
over th e  whole framework of Hindu so c ie ty ? 2
The M oderates were profoundly  d is tu rb e d  by the  e f f e c t s  of th i s  
a n t i - l i b e r a l  p re ss  campaign. In  a no te  which he prepared fo r  h is  
committee in  May 1913> the  p re s id e n t o f th e  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n , Ambika 
Charan Majumdar, wrote:
I t  i s  no t my in te n t io n  to  c re a te  an a larm , but I  am a f r a id  our 
p u b lic  men would be g u i l ty  o f cu lp ab le  n e g lec t i f  th ey  f a i l  to  
take  tim e ly  n o tic e  o f th e  a c tu a l s i tu a t io n  in  th e  coun try  and in  
any way c o n tr ib u te  to  t h e i r  own d ecep tio n  as w ell as to  the  
growing- d em o ra liza tio n  o f th e  p u b lic . Even th e  reform ed 
c o u n c ils  w ill  be of no a v a il  to  us i f  th e re  i s  not a volume o f 
l iv in g ,  h e a lth y  p u b lic  o p in io n  behind them a c t iv e ly  working up 
to  th e  end which th e se  co u n c ils  a re  in tended  to  ach ieve  . . . .  
Recent ev en ts  must have p a in fu lly  im pressed both  the  people and 
th e  government th a t  th e  b o ast o f s e c u r i ty  of l i f e  and p ro p e rty  
under th e  B r i t i s h  ru le  has re ce iv ed  a rude shock. Robbers,
1
S p ec ia l M arriage Amendment B i l l  in tro d u ced  to  th e  Im p eria l L e g is la t iv e  
Council in  1911 by Bhupendranath Basu. I t  was opposed by orthodox 
Hindus and Muslims, as i t  would have made p o ss ib le  in te r - c a s te  and 
in te r - c r e e d  m arriages by p ro v id in g  fo r  c iv i l  weddings, ( im p e ria l 
L e g is la t iv e  Council P ro ceed in g s , v o ls . XLIX & L.)
2
Nayak,* 3 Dec 1912. The a l lu s io n  i s  to  the  God S iv a , who drank the  
po ison  ra is e d  by the  churning- of th e  ocean by gods and demons, and thus 
saved the  u n iv e rse  from i t s  e f f e c t s .  The poison  s tu ck  in  h is  th r o a t ,  
which became b lu e  in  c o lo u r , and th e r e a f te r  he was known as N ilk an th a , 
the  god w ith  th e  b lue th r o a t .
d a c o its  and s e c re t  m urderers have become rampant throughout 
th e  co u n try , w hile innocen t and d e fe n ce le ss  people in  the 
v i l l a g e s ,  in  some cases not even very f a r  from p o lic e  s ta t io n s ,  
a re  l iv in g  in  c o n stan t t e r r o r  o f badmashes. The customary 
exchange of charges and co u n ter-ch arg es  between the  p o lic e  
and th e  p u b lic  b r in g s  no r e l i e f  to  th e  su ffe r in g “ people, 
w hile crim e i s  always in  th e  in c re a se  w ithou t l e t  o r h indrance . . . .  
The bureaucracy  i s  no doubt s a tu ra te d  w ith  i t s  own p re ju d ic e s  
and p re d ile c t io n s  and th e  p o lic e  i s  n o to rio u s ly  co rru p t and 
incom petent. But i t  seems to  me th a t  th e  p u b lic  cannot be 
wholly exonerated  from th e  charge th a t  th ey  have as y e t done 
very  l i t t l e  a c t iv e ly  to  h e lp  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  . . . .  A w ell 
d ire c te d  and su s ta in e d  p r a c t ic a l  e f f o r t  on our p a r t  may count 
fo r  much and w ill  a t  a l l  even ts serve  to  ju s t i f y  our p o s i t io n  
w ith  th e  government.
The M oderates, l ik e  Carm ichael, pinned th e i r  hopes o f r e s to r in g  
th e  s i tu a t io n  on the  new C ouncil. I f  they  could re c a p tu re  bhadra lok  
a t te n t io n  by t h e i r  a c tio n s  in  th e  l e g i s la tu r e  and win w idespread 
support w ith  th e  measures they  sponsored , th en  the  community's f a i t h  
in  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  methods would su re ly  be renewed. The r e u n if ic a t io n  
o f Bengal and th e  B r i t i s h  prom ises o f a new l ib e ra l is m  in  In d ian  
government augured w e ll. The M oderates' hopes were fu r th e r  encouraged 
by C arm ich ae l's  appointm ent and by h is  ev id en t d e s ir e  to  a s s i s t  them 
in  ach iev in g  th e i r  aim. B anerjea  voiced th e i r  optimism in  a le ad in g  
a r t i c l e  in  th e  Bengalee o f 19 Ju ly  1912: 'The fu tu re  i s  o u rs . The 
w orld-wide fo rc e s  o f p ro g ress  a re  w ith  us and th e  sym pathies of 
c iv i l i z e d  mankind w ill  support us in  our c o n s t i tu t io n a l  e f f o r t s  fo r  
th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f our d e s t in ie s  which can only  be accom plished by 
a measure o f self-governm ent th a t  w ill  h e lp  forw ard th e  development
1
A. C. Majumdar to  Pram athanath B an erjea , 13 May 1913> e n c lo su re , IA MSS
of all that is best and noblest in us. Then will indeed England have 
fulfilled her high mission in the East#1 2
The Elections
The elections for the new Bengal Legislative Council were held 
in December 1912 and January 1913*^ For Banerjea's group of Moderates 
this was the first time they had faced a Council electorate, and they 
framed their appeal to their constituents in terms of their ability to 
discharge the grave responsibilities of legislators. One of their 
election manifestos read:
To the people of India has been granted the right of increasing 
participation in the work of framing laws for themselves, and to 
prove ourselves worthy of this right we must return the best of 
our men# Laws that are passed in the Legislative Councils affect 
the interests of all .... Great responsibilities we ^the electors/ 
have before us and if we do not exercise our votes in favour of 
the best man, the "Hon’ble" members who may go to the Council 
will not be the sufferers, but we alone shall be left to suffer.
Our interests will remain uncared for for three years to come.^
The result of the voting was a great disappointment to the group.
Only Banerjea and three others, Surendranath Ray, Devaprasad Sarvadhikari
and Abul Kasem, were elected. This was not as overwhelming a failure
as at first sight it may appear for it must be appreciated that the
Banerjea group could contest only 16 of the 27 elected seats because
1
For a more detailed analysis of the elections see the author's article: 
"The Vote and the Transfer of Power: a study of the Bengal General 
Election, 1912-1913M> Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXI, no. 2,
pp. 163-81.
2
GB, Appointment, 18L-3, B427-433» Jul 1914*
7G
of the  communal and s e c tio n a l o rg a n is a tio n  of the  e le c to r a te s .  Only- 
two of t h e i r  number were Muslims. T herefore  they  were excluded from 
th re e  o f  the  f iv e  Muslim s e a ts .  The rem ainder of the  group, w ith  th e  
ex cep tio n  o f B anerjea who was a jo u r n a l i s t ,  were bhadra lok  law yers and 
as such th ey  had no access to  th e  fo u r  zam indari c o n s t i tu e n c ie s , th e  
In d ian  commercial se a t o r the  seven European e le c to r a te s .  They could 
s tan d  on ly  as re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  m ofussil lo c a l  bod ies (11 s e a t s ) ,  
th e  C orpo ra tion  o f C a lcu tta  (2  s e a ts )  and th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f C a lcu tta  
(1 s e a t ) .
Even a llow ing  fo r  t h i s  i n i t i a l  hand icap , however, t h e i r  f a i l u r e  
to  win more th an  fo u r s e a ts  must s t i l l  be considered  rem arkable. I t  
can  be a t t r ib u te d  to  two main f a c to r s ,  bo th  of which had g re a t 
s ig n if ic a n c e  fo r  the  fu tu re  o f e le c to r a l  p o l i t i c s  in  Bengal. The f i r s t  
o f th e se  was th e  absence of a s a t i s f a c to r y  o rg a n is a tio n  fo r  the  conduct 
o f an e le c t io n  campaign. A ll the  members o f th e  B anerjea  group belonged 
to  th e  In d ia n  A sso c ia tio n , a l i b e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  club o f C a lcu tta  
bhadra lok  p ro fe s s io n a l men. I t  had a proud reco rd  of achievement from 
th e  pre-M orley-M into p e rio d , where i t  had been rem arkably su ccessfu l 
in  th e  p o l i t i c s  of c o n su lta tio n  and p r o te s t .  I t s  accustomed methods 
o f a c t io n  were memorials and p e t i t io n s  to  the  Government, and p u b lic  
m eetings. I t  could o f f e r  i t s  members l i t t l e  a s s is ta n c e ,  however, w ith  
th e  new ta s k s  o f e le c to ra l  p o l i t i c s .
PP, 1913, /C d. 67147» v o l. XLVII, p . 199.
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There was, fo r  in s ta n c e , no m achinery to  ensure th a t  only one
•j
In d ia n  A sso c ia tio n  can d id a te  c o n te s te d  each s e a t .  B enerjea , a lthough 
the  doyen o f  th e  A sso c ia tio n , was no form al p a rty  le a d e r  who could 
d ic ta te  to  h is  fo llo w e rs . More se r io u s  was th e  absence of any campaign 
fund on which the  cand ida tes  might draw, and th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f the  
A ss o c ia tio n 's  a c t i v i t i e s  to  C a lc u tta . Most o f th e  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  were
in  th e  m o fussil and th e re  the  In d ia n  A sso c ia tio n  had no o rg a n isa tio n
2
and l i t t l e  d i r e c t  in f lu e n c e . I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t  th a t  of th e  fo u r 
members o f th e  B anerjea group e le c te d  in  1912, one was re tu rn e d  fo r  
C a lc u tta  U n iv e rs ity  and two o th e rs  fo r  th e  P residency  D iv is io n  
m u n ic ip a l i t ie s .
Commenting- on the  e le c t io n  r e s u l t s ,  a member of the  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n , 
P r ith w is  Chandra Ray, w rote: 'The popular p a rty  has e x h ib ite d  a weakness 
o r want o f o rg a n is a tio n  which i s  r e a l ly  lam en tab le . I t  la ck s  cohesion: 
i t  la c k s  d is c ip l in e .  H alf-a -dozen  can d id a te s  scrambled fo r  a s e a t as 
s ta rv in g  beggars  do a f t e r  a p iece  of b read . The p a rty  i s  a bundle o f 
d is jo in te d  u n i t s  which cannot r e s i s t  the  s l ig h te s t  p re ssu re  from w ith o u t . '^  
In  the  s t r i c t l y  l im ite d  e le c to ra te s  of th e  Morley-Minto C ouncil, th is
1
In  1912, as a r e s u l t ,  th re e  members o f the  B anerjea  group co n tes ted  
one double-member c o n stitu en cy . ( C a lcu tta  G a z e tte « 25 Dec 1912.)
2
Nominally th e re  were b ranches of the  A sso c ia tio n  in  each D is t r i c t  
b u t a l l  were moribund. F requent su g g estio n s  a t  Committee m eetings 
th a t  they  should be rev iv ed  came to  n o th ing .
3
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lack of organisation was not an insuperable obstacle, but, if no 
attempt were made to rectify the situation, as indeed was the case, 
then it would have serious consequences when the franchise was extended. 
As we shall see, this was to be one of the main factors in the Moderates* 
downfall ten years later.
The second and more important reason for the failure of the 
Banerjea group at the 1912 elections was their inability to speak the 
new * language * of electoral politics. The grounds on which they rested 
their claim to election - their reputation as opponents of the partition 
and as agitators for constitutional advance; their experience in 
Congress politics and in local self-government - were not the grounds 
on which most voters made their choice. The electors were primarily 
concerned with the question of their personal obligations to the various 
candidates, or with the acquisition of local, communal and personal 
advantages. Most candidates, for their part, regarded these as natural 
considerations, for they valued election to the Legislative Council, 
as to Municipalities and District Boards, chiefly as a means of raising 
their social standing and increasing their local influence.
As the Banerjea group discovered to its chagrin in 1912, what 
mattered most at an election was not a candidate’s political beliefs 
or experience of public affairs, but the length of his rent roll, his 
local prestige, his religion, caste and family, his connections, his 
wealth and his benefactions. ’The elections in Bengal were fought more 
or less on personal issues,’ lamented Prithwis Chandra Ray on
7
tt u
22 January 1913* 'Votes were given on personal considerations, rather
than on considerations of public policy or principle. The position of
a candidate, not his capacity to work, or the quality of work he
would turn out, was looked into.'^
A glance at any of the contests in 1912 shows that Ray had good
grounds for his complaint. We can take the Rajshahi Division District
and Local Boards electorate as an example. Rajshahi Division comprised
the whole of Northern Bengal, and the majority of its population was 
2Muslim. The candidates came from four of the five southern and most 
populous districts. They were Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri, M.A., a member 
of the Indian Association and of the Pabna District Bar, and son-in-law 
of Surendranath Banerjea; Marharaja Girija Nath Ray Bahadur, a large 
zamindar in both the Dinajpur and Rajahahi Districts, an influential 
member of the landholders' British Indian Association and a member of 
the old Legislative Council of Eastern Bengal & Assam; Raja Mahendra 
Ranjan Ray Chaudhuri, also a member of the Eastern Bengal & Assam 
Legislative Council and of the Eastern Bengal Landholders' Association, 
and a titleholder in the Rangpur district; and Maulvi Hafizar Rahman 
Chaudhuri, a young man, the only Muslim candidate, who was a small 
landed proprietor from Bogra*
1
Indian World, 22 Jan 1913*
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Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri, hoping to  win th e  favours of the  Muslim 
v o te r s ,  persuaded two Muslims to  propose and second h is  nom ination, bu t 
th i s  d id  him no good. The Muslim community in  th i s  a re a  had b i t t e r  
memories o f communal r io t in g  d u ring  th e  a n t i - p a r t i t i o n  b o yco tt a g i ta t io n  
s ix  y ea rs  b e fo re  and fo r  th i s  they  blamed C haudhuri’ s f a th e r - in - la w , 
Surendranath  B anerjea . B esid es, Chaudhuri had chosen unw isely in  
s e le c t in g  h is  seconder. This man, Maulvi Etiiaduddin Ahmed, proved to  
be th e  c h ie f  e le c to ra l  agent of th e  R aja of K akina, Mahendra Ranjan 
Ray Chaudhuri, and he d id  h is  le v e l  b e s t  to  wreck Jogesh Chandra’s 
chances. To th i s  end he used a s tan d a rd  ploy o f the  periods he inform ed 
the  v o te rs  th a t  th e  R ajshahi D is t r i c t  M ag is tra te  was opposed to  Jogesh 
C handra 's can d id a tu re  and th a t  h is  w rath would be f e l t  by any who 
voted fo r  him. The Raja was an in v a l id ,  bu t h is  'fo llo w in g  and h is  
purse  were lo n g ’ . R eputedly , he sp en t R s .2000 on 'inducem ents ' to  
v o te rs ; he o ffe re d  t r a v e l l in g  expenses to  many; and Emaduddin, on h is  
b e h a lf ,  provided  those who came to  v o te  in  R ajshah i town w ith  h o s p i ta l i ty  
'much above h is  own and th e i r  o rd in a ry  s ty le  o f l i v i n g ' .  I t  was the  
R aja , not Babu Jogesh Chandra, nor even Maulvi H afizar Rahman, who 
caught th e  e a r  o f the  Muslims. He l e t  i t  be known th a t  he was w il l in g  
to  pay o f f  th e  lo c a l Muhammadan A ss o c ia tio n 's  debt amounting to  
R s.1500, and, b e t te r  s t i l l ,  he rece iv ed  p u b lic  support from th e  Nawab 
of Dacca. Where th e  Nawab w ent, many B engali Muslims were accustomed 
to  fo llo w . The Raja was e le c te d .
Bengalee, 29 Dec 1912. GB, Appointment, 1ÖL-4> B444-462, Oct 1913*
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In the light of this story it should come as no surprise when we 
discover that 17 of the 26 Indian non-official members of the 1913 
Bengal Legislative Council were landholders. In other respects those 
who had succeeded in their bid for election had the same * social 
qualifications’ as the men in the Banerjea group whom they had defeated. 
The Hindus were all Brahmin or Kayastha by caste; most of them were 
university educated and resided in Calcutta or a mofussil town. Like 
the members of the Banerjea group they were from the bhadralok 'elite, 
but they had this one decisive advantage of holding land.
The post-script to the general election was written in February 
1913 when the non-official members of the new Bengal Legislative Council 
proceeded to elect their two representatives on the Imperial Legislative 
Council. The result was something of a surprise. Of the 68 total votes 
39 were secured by the two nominees of the Banerjea group: Banerjea 
himself and Bhupendranath Basu. Both men would have been elected had 
the votes been distributed evenly as had been arranged. By some mis­
chance, however, Banerjea got 22, and Basu, who got only 17, was 
forced into third place behind the Maharaja of Nashipur, Ranajit Sinha, 
who had the backing of the European members and some of the large 
zamindars.^
The striking thing here was the reversal of the general election 
verdict against the Banerjea group. This points to an important
1
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co n c lu s io n , which h e lp s to  e x p la in  much o f what happened a t th i s  and 
subsequent e le c t io n s ;  th e re  e x is te d  in  3engal a t  th i s  tim e a number o f 
d i s t i n c t  le v e l s  of p o l i t i c s ,  and, fo r  a p o l i t i c i a n  to  be s u c c e ss fu l, 
he had to  be capable of speaking in  d i f f e r e n t  'id io m s’ a t  th ese  v a rio u s  
le v e l s .  He had , fo r  argum ent's  sake , to  t a l k  th e  language of lo c a l 
in flu en c e  and community to  th e  e l e c to r s ,  and th e  language o f n a tio n a lism  
to  h is  fe llo w  le g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c il lo rs .
This s i tu a t io n ,  which appears unusual to  th e  observer from th e  
West, i s  a common fe a tu re  o f non-W estern s o c ie t i e s ,  where a c tiv e  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  p o l i t i c s  i s  l im ite d  to  an e l i t e ,  and where those  hot 
invo lved  have l i t t l e  or no comprehension o f th e  n a tu re  and purpose of 
p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n .^  'When th e  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e  i s  fo rced  to  appeal to  
n o n -p a r t ic ip a t in g  s e c tio n s  -  fo r  example, by a need to  g a in  v o te s  under 
a r e p re s e n ta t iv e  system , or by th e  d e s ir e  to  r e c r u i t  a fo llo w in g  fo r  
a n a t io n a l i s t  movement -  they  must phrase t h e i r  appeal in  term s th a t  
w ill  be understood  by those s e c t io n s .
This ex p la in s  why, in  such c ircu m stan ces , th e re  i s  o f te n  an apparen t 
d isco n n e c tio n  between and ir re le v a n c e  in  th e  p ro fe ss io n s  and a c tio n s  
o f a p o l i t i c i a n  on v a rio u s  o ccas io n s . For in s ta n c e , when the  Raja of
1
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Kakina came down to Calcutta from Rajshahi in January 1913 Re changed 
in colour, chameleon-like, from a mottled manipulator of local and 
communal interests to a true-blue nationalist. In the Legislative 
Council he followed Banerjea’s lead. Here is the explanation of the 
discrepancy between the amount of influence which the Banerjea group 
could wield in the electorate and in the Council: although they were 
not fluent in the idiom of one level of politics, they were the masters 
of the language of another, and were recognised as such.
This disjuncture between the various levels remained a feature of 
Bengal politics throughout the period of our study. With the extension 
of the electorate in 1919 and the resort by the Congress to mass 
politics in the early twenties, it was to become a crucial factor.
To Grind Corn
The first meeting of the Legislative Council of reunited Bengal 
was held on the morning of Saturday 1Ö January 1913 in the former 
Imperial Council chamber at Government House. There was a good attend- 
ance of members and visitors to hear Carmichael’s inaugural speech.
Here was his opportunity to strike his desired note of liberalism and 
make his plea for co-operation. With a polite bow in the direction of 
bhadralok aspirations, he welcomed the councillors as fellow parlia­
mentarians and expressed his pride at presiding over their deliberations.
_
Englishman, 19 Jan 1913*
He con tinued :
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Our m eeting today i s  a form al one, bu t we look  forward to  o th e r 
m eetings when we s h a ll  show th a t  much as we d i f f e r  among o u rse lv es  
in  some th in g s  -  p o ss ib ly  in  many th in g s  -  we a re  a l l  u n ite d  in  
our d e te rm in a tio n  to  do what we can fo r  B engal, fo r  In d ia  and 
fo r  th e  Empire.
Bengal has been w ithout a Council fo r  n e a rly  te n  months.
Some o f you perhaps thought th i s  u n fo r tu n a te . You may have 
wished fo r  l e g i s l a t i o n  -  some o f you, I  know, would have lik e d  
to  ask  q u estio n s  and to  move re s o lu t io n s .  But the delay  was 
u n avo idab le . How th a t  th e re  i s  a Council you w i l l ,  I  fe e l  su re , 
make f u l l  and f a i r  use o f i t ,  and I  fe e l  su re  th a t  those o f us 
who have to  answer q u estio n s  o r to  g ive  c o n s id e ra tio n  to  
c r i t i c i s m  w ill  do so f u l ly  and f a i r ly .^
Looking back on h is  f i r s t  n ine  months in  o f f ic e ,  Carmichael must
have f e l t  p leased  w ith the p ro g ress  he had made and o p tim is tic  fo r  th e
success o f h is  m ission . A ll communities had responded favourab ly  to
h is  obvious s in c e r i ty  and go o d w ill, and th e  bhadra lok  seemed reassu red
th a t  th e  prom ise of a new p o lic y  was not m erely id le  words. He had
e s ta b lis h e d  f r ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  Muslim le a d e rs  and i t  seemed
reaso n ab le  to  hope th a t  he m igh t, w ith  t h e i r  h e lp , p la c a te  th e  community.
The warm welcome which he had re ce iv ed  a t  th e  S t Andrew's Day d in n e r,
in  C a lc u tta  an accepted barom eter o f B r i t i s h  o p in io n , s e t  the  se a l
2upon h is  accep tance  by th e  European n o n - o f f ic ia ls .  He had lo y a l 
and sym pathetic  I .C .S . su b o rd in a te s , and undoubtedly he was s a t i s f i e d  
w ith  t h e i r  p re p a ra to ry  work fo r  the  new l e g i s l a tu r e .  Most im portan t 
o f a l l ,  th e  M oderate n a t io n a l i s t s  had decided  to  r e tu rn  to  the  Council.
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Although they  had not been g iven  a l l  th a t  they  had asked fo r  in  the
re v ised  Council re g u la t io n s , they  had assu red  Carmichael o f t h e i r
a p p re c ia tio n  o f h is  e f f o r t s  to  meet th e re  demands^ and they  had been
p a r t i c u la r ly  p leased  when he chose S .F . S inha and N ilra ta n  S a rk a r,
both  d is tin g u is h e d  n a t io n a l i s t s ,  to  f i l l  two o f th e  s e a ts  reserv ed  
2fo r  nom ination. B an erjea , on whom in  th e  l a s t  r e s o r t  th e  success o f 
C arm ichael’ s m ission  might depend, was back in  the  Council and he 
seemed c h e e rfu l ly  d isposed  to  work th e  new i n s t i t u t i o n .^
So f a r  ev ery th in g  had gone accord ing  to  p la n , but Carmichael had 
y e t to  g e t ' t h e  new m achinery to  g rin d  corn*. As he had po in ted  out 
in  h is  speech on 18 January , th e re  had been a h ia tu s  in  in s t i t u t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s  in  B engal, and w ith  t h e i r  resum ption th e  re a l  t e s t  would beg in . 
'Now th a t  th e re  i s  a Council you w i l l ,  I  fe e l  su re , make f u l l  and f a i r  
use o f i t , '  he had s a id . D isappointm ent aw aited  him, f o r  none of th e  
major communities would co -o p e ra te  w ith  him in  working th e  L e g is la tiv e  
Council as he wished.
B r i t i s h  and Muslim Anger
The secondary e f f e c t s  o f th e  b i t t e r n e s s  of th e  C a lcu tta  European 
n o n - o f f ic ia ls  and th e  Muslims over th e  D elh i announcements were y e t to
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be f e l t .  As we remarked e a r l i e r ,  th e  B r i t i s h  regarded the t a lk  o f a
new p o lic y  as an adm ission o f  o f f i c i a l  weakness in  th e  face  o f
s e d it io u s  In d ia n  a g i ta t io n ,  and they  po in ted  to  the V iceroy , Lord
H ardinge, as th e  c h ie f  o ffen d e r. Prom th e  f i r s t  he had displayed, an
unconscionab le  ten d ern ess  fo r  In d ian  o p in io n  and a d i s t a s t e  fo r
C a lcu tta  European s o c ie ty . O bviously , s a id  th e  n o n - o f f ic ia ls ,  i t
was he who was re sp o n sib le  fo r  moving th e  Government o f  In d ia  away from
the  s a lu ta ry  in flu en c e  of the  Bengal businessm en.^ The B r i t i s h
community, th ey  s a id , must o rgan ise  as a p o l i t i c a l  fo rce  to  combat th e
2p e rn ic io u s  in flu en c e  o f In d ian s  in  th e  government o f the  Empire. In  
1912 th e  European Defence A sso c ia tio n  (a  s ig n i f ic a n t  name) was 
r e c o n s t i tu te d  in  C a lc u tta . I t  rece iv ed  la rg e  monetary c o n tr ib u tio n s  
from B r i t i s h  firm s and, w ith in  th re e  m onths, had e n ro lle d  1400 members.^ 
An a ttem p t to  a s s a s s in a te  the  V iceroy on h is  s t a t e  e n try  to  D elhi 
in  December 1912 in fu r ia te d  th e  B r i t i s h  and brought immoderate demands 
fo r  r e p r i s a l s .  Now, i t  was s a id ,  the  Government must re co g n ise  where 
i t s  fo o l is h  p o lic y  of concessions was le a d in g .^  T heir anger was s t i l l  
running  h igh  when th e  new Bengal L e g is la t iv e  Council assem bled.
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C arm ichael's  in au g u ra l speech was im m ediately follow ed by a r e s o lu t io n ,
moved by S urendranath  B an erjea , ex p ress in g  th e  C o u n c il's  h o rro r  a t
the  a s s a s s in a t io n  a ttem p t. The s ig h t  of t h i s  'a rc h  s e d i t i o n i s t '
p ledg ing  h is  countrym en's support in  th e  sea rc h  fo r  the  c u l p r i t ,  was
too much f o r  Norman McLeod, th e  spokesman o f  th e  European n o n -o f f ic ia ls#
I t  i s  beyond th e  bounds o f b e l i e f  th a t  th e  D elhi and s im ila r  
o u trag es  could tak e  p lace  unno ticed  in  th e  m idst o f a crowd, 
and y e t no one has come forw ard to  denounce th e  m iscrean t 
^he declaim ed fu r io u s ly / .  We h ea r a l l  round of th e  s in s  of 
the P o lic e  -  a dese rv in g  but much-maligned body -  bu t no t a 
word o f th e  s in s  of th e  peop le , and I  have read  and heard o f 
sympathy u n v e ile d ly  expressed fo r  th e  most co ld-b looded 
m urders. As long as t h i s  a t t i tu d e  o f mind e x i s t s ,  as long  
as th e  In d ia n  populace d is p la y  apathy , how can any one expect 
a reaso n ab le  man to  admit th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f g iv in g  an equal 
vo ice  to  such people in  th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f  th i s  coun try  -  
people who so l i t t l e  understand  what t h e i r  d u tie s  and 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  a re  as lo y a l c itiz e n s? 1
2This speech and i t s  endorsement in  th e  C a lcu tta  E uropean .papers, 
provoked a sharp  bhadra lok  re a c t io n  and added to  th e  resentm ent between 
th e  bhadra lok  and th e  B r i t i s h .^
As th e  Council proceeded to  b u s in e s s , th e  European newspapers 
tu rned  t h e i r  a t te n t io n  to  what they  d e sc rib e d  as th e  in to le r a b le  
nu isance  o f B engali v e rb o s ity . 'T a lk , e n d le s s , wearisome and o f te n  
ig n o ran t t a l k ,  i s  tak in g  the  p lace  o f a c t i o n , '  complained the  
Englishman on 3 A p ril , and on th e  fo llo w in g  day i t  w rote: ' I t  i s  b e t t e r  
to  gag th e  C ouncils than  to  c lo g  th e  e x e c u t iv e .1 23 This newspaper
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campaign was followed "by a letter to the Government of Bengal, written 
by McLeod on behalf of the British non-official members of the Council, 
asking for some limit to be placed upon question time. Acting on the 
advice of his officials, who were already feeling the strain of the 
long Council sessions, Carmichael reluctantly agreed to set a maximum 
to the number of questions for which an oral answer could be demanded. 
The first retreat from his liberal position had been forced.
Among the Muslims there was growing dissatisfaction with the policy
advocated by the community’s leaders. A small group of educated younger
men began to question the wisdom of relying upon the Government for
favours. In their opinion, the reunification showed that the officials
could not be trusted to deal fairly with the community. If the Muslims
were to improve their lot, they must adopt a more aggressive posture.
In the Legislative Council the orthodox approach was maintained for the
2first three months, but in the budget debate a new voice was heard.
On 4 April Fazlul Huq, a young Muslim member from Dacca, brushed aside 
the polite conventions and in a powerful extempore speech warned the 
Government that continued failure to heed Muslim demands would lead to 
trouble. However much the Government might deny it, the Muslims were 
entitled to compensation for their past ill-treatment, he declared.
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To me i t  seems th a t  Government has a rr iv e d  a t  a p a r tin g  o f the  
ways, and has go t to  d e c id e , once fo r  a l l ,  i t s  fu tu re  p o lic y  
reg a rd in g  qu estio n s  a f f e c t in g  th e  Muhammadan community . . . .  in  
s p i te  o f th e i r  av ers io n  to  a g i ta t io n ,  Muhammadans are  d r i f t i n g ,  
owing to  sheer fo rce  o f c ircu m stan ces , in to  th e  arena of 
p o l i t i c a l  w arfa re . We f e e l  th a t  we have go t to  move w ith  th e  
tim es o r e ls e  we a re  doomed. Let not th e  o f f i c i a l s  th in k  th a t  
the fe e l in g s  of th e  e n t i r e  community can he soothed sim ply by 
the  bestow al of t i t l e s  and d e co ra tio n s  on our le a d e rs ,  o r by 
p ro v id in g  fo r  a t r a n s i to r y  s ta y  o f the  o f f i c i a l s  a t  Dacca w ith  
a l l  th e  p a rap h en a lia  of Government. We re q u ire  som ething more 
than  a mere concession  to  our sen tim en ts , something ta n g ib le  
which can be reasonab ly  s e t  o f f  a g a in s t our lo s s  by the  
annulment of the  P a r t i t io n .^
Shamsul Huda was qu ick ly  on h is  f e e t  to  deny th e  t r u t h  o f what he
2
eu p h em is tic a lly  d escribed  as t h i s  'p e s s im is t ic  v ie w ', bu t th e  resp o n se
which Huq's speech drew from v a rio u s  s e c tio n s  of th e  Muslim community
suggested  th a t  th e re  were many who thought as he d id . The a t t e n t io n
which the  speech a t t r a c te d  th roughout th e  p rov ince , l e f t  no doubt th a t
3
a new p o l i t i c a l  re p u ta t io n  had been made.
Huq i s  an im portant f ig u re  fo r  th e  p o l i t i c a l  h is to r ia n  o f th i s  
p e r io d , fo r  he brought a new s ty le  to  Muslim p o l i t i c s  in  Bengal. Born 
o f a fam ily  o f  B a r isa l v a k i l s , he fo llow ed the  w ell-w orn tra c k  to  
C a lc u tta  fo r  ed u ca tio n , f in is h in g  on th e  benches o f the  e l i t e  P residency  
C o llege. In  1895 th e aSe o f 22 he re tu rn e d  to  B a r isa l w ith  an
M.A. and B.L. to  teach  in  th e  lo c a l c o lle g e  and l a t e r  he a s s is te d  h is  
f a th e r  w ith  h is  le g a l p r a c t ic e .  A fte r f iv e  y e a rs  C a lcu tta  drew him
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back and he became an a r t i c l e d  c le rk  to  th e  g re a t High Court law yer,
S i r  Asutosh M ukherjea. The d is c u s s io n  over th e  p a r t i t i o n  found him 
keen ly  su p p o rtin g  the  measure and h is  f i r s t  o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
work came in  1906, when the  Nawab of Dacca used him as a runner in  
h is  n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  Muslim le a d e rs  in  o th e r  p a r ts  of n o rth e rn  In d ia  
p r io r  to  th e  fo rm ation  o f th e  Muslim League. The Nawab had a t h is  
d isp o sa l a number of Government appointm ents in  the  new E as te rn  p rov ince  
and he was th u s  ab le  to  reward Hug w ith  a p lace  in  th e  P ro v in c ia l 
E xecutive S e rv ic e . By 19O8 he had become A ss is ta n t R e g is tra r  of 
R ural C o-opera tive  S o c ie t ie s .  At th e  tim e o f r e u n i f ic a t io n ,  however, 
he was aggrieved  a t h is  non-appointm ent as R e g is tra r  fo r  th e  whole of 
B engal, and he l e f t  the se rv ic e  in  d is g u s t .  Again the  Nawab came to  
h is  a id ,  ensuring’ h is  unopposed r e tu rn  fo r  the  Dacca Muslim se a t in  
th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil.
Here was a p o te n tia l  Muslim le a d e r  o f a new k ind . Unlike th e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  communal le a d e r ,  whose in flu en c e  was lo c a l ly  based on 
lan d h o ld in g  and who was u s u a lly  a member of one o f th e  g re a t Muslim 
f a m il ie s ,  Hug had made h is  way by personal a b i l i t y  -  fo r  i t  was h is  
a b i l i t y  which had won him the necessa ry  p a tronage. His ed u ca tio n  and 
h is  exp erien ce  in  te ach in g , law , a d m in is tra tio n  and p o l i t i c a l  
o rg a n is a tio n  s e t  him a p a r t from th e  o ld  le a d e rs h ip , and, what was v i t a l ,  
made him a cc e p tab le  to  the  bhad ra lo k . Here was a Muslim who
1
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(to adapt W.S. Gilbert) was the very model of a modern politician«
It was important, too, that while retaining his contacts with his 
Eastern Bengal District he had established himself as a figure in 
Calcutta, for this enabled him to provide communal leadership on a 
new level.
Equally significant was the fact that his anger - personal and 
communal - was directed primarily at the Government. Although remaining 
a communalist, he would be willing on occasions to ally with other 
groups in attacks upon that Government. Moreover, he shared with 
other educated Indians nationalist aspirations quite foreign to the 
old Muslim leaders. In the years that followed, under the influence 
of pan-Islamism and a growing distrust of British intentions towards 
the Khilafat, men like Huq were willing to form an alliance with the 
Hindus which would have horrified their predecessors. However the 
political movements of this chameleon, the nationalist communal Muslim, 
were as hard for the British and Hindus to follow then, as they are 
for the historian now. We can understand him only if we realise that 
he was groping- uncertainly for a new way forward for his community.
For Huq and men of his kind in Bengal, the alliance with the Hindus 
which they entered in the middle of the second decade proved to be 
a cul-de-sac and it was not until the late 1920s that they found the
right road: the organisation of the Muslim peasantry
0 °ö  U
The Opposition of the Moderates
The intransigence of the British non-officials and the Muslims 
was a severe disappointment to the Government of Bengal*s hopes for 
a reconciliation. Equally disturbing was the attitude of the bhadralok 
members. Although they obviously valued the Legislative Council as 
an institution and were ready to participate fully in its workings, 
they were not willing to co-operate politically with the Governor.
They had undergone an apparent metamorphosis in moving from their 
electorates to the Council chamber. In place of the motley and ill- 
assorted crew which the elections seemed to have produced, the 
Government found itself confronted with a squad of determined and 
inflexible nationalists.
The unity which they displayed is to be explained by Banerjea’s 
ability as a parliamentary leader and the high regard in which he was 
held by his fellow councillors because of his unique contribution to 
the nationalist movement in Bengal. Since he figures so largely in the 
story to be told we should pause at this point to look in some detail 
at his earlier career.
Son of a westernised doctor, born in 1848 into Calcutta Brahmin 
society astir with the excitement of a religious reformation and a 
revival of learning, he spent his school days among the British boys 
at Doveton College. Having taken a B.A. in English literature from 
Calcutta University, he went to London and in 1869 passed the Indian 
Civil Service examination, only one Indian ever having done so before.
0 "
His elation was short-lived, for the India Office declared that he 
and another succesful Indian candidate had falsified their ages. Their 
names were struck from the list. Banerjea challenged the decision 
in Queen*s Bench, won his case and returned to Bengal, unwelcome in 
a service which until then had been the exclusive preserve of the 
British. Three years later he was dismissed for a minor and what was 
almost certainly an accidental error in the return of a law case. He 
went to England in an effort to have the decision reversed but was 
unsuccessful, and, when he tried to make an alternative career at the 
Bar, he was refused admission as a dismissed Government employee. 
Banerjea the official was finished; Suren Babu the nationalist was 
born. *1 felt that I had suffered because I was an Indian, a member 
of a community that lay disorganized, had no public opinion, and no 
voice in the counsels of their Government,' he wrote later. 'The 
personal wrong done to me was an illustration of the helpless impotency 
of our people. Were others to suffer in the future as I had suffered 
in the past? They must, I thought to myself; unless we were capable 
as a community of redressing our wrongs and protecting our rights, 
personal and collective.1^
He returned home, his heart set upon the political regeneration 
of India. With his material worries allayed by a Chair of English 
literature, provided at a Calcutta college by an Indian benefactor, he
Nation in Making, pp. 32-3*
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campaigned, his cause through the columns of the Bengalee, an English-
language newspaper for which he built an international renown in the 
half-century of his editorship. He founded as his political platform 
the Indian Association, a bhadralok organisation, which had only one 
influential rival (the landholders’ British Indian Association) in 
Bengal in the following 40 years. At the end of the seventies he 
toured northern India, firing his audiences with his gospel of 
nationalism; in the eighties he established himself as one of the 
leading figures in Congress; in the nineties he visited England to 
seek support for Indian demands, and he took the lead of the radical 
elements in the Calcutta Corporation and the Bengal Legislative Council.
Then came his clash with Curzon. In 1899 he led the attack on 
the Calcutta Municipal Act and throughout the following six years, as 
bhadralok anger at Curzon's measures mounted steadily, it was his 
voice that was raised in protest. He was a great orator and his public 
meetings at the Calcutta Town Hall attracted thousands. In his early 
fifties, a well-built man with strong features and striking white 
beard, he was a commanding figure. He had the emotional fire 
characteristic of his people, a command of English which few Englishmen 
could surpass and an Augustan delivery. ’»Then Bengal was partitioned 
in 1905 his political star was at its zenith. Prom platform and press 
he thundered his condemnation, and the extraordinarily vociferous 
response which it evoked from the bhadralok surprised him little less
than it did the British,
To h is  dismay he found th a t  he could not c o n tro l th e  a g i ta t io n  
■which he had s ta r te d  and by e a r ly  1907 th in g s  were so f a r  out of hand 
th a t  he jo in ed  the  g re a t zamindars and th e  Muslims in  a d e le g a tio n  to  
ask fo r  th e  V iceroy’ s in te rv e n tio n . ’I t  was sim ply m a rv e llo u s ,’ wrote 
M into, 'w ith  th e  tro u b le s  and a n x ie t ie s  o f a few months ago s t i l l  
f r e s h  in  o n e 's  memory, to  see the  ’’King of B engal” s i t t i n g ’ on my so fa  
w ith  h is  Mahommedan opponents, ask ing  fo r  my a s s is ta n c e  to  moderate 
the e v i l  p ass io n s  of the B en g a li, and in v e ig h in g  a g a in s t th e  ex travagances 
o f Bepin Chandra P a l . '  B anerjea  had caught a d isea se  which has
in fe c te d  so many n a t io n a l i s t  p o l i t i c ia n s  s in ce  h is  days he had become 
a m oderate in  s p i te  of h im se lf.
By 1912 he was no lo n g e r th e  unchallenged  le a d e r  of th e  bhadralok  
bu t he s t i l l  had g re a t in f lu e n c e . His s te a d f a s t  r e fu s a l  to  e n te r  the  
C a lc u tta  C orpora tion  and th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  co u n c ils  u n t i l  th e  p a r t i t i o n  
was revoked, had been g re a t ly  adm ired, and h is  paper, th e  B engalee, 
s t i l l  shaped th e  op in ions o f many of the  E n g l i s h - l i t e r a te  bh ad ra lo k .
His claim  to  a la rg e  share  in  th e  trium ph over the  r e u n if ic a t io n  o f 
Bengal could s c a rc e ly  be denied  and he was ab le  to  re tu rn  to  th e  
Bengal L e g is la t iv e  Council in  1913 as a v ic to r .
Prom th e  day th a t  the  new Council assem bled, i t  was obvious th a t
2
he was to  be th e  'le a d e r  o f th e  o p p o s i t io n '.  In  th i s  h is  age was an
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advantage, for most of his fellow-councillors were his juniors by ten 
to fifteen years. More important, perhaps, was his experience. His 
28 years as a member of the North Barrackpur municipality, the Calcutta 
Corporation, and the Bengal and Imperial Legislative Councils, had 
made him a master of legislative manoeuvre and management. His ability 
as a debater was unmatched in the Council, and, equally important, his 
judgment of when to remain silent could rarely be faulted. Outside the 
chamber, he worked with the industry of an able chief whip: holding 
informal consultations on coming business; persuading the indolent to 
attend and the waverers to support his line; compromising or threatening; 
always actively marshalling a united front for the nationalist cause.
And what did the ’nationalist cause’ mean? What was Banerjea’s 
line of action in the Council? Quite simply, it was opposition to the 
Government. Carmichael would make repeated appeals for co-operation; 
Banerjea would respond with qualified promises*' - but always the 
opposition continued, unremitting and, as far as the Government could 
see, unreasoning. The explanation lay partly in the nature of the 
powers of the Council and partly in the demands which the bhadralok 
made of its politicians.
Under the constitution of 1909 the Indian members of the Council 
were placed in the classic position of an irresponsible colonial 
opposition, with powers of interpellation and censure, but with no
T
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r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  fo rm u la tin g  o r im plem enting p o lic y . I t  was one o f
C arm ichae l's  e a r ly  prom ises th a t  he would t r y  to  in c re a se  th e
o p p o r tu n i tie s  fo r  n o n -o f f ic ia ls  to  in flu en c e  Government p o lic y , and
he a ttem pted  to  honour h is  prom ise by p la c in g  th e  b ro ad est p o ss ib le
c o n s tru c tio n  upon the powers of the  v a rio u s  s tan d in g  and s e le c t
committees o f th e  C ouncil, and by c re a t in g  ad hoc bodies to  ad v ise  on
im portan t q u e s tio n s . This encouraged the  M oderates in  t h e i r  i n i t i a l
hopes th a t  th ey  might have s u f f ic ie n t  power to  re fa sh io n  Government
p ro p o sa ls , so as to  make them more accep tab le  to  bhadralok  o p in io n ,
2and they  to o k  advantage of every  o p p o rtu n ity  to  p re ss  t h e i r  view s.
They had su ccess on many l im ite d  is su e s  b u t i t  was soon apparen t to  
them th a t  they  could achieve l i t t l e  w ith  th e  Government choosing th e  
q u e s tio n s  which they might c o n sid e r and r e ta in in g  f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  
fo r  t h e i r  im plem enta tion .^  In  th i s  s i tu a t io n  th e  e x is ten ce  of a 
w e ll-o rg a n ised  and e f f e c t iv e ly  le d  p a rty  only aggravated  the  te n s io n s  
i n  th e  Council and in c reased  th e  f r u s t r a t i o n  o f the  bhadralok  members.
E qually  im portant was the  f a c t  th a t  p o l i t i c a l l y  t h e i r  l im ite d  
g a in s  brought no reward. To whom could th e  c o u n c il lo rs  re p o r t t h e i r  
success  in  m odifying a c lau se  o f a B i l l ,  or in  persuad ing  the  Government 
to  re-exam ine some asp ec t o f i t s  p o licy ?  C e r ta in ly  not to  t h e i r  
c o n s t i tu e n ts ,  fo r  they  understood  no th ing  o f such s u b t le t i e s .  They
1
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might respond if their representative could gain some concession for 
their locality or community - and the members were always busily 
engaged in securing such concessions - but they had no concern with 
high policy decisions. That was not the stuff of electoral politics.
Nor, for that matter, was it the stuff of nationalism. This was 
vital. To a majority of councillors, the opinions of the electors 
counted for little, but the opinions of their fellow-members of the 
elite counted for a great deal. What they demanded was opposition to 
the Government. To oppose was the work of a nationalist, whether he 
was a member of a legislative council, a journalist or author, a public 
orator, or a terrorist. All must oppose or cease to claim the title 
of nationalist. This was a legacy of the partition period. The 
British actions which had destroyed bhadralok trust had also dealt 
a death-blow to co-operation with the Government as a viable political 
style for any bhadralok politician. In future in Bengal a nationalist, 
to be worth his salt, had to score off the Government. Thus the 
bhadralok members of the new Bengal Council, under Banerjea’s direction 
tried to embarrass the Government at every turn. In their speeches 
they accused it of disregarding Indian opinion and of injuring Indian 
interests. By their questions they drew attention to injustices and 
inequalities, and by moving resolutions and calling for divisions on 
legislative amendments they attempted to outvote the officials.
Confronted with this barrage, Carmichael’s first reaction was to 
insist upon concessions. His officials were to accept what resolutions
they could; enquiries into the alleged grievances were to he instituted; 
extended time for the consideration of controversial legislation was 
to he allowed; full information was to he given in reply to all ques­
tions, no matter how embarrassing; and outside the Council chamber 
members were to he consulted on administrative matters affecting their 
Districts. He was willing to give this ground in the hope that the 
nationalists would meet him half-way. Again he was relying upon a 
demonstration of goodwill to gain their co-operation.
But co-operate they could not; that was tantamount to committing 
political suicide. If the Government was giving ground, they must 
push it harder, and experience was teaching them when and where to push. 
In particular, they developed the devastating tactic of offering the 
Government more than it wanted, thereby putting it in the awkward 
position of having either to accept inconvenient proposals, almost 
always framed so as to increase the opportunities for non-official 
interference in administration, or to appear churlish in rejecting 
magnanimous offers.
One example may illustrate this point. On 1 December 1913 
Banerjea moved a resolution for the appointment of a Council committee 
to enquire into dacoity in Bengal and to recommend preventive measures. 
He recalled that the subject was one of frequent and adverse comment,
_
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and that the Government had asked for non-official co-operation in
dealing with it. He offered this advisory committee as the Council’s 
contribution and he expressed his confidence that its findings would 
prove the Government wrong in imputing political motives to most of the 
dacoits then so numerous in the mofussil. Duke replied that daooity 
was a matter for experts; that the Government was conducting extensive 
enquiries of its own and could see no likelihood of anything valuable 
being- produced by the proposed committee. The Indian members of the 
Council would be more profitably engaged in using- their influence in 
public life to combat terrorism. This reply left the Government open 
to a charge of insincerity in its professed desire for non-official 
assistance and Banerjea was quick to see his opportunity. Although 
unconvinced by Duke's arguments, he said he would not press the issue. 
'But let it go forth to the world,' he continued, 'let it be reiterated 
that we were, from this side of the house at any rate, anxious to help 
the Government, that we made a suggestion which we thought a good 
suggestion in the circumstances, and if that suggestion is not accepted 
the responsibility is no longer ours.’-'
Terrorism
It was this question of political violence which was the greatest 
snag in the relations of the liberally-motivated Governor and the
BLCP, vol• XLV, pp. 797-8O4.1
Moderate nationalists. It posed, for a start, a most perplexing
problem for the bhadralok members of the Council. They were constantly
under pressure to define their position, but few, if any, were certain
in their own minds as to what their attitude really was. While
intellectually repelled by the resort to violence, they were emotionally
sympathetic with those responsible. On the one hand, they feared that
further constitutional development and the transfer of more power to
Indians, which were their goals, would be retarded by terrorist outrages
and the existence of revolutionary organisations.”* Temperamentally,
many of them were averse to violence and they were disturbed by the
indiscipline in bhadralok society which it revealed, //hen groups of
well-bred youths could roam the countryside committing dacoity with
impunity, it seemed apparent that the very fabric of the social order 
2was endangered. On the other hand, they felt a sneaking admiration 
for these boys - their own flesh and blood - who were willing to risk 
life and liberty in attacks upon the foreigners. As bhadralok and as 
opponents of the imperialists, the terrorists' credentials as members 
of the political elite were beyond question. They were patriots, no 
matter how indiscreet.
Thus it would have been an outrage to their personal and communal 
integrity, for the Indian Council members to have joined in any
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Government sponsored condemnation of the terrorists. Politically
it would have been disastrous for them. Here again they were caught
in a cleft stick. There could he no shadow of doubt that, to the
majority of the bhadralok, the terrorists were heroic figures, whose
1valour was removing the stigma of Bengali cowardice. The community 
would not tolerate any public criticism of their actions. Yet the 
councillors had to find some means of disassociating themselves from 
these acts of violence if the Government were not to lose faith in 
their protestations of belief in peaceful and constitutional methods.
They attempted to circumvent the problem by asserting, as on the 
occasion of Banerjea's resolution, that most of what the Government 
described as political crime was, in fact, ordinary daooity. Such 
sophistry satisfied no one. The British accused them of attempting to 
shield seditionists, and their fellow-bhadralok berated them for 
imputing such vulgar motives to patriots. Who would dare call William 
Tell a common outlaw?
Another dimension was added to their problem by the fact that theirs 
was but one of the two groups competing for political influence in 
Bengal, and their way ^constitutional nationalism) was only one of the
1
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two o ffer in g  for  the p o l i t ic a l  “e lite *  To declare  openly for  the 
te r r o r is ts  was to l e t  the con test go by d e fa u lt . Conversely, even to 
hint at disapproval o f terrorism  was to provide ammunition for th e ir  
r iv a ls ,  who, i t  should be added, su ffer in g  from none of the lim ita tio n s  
of Council membership, could ta lk  as irresp o n sib ly  as they wished.
These r iv a ls  were always ready to r e c a ll  the early  days of the a n ti­
p a r tit io n  a g ita t io n , when men as eminent as Banerjea h im self had 
encouraged youthfu l extremism. How old and cautious have our former 
leaders grown, they sneered. How low the f ir e s  o f nationalism  have 
burnt• ^
For the Government o f Bengal, as w e ll, crimes of v io len ce  were a
major problem. In the seven years preceding 1913 there had been more
than 1100 cases of dacoity  reported to the Bengal p o lice  and of these
2only a handful had resu lted  in  co n v ic tio n s. I t  had been estab lish ed  
beyond doubt that a small but s ig n if ic a n t  proportion o f these robberies  
were committed by revolutionary bands in  search o f funds with which 
to buy arms and su sta in  th e ir  a c t iv i t i e s .  More spectacu lar were the 
period ic  te r r o r is t  attacks upon c iv i l  and p o lice  o f f ic e r s .  There had 
been a s ig n if ic a n t  l u l l  in  th ese  in  1912, but, fo llow in g  the unsuccessfu l 
attempt to  a ssa ssin a te  Hardinge la te  in  December o f that year, the
1
S .g . Amrita Bazar P atrik a ,* 29 Dec 1915«
2
BLCP, 13 Mar 1913, v o l. XLV, p. 170.
101
campaign had been resumed in  a l l  i t s  h o rro r.^  I f  the  Government were 
to  r e t a in  th e  confidence o f the  p u b lic  and i t s  own o f f ic e r s ,  i t  had 
to  put an end to  th i s  v io len ce .
C arm ichael, upon whose shou lders  re s te d  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
choosing a course of a c t io n , was convinced th a t  a r e tu rn  to  the  
a u th o r i ta r ia n  methods which had been t r i e d  in  190Ö would do more harm 
than  good. U nless th e  p o lic e  rece iv ed  g en e ra l a s s is ta n c e ,  th e re  could 
be no hope o f more c o n v ic tio n s . R epression  would make th e  t e r r o r i s t s  
m arty rs  and th e  o b je c ts  of p u b lic  sympathy. Carmichael was convinced 
th a t  a l a s t i n g  so lu tio n  could be found only  by m arsh a llin g  bhadra lok  
op in ion  a g a in s t  v io le n t m ethods, and th i s  could b e s t  be done by 
dem o n stra tin g  th a t  the  B r i t i s h  were s in c e re  in  t h e i r  d e s ir e  fo r  
in c re a s in g  In d ia n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  government. The problem was 
b a s ic a l ly  p o l i t i c a l ,  he h e ld , and a p o l i t i c a l  s o lu tio n  to  i t  had to  
be found. He po in ted  out th a t  i f  the Government were to  en fo rce  an 
o rd in an ce , d e a lin g  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  crim e, over th e  head o f th e  L e g is la t iv e  
C ouncil, th e  bhadra lok  would r ig h t ly  reg ard  th e  t a lk  o f reform  and a 
new o rd er as in s in c e re . I f  any a d d itio n a l l e g i s l a t i o n  were needed to  
d ea l w ith  te r ro r is m , i t  had to  be passed by th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, 
p re fe ra b ly  w ith  the concurrence of th e  b h ad ra lok  members. H is own 
p o l i t i c a l  experience  enabled him to a p p re c ia te  the  d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t io n  
in  which th ey  were p laced , and he understood the  ambivalence of t h e i r
i
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attitudes. He knew that personally and politically they would be
reluctant to speak in public against the terrorists, but he realised
the importance of encouraging them to commit themselves before the
Government acted. If action were taken without this commitment, there
1could be little hope of later support.
Carmichael's attitude towards the Moderates brought him into serious
conflict with the Government of India, who rejected what Sir Reginald
Craddock, the Home Member, described as this 'tame cat theory of
treating seditionists'. In his opinion men like Banerjea should be
told, quite frankly, that the Government regarded them as enemies and
would treat them accordingly. He wrote of Banerjeas
I am convinced that his dossier would show the truth of every 
word said, that he is an arch-enemy of the Government without 
a spark of honesty in his composition. I do not for a moment 
believe that Lord Carmichael knows his past history or regards 
him as any more than an advanced politician. With the "tame 
cat" policy a man of this kind gets a swollen head, and struts 
about hugging himself with pride at the thought that he is so 
clever and powerful that Government is afraid of him, and dare 
not assume any attitude except friendship and conciliation 
towards him. 'What if he is driven into the arms of the enemy?
He will be less and not more dangerous than he is at present?
These are the lines on which I would act in Bengal. There 
is no via media between futile conciliation and stern dis­
countenancing of these mischievous pseudo-constitutionalists.^
Deeply shocked by the attempt on Hardinge's life, the Government
of India was angered by Carmichael's apparent indifference to terrorism.
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They interpreted his reluctance to act without public support as a
sign of weakness, and they were perturbed, in particular, at his
failure to silence the Bengali press, which in their opinion was
spreading hot sedition. Craddock maintained that they should
immediately take the matter out of Carmichael’s hands by enforcing a
repressive ordinance, but most of his colleagues disagreed on the
ground that this would make nonsense of the policy of liberalisation
and the devolution of power to the provinces. Some of them hinted
that they were not in full agreement with that policy but they pointed
out that it was Crewe's darling and that he would not countenance any
attempt to push the provinces against their will.
Obviously, the only course was to convince both Crewe and the
Bengal Government that a firmer line was needed. To this end a despatch
was sent to Bengal emphasising the Government of India's concern and
asking the provincial Government to outline its proposals for dealing 
1with terrorism. Craddock went to Calcutta to suggest to Carmichael 
and his officers what these proposals should be, but he returned in 
disgust to report that although the Bengal Government recognised the 
gravity of the matter they were unwilling to apply strong measures.
What was worse (and this was obviously beyond his comprehension) they 
could give no guarantee that their own policy of conciliation would work.
_
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Craddock was convinced that the Government of Bengal had only a
superficial understanding of the problem and on 27 April 1913 be
wrote a long minute to demonstrate its complexity. This document was
a masterly social analysis - masterly but for one grave flaw: the
lack of any appreciation of the bhadralok's need for political self-
expression. Because of his failure or refusal to recognise the
significance of this need, Craddock could explain terrorism only as
a product of some evil inherent in Bengali society.
He attributed the administrative ills of the province to the
weakness of its revenue agency, the paucity of British officers and
the difficulties of communication. He pointed to the Permanent
Settlement and the resultant subinfeudation, with its product: the
bhadralok. This class, he said, had shown an extraordinary liking
for English-language education, and as a result the professions in
Bengal had become over-crowded. The disappointed and half-educated
men which the system produced were easily swayed by the outpourings
of a seditious press. The result, as he saw it, was a society in
which evil had taken possession of men’s minds. He wrote:
It is a strange world, a topsy-turvy arrangement under which 
all the maleficent influences are hailed as deliverances, and
all the benevolent influences are howled down in press and on
platform as tyrannical and malevolent .... In no other country 
in the world than India, and in no other part of India except 
Bengal, could such an absolute inversion of right and wrong 
apparently find acceptance among people, who are more than 
ordinarily gifted with intellectual gifts. In Bengal there is
apparently nobody to rally round the Government and no means 
of securing a rally ...
From this can be seen the gulf which separated Craddock from
Carmichael. .Vhereas the latter believed that terrorism resulted from
the frustration of the bhadralok’s legitimate political aspirations,
the former could see it only as the evil product of a diseased society.
Carmichael believed that it was the British who had to change their 
2ways5 Craddock said that Bengali society had to be refashioned, ’for 
if there are poisonous humours in the body politic which produce these 
growths, the mere application of caustic or the knife to the growths 
themselves can produce no permanent beneficial effect.'^
Regimentation
Craddock warned his colleagues that the trouble in Bengal, if 
left unchecked, would spread rapidly to other provinces. The Government 
of India had to consider its wider responsibilities. * Whatever value 
we may attach to provincial autonomy or decentralization,’ he wrote,
’we cannot overlook ourselves, or let local Governments overlook,
4the Imperial aspects of any weakness or defects in administration.’
This argument, although at first sight apparently straightforward,
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was based on an assum ption o f fa r - re a c h in g  consequence. What Craddock 
was say ing  in  e f f e c t  was th a t  th e  problem of m ain ta in in g  order in  
B r i t i s h  In d ia  was to  be solved by keeping th e  p rov inces regim ented.
For th e  sake of the  whole company no in d iv id u a l should be allow ed to  
s tep  out o f l i n e .  I f  th e re  was to be any movement, a l l  should move in  
un ison .
This was th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  had governed C urzon 's p o l ic ie s  bu t i t
had been d isca rd ed  by th e  refo rm ers in  th e  p e rio d  1909 to 1912.
M orley, fo r  in s ta n c e , reco g n ised  th a t  a lthough  Bengal had only a
L ieu tenan t-G overnor, i t s  a d m in is tra tiv e  problems demanded t h a t ,  u n lik e
o th e r  L ieu ten an t-G o v ern o r's  p ro v in c e s , i t  should  not be denied an
E xecutive C ouncil. In  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  reform s of 19O9 B en g a l's
su p e r io r  p o l i t i c a l  m a tu rity  was acknowledged by th e  p ro v is io n  o f
R ep resen ta tiv e  Government. No o th e r  p rovince was given  th i s .  The I 9H
arrangem ents took c a re fu l account of B en g a l's  sp e c ia l needs, and Crewe,
in  h is  l e t t e r  to  Carmichael o f 15 January  1912, emphasised th e
im portance o f  encouraging the  sep a ra te  development o f th e  p rov ince .
The new L e g is la t iv e  Council re g u la tio n s  of 1912 provided an o th er
o p p o rtu n ity  to  make sp e c ia l lo c a l  ad justm en ts and i t  was one o f
C arm ichae l's  b a s ic  te n e n ts  th a t  Bengal was not to  be tr e a te d  l ik e  the  
2r e s t  o f In d ia .
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At th i s  p o in t he c lashed  head-on w ith  the  Government of In d ia , 
and, u n fo r tu n a te ly  fo r  th e  h h ad ra lo k , i t  was th e  Government of In d ia  
th a t  had th e  f in a l  say. Bengal was ready fo r  an advance to  R esponsible 
Government by 1914» b u t, because of th e  Government o f In d ia ’s in s is te n c e  
th a t  no p rov ince  should be allow ed to  g e t out of s te p  w ith  the  r e s t ,  
i t  had to  w a it u n t i l  1921, w ith  d is a s tro u s  consequences fo r  th e  
l i b e r a l  id e a l  in  bhadra lok  p o l i t i c s .
C arm ichael’ s D efeat
Most o f th e  rem edies f o r  th e  s i tu a t io n  in  Bengal which Craddock
advanced in  h is  minute o f 27 A pril 1913 were considered  too d r a s t ic
by Hardinge and the o th e r  members o f the  Government of In d ia . They
d id , however, accept h is  su g g es tio n  th a t  th e re  should be s t r i c t e r
c o n tro l o f appointm ents to  te ach in g  p o s ts  in  B engal, in  o rd er to  keep
' s e d i t i o n i s t s  ’ from poison ing  th e  minds o f th e  young'. They a lso
agreed to  th e  appointm ent of a committee to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  su b o rd in a te
a d m in is tra tio n  of the  p ro v in ce , fo r  i t s  re p o r t  was c e r ta in  to  prov ide
evidence which th ey  might use  to  support t h e i r  demands fo r  f irm e r 
1m easures.
For C arm ichael, th in g s  were going b ad ly . He was convinced th a t  
i f  he were to  have any hope o f success in  h is  w ider m issio n , he must 
be g iven  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  move c a u tio u s ly  a g a in s t th e  t e r r o r i s t s ,
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carrying with him some degree of Moderate support. With the Government 
of India pressing ever harder for action, however, it was obvious 
that he had only a limited time to secure that support. He was dis­
heartened by the lack of response from the Moderates. In personal
conversations and in his speeches in the Legislative Council and on
1tour, he had appealed for their assistance. He had succeeded in
obtaining encouraging promises from a number of leading nationalists,
but their resolve faltered when it came to translating- private
2assurance into public action. In the Legislative Council the bhadralok 
members continued their harrassing methods, until the Government 
finally felt itself obliged to show less indulgence in providing 
information and in replying to attacks in conciliatory tones. ^  The 
lines in the Council were now drawn in just the way Carmichael had 
striven to avoid, with the officials and the European non-officials 
on one side, opposing the Indian non-officials on the other.
In the British community at large, feeling was running high at 
the frequency of terrorist killings, and alarmist writing in the 
European press did nothing to ease the Governor's task of reaching- a 
modus vivendi.'' Moreover, the British non-officials were growing
1
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im p a tien t a t  h is  p e rs is te n c e  in  n e g o tia tin g  w ith  the n a t io n a l i s t s .
’I s  i t  not tim e to  d isc r im in a te  between le g it im a te  p o l i t i c a l  a s p ir a t io n  
and open o r  sem i-veiled  s e d i t io n ,  to  ask  s t r a ig h t  out who i s  on our 
s id e  and who i s  a g a in s t u s? ' demanded th e  p re s id e n t o f the  European 
Defence A sso c ia tio n , P.H. S tew art, a t  th e  1913 S t. Andrew’s Day 
d in n e r.^
The a c tio n s  of the  Government of In d ia  were a lso  d is tu rb in g
bhadralok opinion in  ju st the way Carmichael had wished to avoid.
F ru s tra te d  in  most d ire c t io n s  by th e  new p o lic y  o f d e c e n tr a l is a t io n ,
th e  Government of In d ia  had se ized  upon the  U n iv e rs ity  o f C a lcu tta
and th e  ed u ca tio n  s e rv ic e , over which i t  re ta in e d  d i r e c t  c o n tro l ,  to
teach  th e  *s e d i t i o n i s t s ' and th e  Government o f Bengal a le s so n . In
May 1913 th e  V ice-C hancellor of th e  U n iv e rs ity  of C a lc u tta , Asutosh
M ukherjea, subm itted  the  names of th re e  le c tu r e r s  fo r  th e  Government
o f I n d ia 's  co n firm atio n . The men -  Abdul f ta su l, Dr Abdul1a-al-Mamun
Suhrawardy and K.F. Jayaswal -  had a lre ad y  tak en  up th e i r  p o s ts  w ith
th e  Government of Bengal' s san ction , but the Government of India
re fu sed  to  confirm  th e i r  appointm ent on the ground th a t  they  had been
a c tiv e  in  p o l i t i c s  and could not be t ru s te d  to  r e f r a in  from ex p ress in g
2a n t i - B r i t i s h  sen tim en ts . E a r l i e r  i t  had issu ed  o rd e rs  aimed a t
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tightening official control over schools and colleges, and, in
June 1913> in appointing a new Director of Public Instruction for
Bengal, it disregarded the claims of the Provincial Education Service
and brought out a young man from England, in the hope that a new
2broom would sweep clean.
These moves were seen by the bhadralok as attacks upon their 
group identity. They smacked strongly of the policies of the Curzon 
era and the speakers at a Calcutta Town Hall meeting (the traditional 
method of bhadralok protest) declared that the ’Spirit of Partition' 
was still rampant." An even greater uproar was narrowly averted 
early in 1914 when the Government of India was persuaded by Carmichael 
and Crewe to drop a proposal to put an Englishman in place of 
Mukherjea as Vice-Chancellor of the University.^
It was patent that in its educational decisions, the Government 
of India had disregarded the wishes of the provincial Government.
This confirmed the bhadralok's suspicion that the policy of devolution 
of power was a sham - and they asked what price now for the other 
arm of the new order: liberalisation? As early as June 1912 Crewe
1
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had disclaimed the suggestion that there had been any intention at
the time of reunification to establish provincial autonomy, and this
had provoked the inevitable retort that he was trying to explain away
2an indiscreet promise. By the beginning of 1914» it was an open 
secret that the Government of Bengal enjoyed little freedom of action, 
and the Bengali Moderates were losing faith in Carmichael's ability 
to keep his side of any bargain.
Carmichael was also having trouble with his own Government. From 
the first, many of his officers, including those most sympathetic to 
his liberal aims, had thought him over optimistic in his hopes of a 
response from the bhadralok leaders.^ Faced with the continued failure 
of his efforts, with the unabated violence of terrorism and with 
incessant complaints from Delhi, they had begun to urge him to take 
stronger action. His difficulties were increased by a personal 
misunderstanding between Duke and Lyon.^ With his two chief advisers 
barely on speaking terms, he had to carry alone his burden of worries.
By the time Hardinge came to Calcutta at Christmas 1913» He found 
Carmichael finally resigned to the necessity for action against the
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t e r r o r i s t s .  The Governor in s i s t e d ,  however, th a t  the  Government use
only the  s ta tu to ry  powers which i t  a lre ad y  p o ssessed , u n t i l  such time
as a B i l l ,  extending- those  powers, could he go t through the  Bengal
L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil, w ith  the approval o f a t  l e a s t  some o f th e  In d ian
n o n -o f f ic ia ls .  He was supported  in  h is  s tand  hy Crewe and th e  B r i t i s h  
2
C abinet, much to the  annoyance o f the  Government of In d ia , who saw 
how l i t t l e  r e a l  hope e x is te d  o f o b ta in in g  In d ia n  support fo r  such 
m easures.^
Throughout the  f i r s t  h a l f  o f 19145 Carmichael s tru g g le d  v a in ly  
to  prove them wrong. He f a i le d  to  o b ta in  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  he needed 
and a lso  he re p e a te d ly  saw ch arg es , which h is  Government l a id  a g a in s t 
suspec ted  t e r r o r i s t s  under th e  e x is t in g  law , d ism issed  by th e  C a lcu tta  
High C ourt, which a t  th a t tim e was a confirm ed an tag o n is t o f th e  
ex ecu tiv e  and which d is t r u s te d  p o lic e  evidence on p r in c ip le .^ -
The Government of In d ia  was growing in c re a s in g ly  im p a tien t a t  
what i t  regarded  as C arm ichael1s f u t i l e  p e rs is te n c e  w ith  m oderate 
methods. With the  ou tbreak  of th e  European war in  August 1914? i t  saw 
i t s  o p p o rtu n ity  to take the  m a tte r out of h is  hands. I t  inform ed
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Crewe th a t  under the changed co n d itio n s  ex cep tio n a l measures could 
no lo n g e r he avoided. In  December i t  assumed com plete charge o f the  
h an d lin g  o f consp iracy  and in  March 1915 i f  passed the  Defence of 
In d ia  A ct, which gave i t  power to  a r r e s t  and d e ta in  su sp ec ts  w ithout 
t r i a l . ^
'These a re  the  l in e s  on which I  would a c t in  B en g a l,' Craddock 
had w r it te n  in  January 1913* ‘There i s  no v ia  media between f u t i l e  
c o n c i l ia t io n  and s te rn  d iscoun tenancing  o f th e se  m ischievous pseudo­
c o n s t i tu t io n a l i s t s .  ’ Carmichael knew very  w ell th a t  the  M oderates' 
p ro fessed  attachm ent to  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  methods was no p re ten ce  and he 
a p p re c ia te d  the  p o te n tia l  danger to  th e  fu tu re  of bhadra lok  p o l i t i c s  
of d ism iss in g  them as m ischievous busybodies. Throughout, h is  a c tio n s  
had been based on th e  fundam ental c o n v ic tio n  th a t  a v ia  media between 
’f u t i l e  c o n c i l ia t io n  and s te r n  discountenancing* had to  be found to  
save l ib e ra l is m  in  Bengal. He had c lash ed  w ith  the  Government o f  In d ia  
on t h i s  is su e  and had been d e fe a te d . With th e  passage of th e  Defence 
o f In d ia  Act th e  Craddock l in e  had trium phed, to  the  ru in a tio n  of 
C arm ichael’ s a ttem pt to  g a in  th e  c o -o p e ra tio n  o f the  bhadralok  through 
the  L e g is la t iv e  Council.
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CHAPTER I I I
TALL TALK ARP LOW PERFORMANCES 
The M oderates in  T rouble
Among th e  b h ad ra lo k  th e re  was in d ig n a t io n  a t  th e  Government o f  
I n d i a 's  a c t io n s  in  th e  e a r ly  months o f  1915* In  Jan u a ry  i t  p u b lish e d  
th e  r e p o r t  o f  th e  Bengal D i s t r i c t  A d m in is tra tio n  Com m ittee. T h is  was 
th e  com m ittee o f en q u iry  e s ta b l i s h e d  a t  C rad d o ck 's  in s ta n c e  in  O ctober 
1913 and i t s  r e p o r t  was v i r t u a l l y  an e x te n s io n  o f  h is  m inute o f  27 A p r il  
1913> c o n c e n tra tin g ' a t t e n t i o n  upon th e  sho rtcom ings o f  th e  p r o v in c ia l  
a d m in is t r a t iv e  s t r u c tu r e  and system  o f  e d u c a tio n , and th e  r o le  o f  
e d u ca ted  Hindus in  's e d i t i o u s '  a c t i v i t i e s .  The r e p o r t  had been w ith ­
h e ld  f o r  some months and when i t  d id  ap p ea r i t  ro u sed  th e  i r e  o f  th e  
b h a d ra lo k  who re g a rd e d  i t  a s  an o f fe n s iv e  a t t a c k  on t h e i r  community.
The p a s s in g  o f th e  D efence o f  In d ia  Act in  March b ro u g h t im m ediate
p r o t e s t s  from  a l l  s e c t io n s  o f  B en g a li p o l i t i c a l  s o c ie ty ,  H indus and 
2
Muslims a l i k e .  The Government was accu sed  o f  h av in g  ta k e n  advan tage 
o f  th e  g e n e ra l s t a t e  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  to  r e s t r i c t  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s .  The 
manner in  w hich th e  B i l l  had been  h u s t le d  th ro u g h  th e  Im p e r ia l C o u n c il,
_
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w ith o u t r e f e r e n c e  to  a s e le c t  com m ittee , was h e ld  to  be ev idence  o f  th e  
G overnm ent’ s d is re g a rd  f o r  th e  e l e c te d  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f th e  p e o p le .
When i t s  p ro v is io n s  were f i r s t  e n fo rc e d , many o f  th o se  im p risoned  o r  
p la c e d  u n d er house a r r e s t  were b h a d ra lo k  s tu d e n ts  and th e re  was an 
o u tc ry  a g a in s t  hand ing  in n o c en t y o u th s  ov er to  th e  c r u e l t i e s  o f  th e  
p o l i c e .^
In  h i s  p r e s id e n t i a l  a d d re ss  to  th e  In d ia n  A ss o c ia tio n  on 14 May 1915 
A.C. Majumdar d e c la re d  th a t  th e  Government had f o r f e i t e d  th e  t r u s t  o f 
B e n g a lis . ’C o -o p e ra tio n  i s  a word e a s i l y  u t t e r e d  and e a s i l y  re p e a te d ,  
b u t n o t a s  e a s i l y  a c te d  u p o n ,’ he s a id .  'L e t  b o th  s id e s  be f ra n k  and 
acknow ledge th a t  th e re  i s  no sympathy and th e r e f o r e  no c o -o p e ra t io n  
betw een th e  p eo p le  and th e  Government. The c o -o p e ra t io n  can o n ly  come 
w ith  t r u s t  and co n fid en ce  w hich u n h a p p ily  a re  v e ry  much w a n tin g . '
I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  j u s t  over th r e e  y e a rs  e a r l i e r ,  Majumdar 
had been  one o f  th e  s ig n a to r ie s  to  th e  M oderate n a t i o n a l i s t s '  d e c la r a t io n  
e x p re s s in g  'o u r  p ro found  homage, ou r dev o ted  lo y a l ty  and our h e a r t - f e l t  
g r a t i t u d e '  a t  th e  'happy  Reunion o f  B e n g a l '." ' As t h i s  s u g g e s ts ,  th e re  
had been  a s i g n i f i c a n t  lo s s  o f  co n fid en ce  among th e  B en g ali M oderates in  
t h i s  p e r io d .  The optim ism  w ith  w hich th e y  had g re e te d  th e  r e u n i f i c a t i o n ,
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as  th e  s ig n a l  o f  a new e r a ,  had d ie d , f o r  t h e i r  h ig h  hopes in  e n te r in g
th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil had n o t been  r e a l i s e d .  T h e ir  e l e c te d  m ajority -
had p roved  to  he o f no r e a l  advan tage  f o r  th e y  had no power over th e
e x e c u tiv e  and t h e i r  w e ll-o rg a n is e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  p a r ty  had found n o th in g
b e t t e r  to  do th a n  to  n eed le  th e  Government a t  ev e ry  p o s s ib le  p o in t .
F r u s t r a te d  by such a p r o f i t l e s s  o c c u p a tio n , th e y  abused  th e  o f f i c i a l s
f o r  t h e i r  u n w ill in g n e s s  to  ta k e  n o t ic e  o f  n o n - o f f i c i a l  o p in io n . In  h is
p r e s i d e n t i a l  speech  to  th e  Bengal P ro v in c ia l  C onference in  A p r il  1914?
Byomkes C h a k ra v a r ti ,  a le a d in g  M oderate and a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e
P re s id e n c y  D iv is io n  zam indars in  th e  C o u n c il, had s a id :
T h is  i s  th e  im p ress io n  one g a in s  from a p e ru s a l  o f  r e c e n t  
p ro c e e d in g s  in  th e  Im p e r ia l  C ouncil a s  w e ll a s  th e  Bengal 
C o u n c il. The members o f  Government seem to  be in  no way 
an x io u s  to  encourage n o n - o f f i c i a l  c o -o p e ra t io n . Almost 
ev e ry  n o n - o f f i c i a l  s u g g e s tio n  i s  met w ith  an em phatic , i f  
c o u r te o u s ly  e x p re s se d , n e g a t iv e .  Sometimes th e  a s p i r a t io n s  
o f  n o n - o f f i c i a l  members a re  t r e a t e d  w ith  a s o r t  o f  amused 
c y n ic ism . I t  i s  dangerous to  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  to  t r i f l e  w ith  
th e  le g i t im a te  demand o f  p u b lic  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  to  be 
fu rn is h e d  w ith  th e  m a te r ia ls  w hich w i l l  b e t t e r  en ab le  them 
to  r e p re s e n t  th e  v ie w s, n o t o f th em se lv es  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  b u t 
o f  th e  ed u ca ted  p u b l ic ,  though c o m p a ra tiv e ly  sm a ll, who a re  
i n t e r e s t e d  in  m a tte rs  coming up f o r  d is c u s s io n .^
The co n tin u e d  a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  t e r r o r i s t s  had p roved  a sev e re
em barrassm ent to  th e  M odera tes, whose e v a s io n  o f  C a rm ic h a e l's  r e q u e s ts
f o r  a r e p u d ia t io n  o f  v io l e n t  m ethods had f u r th e r  s t r a in e d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s
w ith  th e  B engal Government. I t  had a ls o  h a s te n e d  th e  d i r e c t  in te r v e n t io n
in  p r o v in c ia l  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  Government o f  I n d ia ,  w hich o b v io u s ly  had
1
Hindu P a t r i o t ,*  20 Apr 1914
none of Carmichael’s sympathy for the Moderates’ aspirations. The
enactment of the Defence of India Act was the final demonstration of
the Moderates’ impotency, and, as if to complete their humiliation, the
Government of India had directed that the non-official members of the
legislative councils should demonstrate their support for the war
1effort by foregoing all discussion of controversial subjects. Thus, 
at a time of rising bhadralok anger at British actions, the Moderates 
had to content themselves with loyal utterances and petty talk of local 
affairs.
When they had entered the new Legislative Council in 1913 it had
been to the accompaniment of a chorus of jeers from the Extremists,
who declared that the Moderates had been duped by the British into
2thinking that they were being given something worthwhile. It now 
seemed that the Extremists had been right, and, as a consequence, the 
Moderates were held up to ridicule in the bhadralok press. 'What a 
tempting and beautiful picture was drawn by the Congress leaders when 
the bonbon of the reformed Councils was dangled before the eyes of the 
people, and how sad and deplorable is the reality!1 23 wrote the Amrita 
Bazar Patrika.^  On a later occasion it compared the Council members
_
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with a swarm of noisy little hornets, able to sting and inflict pain
but with no poison to do real harm.
In an article on ’Lord Morley's ’’Reforms'” in the Calcutta Hindu
Review of April 1914? Bepin Chandra Pal had written:
What was really wanted was not a reform and expansion of the 
Legislative Councils, but a reconstitution of the Executive 
Administration. The new patriotism craved really for neither 
reform nor reconstitution, but rather only for a little more 
freedom of self-expression and self-reliant civic activities.
This was the inner meaning of the Boycott Movement and the 
organisation of the so-called Rational Volunteers .... The 
’’Moderates” have been "rallied”, but the "revolutionaries” are 
almost as active as ever. These revolutionaries actually 
helped the Moderates to the enlarged privileges which the 
"Reforms” bestowed on them. And these very Moderates now, by 
keeping up a constant stream of unfriendly and unwise criticism 
of executive action and policy, are, in their turn, materially, 
though unconsciously, contributing to the strength of the 
revolutionary party. For, the failure of every Resolution 
brought before the Councils by the popular leaders, and the 
rejection of every amendment proposed by them in any Bill 
under the consideration of the legislatures, inevitably 
strengthen the conviction of the impossibility of working out 
any reasonable reconciliation between popular rights and the 
British connection with this country. Lord Morley's "Reforms” 
have, thus, only increased the difficulties of an already 
difficult situation.2
By early 1915 the Moderates were forced to admit that there was a 
great deal of truth in what Pal had said. Their failure to achieve 
anything worthwhile in the Council because of their lack of power, 
had seriously weakened their influence with the bhadralok, and, what 
was more serious, it had very largely discredited their political 
style: constitutional nationalism.
1
Amrita Bazar Patrika,* 31 May 1917*
Nationality and Empire, pp. 222-3.
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As a debating point, they had always argued that the Extremists
were foolish to criticise the Morley-Minto councils for what they were
not, without considering what they might become. They had to be
regarded merely as staging points on the road to self-government, the
1Moderates insisted. This assertion, however, depended upon faith -
faith in the British intention to give India self-government - and the
Extremists maintained that this faith was groundless. They pointed out
that the British had never declared self-government to be the object of
their policy in India and they held that there was nothing in British
actions to suggest that they would ever voluntarily give up power.
The reformed Legislative Councils and the talk of liberalising provincial
administration were simply sops to appease an angry people. It was
the Craddocks, not the Carmichaels, who were the real force in British
Indian government and the Defence of India Act was the true product 
2of their work.
The logical conclusion of this argument was, as Pal had said,
’the conviction of the impossibility of working out any reasonable 
reconciliation between popular rights and the British connection with 
this country', and that almost certainly meant violent revolution. To 
the Moderates this was a frightful conclusion.
1
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They could see only one sure v/ay of defeating that logic: to secure 
a clear declaration from the British that they intended India to be 
self-governing. This should be followed immediately by the transfer 
of some measure of real power to the Indian members of the legislative 
councils and a guarantee that more would be given at successive stages.
The object was to restore that faith in the value of liberal, con­
stitutional methods of political action which had been so badly shaken, 
first by the partition of Bengal, and later by the Moderates' difficulties 
in the reformed councils. To achieve this object, there had to be a 
minimum of hesitation on the part of the British in making their 
declaration and no display of reluctance in giving the powers demanded 
by the Moderates.
Demands for Constitutional Advance
This critical point in their thinking had been reached by the 
Moderate nationalists in Bengal by the middle of 1915* As v/e have seen, 
the actions of the Government of India in the months following the 
outbreak of the war had had a negative influence in forcing them to 
this conclusion. The declaration of war itself had had a more positive 
effect. In India, as in other parts of the British Empire, August 1914 
sent a wave of excitement and hope through the educated classes. There 
was talk of a short and glorious campaign, to be followed by a re­
adjustment of international relations, in the forefront of which would 
be a new partnership of the nations of the British Empire. A new
co n ce p tio n  o f  In d ia  caught th e  im a g in a tio n  o f  In d ia n  n a t i o n a l i s t s :  a
s e lf -g o v e rn in g  In d ia  ta k in g  i t s  p la c e  a s  an eq u a l b e s id e  th e  o th e r
B r i t i s h  dom inions in  an Im p e r ia l f e d e r a t io n .  A lread y , th e y  d e c la re d ,
I n d ia ’ s new s ta tu s  had been  foreshadow ed by th e  employment o f la rg e
numbers o f  In d ia n  tro o p s  b e s id e  th o se  o f  G reat B r i t a in  and th e  w h ite
dom inions on th e  European b a t t l e f i e l d s .  ’Comrades in  arm s, i t  w i l l  be
d i f f i c u l t  to  t r e a t  them as  h e lo t s  in  p o l i t i c s , ’ declaim ed  th e  B engalee 
2
in  Septem ber 1914*
E x c ite d  by t h i s  p r o s p e c t ,  th e  M oderates s e t  about p re p a r in g  schemes 
f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  re fo rm , ty p i c a l  o f  w hich was one p u b lish e d  in  J u ly  
1915 by S u ren d ran a th  B a n e rje a . I t  i s  w orth  s tu d y in g  in  d e t a i l ,  f o r  i t  
c o n ta in e d  th e  essen ce  o f  im p o rta n t l a t e r  p ro p o s a ls :  S .P . S in h a 's  
C ongress p r e s id e n t i a l  a d d re s s  o f  December 1915; th e  m em orial p re s e n te d  
to  th e  V iceroy  in  O ctober 1916 by 19 members o f  th e  Im p e r ia l L e g is la t iv e  
C o u n c il; and th e  C ongress-L eague scheme o f  December 1916.
B a n e rje a  assumed t h a t  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e c o n s tr u c t io n  was imminent 
and he a rg u ed  th a t  th e  b e s t  way f o r  th e  In d ia n  le a d e r s  to  draw a t t e n t i o n  
to  t h e i r  demands was f o r  H indus and M uslims to  ag ree  to  a common p la n . 
'The id e a l  i s  se lf-g o v e rn m en t w ith in  th e  Em pire, and ev e ry  p a r t  o f  th e  
scheme must te n d  tow ards i t , '  he w ro te . The demands sho u ld  be f o r  
th e  appo in tm en t o f a h ig h e r  p ro p o r tio n  o f  In d ia n s  to  th e  C iv i l  S e rv ic e ,
1
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r e a l  autonomy f o r  th e  p ro v in c e s ,  and an Im p e r ia l L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil
w ith  ex ten d ed  powers* The Government sh o u ld  be bound by c o u n c il
r e s o lu t io n s ,  and e le c te d  members sh o u ld  be in  a tw o - th i rd s  m a jo r i ty
in  a l l  d e l ib e r a t iv e  b o d ie s ,  w ith  e f f e c t iv e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  f o r  ’ev e ry
d i s t r i c t  and every  i n t e r e s t * .  Most im p o rta n t o f  a l l ,  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e
c o u n c ils  sh o u ld  have th e  power o f th e  p u rs e ,  f o r  t h i s ,  B an erjea  h e ld ,
1
was th e  key  to  r e a l  se lf-g o v e rn m e n t.
In  t h i s ,  a s  in  th e  l a t e r  schem es, th e  demand was f o r  th e  e x te n s io n
o f th e  pow ers o f th e  e x i s t in g  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  f o r  th a t  would j u s t i f y  th e
M o d era tes’ p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  th e  o ld  c o u n c i ls ,  and , a s  an advance a lo n g
a re c o g n ise d  l i n e  o f  c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  developm ent, would a f f o r d  them a
c le a r  v ic to r y .  Accompanying t h e i r  programmes o f  re fo rm , was an ap p ea l
to  th e  B r i t i s h  to  make a d e c la r a t io n  t h a t  In d ia  was to  be g iv en  s e l f -
governm ent -  a d e c la r a t io n  'w i th  re g a rd  to  w hich th e re  w i l l  be no ev a s io n
no m isu n d e rs ta n d in g  p o s s i b le ’ . The v/ords a re  S .P . S in h a 's  and he
fo llo w ed  them w ith  an a r t i c l e  from th e  M odera tes ' c re e d : ' i f  th e
n ob le  p o l ic y  o f  Malcolm and E lp h in s to n e , Canning and R ipon, B r ig h t and
M orley, i s  n o t s t e a d i ly ,  c o n s i s te n t ly  and u n f l in c h in g ly  adhered  t o ,
th e  m oderate  p a r ty  amongst us w i l l  soon be d e p le te d  o f  a l l  t h a t  i s  f in e
2
and n o b le  in  human c h a r a c t e r . ’
_
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Advance Deferred
The Moderates had made their plea and it was important to them 
that the British should respond quickly and generously, for any 
hesitation, any hint of neglect for constitutional aspirations, would 
reinforce the growing impression that the Moderates had no influence.
The British acted neither quickly nor generously. More than three 
years had elapsed from the declaration of war Before the British Government 
announced its plans for India's future, and then only when its hand had 
been forced by Indian agitation and non-official British action.
At the outset the attention of the British and Indian Governments 
was fully occupied with the urgent problems of reorganising for war, 
and, although the excitement in India over the possibility of
constitutional reforms did not pass unremarked, it was agreed that
1consideration of such questions should await the return of peace.
Even when hopes of a quick victory had receded, the Government of India 
was reluctant to make any move which might disturb political order in 
India and thereby jeopardise its contribution to the war effort.
For the first two years of the war its primary concern was the 
handling of conspiracy. Bengal occupied the lion's share of its time, 
for it was very afraid that the terrorists there would receive direct 
aid from German agents, and it could not persuade Carmichael to apply
GI, Home Public, A128-131, Oct 1914.
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th e  D efence o f In d ia  Act as  r ig o r o u s ly  as  i t  c o n s id e re d  n e c e s sa ry . 
A lthough th e  G overnor’ s l i b e r a l  p o l ic y  was v i r t u a l l y  w recked, he 
re fu s e d  to  g iv e  in  co m p le te ly  to  S im la , and h i s  l a s t  two y e a rs  in  
o f f ic e  w ere devo ted  to  a s t ru g g le  to  p re v e n t th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  powers 
w hich th e  e x e c u tiv e  had a c q u ire d , from  b e in g  u sed  to  s t i f l e  h e a lth y  
p u b lic  l i f e  in  h is  p ro v in c e .
To th e  Government o f  I n d i a 's  r e i t e r a t e d  demands f o r  extrem e a c t io n ,  
h is  custom ary  r e p ly  was: 'we must w a it p a t i e n t l y  and n o t lo s e  our h e a d s . ' 
He opposed su g g e s tio n s  f o r  th e  d e p o r ta t io n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s u s p e c ts .^  He 
i n s i s t e d  on th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  com m ittees to  examine th e  ev idence  on 
w hich s u sp e c ts  were d e ta in e d , and he p rop o sed  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  In d ia n  
n o n - o f f i c i a l s  on th e se  com m ittees to  g a in  p u b lic  su p p o r t.  'T i l l  th e re  
i s  g e n e ra l co n fid en ce  in  th e  f a i r n e s s  o f  our e n q u i r ie s ,  w e ..sh a ll n o t 
g e t on v e ry  f a r . H e  s to o d  f irm  a g a in s t  p re s s u re  from th e  Government 
o f In d ia  and h i s  own o f f i c i a l s  to  use  th e  D efence o f I n d ia  Act r e t r o ­
s p e c t iv e ly  a g a in s t  men whom th e  p o l ic e  b e l ie v e d  had been in v o lv ed  in  
p o l i t i c a l  crim e as f a r  back  as  1908. He in s i s t e d  th a t  th e  members o f  
th e  L e g i s la t iv e  C ouncil sh o u ld  be g iv e n  f u l l  in fo rm a tio n  in  r e p ly  to
1
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t h e i r  q u e s tio n s  on th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  A c t, and w henever he
a d d re sse d  th e  C ouncil he e x p la in e d  th e  re a so n s  f o r  a c t io n s  w hich h is
2
Government had ta k en .
The 1916 E le c tio n s
He had h is  rev/ard f o r  t h i s  p e r s i s te n c e  in  t r y in g  to  m i t ig a te  th e
s e v e r i t y  o f  B r i t i s h  w artim e a d m in is t r a t io n ,  in  th e  d e c is io n  o f th e
M oderates to  c o n te s t  th e  June 1916 L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil e l e c t i o n s .  The
E x tre m is t p re s s  in  Bengal r id i c u le d  th e  id e a  o f  any f u r th e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n
3
in  th e  M orley-M into l e g i s l a t u r e s  and i t  i s  n o t u n l ik e ly  th a t  th e  
M oderates would have re p e a te d  t h e i r  1909 "boycott had C arm ichael Been 
l e s s  sy m p a th e tic .
In  th e se  e le c t io n s  n a t i o n a l i s t  p o l i t i c s  p la y e d  a more im p o rta n t r o le  
th a n  in  th e  1912-13 c o n te s t s .  In  th e  te n  lo c a l  Body c o n s t i tu e n c ie s ,  
where B hadralok  o p in io n  was most c l e a r ly  e x p re s se d , th e re  was a d e c is iv e  
change. The f iv e  s i t t i n g  members f o r  th e  D i s t r i c t  and L ocal B oards 
s e a t s  were d e fe a te d  By men who were younger and more an g ry , i f  we may 
judge from  t h e i r  subsequen t B ehav iour in  th e  C o u n c il. The M u n ic ip a l i t ie s  
s e a ts  were won By angry  o ld  men, f iv e  v e te r a n s  o f  th e  a n t i - p a r t i t i o n  
cam paign, a l l  In d ia n  A ss o c ia tio n  la w y e rs : K is o r i  Mohan C haudhuri,
1
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K.B. Dutt, Ambika Charan Majumdar and, two re-elected members, Surendranath 
and Mahendranath Ray. This suggests that a considerable change had 
occurred in the electorates since the Banerjea group1s debacle in 1913? 
and a comparison of the political affiliations of the members of the 
old and new Councils points to the same conclusion. Of the 16 elected 
Hindu members in 1913» ten belonged to no organisations outside their 
local regions, whereas in 1916, all but one Hindu member belonged to some 
province-wide association. While local influence was still important in 
securing votes - and the contests gave good evidence of this - a 
nationalist reputation now carried considerable weight at the polls.
It appears that, because of the impact of the events of the years 
between 1913 and 1916, the activities of nationalist politicians, and the 
writings of the vernacular press, the values of the ’upper1 level of 
politics were by this time understood and, to some degree, accepted at 
the next level. Thus, in spite of the shortcomings of the Morley-Minto 
Council and the consequent frustration of its bhadralok members, something 
really significant had been achieved in Bengal in this period.
There was a great opportunity here for the British. At the same 
time, however, there was grave potential danger. If they could meet the 
demands of the active political elite and thereby reconcile the upper 
level of political society, they would have a good chance of stabilising 
the second level as well. That it was not too late to do this, was 
indicated by the Moderates’ participation in the 1916 elections - 
particularly the participation of the young uncommitted men. Conversely
130
i f  th e  B r i t i s h  were to  f a i l  to  meet th e  demands o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  'f e l i te ,  
th e re b y  le a v in g  th e  an g er o f  th e  upper l e v e l  unchecked , th e re  was now 
a s e r io u s  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  t h a t  an g er ru n n in g  l i k e  a sc ru b  f i r e  th rough  
th e  second le v e l  -  and even beyond. The L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil was no 
lo n g e r  th e  e x c lu s iv e  concern  o f  th e  a c t iv e  e l i t e ,  and t h i s  meant th a t  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f i t s  refo rm  had assumed a co m p le te ly  new s ig n i f i c a n c e .
T hat th e  anger o f  th e  e l i t e  was r e a l ,  was d em o n stra ted  in  th e
L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil as  soon as i t  assem bled . The f i r s t  a c t  o f  th e
new members was to  r e j e c t  S u ren d ran a th  B an e rjea  a s  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e
on th e  Im p e r ia l  L e g is la t iv e  C o u n c il. T h is  was a d i s a s t e r  f o r  him,
f o r ,  fa c e d  w ith  a new r e g u la t io n  w hich p re v e n te d  members from s i t t i n g  in
2
b o th  a p r o v in c ia l  c o u n c il and th e  Im p e r ia l C o u n c il, he had n o t c o n te s te d  
a s e a t  f o r  th e  Bengal l e g i s l a t u r e ,  r e ly in g  upon h i s  r e tu r n  to  th e  
c e n t r e .  H is d e fe a t  was an obv ious g e s tu re  o f  im p atien ce  w ith  th e  
r e s t r a i n e d ,  decorous methods o f  p r o t e s t  f o r  w hich he s to o d  and i t  was 
an ominous s ig n  fo r  th e  B r i t  Mi.
H aving g iv en  t h i s  w arn ing , th e  c o u n c i l lo r s  th e n  s e t  ou t to  dem o n stra te  
t h a t  u n l ik e  th e  o ld  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  th e y  re s p e c te d  p u b lic  o p in io n  more 
th a n  any d i r e c t iv e  from th e  Government o f  I n d ia .  Taking t h e i r  cue from 
th e  v e rn a c u la r  p r e s s ,  th e y  p robed  ev ery  case  o f  house s e a rc h , in te rn m en t 
and d e p o r ta t io n  under th e  D efence o f I n d ia  A c t, a l le g in g  i l l e g a l i t y  o r
_
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injustice v/herever they sensed a weakness. They also attacked the
police without restraint. In the budget debate early in 1917? one
member after another criticised the work of the police and demanded
a reduction in expenditure on the force. 'We are not very proud of
our Police,' declared Majumdar, 'and I do not realize the justification
of such lavish expenditure on their account unless some definite scheme
2is arrived at to make them more efficient and useful to the public.'
There were repeated complaints from the Indian non-official members
that the Government was denying them information, disregarding their
suggestions and using the official bloc to vote down their resolutions.
'I have now been four years in Council and know that going against
official opposition is like dashing one's head against a stone wall,'
3complained Huq.^ Speaking at the end of the budget debate on 14 March 
1917? Akhil Chandra Datta told the Government that its obstructive 
attitude had cut the ground from under the feet of the Council 
supporters. 'Will not the impression go forth from one end of the 
country to the other that our much vaunted reformed Council is not, for 
all practical purposes, a whit better than that of pre-reform days?' he 
asked. 'My Lord, as the proceedings of the Council went on these two 
days from resolution to resolution, the feeling that oppressed me most
1
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was th a t  we n o n - o f f ic i a l  members s i t  h e re  o n ly  to  p la y  th e  p a r t  o f th e  
chorus in  a Greek t r a g e d y .1 23
A W arning D isreg a rd ed
T h is  p o l i t i c a l  d is c o n te n t  in  Bengal v/as o f  g r e a t  concern  to  th e
Government o f  I n d ia ,  f o r  i t  c o n s id e re d  i t  a menace to  th e  m ain tenance
o f  o rd e r  th ro u g h o u t In d ia  g e n e r a l ly .  Craddock was adamant th a t  th e
s o lu t io n  la y  in  a re fo rm  o f th e  p r o v in c ia l  a d m in is t r a t iv e  s t r u c tu r e  and
e d u c a tio n  system , and th e  p ro v is io n  o f  new economic o p p o r tu n i t ie s  f o r  
2
th e  b h a d ra lo k . In  an e f f o r t  to  g e t  th e  Government o f  B e n g a l 's  en d o rse­
ment o f  t h i s  programme, th e  Government o f  I n d ia  re q u e s te d  i t  in  A p r il  
1916 to  o u t l in e  th e  rem e d ia l m easures i t  th o u g h t n e c e s s a ry , hav ing  
r e g a rd  to  th e  Bengal D i s t r i c t  A d m in is tra tio n  C om m ittee 's  recom m endations.
The r e p ly  w hich was re c e iv e d  from th e  p r o v in c ia l  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  
l a t e  in  Septem ber was s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  b u t w ith  i t  came a d is tu r b in g  n o te  
o f  d i s s e n t  from th e  s e n io r  member o f  th e  E x ec u tiv e  C o u n c il, P ercy  Lyon. 
The s o lu t io n  to  B en g a l’ s problem  was n o t to  be found in  any t in k e r in g  
a d m in is t r a t iv e  a d ju s tm e n ts , he a s s e r te d ,  b u t in  a fundam ental p o l i t i c a l  
re fo rm . Here in  Bengal th e  B r i t i s h  w ere fa c e d  v /ith  a genu ine n a t i o n a l i s t  
movement, and th e y  had to  acknowledge im m ed ia te ly  th e  p e o p le 's  le g i t im a te
_
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aspirations for self-government. The moment was critical, Lyon said.
There could be no delay.
I am profoundly convinced that the authors of this letter have 
failed to diagnose correctly the root-cause of our present 
trouble in Bengal - which is political in its nature. In 
considering the various influences which have given it a 
violent and explosive character, they have overlooked entirely 
the spirit of nationalism which inspires it, and they have 
consequently restricted themselves to schemes for the improve­
ment of the administration and of our system of education, 
while omitting all reference to the urgent need for an advance 
towards self-government, without which such schemes will fail 
to remove the distrust with which Government and all its 
measures are regarded.
This feeling of nationality is at the basis of the propaganda 
of the revolutionaries whom we are actually fighting: it is the 
MideaM which is being spread to them in most of the schools 
and colleges of Bengal: it is referred to in paragraph 15 of 
this letter as "a spirit of almost exaggerated devotion to 
Bengal"; and it is alluded to in the Report of the District 
Administration Committee, where "the English-knowing classes" 
are described as "deeply imbued with national sentiment". Sir 
Satyendra Prasanna Sinha made it the burden of his presidential 
address at the last National Congress: it is the constant theme 
of every leading speaker and writer in Bengal; and, under the 
stimulus that has been given by the World War to the spirit of 
patriotism in all civilized countries, the vast majority of the 
educated classes and almost every student who thinks of public 
questions at all are deeply affected by it. Moreover these 
classes can no longer be regarded as an isolated and insignificant 
minority of the population. They are already learning to 
identify themselves v/ith the masses, and are spreading their 
own distrust of British rule amongst them, and they will 
ultimately carry the people v/ith them in their demands that 
nationalist viev/s should be introduced into the government of 
the country.
Hopeless and criminal as the methods of the revolutionaries 
are, and essential as it is to exterminate those methods, their 
aspirations to political freedom are the same as those held by 
moderate and loyal Bengalis, and can never be condemned utterly 
by the British nation. It would be inconsistent v/ith the v/hole 
history of our race and our recent action in the domain of world- 
politics if we failed to recognize such aspirations and made no 
attempt to satisfy them. And, should we make no effective advance 
towards self—government in India at the conclusion of the war,
we shall so disillusion and disappoint the educated classes as to 
intensify the very unrest which we desire to remedy, and render 
our campaign against political crime even more difficult than 
it is at present.
We have to attempt, therefore, to find a solution of the political 
problem which will modify the distrust with which our rule is 
regarded and enable us to secure the co-operation of the people 
in the maintenance of law and order and the introduction of the 
reforms which we consider necessary. It appears to me that a 
frank declaration of the ultimate goal and aim of our policy in 
governing India is the first step we have to take. I believe 
that this goal should be proclaimed to be such self-government 
v/ithin the Empire as will enable India to take her place as one 
of the self-governing nations which constitute that Empire ....
The war has given us an opportunity of adopting a broad and 
constructive policy of reforms with these objects in view. If 
we fail to obtain them, our proposals will lead inevitably to 
coercion followed by an administrative collapse, and it may then 
be too late to guide the political evolution of the country 
along any safe and peaceful course.^
As Lyon himself pointed out, he was merely restating in this note
what the Moderate nationalists had been saying over and over again in
the preceding twelve months. The Government of India had refused to
2acknowledge their appeals and once more upon Lyon's note it preserved 
a stony silence. In its opinion, Lyon would be better occupied in 
applying himself to the details of provincial administration than in 
trying to teach the Government of India its business on all-India 
affairs.
3The endorsement of Lyon's sentiments by Carmichael, confirmed 
Craddock and his school in their opinion that these two senior members
1
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o f  th e  Government o f  Bengal were fu n d am e n ta lly  unsound* E a r l i e r  in
1916 th e  Government o f  In d ia  had even c o n s id e re d  a sk in g  f o r  t h e i r
r e s ig n a t io n s  Because o f  what i t  re g a rd e d  a s  t h e i r  a tte m p ts  to  o b s tru c t
th e  p ro p e r  h a n d lin g  o f  te r r o r i s m ,  and i t  was on ly  in  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f
th e  f a c t  th a t  b o th  were due to  r e t i r e  e a r ly  in  th e  fo llo w in g  y e a r  th a t
2
th e y  had been l e f t  in  o f f ic e *  C raddock, h is  a b le  pen as u su a l a t  th e
re a d y , had g iv en  h is  v e r d ic t  on C a rm ic h a e l 's  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  B engal:
Lord C a rm ic h a e l's  c o n c i l i a to r y  p o l ic y  and h i s  e f f o r t s  to  meet 
th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  a t  ev ery  tu rn  has b ro u g h t him some p e rso n a l 
p o p u la r i ty  b u t i t  has n o t had th e  s m a l le s t  e f f e c t  on anarch y .
H is a f f a b i l i t y  to  th e  e x tre m is t  p o l i t i c i a n s  and j o u r n a l i s t s  
may have secu red  some s u r fa c e  q u ie t ,  b u t i t  has n o t made th e  
work o f Government sm oother. Under t h a t  p o l ic y  anarchy  has 
co n tin u e d  to  grow and i t  was o n ly  v/hen he was a s s i s t e d  by war 
l e g i s l a t i o n  and a b le  to  ta k e  s t e r n  m easu res, th a t  he se c u re d  a
l u l l . 3
C arm ichae l, a sad  and d is a p p o in te d  man, gave h i s  own v e r d ic t  on
h i s  ach iev em en t. W ritin g  on 2 Septem ber 1916 to  h i s  w ife , who had
re tu r n e d  to  England because  o f  i l l n e s s ,  he s a id :
I  f e e l  h o r r ib ly  sad  to d a y , though i t  i s  a lo v e ly ,  lo v e ly  day . . . .  
e v e r  s in c e  you went away I  have been  w orking v e ry  h a rd  -  i t  
m ay n 't come to  much, b u t I  can , a t  any r a t e ,  c la im  I  have worked 
r e a l l y  h a rd , and have n ev e r gone to  bed w ith o u t f e e l in g  dead 
t i r e d ,  and i t  i s n ' t  alw ays easy  to  g e t even a few m inu tes to  do 
what one w an ts . I  t e l l  G ourlay  / h i s  s e c r e t a r y /  i t ' s  l i k e  
G r o t iu s 's  e p i ta p h  "Vitam p e r d id i  o perose  n i h i l  agendo ,"  b u t o ld  
G ourlay  w o n 't h e a r  o f  th e  n o th in g  and t a lk s  o f  c a s t in g  b read  on 
w a te r s ,  e t c .  But a l l  th e  same, I n d ia  i s  f o r  everyone a th row ing  
away o f w ork .4
1
1
2
3
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The Hew Men
The departure of the two Liberals from the Bengal Government early
in 1917 gave the Government of India its opportunity to inject some
’backbone' into the provincial administration. Lyon's place was taken
by Sir Henry Wheeler, who had capped a brilliant secretariat career
with service under Craddock as Home Secretary to the Government of India
from 1912. The new Governor was the Earl of Ronaldshay, a 40 year
old Conservative member of Parliament who had travelled extensively in
Asia and written a number of books on his experiences. He had served
in India for a short period in 1900 as Curzon's A.D.C. and had returned
in 1912 as a member of the Lothian Commission on the public services.
These appointments perturbed the Bengali nationalists who feared
a return to the reactionary policies of the partition period. They
regarded a Curzonite and a Simla secretariat man as unwelcome replacements
for Liberals like Carmichael and Lyon, and Ronaldshay's arrival in
Calcutta on 21 March 1917 was greeted with protests from the newspapers
1and political associations. Ronaldshay recognised the need to mollify 
this hostility and he took care in his first public speeches to 
emphasise that he was approaching his new duties free from rigid 
preconceptions.^
_
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Despite this denial he did have well-formed notions of the way
in which he should act. He believed that the tasks facing his
administration were twofold, the first being to advance the material
welfare of the Bengali populace. He wrote:
Previous acquaintance of the problems of rural India had taught 
me that the average Briton has a genius for assuming the role 
appropriately termed in India that of ma-bap (mother-father), 
when dealing with backward peoples, and I had little difficulty 
in deciding that the key-note of my policy so far as the great 
mass of the population were concerned, must be encouragement 
and support of the members of the numerous Public Services from 
the Indian Civil downwards ...
The second task was to deal with the Bengali intelligentsia with 
its predilection for terrorism. This he saw as a problem 'of far 
greater complexity as it was concerned with the psychology of a people - 
a people moreover whose history, traditions, modes of thought, 
philosophies and religions - whose whole outlook on life in short, 
differed profoundly from that of the West.' Ronaldshay saw terrorism 
as the product of a reaction against the acceptance of European 
institutions and values. He believed that it was inspired by a deep- 
seated fear that in embracing an alien culture 'India was immolating 
her own soul'.
There is a marked and significant contrast between his views and 
those which Carmichael had expressed as he approached the same problems 
four years before. Carmichael had written: 'I conclude that we should
Essayez, pp. 68-9 & 76.1
do well if we assumed less often than we do that the Indian mind is
entirely different from the European mind, and expected the Indian more
often to he swayed by the same motives which actuate Englishmen.'
From this assumption he argued that a rational approach to Indians,
an appeal to their innate liberalism and goodwill, would have beneficial
results. Ronaldshay, working from a different assumption, argued
differently. He held that it was pointless to reason with the terrorists
because of the psychological gulf separating them from Englishmen.
This came close to the position taken by Craddock in his minute
on bhadralok politics of 27 April 1913* 'In Bengal there is apparently
nobody to rally round the Government and no means of securing a rally.1 2
Ronaldshay would have accepted at least the spirit of the first half
of this but he v/ould have rejected the proposition that there was no
means of securing a rally, for he believed that by developing a
parliamentary system in India the British could train an ever-widening
group of responsible Indians, who would recognise the need to support
the Government as an institution requiring support for the good of the 
2country. Obviously there was an element of inconsistency between 
this argument and that about the alien psychology of the Bengali 
intellectual. Reasoning logically from that premis, one would reach 
Craddock's conclusion, but Ronaldshay had spent ten years as a member
1
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2
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of Parliament and was therefore predisposed to accord the parliamentary 
system an importance which would have appeared exaggerated to men of 
Craddock's ilk.
Ronaldshay had alv/ays believed that the logical outcome of the
1reforms of 1909 was the development of a parliamentary system in India,
and he was therefore amazed to discover when he arrived in Bengal that
the Government of India still denied that this was the direction which
constitutional advance should take. In a despatch to the Secretary of
State a few months earlier it had written: 'We have no wish to develop
2the Councils as quasi-Parliaments.'
Snail's Pace
Events in India and Great Britain in 1916 had finally forced the 
Government of India to give serious consideration to the question of 
constitutional reforms. To the insistent demands of the Indian 
nationalists had been added the comments of an influential group of 
British public men, students of Imperial affairs, who had reached the 
conclusion that India had to be given some measure of self-government 
to qualify it for admission to the Imperial federation which they 
advocated. This group - the Round Table as it called itself - was led 
by Lionel Curtis, a former administrator and politician in the Transvaal
_
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and it numbered among its members men who were well placed to influence
the thinking of the British Cabinet.
The Government of India resented what it regarded as the interference
2of these men in Indian affairs, but it also realised that unless it 
took some action itself, it was in danger of losing the initiative to 
them. If this happened, some reckless scheme might be foisted upon it. 
Hardinge had already sketched out a plan of limited reforms.“1 234 Lord 
Chelmsford, who replaced him as Viceroy in April 1916, was convinced 
that the British should define the aim of their rule in India and he 
pressed his Government to agree to a declaration of policy being made.
The Members conceded that some such gesture would be a fitting reward 
for India's loyal contribution to the British war effort.^
The deliberations went on throughout the year, as the Government 
of India slowly and cautiously considered every possible aspect of a 
policy statement, without any apparent realisation that time was fast 
running out. As Lyon vainly tried to tell them in September, there was 
an urgent need for a bold and arresting declaration to save the 
situation in politically 'advanced1 regions like Bengal. The purpose 
of that declaration was to demonstrate the British desire to further
_
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Indian constitutional advance; to prove that they valued the loyal 
aspirations of the Moderate nationalists and were prepared to heed 
their requests; and to discount the assertion that concessions would 
only he made in the face of violent agitation. Nothing of this 
would he achieved if the British hesitated too long, for hy then Indian 
demands would have become extreme and any subsequent British action 
would appear to have been forced.
When Lyon wrote his minute of dissent in September there may have 
been just time enough to act. By the beginning of the new year it 
was too late, for in the closing months of 1916 the Extremists had 
been taken back into the National Congress, which had formed an alliance 
with the Muslim League with the purpose of extracting constitutional 
concessions from the British.
By December 1916 the question of Indian reforms was already under
discussion between the Government of India and the Secretary of State,
but throughout they had obstinately refused to give any public
1indication of the direction in which they were moving. And they were 
travelling at a snail*s pace. It took them another eight months before 
they made their announcement. On the 20 August 1917 Edwin Montagu, 
who had been appointed Secretary of State for India in the preceding 
month, made the following statement in the House of Commons:
Mehrotra, op.cit., pp. 85-7»
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The policy of His Majesty*s Government, with which the 
Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing 
association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and 
the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a 
view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in 
India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have 
decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken 
as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance, 
as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, 
that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion 
between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty’s 
Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, 
that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India 
to discuss these maters with the Viceroy and the Government of 
India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local governments, 
and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies 
and others.
I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved 
by successive stages. The British Government and the Government 
of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and 
advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and 
measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation 
received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will 
thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that 
confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.
Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of 
the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to 
Parliament.^
Bhadralok Distrust
The British had made their bold, arresting declaration - but for 
Bengal, at least, it had come a full year too late. The bhadralok 
politicians, frustrated by the limitations of the Morley-Minto councils 
and angered by the years of delay in securing as much as an acknowledge­
ment of their demands for reforms, were no longer to be satisfied by
1
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a nicely-phrased, statement of British intentions. As early as June
1917 a contributor to the Modern Review had written:
... history is strewn with the graves of pious promises 
issuing’ in reactionary deeds. Ever since the foundation of 
British rule in India there has been a continued shower of 
utterances breathing sympathy with the final goal of Indian 
aspirations, but actually so little has been done that these 
utterances are now regarded merely as a convenient cloak, 
under which the task of preparing for freedom the subject 
races of India may continue to be the white man's pleasant 
burden for evermore. The time has now come when a time-limit 
must be prescribed, so that the goal may be clearly seen and 
the steps towards it clearly thought out.
The same scepticism characterised Bengal press comment on Montagu's 
declaration in August. Attention was concentrated on the second 
paragraph of his statement and it was generally agreed that the 
qualification regarding the achievement of self-government by successive 
stages could be made the excuse for years of delay. Unless some 
definite time-limit were fixed, there could be no certainty of the 
British ever fulfilling their promise. Similarly, although most papers 
were pleased that Montagu was coming to examine the situation in India 
for himself, they feared that the Europeans - official and non-official 
would dominate his thinking throughout his visit. 'Here he will be 
influenced by the official atmosphere which will surround him as soon 
as he lands,' observed the Sadaqat. 'He will thus see things through 
a new pair of spectacles. His ears will become proof against public 
opinion.* Even Banerjea's vernacular paper, the Bangali, could
HP, 1 Sep 1917.
Sadaqat,* 2 5 Aug 1917«
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summon only enough enthusiasm to remarks ’But we must rest content,
as half a loaf is better than no loaf.1
In Bengal the British had failed completely to restore faith in
their good intentions. The bhadralok now watched with suspicion the
developments which flowed from the August declaration, genuinely
fearing that the 'pious promise would issue in reactionary deeds'.
They expected the British to procrastinate and hedge before they gave
anything. They predicted that the I.C.3. would contrive to build
barriers into any scheme of reforms to protect its autocratic powers
and that concessions would be made to reactionary groups - such as the
European business community and the Muslims - to buttress British rule 
2in India. Nothing which happened in the three and a half long years 
which it took the British to frame a new constitution and get it 
working, served to dispel these initial fears. To illustrate this 
point we shall examine the attitudes towards the reform proposals of 
the official and non-official Europeans in Bengal, and in the following 
chapter we shall consider the Bengali Muslims' position.
The Bengal Officials
In his memoirs Ronaldshay recalled that Montagu's declaration 
'caused considerable fluttering in the official dovecots in Simla and
_
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in those of the capitals of the Provinces. His further announcement
that he proposed coming to India in propria persona to gather material
for the construction of the constitutional edifice of which he had
*1visions, added to the fluttering a chorus of squawks'. The I.C.S. 
distrusted Montagu, for he had notoriously radical ideas on Indian 
politics and administration, and was severely critical of the "bureau­
cratic methods by which the country was governed. Speaking in the 
House of Commons just a week before he entered the Cabinet as Secretary
of State, he had attacked the Government of India as 'too wooden, too
2iron, too inelastic, too antediluvian'. That such a man should now 
have responsibility for a major reconstruction of the Indian constitution 
was profoundly disturbing to the I.C.S.
In these circumstances it v/as some reassurance to the Bengal 
Civilians that they had Ronaldshay as Governor, for he fully recognised 
the inevitable difficulties and dangers that lay ahead in the period 
of readjustment, and he emphasised his determination to maintain a firm, 
conservative Government in his province to provide the bedrock on 
which experimental structures could be built with greater safety.
He already had Wheeler, an acknowledged strong man, as his second- 
in-command and he appointed a former provincial Chief Secretary,
1
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J.G. Cumming, to take special charge of the administration of the Defence
of India Act. When S.P. Sinha went to England in 1918, Ronaldshay
appointed the leader of the Bengal great zamindars, the Maharajadhiraja
of Burdwan, to fill his place on the Executive Council. This Brought
a protest from Montagu, who wanted a nationalist politician included
in the Bengal Government, hut Ronaldshay refused to give way, arguing
that he would have enough to do with politicians when the proposed
reforms were implemented, while Burdwan would bring with him the support
1of Bengali conservatives.
Cumming retired in 1920 and his portfolios of Justice and Jails 
were given to Sir Abdur Rahim, a Bengali Muslim judge of the Madras 
High Court who had served with Ronaldshay on the Lothian Commission.
A few months later the Executive Council was enlarged to four members 
and the Chief Secretary, J.H. Kerr, a man of great vitality, was 
included as Finance Member. Thus throughout this period of uncertainty, 
Ronaldshay was able to provide himself with conservative subordinates 
of outstanding ability and experience, who were a match for any of the 
Bengali nationalists with whom his Government had to deal.
For the Bengal officials, the Governor’s conservatism was one 
element of security in an insecure situation. Another was the 
Viceroy's evident concern that the nationalists should not monopolise
_
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Montagu's attention while he was in India. In a private letter to
Ronaldshay on 27 September 1917? Chelmsford wrote:
It is all-important that the interests of every class, including 
those of the European and commercial communities, those of the 
landed aristocracy and those of the people professing moderate 
and conservative opinions, as well as of people holding advanced 
opinions, should he represented before the Secretary of State 
and myself.
If you find that any important classes or interests which ought 
to he moving in the matter are not alive to the position, I would 
suggest that you should point out to them the desirability of 
their taking steps to secure that their views receive proper 
consideration.^
This was music to the ears of the officials and they busied themselves
with the task of sorting out the right people for Montagu to meet.
The names of 54 conservatives and moderates were suggested as a 'Rough
list of persons who might be asked to see the Secretary of State'.
'We must see that the conservative men do not hold back,' wrote the
2Governor's Secretary, W.R. Gourlay, emphatically.
Montagu came to India in November 1917 and for five months toured 
the sub-continent with Chelmsford. As a result of their enquiries, the 
two men presented a joint report to the British Government in July 1918.
It recommended a greater devolution of power by the Home Government 
to the Government of India, and by the Government of India to the 
provinces. It insisted that Indianisation of the services should 
proceed more rapidly. It suggested the enlargement of the legislatures,
1
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an extension of the franchise and the transfer in the provinces of 
responsibility for some functions of government to Ministers responsible 
to the legislative councils.
These proposals brought protests from the I.C.S. officers in Bengal, 
as in other parts of India. J.H. Kerr, Chief Secretary to the Bengal 
Government, wrote:
Official opinion is, on the whole, frankly dubious as to the 
working of the scheme, and the most experienced administrators 
in this Presidency regard it with serious misgivings, even as 
a temporary measure during a transitional period .... there is a 
widespread feeling that the line of advance proposed in the 
Report is attended with even graver difficulties than are in 
fact admitted and that these may cause a serious breakdown*
Whatever the intentions of the framers of the Report ... it is 
apprehended that the scheme is bound, in practice, to lead, at 
any rate in the first instance, to the establishment of an 
oligarchy, the smooth working of which in conjunction with an 
official element of different traditions is at least problematical.^
This was the Civilians' greatest fear: that an immediate advance
towards Responsible Government would mean the consolidation of power
in the hands of the small group of bhadralok nationalist politicians,
whose intentions they distrusted. What, they asked, would become of
the I.C.S. tradition of protecting the weak and uplifting the
impoverished if the members of the service had to obey the dictates
of high-caste politicians? Closer to home, what security would an
English officer have if his career were subject to Indian political
1
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c o n tro l?  In  th e  h ig h e r  b ran ch es  o f  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  th e y  saw th e  
danger o f  a d is a s t r o u s  c o l la p s e  i f  p o l i t i c s  w ere a llow ed  to  in f lu e n c e  
v i t a l  d epartm en ts  l i k e  p o l ic e  and j u s t i c e ,
Montagu and C helm sford had in v i te d  c r i t i c i s m  o f t h e i r  p ro p o s a ls
2
and th e  Bengal Government made th e  most o f  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty .  I t  a lso  
began p re p a r in g  i t s  subm issions f o r  th e  two com m ittees w hich w ere to  
to u r  In d ia  a t  th e  end o f 1918 to  c o n s id e r  schemes f o r  a new f r a n c h is e ,  
and fo r  th e  d iv i s io n  o f  fu n c tio n s  betw een th e  Government o f  I n d ia  and 
th e  p r o v in c ia l  Governm ents, and betw een th e  two b ran ch es  p roposed  f o r  
th e  new p r o v in c ia l  Governm ents.
The Bengal C iv i l ia n s  d ec id ed  th a t  t h e i r  m ajor e f f o r t  sho u ld  be 
d i r e c te d  tow ards s e c u r in g  a la rg e  e x te n s io n  o f th e  f r a n c h is e  in  th e  
p ro v in c e , f o r  t h i s  seemed to  be th e  on ly  p o s s ib le  means o f  p re v e n t in g , 
o r  even m i t ig a t in g  th e  e f f e c t s  o f ,  th e  m o n o p o lisa tio n  o f power by th e  
' b h a d ra lo k  o l i g a r c h y '. A b ro ad  e l e c to r a t e  would u l t im a te ly  en ab le  
th e  mass o f  th e  peop le  to  e x e r t  t h e i r  r i g h t f u l  c o n tro l  over th e  
a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  th e  t r a n s f e r r e d  pow ers. The a l t e r n a t i v e ,  a s  f a r  as  
th e  o f f i c i a l s  co u ld  s e e , was to  a c q u ie sc e  in  th e  co n tin u an ce  o f  
c o r ru p t and s e l f - in d u lg e n t  b h a d ra lo k  p o l i t i c s .  ' I  am aware t h a t  th e re
1
Government o f  I n d i a 's  D espatch  o f  March 5 th , 1919» and co n n ec ted  p a p e r s , 
ppT 194-213. GB, A ppointm ent, 6R-19(1-51)> A8- 5 8 , Dec 1918.
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'The V iceroy  h im se lf  somewhat w o rrie d  abou t th e  famous Reform scheme.
A ll P ro v in c ia l  G overnm ents, i t  a p p e a rs , have g iv e n  i t  an ex tre m e ly  
rough  h a n d l in g . ' (R onaldshay  d ia ry  e n t ry ,  31 Dec 1918, E ssa y e z , p . 132 .)
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are numerous objections to this proposal /for an extended electorate/?’
wrote the District Magistrate of Tippera, D.H. Wares, ’but they will
have to be faced ultimately, and the sooner this is done, the better
it will be for the country.' Wares' superiors in the provincial
Government were of the same opinion and they accepted this as their
guiding principle in formulating their reform proposals.
The practical limitation to the extension of the franchise was the
machinery available to prepare electoral registers and poll votes.
Inevitably the lion's share of this work would have to be borne by the
District and Sub-Divisional officers, as an addition to their normal
duties. Previously they had had to handle no more than a few hundred
voters at each election but now the electors would be numbered in
2thousands and the majority would be illiterate. The officers would be 
unable to turn for guidance to the experience of their fellow administrators 
in other colonial territories, for this was the first time in the 
history of the British Empire that an attempt had been made to form a 
mass electorate.
The Government of Bengal refused to be discouraged by these
3formidable obstacles, and, to the dismay of the Government of India,
_
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it proposed an increase in the number of voters from the twelve
thousand registered to elect the old councils, to an estimated one and 
1a half millions. The bulk of these would be in rural areas, where
the main franchise qualification would be the annual payment of a
minimum of one rupee in cess. The provincial Government explained
that, unless the qualification were kept as low as this, even well-to-do
cultivators would be excluded and Hindu voters would greatly outnumber
the Muslims, in spite of the general numerical superiority of the latter.
The importance of this consideration will be somewhat qualified 
if separate Muhammadan electorates are created /wrote the 
Government committee on electorates/, but even so, it is 
necessary to have a fairly numerous electorate in order to 
prevent corruption and also in order to give a wide body of 
Muhammadans a political education which will enable them to 
hold their own when communal representation is abolished.2
The Montagu-Chelmsford report had recommended that the Muslims
be given separate electorates only where they had a minority of voters,
but the provincial Government insisted that the Bengal Muslims be
given communal representation throughout the province to safeguard them
against the domination of Hindu landlords and moneylenders.^ The Hindu
backward classes should be provided for by nomination/1 234"
1
This proved to be a considerable overestimate. (See Simon Commission 
Report, vol. VIII, p. 130.)
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In  an a ttem p t to  le s s e n  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  b h ad ra lo k  s tro n g h o ld ,
C a lc u t ta ,  w hich th e  Government re g a rd e d  as  * te n d in g  to  swamp a l l  e lse*  
in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f th e  p ro v in c e , i t  p roposed  to  g iv e  th e  c i t y  
on ly  th r e e  g e n e ra l s e a ts  (two Hindu and one Muslim) and to  p re v e n t
c a rp e t-b a g g in g  by i n s i s t i n g  upon a r e s i d e n t i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  fo r
2c a n d id a te s .
The F ra n c h ise  Committee a c c e p te d  th e  Government o f  B e n g a l 's
recom m endations f o r  a wide f r a n c h is e  and f o r  s e p a ra te  communal e l e c to r a t e s
f o r  th e  Muslims th ro u g h o u t th e  p ro v in c e . I t  y ie ld e d  to  b h a d ra lo k
p r e s s u r e ,  how ever, and opposed th e  su g g es ted  r e s i d e n t i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n
f o r  c a n d id a te s .  I t  a ls o  recommended e ig h t  s e a ts  f o r  C a lc u tta  and an
a d d i t io n a l  f iv e  s e a ts  f o r  th e  n e ig h b o u rin g  a re a s  o f  th e  P re s id e n c y
D iv is io n .  The Government o f  Bengal p re p a re d  f ig u r e s  to  show th a t  i f
3
t h i s  w ere done th e  c i t y  would be 'a b s u rd ly  o v e r - r e p r e s e n te d ',  b u t
i t s  p r o t e s t  was ig n o red  and i t  had to  make th e  b e s t  o f a bad  job by
o rg a n is in g  th e  C a lc u tta  Hindu c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  in  such  a way a s  to  ensu re
4
th a t  m in o r i ty  g ro u p s, such a s  th e  M arw aris, se c u re d  r e p r e s e n ta t io n .
The r e p o r t s  o f th e  F ra n c h ise  and S u b je c ts  Com m ittees v/ere p u b lish e d  
in  F e b ru a ry  1919 and in  th e  same month a C ab in e t\co m m ittee  was
_
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I b id ,  6R -75 (1 -142 ), A232-373? Jun  1920.
ap p o in te d  to  p re p a re  th e  Government o f In d ia  B i l l  f o r  i t s  in t r o d u c t io n
to  P a rlia m e n t on 29 May. I t  was th e n  su b m itte d  to  a J o in t  S e le c t
Com m ittee, w hich sp en t th r e e  months exam ining w itn e s s e s  and d r a f t i n g
amendments. The B i l l  had i t s  t h i r d  re a d in g  in  b o th  Houses in
December 1919 an(  ^ r e c e iv e d  th e  ro y a l  a s s e n t  on 23rd  o f t h a t  month.
There was on ly  one ta s k  l e f t  to  be done b e fo re  th e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n
cou ld  be in a u g u ra te d : r u le s  had to  be fram ed f o r  th e  refo rm ed  c o u n c i ls .
T his was th e  o f f i c i a l s '  l a s t  chance to  p r o te c t  t h e i r  pow ers. The Bengal
Government to o k  i t s  s ta n d  on th e  p ro p o s i t io n  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h
p a r l ia m e n ta ry  model shou ld  n o t be a p p l ie d  to  Bengal w ith o u t m o d if ic a t io n
so th a t  a la rg e  a re a  o f  governm ent m ight be l e f t  f r e e  from p o l i t i c a l
i n t e r f e r e n c e .  For t h i s  re a so n  i t  had fav o u red  an E x ecu tiv e  C ouncil
w ith  a m a jo r i ty  o f European members and i t  now r e je c te d  th e  J o in t
S e le c t  C om m ittee 's  recom m endation th a t  a B r i t i s h  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n  sh o u ld
2
be b ro u g h t ou t to  p re s id e  over th e  L e g i s la t iv e  C o u n c il. I t  a ls o  
opposed M ontagu 's s u g g e s tio n  f o r  th e  appo in tm en t o f  C ouncil S e c r e t a r i e s  
to  f u l f i l  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f  B r i t i s h  P a r lia m e n ta ry  U n d e r-S e c re ta r ie s  
in  a s s i s t i n g  members o f  th e  Government w ith  t h e i r  d ep a rtm en ta l d u t i e s  
and r e p r e s e n t in g  them in  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  'We s t ro n g ly  o b je c te d  to  
i t , '  e x p la in e d  th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry ,  H .L. S tephenson , 'o n  th e  ground 
t h a t  th e re  was no an alogy  betw een th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  p a r lia m e n t a t
1
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2
I b id
Obviously what the officialshome and the Legislative Council here.‘
found unpalatable was the thought of a politician being pitchforked
into their tidy bureaucracy. ’I think there will be endless confusion,
grumbled Wheeler, ’if the Council Secretary came, in any way as a cog
2in the Secretariat machine.
Looking back over this narrative of the part played in the reforms 
discussions by the Bengal officials, it will be seen that there was 
nothing which might have served to restore bhadralok faith in the 
beneficence of British intentions. The Civilians were concerned 
throughout to safeguard their powers, just as the bhadralok press had 
predicted they would be, and they made no attempt to conceal their 
animus for the bhadralok which led them to advocate a greatly extended 
franchise, separate communal electorates for the Muslims, and a 
restricted representation for Calcutta. They obviously had no desire 
to see a parliamentary system developed in India and could be expected 
to oppose a further transfer of power to Indians. They, at least, 
had fully justified the bhadralok* s suspicions.
The European Non-Officials
So too had the European non-officials. As a small community with 
large vested interests in Indian trade and commerce, they had been
_
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g r e a t ly  a larm ed  by th e  i n i t i a l  p ro p o s a ls  f o r  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f 
p a r lia m e n ta ry  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  I n d ia .  Up to  t h i s  tim e th e y  had r e l i e d  
upon t h e i r  p e rso n a l c o n ta c ts  w ith  s e n io r  members o f  th e  I .C .S . ,  w ith  
G overnors and V ice ro y s , and w ith  C iv i l  S e rv a n ts  and p o l i t i c i a n s  in  
London to  m a in ta in  t h e i r  c o n s id e ra b le  p r iv i l e g e s .  Knowing th a t  r e a l  
power la y  w ith  th e  Home Government and w ith  th e  o f f i c i a l s  in  I n d ia ,  
and c o n f id e n t o f t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  in f lu e n c e  t h e i r  d e c is io n s ,  th e  B r i t i s h  
n o n - o f f i c i a l s  had been a b le  to  d is r e g a rd  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls  o r ,  
a t  b e s t ,  to  t r e a t  them w ith  an a i r  o f  amused to le r a n c e .  S e rv ic e  as  a 
European r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  in  a l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c il had been re g a rd e d  as  
an irksom e d i s t r a c t i o n  from  th e  im p o rta n t b u s in e s s  o f money-making, 
and tw elv e  months as a member was g e n e r a l ly  c o n s id e re d  to  be a l l  t h a t  
a man co u ld  be asked  to  devo te  to  such u n p r o f i ta b le  work. T hat th e  
In d ia n  n a t i o n a l i s t s  r e s e n te d  t h i s  c a v a l ie r  a t t i t u d e  and re g a rd e d  th e  
com m unity 's p r iv i le g e d  a c c e s s  to  th e  Government a s  ev idence  o f  r a c i a l  
d is c r im in a t io n ,  d id  n o t t r o u b le  th e  E uropeans, f o r  th e y  were se c u re  
in  th e  knowledge th a t  th e  In d ia n s  w ere u n ab le  to  make good t h e i r  t h r e a t s .
T h is s e c u r i t y  depended upon th e  m ain tenance o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  
a rran g em en t, w ith  th e  o f f i c i a l s  h o ld in g  r e a l  power and a c c o rd in g  t h e i r  
n o n - o f f i c i a l  c o m p a tr io ts  a p r e f e r e n t i a l  h e a r in g . T h is e x p la in s  why 
th e  B r i t i s h  n o n - o f f i c i a l  community had been  so p e r tu rb e d  by th e  
r e u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  Bengal and th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  th e  Im p e r ia l c a p i t a l  to
1
In  th e  p e r io d  1913—1920 th e  two Bengal Chamber o f  Commerce s e a t s  in  
th e  Bengal L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil had e le v e n  o c c u p a n ts .
Delhi in 1912. These moves were a response to Indian pressure, and,
worse still, they had been kept secret with the express purpose of
preventing the European non-officials from exercising their normal
1influence on the decision. The Statesman, in a revealing leading
article, had described this as a violation of India’s 'Constitution'.
'In the interests of commerce it is essential that the English public
should know that India is not wholly subject to the caprices of a
one-eyed bureaucracy,' it wrote, 'that public opinion here insists on
being consulted, and that the recent irregular and irresponsible
2proceedings have been vigorously challenged.'
Montagu's declaration in August 1917 was even more alarming.
Again it was a response to Indian demands and this time the whole 
system seemed to be in danger. If parliamentary institutions were 
established, with a Government responsible to a representative body, 
the old methods of confidential access and influence would have to 
give way to 'sordid' political negotiations.
Worse still, power would be transferred from British officials to 
the very Indians who were most antagonistic to the privileges of 
European commerce. A Calcutta businessman, commenting on Lionel 
Curtis' reform proposals earlier in 1917? had voiced his community's 
fears:
_
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Statesman, 2 Peb 1912.
You propose to destroy a Government in which British Commerce 
trusts, and to put in its place one in which British Commerce 
cannot trust.
If you destroy the present Government you must put something 
in its place which will ensure that our Interests are safeguarded 
as at present, and that we are not placed at the mercy of 
Bengali Zamindars and Lawyers, and I am satisfied that you are 
attempting an impossibility.1
How could this disaster of bhadralok domination be averted now that 
Montagu had made his ’rash promise' of concessions? The European 
community saw two possible means. Firstly, they would impress upon 
British opinion at Home the dangers of establishing a parliamentary 
system in India. Secondly, they would frame a scheme of limited 
reforms which would stop short of a transfer of power from the provincial 
and Imperial Governments.
Their newspapers immediately launched a campaign to demonstrate
how the interests of the British Empire in India and of the great
mass of Indians would suffer if the misguided schemes of British
radicals were accepted. In an article in the Calcutta Review of
October 1917 entitled "The Evacuation of A.sia", "Brit" wrote:
It is, of course, popular government that our British progressive 
proffers. But I am afraid it is something rather different 
that the educated, moneyed, landed Indian wants - it is not 
government "by the people" he wants; it is government of_ the 
people, by_ the educated, moneyed and landed classes for - 
themselves! It is a House of Lords he wants, but not a 
House of Commons; it is oligarchy, hierachy, plutocracy he 
aims at, and not democracy. He is in a hurry for autonomy, 
but his progress in democracy will be slower than ever.
Zemindar and mandarin - it is only a difference of a letter,
1
L. Curtis: Papers relating to the application of the principle of 
Dyarchy to the Government of India, p. 161.
and (looking easterly for an illustration) it is mandarin-rule 
he wants.1
When Montagu and Chelmsford came to Calcutta at the beginning of 
December, the three European organisations - the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce, the Calcutta Trades Association and the European Association -
put forward similar proposals for limited reforms. They emphasised 
that in their opinion the time was not ripe for constitutional changes
of any kind, but that, if the Government were determined to press ahead, 
it must avoid 'experiments on a large scale that might mean large 
disaster'. Reforms should be limited to the development of local 
self-government, the extension of the legislatures as advisory councils, 
and provincial and local decentralisation. It was stressed that British 
non-official representation in the legislative councils should be 
maintained and that any suggestion of establishing responsible government
at that stage was absurd.
The European Association desires to state, definitely and 
deliberately, its opinion that a grant of anything approaching 
self-government to India at the present time would be utterly 
disastrous to the real interests of the country and a grave 
injustice to her peoples. It would place the many of the 
lower castes under the heel of the few of .the higher castes, 
and could only impair the British tradition in India, that tie 
between the British and Indian peoples to which the lower 
castes look for their ultimate emancipation, and by which alone 
the future advancement of India can best be secured.^
Calcutta Review, new series, no. 290, Oct 1917 > pp. 367-8. 
PP, 1918, /Cd. 91787, vol• XVIII, pp. 495-8 & 508-9.
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In  h i s  in te rv ie w s  w ith  th e  a s s o c ia t io n s ' r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  Montagu
urged  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  n o n - o f f i c i a l s  sh o u ld  in  f u tu r e  ta k e  p a r t  in
p o l i t i c s  and ' r e s t  t h e i r  c la im  to  p r o te c t io n  on th e  v in d ic a t io n  o f
t h e i r  case  to  th e  In d ia n  peo p le  r a th e r  th a n  f o r  ev e r  on th e  Government
o f I n d i a ' . T h is  d id  n o th in g  to  re a s s u re  th e  community. Nor d id  th e
prom inence g iv en  in  th e  j o i n t  r e p o r t  to  th e  need  f o r  a l e s s  e x c lu s iv e
2
r a c i a l  s p i r i t  among th e  B r i t i s h  in  I n d ia .  I t  was add ing  i n s u l t  to
in ju r y ,  th e  C a lc u tta  European p re s s  a s s e r te d  a n g r i ly ,  to  conclude  th e
document w ith  an app ea l to  th e  Europeans f o r  a sy m p a th e tic  accep tan c e
o f  In d ia n  a s p i r a t io n s  so th a t  th e  p roposed  refo rm s m ight he a s u c c e s s .
'S ta te sm en  who make a ra s h  prom ise w ith o u t c o n s u lt in g  p u b lic  o p in io n
have no r i g h t  to  c a l l  upon th e  whole w orld  to  c o -o p e ra te  c o r d ia l ly  in
e x t r i c a t i n g  them out o f th e  th i c k e t  in to  w hich th e y  have jum ped ,'
3
grow led th e  S ta te sm an .
Montagu and C helm sford were accu sed  o f  r id in g  roughshod o v er th e
B r i t i s h  community in  an e f f o r t  to  w in th e  ap p lau se  o f  a sm all group o f
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  In d ia n s .  I t  was a s s e r te d  th a t  t h e i r  p roposed  re fo rm s
would le a v e  th e  v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  B r i t i s h  commerce u n p ro te c te d  and
4
r u in  th e  I .C .S .  by p la c in g  i t  a t  th e  mercy o f  c o r ru p t p o l i t i c i a n s .
1
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S ta te sm a n ,*  12 J u l  1918.
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I b id ,  16 J u l  1918. E nglishm an,*  8 & 9 J u l  1918*
The Englishm an demanded th a t  th e  r e p o r t  o f  th e  R ow latt Com m ittee, w hich
had ju s t  concluded  e n q u i r ie s  in to  th e  e x te n t  o f  s e d i t io u s  c o n sp ira c y
in  I n d ia ,  he w id e ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  in  E ngland , f o r  i t  ' i s  a n e c e s s a ry
a n t id o te  to  th e  easy  nonchalance  and f re q u e n t i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  th e
Chelm sford-M ontagu p ro p o s a ls ;  i t  s e rv e s  th e  pu rpose  o f a s ig n  o f
-]
w arn ing  upon a dangerous r o a d . '
On 2 O ctober 1918 th e  Bengal Chamber o f  Commerce met to  p a s s
judgm ent on th e  j o i n t  r e p o r t .  I t s  p r e s id e n t ,  W.A. I r o n s id e ,  v o ic e d
th e  in d ig n a t io n  o f h i s  community:
N ever b e fo re  in  th e  h i s to r y  o f  t h i s  Chamber have i t s  members 
assem bled  to g e th e r  a t  a more momentous o c c a s io n , seldom p erh ap s  
in  th e  h i s to r y  o f th e  w orld  has  any community in  s im i la r  
c irc u m s ta n c e s , sm all in  numbers y e t  v a s t  in  i n t e r e s t s ,  been 
ask ed  to  face  a f u tu r e  w hich p r e s e n ts  to  a l l  san e , s te a d y ­
th in k in g  men o f  our community such f a r - r e a c h in g  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  e v i l  to  th e  co u n try  and i t s  p e o p le .^
D e sp ite  t h e i r  a n g e r, th e  B r i t i s h  n o n - o f f i c i a l s  now r e a l i s e d  th a t  
a r e c o n s t r u c t io n  was coming and th a t  th e y  had to  concern  th em se lv es  
w ith  th e  form i t  v/ould ta k e  and w ith  e v o lv in g  new methods o f  a c t io n  
by w hich th e y  cou ld  m a in ta in  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e .  W ith t h i s  
r e a l i s a t i o n  came th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  more m oderate v o ic e s  to  g a in  a 
h e a r in g .  By th e  l a s t  q u a r te r  o f  1918, th e  European jo u rn a ls  were 
w i l l i n g  to  devote space to  a r t i c l e s  d e c ry in g  th e  e a r l i e r  a larm ism  and 
c a l l i n g  f o r  a p o s i t iv e  e f f o r t  to  work w ith  m oderate In d ia n s  to  make
_
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th e  re fo rm s a s u c c e s s . ' S im i la r ly ,  th e re  was a no tew o rth y  change o f  
s p i r i t  in  th e  European r e p r e s e n ta t io n s  b e fo re  th e  F ra n c h ise  and S u b je c ts  
Com m ittees, a lth o u g h  a g a in  th e re  was a demand f o r  s a fe g u a rd s : w eigh ted  
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  f o r  th e  community in  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls  and th e
2
r e te n t io n  o f  powers o f  law and o rd e r  in  th e  hands o f  B r i t i s h  G overnors.
At th e  annual m eeting  o f th e  European A ss o c ia tio n  in  March 1919?
th e  p r e s id e n t ,  P .L . B uckland, c a l le d  f o r  a new a t t i t u d e  o f  r e s p e c t
fo r  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls .  He observ ed  th a t  th e  re fo rm s would g iv e
them in c re a s e d  pow er, in  view  o f w hich th e  B r i t i s h  n o n - o f f i c i a l s  would
have to  ta k e  them more s e r io u s ly  th a n  in  th e  p a s t .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  th e y
would have to  f in d  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  who were w i l l in g  to  devo te  t h e i r
f u l l  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e i r  l e g i s l a t i v e  d u t i e s  and he su g g es ted  e s ta b l i s h in g
3
a fund  to  pay t h e i r  s a l a r i e s .
Under th e  refo rm s Act p a sse d  a t  th e  end o f  th e  y e a r ,  th e  Europeans 
were g iv e n  a la rg e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  (a lm o s t a s ix th  o f a l l  e le c te d  s e a ts )  
in  th e  p r o v in c ia l  L e g is la t iv e  C o u n c il, th e  L e g i s la t iv e  Assembly and 
th e  C ouncil o f  S ta t e .^  A lthough th e y  p r o te s te d  th a t  t h i s  was in a d eq u a te  
and grum bled a t  h av ing  been ’more o r  l e s s  ig n o re d ’ in  th e  refo rm s 
d is c u s s io n s ,  th e y  saw c l e a r ly  enough th a t  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  f u tu r e  now
_
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depended upon the ability of their representatives to form alliances 
with Indian groups in the legislatures and thus maintain the community1s 
advantages.
Speaking in the Bengal Legislative Council on 3 February 1920 to 
a motion expressing the members' gratitude at the passage of the 
Government of India Act, R.M. Watson-Smyth, a representative of the 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce, said that the time had come 'for the 
British mercantile community to put their cards on the table and to 
state definitely what their attitude is to be with regard to this Bill.' 
He continued:
It is well-known - and I hasten to admit it - that we were of 
opinion that these reforms, although we agree to a certain 
extent with the principle, went too fast and too far. We 
thought and we still think that the time was not ripe for the 
introduction into India of a form of government on western 
democratic lines, and that the franchise difficulty was so 
great that any form of elected government to be really 
representative of the will of the people was a practical 
impossibility. These were not conclusions hastily arrived at, 
but were the results of much thought and consideration, and I 
would that we could say that we had had a fair hearing when the 
measure was being discussed, but this is not so .... All this, 
however, is past history. By the vote of Parliament and by 
the will of the Sovereign this Bill has become lav/, and now, 
without recrimination and with no illwill, we enter the next 
stage - a much more difficult stage - that of carrying these 
reforms into effect .... to the moderates I say stretch out 
your hand and we will take it. Ask for our co-operation and 
you shall have it and you and we will then tackle this problem 
of reforms and turn the Bill into something for which thanks 
are really due - something to the great benefit of the people 
and to the lasting good of this mighty Empire of India which 
is both yours and ours. *
B.L.C.P., vol. LII, pp. 63-4*
1
if1 H
The bhadralok members could surely be excused the display of
disgust with which they greeted this 'magnanimous’ offer of co-operation. 
The European non-officials had changed their tune only when the pressure 
of circumstances and considerations of their own self-interest had 
forced them to do so. It could scarcely be credited that they had 
any genuine sympathy for bhadralok aspirations after having attacked 
the group so bitterly.
Throughout the reforms debate the European non-officials had hit the 
bhadralok at their most sensitive points. They had denied Indian equality 
with their own race and declared India unfit for parliamentary 
institutions - ’the time was not ripe for the introduction into India 
of a form of government on western democratic lines'. They had 
denounced the bhadralok’s professed desire for constitutional advance 
as a subterfuge to gain selfish power - ’it is not government "by the 
people" he wants; it is government of_ the people, by the educated, 
moneyed and landed classes for - themselvesI' They had explicitly 
stated that the bhadralok could not be trusted to uphold the British 
tradition if India were granted self-government. 'It v/ould place the 
many of the lower castes under the heel of the few of the higher 
castes, and could only impair the British tradition in India'. And all 
the time they had been using their fund of backstair influence and
1
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their vituperative press to restrict the degree of change so that 
their own privileged position might be maintained.
The effect of such opposition on the bhadralok1s trust in the 
promises of the Imperial Government is too obvious to need elaboration. 
How could they believe that the British really intended to do for 
India what they had done for the white empire when the British non­
official community in Calcutta was talking so arrogantly of Indian 
inferiority and when it was given such a disproportionate share of 
the legislative representation? How could they believe that liberal, 
constitutional methods of political action would be sufficient to 
secure real power from the British when this influential group v/as 
obviously prepared to use any device to maintain its position in India. 
The British had been asked to give proof that they meant what they said 
and this is what they had produced. 'Tall talk and low performances 
may be amongst the many and varied privileges of Englishmen,' remarked 
Pazlul Huq bitterly, 'but do they seriously realize v/hat the verdict 
of history is likely to be on the achievements of their own countrymen 
in India?'^
1
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CHAPTER IV
THE FORGOTTEN MAJORITY
The Lucknow P a c t
P u t t i n g  fo rw a rd  h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  re fo rm  schem e i n  J u ly  1915»
B a n e r je a  had em phasised  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  H indus and M uslim s m aking1 a
u n i t e d  dem and. At t h e  tim e  he  was w r i t i n g ,  t h e r e  seem ed a  r e a s o n a b le
ch an ce  o f  some m easure  o f  ag reem en t b e in g  re a c h e d  be tw een  th e  l e a d e r s
o f  th e  two com m un ities  i n  B e n g a l. The d e a th  o f  th e  Nawab o f  D acca i n
J a n u a ry  1915 had rem oved th e  m ost i n t r a n s i g e n t  o f  th e  o ld -g u a rd  M uslim s,
*]
and many o f  th o s e  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  s u c c e s s io n  s t r u g g le  w hich fo llo w e d  
w ere young e d u c a te d  men, n a t i o n a l i s t  M uslim s l i k e  F a z lu l  Huq, who spoke 
th e  same p o l i t i c a l  la n g u a g e  a s  th e  H indu n a t i o n a l i s t s .
M o reo v e r, th e  a n g e r  o f  th e s e  y o u n g e r men w ith  th e  Government a t  
th e  r e u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  B engal had  b e e n  r e i n f o r c e d  by  t h e i r  c o n c e rn  o v e r  
th e  e n t r y  to  th e  war o f  I s la m ic  T urkey  a s  a  German a l l y .  The I n d ia n  
M uslim s a c c e p te d  th e  S u l ta n  o f  T u rk ey , th e  K h a l i f a ,  a s  th e  s p i r i t u a l  
and te m p o ra l l e a d e r  o f  a l l  I s la m ,  and th e  f a c t  t h a t  he  was now a t  w ar 
w i th  t h e  B r i t i s h  im posed a s e v e r e  s t r a i n  on t h e i r  l o y a l t y  to  th e
1
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B r i t i s h  r a j . While s t i l l  p ro testing - th e i r  prim ary commitment to  th e
Muslim community, the  n a t io n a l i s t  Muslims in  Bengal were th e re fo re
w il l in g  to  co -o p era te  w ith  Hindu n a t io n a l i s t s  in  fo rm u la tin g  demands
fo r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  concessions.
In  1915 and 1916 they  gained  c o n tro l o f the  Bengal P residency
2
Muslim League, w ith  F az lu l Huq as s e c re ta ry ,  and they  subscribed  to 
a p roposal fo r  a jo in t  scheme o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform s to  be adopted 
by th e  Congress and the  League in  t h e i r  annual a l l - I n d i a  se ss io n s  a t 
Lucknow in  December 1916. The Lucknow P a c t, as th i s  came to  be known, 
was based  on a memorial subm itted  to  the  V iceroy by 19 members o f th e  
Im p eria l L e g is la t iv e  Council in  October 1916» b u t, as th e  p r ic e  o f 
Muslim su p p o rt, t h e i r  scheme was m odified to  g ive  the  Muslims ov er- 
re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  proposed new l e g i s l a t i v e  co u n c ils  o f  those  
p ro v inces where they  were in  a m in o rity . In  Bengal and the  Punjab, th e  
Muslim m a jo rity  p ro v in ces, th e  Hindus were to  have a s l ig h t  w eightage. 
Thus th e  Bengal Muslims, w hile form ing 52.6 per cent o f the  p o p u la tio n , 
were to  have only  40 per cen t o f the  Council s e a ts .^
T his d e c is io n  was g e n e ra lly  unpopular w ith  the  Muslim community in  
Bengal and th e re  was g re a t anger a t  those  who had agreed to  such 
d isadvan tageous term s. The young Muslim Leaguers were accused of
1
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b e t ra y in g  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e i r  community to  p le a se  th e  Hindus and 
th e re  was a r e a c t io n  a g a in s t  c o -o p e ra t io n .  ’Those who apprehend th a t  
th e  Moslems w il l  s u f f e r  p o l i t i c a l  d e a th  i f  th e y  do n o t u n i t e  w ith  th e  
Hindus a re  g r e a t ly  m is ta k e n ,’ dec la im ed  a C a lc u tta  Urdu d a i ly ,  th e  
R e s a la t . 'We have a lre a d y  s to o d  a lo n e  1300 y e a r s .  What i s  w anted i s  
t h a t  we shou ld  f irm ly  ab ide  by our r e l i g io u s  law s and n o t become 
f a i n t - h e a r t e d . '
I t  was on t h i s  is s u e  t h a t  d e b a te  among th e  Bengal Muslim le a d e r s
tu rn e d  in  1917* The s u p p o r te r s  o f  th e  C ongress-L eague P ac t i n s i s t e d
th a t  th e  f i r s t  aim o f a l l  In d ia n s  sho u ld  be to  fo rc e  th e  B r i t i s h  to
y ie ld  power, w h ile  i t s  opponents m a in ta in e d  th a t  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f
communal i n t e r e s t s  was th e  param ount d u ty  o f th e  Muslim le a d e r s .
M ontagu 's  d e c l a r a t i o n  in  A ugust, b r in g in g  as  i t  d id  th e  need f o r  a c t io n
2
o n ly  added to  th e  acrim ony o f  th e  d is p u te .
The R e je c t io n  o f  th e  P ac t
I t  was s e t t l e d  q u i te  su d d en ly , how ever, by communal r i o t i n g  in  
B ih a r  l a t e  i n  th e  fo llo w in g  month. When th e  Muslims o f Shahabad 
D i s t r i c t  a ttem p ted  to  perform  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o w -s a c r if ic e  on th e  
B a q r - Id , th e y  were a t ta c k e d  by H indus. The n a tu re  and e x te n t  o f  th e  
r i o t i n g  w hich fo llow ed  -  more f i e r c e  and p ro longed  th a n  any which
1
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p re v io u s ly  had o ccu rred  in  B r i t i s h  tim es  -  su g g es ted  a p re m e d ita te d  
a ttem p t on th e  p a r t  o f th e  lo c a l  H indus to  p u t an end to  c o w -s a c r if ic e  
in  th e  D i s t r i c t . 1
T h is  had s e r io u s  re p e rc u s s io n s  on communal r e l a t i o n s  i n  n e ig h b o u rin g
a re a s  o f  e a s te r n  I n d ia .  I n  B en g a l, where ex c item en t was a lre a d y  ru n n in g
h ig h  a t  th e  p ro sp e c t o f  re fo rm s , th e  Muslim le a d e r s  h u r le d  th e  a c c u s a tio n
o f  t r e a c h e ry  a t  t h e i r  Hindu o p p o s ite s .  H ere, th e y  d ec la im ed , was an
example o f  th e  use  to  which th e  H indus would pu t any power th ey  cou ld
2
w ring  from  th e  B r i t i s h .  T h is was a f o r e t a s t e  o f  Hindu r a j . A ll 
th o u g h ts  o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  were drowned i n  a wave o f  communal b i t t e r n e s s  
and th e  o ld  r e l i g io u s  a n im o s ity  o f  th e  two com m unities was re v iv e d .
' I n  th e  West r e l i g i o n  and p o l i t i c s  can  be s e p a ra te d  b u t i n  th e  E a s t 
n e v e r , '  d e c la re d  th e  S ad aq a t.^
I t  was i n  t h i s  atm osphere o f  r e c r im in a t io n ,  t h a t  th e  Bengal Muslims 
s e t  abou t draw ing  up t h e i r  su b m issio n s on c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  reform  f o r  
Montagu and Chelm sford. A lready  th e r e  had been  a  number o f d e fe c t io n s  
from th e  ran k s  o f  th e  p ro v in c ia l  Muslim League o f  th o se  who re p u d ia te d  
th e  Lucknow F a c t . The C e n tra l N a tio n a l Muhammadan A ss o c ia tio n , a 
C a lc u t ta  o rg a n is a t io n  o f lo n g  s ta n d in g  w hich had fo rm e rly  concerned  
i t s e l f  p r im a r i ly  w ith  Muslim e d u c a tio n , o f fe re d  th e s e  men an a l t e r n a t i v e  
_
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body through which to work. They persuaded the Association to form a
1Constitutional Reforms Sub-Committee, of which they took command.
They then prepared an address to Montagu and Chelmsford in its name, 
attacking- the Lucknow Pact and demanding legislative representation for 
the Bengal Muslims in proportion to their population. The spirit of 
their submissions was characterised by the concluding sentence of the 
address: ’For England now to place the Indian Moslems, without proper, 
definite, and ample safeguards, under the heels of a hostile non- 
Moslem majority, would, your humble memorialists venture respectfully
2to submit, be a cruel act of breach of faith and violation of trust.’
In November the same group of League defectors, under the leader­
ship of Golam Husain Cassim Ariff and Dr Abdulla-al-Mamum Suhrawardy,
formed a new and specifically political organisation of their own -
3the Indian Moslem Association - and drew up another address. Its tone 
was more extreme. It emphasised its authorfe* determination to secure 
communal advantages at any cost and it characterised the Lucknow 
agreement as a snare and a delusion for Muslims and British alike. 
’Indeed the ink of the compact of fraternity itself has been washed 
away by the blood of the victims of the Bakri-Id riots at Arrah and the 
Ram-Lila Moharrum disturbances at Allahabad.'^
Octennial Report of the Central National Mahommedan Association, 
1917-1924, pp. 5-o.
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In  the  p ro v in c ia l Muslim League, th e  su p p o rte rs  of th e  Pact were 
now unchallenged  hu t they  were uncom fortably aware of the  u n p o p u la rity  
of th e  P a c t’ s p ro v is io n s  fo r  Bengal and th e  consequent danger fo r  them 
of b e in g  l e f t  out on a p o l i t i c a l  lim b. They attem pted  to  save them selves 
by advocating* a m o d if ica tio n  o f th e  scheme to  g ive th e  Bengal Muslims
A
50 per cen t of th e  Council s e a ts ,  and, a t  th e  same tim e, w ith  the  
a s s is ta n c e  o f some U nited P rov inces members o f th e  League, th ey  s ta r te d  
a new Urdu d a ily  in  C a lcu tta  to  support the scheme in  th i s  m odified 
form.
Thus when Montagu and Chelmsford came to  C a lcu tta  in  December 1917» 
the th re e  Muslim a s so c ia tio n s  were u n ite d  in  th e i r  o p p o s itio n  to  the  
re p re s e n ta t io n  p ro v is io n s  o f the  Lucknow Pact and a l l  were demanding 
more generous trea tm en t fo r  t h e i r  community.
Montagu had l i t t l e  sympathy w ith  t h i s  demand. He b e lie v ed  th a t  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c tio n  fo r  m in o r it ie s  -  p a r t i c u la r ly  fo r  la rg e  
m in o r i t ie s  l i k e  the  Muslims -  encouraged t h e i r  s e p a r a t i s t  te n d e n c ie s , 
and, a t  th e  same tim e , d iscouraged  them from making the  e f f o r t  to  stand  
on t h e i r  own f e e t  in  p o l i t i c s .^  He was eager to  do away w ith  communal 
e le c to r a te s  bu t r e lu c ta n t ly  d isca rd ed  t h i s  id ea  when he r e a l i s e d  th e  
s t r a i n  which such a re v e rsa l o f B r i t i s h  p o lic y  would impose on Muslim
1
HP, Nov 1917.
2
S a d a g a t,* 24 Hov 1917«
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lo y a l ty .  In  th e  jo in t  re p o rt pub lished  in  Ju ly  1918, he d id  make i t
c le a r ,  however, th a t  he d isapproved  of communal re p re s e n ta t io n  in
p r in c ip le ,  and he emphasised th a t  he would not agree to  i t s  ex ten s io n ,
or even to  i t s  m aintenance, in  any prov ince  where th e  Muslims formed
2a m a jo rity  of th e  v o te rs .
The Bengal Muslim le a d e rs  were aghast a t  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f th i s  
fo r  t h e i r  community. I f  the  B r i t i s h  accepted  th e  p ro v is io n s  of the 
Lucknow Pact as a f a i r  b a s is  fo r  the  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f s e a ts  in  th e  new 
le g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c ils , the  Bengal Muslims would not be g iven  a 
r e p re s e n ta t io n  p ro p o rtio n a te  to  t h e i r  o v e ra ll  num erical m a jo r ity , and 
y e t ,  i f  Montagu had h is  way, th a t  m a jo rity  would be made the  excuse 
fo r  d e p riv in g  them of t h e i r  s e p a ra te  e le c to r a te s .  There were vehement 
p r o te s ts  from the p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c ia t io n s . ’My Committee have c a r e fu l ly  
s tu d ie d  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Scheme in  a l l  i t s  a sp e c ts  and apprehend th a t  
i t s  working in  i t s  p re sen t shape would be d is a s tro u s  to  Moslem i n t e r e s t s ,  
and le a d  to  the  p o l i t i c a l  e x t in c t io n  o f a g re a t and h i s to r i c  community 
in  I n d i a , ’ th e  s e c re ta ry  o f the  C en tra l N ational Muhammadan A sso c ia tio n  
to ld  th e  Government of Bengal*^
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Courtiers and Co-operators
The Bengal Muslims were, indeed, in a desperate position. At 
this crisis in Indian constitutional development, with the future of 
their community hanging in the Balance, they were faced with the failure 
of both courses of political action which they had pursued in the 
preceding decade.
The first of these, which had been evolved in the period of the 
partition agitation and the Morley-Minto reforms, was the Dacca Hawab's 
method of dependence upon the British Imperial rulers. It assumed that 
the Muslims, as an educationally and economically depressed community, 
could not hold their own with the bhadralok in the hurly-burly of 
politics. It also assumed that the British were worried by the growing 
strength and increasingly aggressive tone of Hindu nationalism, and 
would welcome the clientage of the Muslims - a distinct and self- 
conscious community which might serve as a counterpoise to the bhadralok 
The strategy was for the Muslim leaders to proclaim the loyalty of 
their community to the British ra.j and to offer it in liege to the 
Imperial Government. In return they would expect the community to 
receive favoured treatment in any constitutional or political settlement 
The British were in need of support and they willingly accepted 
the arrangement on these terms. As a result the Muslims gained many
_
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concessions in  the period  betw een 1906 and 1911, the  most s ig n if ic a n t  
being  sep a ra te  communal r e p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  reform ed le g i s l a tu r e s .
As w ith  a l l  system s of p a tro n ag e , however, th i s  r e la t io n s h ip  
depended upon the  m aintenance o f a f in e  balance between th e  i n te r e s t s  
o f p a tro n  and c l i e n t .  In  th i s  case  th e  balance  would be d is tu rb e d  i f  
the  B r i t i s h  considered  th a t  i t  was in  t h e i r  in t e r e s t  to  make concessions 
to  communities o th e r th an  the  Muslims. Thus th e  r e u n if ic a t io n  o f  Bengal 
in  1912, which was in tended  to  b e n e f i t  th e  b h a d ra lo k , was held  by th e  
Muslims to  be a breach  o f f a i t h ,  and i t  r a is e d  doubts in  t h e i r  minds 
as to  th e  va lue  o f the  whole arrangem ent.
The Nawab of Dacca, however, in s i s t e d  th a t  th e re  was no s a t i s f a c to r y  
a l te r n a t iv e  to  t h i s  system fo r  th e  Bengal Muslims. He saw th a t  what 
was re q u ire d  was the estab lish m en t o f c lo se r  c o n ta c ts  between the  
Muslim le a d e rs  and the  Government. To ensure th a t  th e  community’ s 
needs were adequate ly  rep re sen ted  to  the  B r i t i s h  and a lso  to  ensure 
th a t  th e  community was never ag a in  caught unawares by Government a c tio n  
as i t  had been  in  1911 > i t  was v i t a l  th a t  i t  should a t  a l l  tim es have 
’c o u r t i e r s '  who were in  th e  confidence o f th e  Governor and h is  o f f i c i a l  
en tourage.
In  th i s  re g a rd , the  opening y e a rs  o f C arm ichae l's  regime could 
s c a rc e ly  have su ite d  the  Muslims b e t t e r ,  w ith  th e  Nawab h im se lf  in s ta l l e d  
in  a p lace  o f honour a t  th e  G overnor's r ig h t  hand, and Shamsul Huda 
s i t t i n g  in  th e  Executive C ouncil. Follow ing th e  Nawab's  d ea th  in  
January  1915» however, th e  system  broke down. There was no ab le  and
aristocratic successor to take the Kawab’s place at ’court’, and, when 
Kuda’s term on the Executive Council expired in June 1917) Ronaldshay 
gave the seat to 3.P. Sinha, a member of the bhadralok. This perturbed 
the Muslim leaders. The Bengal Chief Secretary, J.H. Kerr, remarked 
on 1b August: *The present Government is already suspected of being 
less favourably inclined to, or at any rate less mindful of, Muhammadan 
interests than the late Government which included a Muhammadan member 
and Mr Lyon who was well known to be actively pro-Muhammadan and pro- 
Eastern Bengal in his tendencies.’
The full extent of their loss was apparent to the Muslims only 
after Montagu’s declaration. They then realised that they had been 
deprived of their means of confidential access to the Government at the 
very moment when it was most important for them to be able to influence 
its decisions. The disastrous consequences of this seemed to be fore­
shadowed in the opposition of the Montagu-Chelmsford report to the 
provision of separate communal electorates in Muslim majority areas.
The other method of political action which had been tried and 
found wanting by July 1918 was co-operation with the bhadralok, as 
advocated by Fazlul Huq and his nationalist Muslims. These middle- 
class professional men were not acceptable to the Government as 
'courtiers’, nor did they wish to fill such a role. After the re­
unification of Bengal in 1912, they rejected the Dacca Nawab's style
Minute, GB, Appointment, 4M-4(l-2), A30-31> Sep 1917*
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of dependence on the  B r i t i s h ,  d e c la r in g  as in v a lid  the  assum ptions on 
which i t  was based. The B r i t i s h  no lo n g e r welcomed the  Muslims as 
c l i e n t s ,  they  s a id , nor was i t  necessary  fo r  th e  Muslims to  avoid the  
rough and tumble of p o l i t i c s ,  fo r  th ey  now had an educated e l i t e  
which could hold i t s  own w ith  the  b h ad ra lo k .
The p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  o f th e  Bengal Muslim community, as th ey  saw 
i t ,  la y  in  an a l l ia n c e  w ith  the bhadra lok  a g a in s t th e  common enemy: 
the  B r i t i s h .  The aim was to  w rest power from the  B r i t i s h  and t h i s  power 
was to  be d iv id ed  between th e  communities according' to  a p re -a rran g ed  
scheme which would g ive  th e  Muslims t h e i r  f a i r  sh a re . This was the  
o b je c t fo r  which Huq and h is  men su bscribed  to  th e  Lucknow P a c t.
T he ir confidence th a t  the  a l l ia n c e  would fo rce  the  B r i t i s h  to  
y ie ld  power was shown by subsequent even ts to  have been f u l l y  j u s t i f i e d .  
T h is , however, proved to  be a d oub tfu l b le ss in g ', fo r  in  n e g o tia tin g  the  
P act th e  Bengal Muslim le a d e rs  had f a i l e d  to  secu re  a s u f f ic ie n t ly  
la rg e  s l i c e  o f the  new powers to  s a t i s f y  t h e i r  own community. Thus an 
arrangem ent th a t  was o r ig in a l ly  in tended  to  safeguard  the  Bengal Muslims 
had, by 1918, come to  be regarded  by th a t  community as the g rav est 
danger to  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  in  the  impending c o n s t i tu t io n a l  re s e tt le m e n t.
The R io ts
Faced w ith  th i s  a larm ing f a i lu r e  o f t h e i r  e f f o r t s ,  the  B engali 
Muslim p o l i t i c ia n s  were a t  a lo s s  fo r  any c o n s tru c tiv e  sug g estio n s  fo r  
fu tu r e  a c tio n . Throughout Ju ly  and August 1918 they  ta lk e d  d e sp a ir in g ly
of the  ‘p o l i t i c a l  e x t in c t io n ’ o f th e i r  community. They accused th e
B r i t i s h  and the  bhadra lok  of a d e s ire  to  c r ip p le  i t s  s t r e n g th ,  and they
1
accused one ano ther o f tre a c h e ry .
There could have been no worse moment fo r  such a d isp la y  o f  weakness 
fo r  th e  Muslim community in  Bengal was d e sp e ra te ly  in  need of th e  
rea ssu ran ce  o f firm  le a d e rs h ip . Among i t s  educated members, th e  un­
welcome tone o f th e  Montagu-Chelrasford re p o r t  and the in c re a s in g ly  
extrem e demands o f th e  Hindu n a t io n a l i s t s  were th e  cause of grave 
a n x ie ty . To th e  orthodox Muslims, the  d e fe a ts  su ffe re d  by Turkey and
the  w idely  c re d ite d  rumours th a t  B r i ta in  in tended  to  depose th e  K h a lifa
2
were th e  cause of deep concern , while th e  mass o f the  community was 
s u f f e r in g  from th e  e f f e c t s  o f a bad h a rv e s t ,  heavy flo o d in g  due to  an 
e a r ly  monsoon and e x tra o rd in a r i ly  h igh  p r ic e s  fo r  c o tto n  goods. Added 
to  a l l  t h i s  were the  ravages o f th e  g re a t in f lu e n z a  epidem ic, which 
had s tru c k  Bengal in  Ju ly  1913.^
With t h i s  g en era l u n re s t and a dem oralised  le a d e rs h ip , th e  community 
was an easy  prey fo r  ex trem is t a g i ta to r s ,  and a group of such men were 
on hand to  tak e  advantage of th e  o p p o rtu n ity . T he ir le a d e rs  were 
th re e  non-B engalis -  a P u n jab i, Habib Shah, a M adrasi, Kalami, and a
%_
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B ih a r i ,  F az lu r Rahman -  whose c h ie f  in flu en c e  was among th e  Urdu­
speaking immigrant com m u n ity  of C a lcu tta : th e  Muslim t r a d e r s ,  m anufacturers 
and lo w e r-c la ss  fa c to ry  la b o u re rs .
'Throughout 1918 th e se  men had been lo o k in g  fo r  a chance to  s t i r  
up tro u b le  and they  saw September as t h e i r  b e s t  o p p o rtu n ity , fo r  in  
th a t  month the  Muslim Bakr Id  would co incide  w ith  the Hindu Durga Fu.ja.
Such a concurrence o f r e l ig io u s  f e s t i v a l s  always brought th e  lik e lih o o d
2of communal d iso rd e r  and, w ith  b i t t e r  memories of th e  p rev ious y e a r ’s 
r io t in g  in  B ihar s t i l l  f r e s h  in  Muslim m inds, th e  s i tu a t io n  on t h i s  
o ccasio n  promised to  be un u su a lly  ex p lo siv e .
The Muslim p re ss  was busy whipping up d is c o n te n t. The B ihar r i o t s  
were f re q u e n tly  m entioned, w ith  heavy u n d e rsco rin g  of th e  m oral: ’The 
Moslems should be on th e i r  guard in  tim e th i s  y e a r .*J Hoarders were 
blamed fo r  the  p ro h ib i t iv e  p r ic e  of c o tto n  goods and the  f in g e r  of 
a c c u sa tio n  was po in ted  a t  the  M arwaris.
This m oney-lending community, which came from the  R ajputana s t a t e s ,  
had e s ta b lis h e d  i t s e l f  in  fo rc e  in  C a lcu tta  in  th e  preced ing  decade.^
In  t r a d e ,  i t s  members worked in  c lo s e ly -k n i t  fam ily  groups, and, w ith  
t h e i r  f l a i r  fo r  a good sp e c u la tio n  combined w ith  a la rg e  measure of
1
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unscrupulous dealing-, they  had qu ick ly  secured  an im portan t p o s i t io n  in
•j
Bengal commerce. Communally ex c lu s iv e  and r e l ig io u s ly  u ltr a -o r th o d o x ,
they kept a lo o f  from bo th  th e  Muslims and th e  Hindus in  B engal, which
d id  no th ing  to  d isp e l the je a lo u sy  and m is tru s t  which th e i r  ra p id
success had engendered. They offended the  Muslims, in  p a r t i c u la r ,  by
th e i r  deep av e rs io n  to  cow s la u g h te r  and i t  was an u n fo r tu n a te  acc id en t
o f geography th a t  threw to g e th e r  la rg e  numbers o f bo th  communities in
th e  overcrowded la n es  around B urra Bazar in  c e n tr a l  C a lc u tta . By
August 1913 th e  Marwaris of th i s  a rea  were aware o f the  h o s t i l i t y
surrounding  them, and, fe a r in g  lo o tin g  o f t h e i r  warehouses should
r io t in g  b reak  out in  September, they  im ported up-coun try  guards. This
2was noted w ith  d is fav o u r in  th e  B engali p re s s .
The s i tu a t io n  was p e r fe c t fo r  the  Muslim a g i ta to r s .  A ll they  had 
to  do was to  s t r ik e  the  spark  which would ig n i te  th i s  t in d e r .  Habib 
Shah was th e  in c en d ia ry . At th e  beg inn ing  o f August in  h is  Urdu paper, 
th e  Naqqash, he took excep tion  to  a paragraph  published  a few days 
e a r l i e r  in  th e  In d ian  D aily  News, on the  ground th a t  i t  co n ta in ed  an 
o ffen s iv e  re fe re n c e  to  the  p rophet Muhammad. This c re a te d  a fu ro re .
The o th e r  Muslim papers jo ined  th e  Haqqash in  i t s  a t ta c k  and on 4 August 
th e  Bengal P residency  Muslim League c a l le d  upon th e  Government to  
i n s t i t u t e  p roceed ings a g a in s t the  e d i to r  o f the  In d ian  D aily  Hews.
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At a public meeting six days later there was wild talk of a holy war 
against the infidel and it was decided to call an all-India gathering 
of Muslims in Calcutta for 8 and 9 September to consider the religious 
and political future of the community. ‘At this moment, Moslems are 
being attacked from all sides,’ wrote the Raqqash. 'They say that 
their feelings are hurt by everybody. But the mere expression of such 
a sentiment will not stop the mouths of the enemies of Islam. Practical 
steps should be taken. They should act on the motto, iron must be 
hammered by iron.'
Moderate Muslim politicians were becoming- alarmed by the trend of 
events but they were reluctant to denounce the agitators publicly lest 
this endanger their personal popularity and in some way favour their 
rivals. They became a little more resolute when they found themselves 
excluded by the extremists from the reception committee which was 
formed after the meeting of 10 August to organise the following month’s 
demonstration, but even then they would risk nothing more than a 
confidential appeal to the Government to prohibit the rally.
The Government of Bengal was slow to recognise the gravity of the 
situation. It handled the affair of the Indian Daily Mews ineptly and 
provided much ammunition for the Muslim press before the Government of 
India intervened to persuade the Daily Hews editor to publish an apology. 
Ronaldshay was absent from Calcutta and it was not until his return at
1
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the end of August that his Government considered the matter of the 
all-India rally. Twelve Muslim leaders were then called to discuss 
the question with the Executive Council. The representatives of the 
reception committee denied any intention of fomenting trouble, but 
their moderate opponents accused them of deceit and favoured cancelling 
the gathering. At Ronaldshay’s request, the reception committee met 
that evening’ to reconsider its decision but it used the occasion as 
an excuse to heap abuse on the heads of the moderates for what it 
described as their collusion with the Government.
In the meantime there had been much inflammatory writing in the 
Muslim press and a number of religious leaders had arrived in Calcutta 
from other parts of northern India. On 4 September the Government 
banned the gathering, ordered the visitors to leave Bengal and stopped 
the publication of the Naqqash and a number of other Muslim papers.
The reception committee, in defiance of the order, went ahead with its 
arrangements.
Most of the moderates were now thoroughly frightened and some 
went as far as requesting police protection. An exception was Fazlul 
Huq. For ten days from 26 August he had been absent in Bombay attending 
the special sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League called to 
consider the Montagu-Chelmsford report, and on his return he had been 
confined to bed with a fever. As soon as he recovered he made an 
effort to ensure that the Government’s order would be obeyed. Speaking 
to a meeting of the reception committee on the evening- of 7 September,
he persuaded all hut three of its members to abandon the rally. The 
three were Habib ohah, Kalami and Fazlur Rahman.
On the following day a crowd of five or six thousand Muslims 
assembled at the site of the rally but they dispersed when they were 
told that the Government had granted another interview to the reception 
committee for the next afternoon. On the morning of the 3th a large 
mob gathered around the Nakhoda Mosque in Burra Bazar, and, shortly 
after midday, began moving towards Government House. Huq asked for 
police permission to talk to them but this was refused. They were 
stopped by armed constables and forced to return to the mosque, where 
they milled angrily in the surrounding lanes. Fearing damage to their 
property, some of the Marwaris ordered their durwans to clear the 
footpaths in front of their gateways. Elows were exchanged, and, when 
a shot was fired from one of the Marwari houses, rioting broke out.
The police charged with lathis but were bombarded with bricks. They 
then opened fire, killing and wounding a number in the crowd. Looting 
and arson had already begun in many parts of the city, with the 
Marwaris as the chief victims. It took three days and the bayonets 
of a regiment of British troops to restore order.
The Lessons of Violence
Looking back over a half century disfigured with the scars of 
communal rioting in Calcutta, the pattern of these events seems too
1
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f a m i l i a r  to  e x c i te  comment, b u t i n  1918 i t  was novel and a la rm in g .
For men o f  p ro p e r ty  i n  g e n e ra l and f o r  th e  M arw aris in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  
r a i s e d  an aw ful v i s io n  o f  th e  d is a s t r o u s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  a breakdown 
o f law  and o rd e r  in  th e  fa c e  o f a m a lco n te n t o r  f a n a t i c a l  ra b b le .
They were u n co m fo rtab ly  aware t h a t  i n  some way th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  In d ia n  
s o c ie ty  had been  shaken  i n  th e  war y e a r s .  The sm all d e le g a t io n  o f  
businessm en  ~ B en g a li H indus, M arw aris and M uslims -  which Byomkes 
C h a k ra v a r ti  le d  to  th e  V /r i te r s ' B u ild in g  on 17 Septem ber to  th a n k  th e  
Government f o r  su p p re s s in g  th e  r i o t s , ^  was e x p re s s iv e  o f  a co ncern  f o r  
what was to  come as much as  o f  r e l i e f  f o r  what was p a s t .
The p o l i t i c a l  im p lic a t io n s  o f  th e  r i o t s  were e q u a lly  d is tu r b in g .  
F o r th e  f i r s t  tim e in  B r i t i s h  In d ia  an a tte m p t had been  made to  u se  
mob v io le n c e  a s  a p o l i t i c a l  weapon. C e r ta in ly  th e  p o l i t i c a l  aims o f  
th e  a g i t a t o r s  were n o t c l e a r ly  d e f in e d ,  b u t t h i s  does n o t a l t e r  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  i n  i t s  o r g a n is a t io n  th e  1918 r i o t i n g  d i f f e r e d  i n  k in d  from 
p re v io u s  communal d is o r d e r s .  Habib Shah and h i s  fe llo w s  were engaged 
i n  a p o l i t i c a l  c o n te s t  i n  w hich th e y  used  v io le n c e  and th e  t h r e a t  o f 
v io le n c e  a g a in s t  t h e i r  opp o n en ts . The o rg a n is a t io n s  th ro u g h  w hich 
th e y  worked were p o l i t i c a l  and th e y  p lay ed  upon p o l i t i c a l  as w e ll as 
communal g r ie v a n c e s .
T h e ir  su c c e ss  su g g es ted  a c o r o l l a r y :  t h a t  by t h i s  tim e th e re  was 
l a t e n t  mass d is c o n te n t  w hich cou ld  be e x p lo i te d  fo r  p e rso n a l o r
S a n g a li,* & Hayak,* 18 Sep 1918.
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communal advantage by unscrupulous politicians. This gave a completely 
new significance to the numerical strength of the Muslim community, 
and forced the basic fact of its majority on the attention of the 
British, the bhadralok and the Bengali Muslim politicians - courtiers 
and., co-operators alike - all of whom had been acting- as though they 
had forgotten that majority.
There were other important lessons to be learnt from the riots.
In the first place, they had shown the Muslim politicians that a resort 
to violence could provide a means of expressing their anger and 
frustration when other forms of political action had failed. More 
important still, it was apparent that the mere threat of such violence 
could force the British and the bhadralok to pay more serious attention 
to Muslim demands. In other words, violence had been proved an effective 
political mode of action. The techniques for promoting mass violence 
had been well noted. The Muslim agitators of the future appreciated 
only too well the value of the mosque as a rallying point, of the 
migrant groups of the bustee areas as a source for rioters, of the 
Marwaris as an alien and unpopular object of violence, and of the 
vernacular press as a medium for incitement.
Obviously violence in Calcutta was a sword which the Muslims might 
use against their communal opponents, but it was a double-edged sword.
As the September 1918 riots had shown, the instigators of an outbreak 
could never be certain that they would be able to control the disorderly 
elements which they had set loose, and when the rabble got out of hand
no one was free from danger - certainly no one of property. The size 
of Calcutta; the overcrowding- of its older areas, with their jumbled 
maze of narrow lanes and alley-ways; the mixed racial and religious 
composition of its population; its drifting and unstable migrant 
section; its large criminal class; its spectacular inequalities of 
wealth and opportunity; its influential yellow press - all of these 
factors contributed to the exceptional difficulty of maintaining order 
in Calcutta or of arresting disorder once it had begun. And this 
problem of law and order was a matter of concern for politicians as 
well as police. After the September 1918 riots, no Bengali political 
leader could ever again disregard the possibility that extreme action 
on his part might provoke mass violence in Calcutta, with possibly 
disastrous consequences. This consideration, as we shall see, loomed 
large in the minds of the bhadralok leaders as they searched for new 
methods of political action in the following two years.
The Government of Bengal was also shaken by what had happened in
September 19 18 . Clearly it had misjudged the situation. Its initial
hesitation and its later reliance upon police and troops to the
exclusion of assistance from Muslim leaders, almost certainly cost
lives. Its actions were censured by both the Government of India and
2a non-official committee of enquiry, and Ronaldshay, writing his
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memoirs 30 y e a rs  l a t e r ,  s t i l l  f e l t  th e  need f o r  a le n g th y  a p o lo g ia .
Some good came o f th e  a f f a i r .  A part from a r e o r g a n is a t io n  o f  armed
p o lic e  in  C a lc u tta  in  an a tte m p t to  o b v ia te  th e  u se  o f  t r o o p s ,  th e re
was a r e a l i s a t i o n  among th e  o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  new fo rc e s  were a t  work
in  B en g a li s o c ie ty  and th a t  th e  p o l i t i c s  o f  th e  p o s t-w ar y e a rs  prom ised
2
to  he v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from th o se  o f th e  p a s t .
A hew Course
The e v e n ts  o f August and Septem ber l e f t  many r e p u ta t io n s  ta rn is h e d .  
The w il l in g n e s s  o f most o f th e  Muslim p o l i t i c i a n s  to  s u b o rd in a te  p u b lic  
d u ty  to  c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  p e rso n a l ad v an tag e  and s e c u r i t y ,  t h e i r  
p re o c c u p a tio n  w ith  p e t ty  in t r ig u e  and f a c t io n a l i s m ,  had been  p la in  f o r  
a l l  to  s e e ."
F a z lu l Huq. had come th ro u g h  th e  a f f a i r  b e t t e r  th a n  m ost, b u t he was 
in  d is fa v o u r  w ith  th e  b u lk  o f  h i s  community b ecau se  o f h i s  p e r s i s t e n t  
su p p o rt o f  th e  Lucknow P a c t . H is e l e c t i o n  to  p re s id e  a t  th e  December 
1918 s e s s io n  o f  th e  a l l - I n d i a  Muslim League won him few f r ie n d s  in
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R onaldshay to  C helm sford , 9 Oct 1918: ’S in ce  th e  d e a th  o f Uawab S i r  
K haja S a lim u lla  Bahadur th e  Bengal Mabomedans have s u f fe re d  g r e a t ly  
from la c k  o f le a d e r s h ip .  There i s  no o u ts ta n d in g  p e r s o n a l i ty  amongst 
them who commands th e  c o n fid e n ce  o r th e  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  community as 
a w hole, and th e  r e l a t i o n s  e x i s t in g ’ betw een th e  number o f  sm a lle r  men 
who a s p ir e  to  le a d e r s h ip  a re  c h a r a c te r i s e d  by p e rso n a l je a lo u s ie s  and 
p e t t i n e s s . '  (G I, Home P u b lic ,  D ep o sit 36, Apr 1919)*
B engal, and h is  c h a r a c te r isa t io n , in  h is  p r e s id e n t ia l address on th a t
o cca sio n , o f ta lk  o f  Hindu ra.j as a ’g ro s s  l i b e l ’  ^ was p a r t i c u l a r l y
unwelcome in  the atmosphere o f communal acrim ony fo llo w in g  th e  C a lc u tta
r i o t s .  Huq had tarred  h im se lf  w ith  th e  b ru sh  o f c o -o p e ra t io n  and i t
was a lo n g  tim e b e fo re  th is  was fo rg iv e n .  'He has a s tro n g  d e s i r e  to
g a in  a r e p u ta t io n  among a l l  c o m m u n itie s ,' w ro te  th e  Moslem H i ta is h i
con tem ptuously  in  O ctober 1919* ’So he keeps h im se lf  in  th e  good g ra c e s
o f  a c e r ta in  s e c t io n  o f Moslems and i s  re a d y , w ith o u t th e  l e a s t
h e s i t a t i o n ,  to s a c r i f i c e  Moslem communal i n t e r e s t s  i n  o rd e r  to win fame
2
and p o s i t io n  among; th e H indus. '
.That the Bengal Muslims were lo o k in g  f o r  l a t e  in  1913 was n o t a 
l e a d e r  who would compromise but one who would pu t communalism b e fo re  
a l l  e l s e  in  th e  b a t t l e  w hich was abou t to  be fo u g h t over Muslim 
l e g i s l a t i v e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n .  The man who su p p lie d  th e  need was Nawab 
Khan Bahadur S a iy id  Hawah A li C haudhuri, th e  E a s te rn  Bengal r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
in  th e  Im p e r ia l L e g is la t iv e  C o u n c il. He had much to  recommend him.
A B en g a li and a g r e a t  la n d h o ld e r ,  he s to o d  a p a r t  from th e  U rd u -speak ing  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  o f C a lc u tta  who had been  c h i e f ly  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e
r e c e n t  t r o u b le s .  At th a t  tim e he had spoken ou t s t ro n g ly  a g a in s t  th e
3
encouragem ent o f v io le n c e “ and y e t  had r e ta in e d  th e  ap p ea ran ce , a t  
l e a s t ,  o f  non-invo lvem ent in  th e  v a r io u s  in t r i g u e s .
1
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E ssa y e z , p. 111.
More im p o rtan t, a t no s tag e  in  h is  c a re e r  had he had dealing 's  w ith  
th e  n a t io n a l i s t s .  He was a communali s t  f i r s t  and l a s t .  When th e  non­
o f f i c i a l  members of the Im p eria l L e g is la tiv e  Council drew up t h e i r
memorial on reform s in  1916, he had re fu sed  to  s ig n  on th e  ground th a t
-]
Muslim in t e r e s t s  were not e x p l i c i t l y  p ro te c te d . He had re s ig n ed  th e
p residency  of the  p ro v in c ia l Muslim League in  1917 because o f th e
term s o f the  Lucknow Pact and in  December had argued the case f o r  h is
2
community in  a personal in te rv iew  w ith  Montagu and Chelmsford.
His main work la y  b e fo re  him. In  August 1918 he was e le c te d  
p re s id e n t o f th e  C en tral N ational Muhammadan A sso c ia tio n  and im m ediately 
s e t  about preparing- subm issions fo r  the F ran ch ise  and Functions 
com m ittees. The l a t t e r  he regarded  as supp ly ing  an o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  a 
p u b lic  p ro te s t  a g a in s t the  ’serfdom ’ imposed upon the  Muslims by the  
b h ad ra lo k . I t  would be s u ic id a l  fo r  th e  Muslim to  agree to  any scheme 
f o r  the  p ro g ress iv e  r e a l i s a t io n  of self-g o v ern m en t, th e  committee was 
t o ld ,  fo r  th e re  was ’no common sentim ent of n a t io n a l i ty  between th e  
Moslem and th e  B engalee’ . ^
The evidence fo r  th e  F ran ch ise  committee was of more p r a c t ic a l  
im portance, fo r  th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  of l e g i s l a t i v e  s e a ts  was s t i l l  an open 
q u e s tio n . The Government o f B engal, p re p a rin g  i t s  recommendations, had
1
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come to the conclusion  th a t  no s a t i s f a c to r y  f ra n c h ise  q u a l i f ic a t io n  
could he dev ised  V7hich would g ive th e  Bengal Muslims a m a jo rity  of 
v o te rs  and t h a t ,  th a t  be ing  so , they  were e n t i t l e d  to  sep a ra te  
e le c to r a te s .  I t  accep ted  th e  Congress-League scheme as %, convenient 
s o lu t io n ’ of the  problem of ap p o rtio n in g  s e a ts  between the  two 
communities and recommended a L e g is la t iv e  Council fo r  Bengal o f 112 
members. F if ty -n in e  o f th e se  should be e le c te d  from t e r r i t o r i a l  
c o n s t i tu e n c ie s , w ith  the  Muslims p ro v id in g  27 and the  Hindus 32. The 
C en tral N ational Muhammadan A sso c ia tio n  s tro n g ly  opposed th i s  sugges­
t io n .  The Lucknow Pact was accep tab le  fo r  th e  r e s t  o f In d ia ,  i t
a s s e r te d ,  but fo r  Bengal i t  was u n f a i r  to  the  Muslims. T h e ir p o p u la tio n
2e n t i t l e d  them to  a t  l e a s t  50 per cen t o f th e  Council s e a ts .
The F ranch ise  committee d id  not ag ree . I t  accepted  the  Government 
o f B engal’s argument fo r  communal e le c to r a te s  and i t s  apportionm ent of 
45 p er cen t o f the t e r r i t o r i a l  s e a ts  to  th e  M uslim s.^
Chaudhuri had not appeared as a w itness b e fo re  e i th e r  of th e  
committees bu t he had not been id le .  As an o ld  comrade of th e  Dacca 
Nawab, he knew the value o f personal in te r c e s s io n  a t  the h ig h e s t l e v e l ,  
and he had been a c tiv e  in  D elhi ta lk in g  w ith  members of th e  Government 
o f In d ia . He had in s is te d  th a t  the  Muslim, League d id  not t r u ly
1
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re p re se n t th e  Muslim community in  Bengal and th a t  th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f
the  Congress-League scheme to  the  province would he regarded  by h is
community as a b e tra y a l s im ila r  to  th a t  o f  the  r e u n if ic a t io n  in  1912.
He had spoken p e rsu a s iv e ly . ' I  have been much im pressed by the
arguments which have s in ce  been addressed  to  th e  Government of In d ia
by S a iy id  Mawab A li Chaudhuri, ’ w rote S i r  W illiam V incen t, th e  Home
Member, in  opposing th e  F ranch ise  Committee’s p ro p o sa ls . V incent spoke
fo r  h is  co lle ag u es . They had a l l  been im pressed by Chaudhuri’s p lea
and they in s i s t e d  th a t  th e  Bengal Muslims be g iv en  44 s e a ts  in s te a d
2
of th e  34 recommended by the  Southborough com m ittee. The q u es tio n  was 
re f e r r e d  back to  the Government o f  B engal, w ith  the  re q u e s t th a t  i t  
p repare  a scheme to  in c re a se  Muslim re p re s e n ta t io n ,  but i t  s tood  by 
i t s  e a r l i e r  recommendation th a t  45 per cen t o f th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  s e a ts  
was s u f f i c i e n t .  ’I  admit th e  case fo r  more Muhammadan s e a ts  i s  
a rg u a b le ,’ w rote W heeler, 'b u t the  p au c ity  o f Muhammadan v o te rs  i s  
a p r a c t ic a l  d i f f i c u l t y ,  as a lso  i s  th e  com parative backwardness of th e  
community v is  a v is  the  H in d u s .’^
Chaudhuri would not g iv e  up w ithout a f ig h t .  Throughout th e  
rem ainder o f 1919> "by p ersonal in te rv ie w s  and l e t t e r s  he kep t up h is
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p re ssu re  on th e  members of th e  p ro v in c ia l and In d ia n  Governments.
Through the C entral N ational Muhammadan A sso c ia tio n  he o rgan ised
Muslim conferences in  v a rio u s  p a r ts  o f the  p ro v in ce , a t  which
re s o lu t io n s  were passed disavow ing th e  r ig h t  of the  Muslim League to
speak fo r  Bengal and u rg in g  th e  B r i t i s h  to honour t h e i r  p ledges to  th e  
2Muslim community. Forwarding a f in a l  no te  to  th e  Government of Bengal 
on 10 January  1920, he warned o f th e  consequences of a f a i lu r e  to  
s a t i s f y  Muslim demands:
Any d e c is io n  to  adhere to  th e  recommendation o f the  Southborough 
Committee would leav e  th e  moderate elem ent among th e  Muhammadans 
p r a c t ic a l ly  w ithout any in flu en c e  or fo llo w in g  in  th e  reform ed 
Council and in  the  coun try . D isappoin ted  in  secu rin g  what they  
ju s t ly  re g a rd , and what was a lso  confirm ed by the  very  m ature 
and c o n s id e ra te  d e c is io n  of th e  Government o f In d ia  as th e  
proper r a t io  of r e p re s e n ta t io n , th e  Mussalmans, i f  they  do not 
m ain ta in  a s p i r i t  o f a lo o fn e ss , w il l  c e r ta in ly  look  w ith  d is ­
favour and ra n k lin g  d isc o n te n t on a c o n s t i tu t io n  in  which, in  
s p i te  of t h e i r  num erical s u p e r io r i ty ,  they  s h a l l  be in  a 
decided p o l i t i c a l  m in o rity . Should th e  s t a t e  of th in g s  be l e f t  
as they  a re ,  i t  does not re q u ire  much im ag in a tio n  to  conceive 
th e i r  even tua l cap tu re  by th e  e x tre m is ts  to  wreck th e  c o n s t i tu t io n .
C haudhuri’s argument here  i s  o f g re a t  s ig n if ic a n c e . He d id  not
approach the  Government as a c o u r t i e r ,  w ith  a humble p e t i t io n  fo r
concessions in  re c o g n itio n  o f h is  community’ s lo y a lty . Nor d id  he
tak e  a stand  w ith  the  bhad ra lok  n a t io n a l i s t s  in  demanding I n d ia 's  ju s t
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c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d e s e r ts .  He sim ply drew the  Government’s a t te n t io n  to  
the  fa c t  th a t  the  Muslims were in  a m a jo rity  in  Bengal and demanded 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  re c o g n itio n  o f th a t  m a jo rity . As a sa n c tio n , he 
added th e  comment th a t  a f a i l u r e  to  s a t i s f y  t h i s  demand would endanger 
p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r. ’Should the s t a t e  of th in g s  he l e f t  as th ey  a re , 
i t  does not re q u ire  much im ag in a tio n  to  conceive th e i r  even tual cap tu re  
hy th e  e x tre m is ts  to  wreck the c o n s t i t u t i o n . ’
The le sso n s  of the  September 1913 r i o t s  had obviously  not been 
l o s t  on Chaudhuri, and he was now p o in tin g  the  way fo r  th e  Muslim 
community to  a new course  o f  a c tio n : the  use in  p o l i t i c s  of i t s  num erical 
s t r e n g th .  He was p o in tin g  in  th e  r ig h t  d i r e c t io n ,  fo r  i t  was by 
fo llo w in g  t h i s  course  throughout the  decade which was ju s t  opening 
th a t  the  Bengal Muslims were ab le  to  w rest power from the  bhadra lok«
The immediate outcome of Chaudhuri’ s note of 10 January  1920 was 
u n s a t i s f a c to ry  fo r  th e  Muslims, fo r  the  B r i t i s h  d is reg a rd ed  h is  
adm onition. The t o t a l  number o f members in  th e  new Council was ra is e d  
to  140, w ith  85 t e r r i t o r i a l  s e a ts ,  bu t the  Muslim percen tage was kep t 
a t  45* They were to  have only 39 s e a ts  to  th e  H indus' 46» ' Chaudhuri 
was d isap p o in ted  but he recogn ised  th a t  th e re  had been worthw hile 
g a in s . 'The trea tm en t accorded to  th e  Mussalmans by th e  B r i t i s h  
government had not been q u ite  s a t i s f a c to r y  in d e e d ,’ he w ro te , ’bu t 
i t  has a t  any r a te  saved us from b e in g  swamped by more powerful
PP, 1920, /Cmd. 8127, v o l • XXXV, pp. 295-9-
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S epara te  communal e le c to r a te s ,  which had seemed in  
jeopardy in  Bengal fo llo w in g  Montagu’ s s t r i c t u r e s  in  1918, had Been 
p rese rv ed , and the  Muslims had secured f iv e  s e a ts  more than  a s t r i c t  
adherence to  th e  Lucknow Pact would have g iven  them. This meant a 
g ro ss  re d u c tio n  o f te n  in  th e  v o tin g  power of the Hindus; to  Muslim 
minds an adm irable g a in .
The B hadralok’s Fears
For th o se  who valued  f r ie n d ly  in te rc o u rs e  and p o l i t i c a l  co -o p e ra tio n  
between Hindus and Muslims, the  y ea rs  o f the  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform s 
debate  in  Bengal -  1915 to  1920 -  had g iven  l i t t l e  cause fo r  p le a su re . 
B an e rjea ’s hopes of Ju ly  1915 fo r  a u n ite d  campaign a g a in s t the  B r i t i s h  
looked sad when compared w ith  the  a c e rb ity  which c h a ra c te r is e d  communal 
u tte ra n c e s  in  1919 and 1920. The o b je c t o f B anerjea  and h is  fe llo w  
M oderates had been to  r e s to re  the  b h ad ra lo k *s confidence in  th e  
e f f ic a c y  of l i b e r a l ,  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  methods of p o l i t i c a l  a c tio n . The 
whole tre n d  of Muslim p o l i t i c s  in  Bengal from 1917 had been in  the  
o p p o s ite  d i r e c t io n .  The Muslim community had re je c te d  Huq and the  
o th e r  men o f compromise who had subscribed  to  the  Lucknow P a c t, and 
taken  as i t s  le a d e r  an unb lush ing  com m unalist, who regarded th e  
n a t io n a l i s t s  -  Muslims o r Hindus -  as the  enemies o f In d ia n  Islam .
’Then thw arted  in  t h e i r  demands fo r  a l a r g e r  share  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l
Views on P re se n t P o l i t i c a l  S i tu a t io n  in  In d ia ,  p. 12.
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concessions, the Muslims had resorted to violence in Calcutta, and 
from that time onwards had placed an increasingly aggressive emphasis 
on their numerical majority.
Nothing could have been better calculated to alarm the bhadralok, 
and edge was given to their fears by their distrust of the British.
How could the bhadralok be sure that the British would not encourage 
this new spirit of Muslim hostility, or themselves use the Muslim 
population figures for some nefarious purpose? The British officials 
obviously had no time for the bhadralok leaders, while they always 
seemed ready to spare a friendly moment for Chaudhuri and his kind.
For the bhadralok it was a bad sign that certain provisions of both the 
Lucknow Pact and the Montagu-Chelmsford report had been disregarded 
by the Government in order to strengthen the position of the Bengal 
Muslims. This was no encouragement to the bhadralok1 s faith in the
198
value of liberal constitutionalism
CHAPTER V
THE RELUCTANT DEMOCRATS
The Years of Uncertainty
In making their demands for reforms in 1915) the Bengal Moderates 
v;ere not motivated simply By a desire to further the constitutional
ideal. They were desperately concerned to save themselves. Their 
political influence had been seriously weakened by their difficulties 
in the Morley-Minto councils and by the general trend of Government 
policy in 1914 and early 1915« Hard-pressed by the Extremists, they 
pinned their hopes of repairing their political position upon a 
satisfactory British response to their demands. If the British 
immediately made the desired declaration regarding self-government, 
the Moderates would be able to point to this as proof of their ability 
to influence the Government. If the British implemented reforms along 
the lines proposed by the Moderates, the latter would be able to 
assert a proprietary title to the new constitution - they would be able 
to speak with assurance of the reforms as 'their reforms'.
As we have seen, the declaration was not made with any despatch, 
nor was the new constitution - with its built-in safeguards for the 
officials, the European non-officials and the Muslims - what the 
Moderates had wanted. The very length of the reforms discussions
worked against the Moderates, and, indeed, against the security of the 
bhadralok as a whole. Its consequence was the inordinate extension of 
the period of flux and uncertainty in political life. Instead of being 
a brief transitional stage between one political order and another, the 
interregnum was so long as to become almost a new order in itself.
In this lengthy interlude, the balance of political relationships 
was upset, and new relationships developed, owing their form primarily 
to the existing state of uncertainty and not to the future order as 
would have been the case had the period of reconstruction been brief.
That swift and direct progress from one political order to the next, 
which would have kept intact the structure of the old political society 
and enabled the Moderates to rule a straight line from their first 
intentions to their final achievement, was replaced by five years of 
confused movement and counter-movement in which the clarity of original 
intentions was blurred. In this chapter we shall trace the development 
of bhadralok politics through these five uncertain years - 1916 to 1920.
The Return of the Extremists
For the nationalists as for their opponents, the prospect of reforms 
brought the need for reappraisal and action. The future of political 
India was in the making. One had either to take part or stand back 
and be content to see others shape the nation's destiny. If one did 
stand back, one had to accept the fact that those who had a hand in 
the construction would almost certainly attempt to secure for themselves
a favoured position,
The Extremists had been content to remain outside the arena of 
the Morley-Minto councils and bespatter the participants with the mud 
of their invective. Their studied refusal to become involved con­
stituted their political style and it had served them well while that 
political order lasted. But the constitutional reconstruction brought 
it to an end. All groups, whether actors or ’mud slingers*, had then 
to search for a new style which would give them a position in the 
future order. In doing this, they were faced with difficulties, for 
they had to look in three directions at once: to their own immediate 
past5 to the reforms which were being evolved; and to their position in 
the political society of the future.
In all three ways, paradoxically, the Extremists had the greatest 
problem. Looking to the past, they had in some way to maintain a 
semblance of consistency. Certainly in the excitement accompanying 
the first news of reforms there was an excellent opportunity to slough 
off the old skin of non-participation, but there was then the danger 
that one would be unrecognisable in one’s new colours. Worst of all, 
one might be taken for a Moderate, which might be disastrous for one's 
political future. To avoid this, the Extremists had to give a 
convincing- explanation of any change which they might make and 
demonstrate by their attitude to the reforms that they were not simply 
following the Moderates' lead. They explained that they were being 
forced to intervene on behalf of the mass of their countrymen to
prevent th e  M oderates from tw isting* th e  reform s to  s u i t  t h e i r  personal 
and c la s s  ends.
Home Rule or self-governm ent n o tw ith s ta n d in g , the  re a l  o b je c t 
o f Surendra Nath and h is  fo llo w ers  i s  to  in c re a se  the  power 
and p re s t ig e  o f th e  E n g lish -ed u cated  community and to  secure  
fo r  them a la rg e r  share  in  th e  p u b lic  s e rv ic e  ^ the  Nayak to ld  
i t s  re a d e rs  on 11 Ju ly  19177« What we want, however, i s  to  
p lace  th e  handful o f educated Babus in  th e  background and to  
u p l i f t  th e  i n a r t i c u la te  masses whose i n t e r e s t s  a re  never cared 
fo r  by our s o -c a lle d  le a d e rs .  These l a t t e r  g ive  d isp la y s  of 
o ra to ry  in  the  h a l l s  o f the  In d ia n  A sso c ia tio n  and th e  B r i t i s h  
In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  w ith th e  o b je c t ,  no t o f a m e lio ra tin g  th e  
m ise rie s  o f the  people a t  la rg e ,  bu t to  advance t h e i r  own 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t s .
To dem onstrate  th a t  th ey  had not become cam p-follow ers o f the  
M oderates and in  o rd e r to  rem ain tru e  to  t h e i r  p a s t ,  the  E x trem ists  
aimed t h e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  demands h igh . They in s is te d  (and th e re  i s  
no reaso n  to  doubt t h e i r  s in c e r i ty  in  t h i s )  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  would 
g ive  no th ing  w orthw hile u n le ss  they  were pushed hard . 'No a l ie n  
conquering n a tio n  has ever v o lu n ta r i ly  g ra n te d , nor can ever g ra n t ,  
Home Rule or re sp o n sib le  government to  a conquered and su b jec t people. 
I t  i s  a th in g  not to  be g iven  by way of c h a r i t y , '  d ec la red  the  Nayak. 
The E x trem ists  a s s e r te d  t h a t ,  under the  p re ten ce  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
re fo rm , th e  B r i t i s h  would attem pt to  b u t t r e s s  t h e i r  ru le  in  In d ia  by 
making concessions to  re a c tio n a ry  groups -  such as the  la n d h o ld e rs , 
th e  Muslims and th e  M oderates -  and th a t  the  n a tio n  a t  la rg e  would be 
l e f t  to  s u f f e r  a t  th e  hands o f th e se  s tren g th en ed  v ested  i n t e r e s t s .
1
Nayak,* 23 Nov 1917
I t  was t h e i r  se lf-im posed  duty  to  ensure  th a t  the  In d ian  people were 
not so ld  out to  the  fo re ig n e r  by a handfu l o f s e l f i s h  o p p o rtu n is ts .
Where the  E x trem ists  were weak, the  M oderates were s trongs th e i r  
co n sis ten cy  in  advocating  reform s could no t be questioned . They had 
t h e i r  problems n o n e th e le ss . Knowing f u l l  w ell th a t  whatever reform  
schemes they  advanced would alm ost c e r ta in ly  be w h ittle d  away by th e  
B r i t i s h ,  th ey  had, as a m a tte r of t a c t i c s ,  to  demand more th an  they  
expected to  re c e iv e  and d e c la re  t h i s  to  be an ’i r r e d u c ib le  minimum’ • 
There was th e  consequent r i s k  th a t  u n re a l e x p e c ta tio n s  would be aroused 
in  view of which the f in a l  achievem ent would appear d isa p p o in tin g . A 
t a c t i c a l  w ithdraw al i s  always too  c lo se  to  a r e t r e a t  fo r  com fort.
The M oderates had to  succeed and succeed g lo r io u s ly . S im ila r ly  
th ey  had to  p reven t r iv a l  groups from s te a l in g  a share  o f th e  c r e d i t  
fo r  w hatever was achieved and y e t they  were ob lig ed  to  encourage those  
same groups to  a s s o c ia te  them selves w ith  t h e i r  reform  p roposa ls  in  an 
e f f o r t  to  convince the  B r i t i s h  th a t  th e se  were n a tio n a l demands. This 
was what prompted them to  readm it th e  E x trem ists  to  the  Congress of 
1916 and to  e n te r  upon th e  s e r ie s  o f n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  th e  Muslims 
which produced th e  Lucknow P a c t. I t  i s  s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  th e  M oderates 
were a t  pa in s to  s t r e s s  th a t  they  were s t i l l  i n  co n tro l of th e  reform  
movement, hav ing  merely e n l is te d  the  E x trem is ts  and th e  Muslims as 
r e c r u i t s .  Commenting on th e  1916 Congress s e s s io n , B anerjea  wrote in
IIP, Jan  1916. Cf. L. Rais Young; I n d ia , pp. 195-6«
1
the Bengalee: 'All are now gathered together under the "banner of self- 
government, which they are resolved to achieve by and through the aid 
of all constitutional means at their disposal. The constitutional 
party derives added strength by this union.*
The hew Men
The Moderates had to face a challenge from another quarter: from 
the new men who were entering politics. As at the time of the anti­
partition campaign ten years before, so now in the activity of the 
constitutional reconstruction there were opportunities for newcomers 
to break into political life in Bengal. With the old political order 
in dissolution, the sources of influence and power on which its leaders 
had depended - their reputation as anti-partition agitators; their 
control of local bodies, public organisations and political associations; 
their membership of the legislative councils - were, for a time at 
least, of reduced importance. It became possible for a man to cut a 
figure simply by adopting a striking attitude towards the reforms, 
provided, of course, that he had social standing.
The outstanding example was the rapid rise to prominence in 1917 
of Chitta Ranjan Das. Socially, Das was everything a member of the 
bhadralok should be. His family were Brahmos (originally Vaidyas) 
from Dacca District. His father and uncle were Calcutta High Court
B engalee,*  5 Jan  1917*
1
vakils and he had been educated at Presidency College, where he had 
been an active member of the Students’ Association in the exciting 
days following Surendranath Banerjea’s dismissal from the I.C.S,
After graduation, he had himself been sent to England by his family 
as a candidate for the I.C.S. but, having failed, he had turned to 
the Bar. As in so many similar cases, his father was impoverished by 
the financial effort required to send him to England and, for ten years 
after his return to the overcrowded legal profession of Calcutta,
Chitta Ranjan was unable to build up a practice large enough to repair 
the family fortunes.
All was changed by his part in the political trials of 1907-8.
His successful defence of Aurobindo Ghose, Bepin Chandra Pal and other 
leading nationalists brought him fame and riches. In a few years 
he had become the city’s leading barrister, enjoying the luxury of 
frequent trips to Europe in the legal vacation and renowned in Calcutta 
society for his hospitality and his Bengali poetry.
He took no direct part in politics until the talk of constitutional 
reforms caught his interest. In the discussions at the influential 
Calcutta Bar Library he emerged as a leader of radical opinion,"* and, 
as a result, was asked to preside at the Bengal Provincial Conference 
to be held in April 1917 in his home suburb of Bhowanipur. It was 
ironical, but indicative of the problems faced by the established
E.S. Montagu* An Indian Diary, pp. 66-7.
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le a d e rs h ip , th a t  i t  was S urendranath  B anerjea  who fo rm ally  proposed
1
th a t he should take th e  c h a ir .  His speech was a huge su ccess , w inning
the  acclaim  of the B engali p re ss  as a tu rn in g  p o in t in  p ro v in c ia l
p o l i t i c s :  1 the  message of a new l i f e  f o r  B en g a lis , a c a l l  to  p a t r i o t i c
s e rv ic e , an appeal fo r  th e  developm ent o f edu ca tio n  in  th e  in te r e s t s
2o f th e  n a tio n a l w e lf a r e .1
Das had e s ta b lish e d  an immediate claim  to  be inc luded  in  th e  f i r s t  
rank  o f B engali p o l i t i c ia n s .  When, th re e  months l a t e r ,  a Town H all 
m eeting nominated a d e p u ta tio n  o f s ix  to  c a rry  i t s  p r o te s t  to  th e  
Government a g a in s t th e  in ternm ent o f Annie B esan t, Das was one o f th o se  
named. The com position o f t h i s  d e p u ta t io n  i s  in te r e s t in g ,  fo r  i t  
inc luded  a l l  th e  c h ie f  con tenders fo r  p ro v in c ia l  le a d e rsh ip : th e  two 
o ld  r i v a l s  o f p o l i t i c a l  jo u rn a lism , Surendranath  B anerjea  o f th e  
Bengalee and M o tila l Ghose of th e  Amrita Bazar P a t r ik a ; S ir  H ashbehari 
Ghose, one o f the g re a t f ig u re s  o f the  N a tio n al Education movement; 
and a t r i o  of younger men, a l l  law y ers, Byomkes C h ak rav a rti, F az lu l 
Huq and C.R. D as.^
The r i v a l r y  among th e se  men was soon re v e a le d . On 29 August th e  
P ro v in c ia l Congress Committee met to  choose a p re s id e n t fo r  the  a l l -  
In d ia  Congress se s s io n  to  be held  in  C a lc u tta  in  December. With
_
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Banerjea’s backing, a Moderate landholder, Provas Chandra Mitra,
proposed an Oudh taluqdar, the Raja of Mahmudabad, but Chakravarti
nominated Mrs Besant and this was seconded by Das. Mahmudabad was
chosen by 34 votes to 30. The Congress Reception Committee met the
following evening to ratify this decision and both parties attempted
to pack the meeting with their supporters. It was immediately apparent
to Banerjea that his group was hopelessly outnumbered; and, after a
brief angry exchange over the accuracy of the minutes of the previous
night's meeting, he and his supporters left the hall to shouts of
'Get Out'. The chairman, Baikunthanath Sen, went with them but this
did not deter those who remained from proceeding to the election of
1Mrs Besant as Congress president. The dispute was not resolved until
nearly two months later when a compromise was patched up through out- 
2side intervention and, in the meantime, the rift in the Bengal Congress
had been opened so wide as never again to be bridged.
Expressing its concern at this dissension, the Dainik Bharat Mitra
put its finger firmly on the cause: the constitutional reconstruction.
The political situation in India is just now very delicate.
So long as Government was following the policy of repression, 
the public leaders were of one opinion. But simultaneously 
with Mr Montagu's announcement a strange change has come 
over them. They have become divided into parties. They do 
not seem to realise that this is extremely prejudicial to 
India's welfare.3
1
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C erta in ly  B anerjea  and h is  fe llo w  M oderates r e a l i s e d  th a t  i t  was 
p re ju d ic ia l  to  t h e i r  reform  p la n s , as w ell as endangering th e i r  
personal le a d e rs h ip .
I f  In d ia  i s  to  o b ta in  h e r p o l i t i c a l  em ancipation /w ro te  the  
Bengalee on 4 September 19177» i t  must be by the  c u l t iv a t io n  
o f a s p i r i t  o f d i s c ip l in e ,  by v e n e ra tio n  fo r  g re a t le a d e r s ,  
through the s t r i c t  observance o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  u sag es , and 
th e  avoidance o f a l l  rowdyism. Any d e p a r tu re  from th ese  
p r in c ip le s  would supply th e  enemies of In d ia n  a s p ir a t io n s  
w ith  a powerful weapon fo r  denouncing t h e i r  c laim s to  s e l f -  
government.
But th in g s  had gone too f a r  to  be s e t  r ig h t  by B a n e rje a 's  le c tu r in g .
A lready the  c h ie f  p ro ta g o n is ts  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  power were d e c la r in g
t h e i r  p o s it io n s  on refo rm s, and B anerjea  a lone stood  by the  Lucknow
P a c t. F az lu l Huq, caught awkwardly in  th e  c l e f t  s t i c k  o f communalism
and n a tio n a lism , h e s i ta te d  between th e  Congress-League scheme m odified
to  g ive  in c re ase d  re p re s e n ta t io n  to  th e  Bengal Muslims, and a proposal
1 2fo r  an In d ian  fe d e ra t io n  w ith  p ro v in c ia l Cabinet Government. Das, 
M o tila l Ghose^ and C hakravarti^  a l l  demanded f u l l  re sp o n s ib le  Government 
i n  th e  p ro v in ces . T he ir s tan d  won th e  lo u d e s t app lause . I t  was c le a r  
and uno^ualified . U nlike B an erjea , th ey  had no th ing  to  lo s e  i f  they 
f a i l e d  to  secu re  t h e i r  demands. Indeed , t h e i r  alm ost c e r ta in  f a i lu r e
1
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was to th e i r  advan tage, fo r  th e  p re v a il in g  mood was one o f m is tru s t
o f B r i t i s h  in te n t io n s .  ' . . .  nobody b e lie v e s  th a t  we a re  in  e a r n e s t , ’
a B r i t i s h  newspaper correspondent in  C a lc u tta  to ld  Montagu; 'nobody
b e lie v e s  th a t  we w ill  do a n y th in g . ' ^
The M oderates were alarm ed a t  th e  p o ss ib le  e f f e c ts  o f  t h i s  s p i r i t
o f scep tic ism  on th e  reform s n e g o tia tio n s  and they  appealed to  th e
B r i t i s h  to  a c t qu ick ly  and generously  to  d is p e l i t .  ' I f  we may be
p erm itted  to  say so , i t  has been the  weakness o f In d ian  a d m in is tra to rs
in  th e  p a s t to  handicap a l l  g re a t experim ents w ith  th a t  dead-w eight o f
h e s i t a t io n  and even of m is tru s t  which has in te r f e r e d  w ith  t h e i r  complete
s u c c e s s , ' w rote th e  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  on 4 December 1917 in  i t s
ad d ress  to  Montagu and Chelmsford. 'We pray th a t  th e  same m istake may 
2not be r e p e a te d '.
The A ssau lt on the  In d ia n  A sso c ia tio n
I t  was obvious th a t  th e  M oderates had l o s t  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  to  the  
E x tre m is ts . They re ta in e d  one m ajor advantage. They had c o n tro l o f 
th e  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  and, through i t ,  o f th e  P ro v in c ia l Congress 
Committee. I t  was e loquent testim ony  to  the power which B anerjea  had 
once w ielded in  Bengal n a t io n a l i s t  p o l i t i c s ,  th a t  th e  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  
had th e  lo c a l  Congress o rg a n is a tio n  in  i t s  pocket. I t  enjoyed th e
7 ~
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right to nominate the majority of the members of the Provincial Congress 
1 2Committee and to fill casual vacancies; it was customarily asked by
District reception committees to suggest presidents for the annual
Provincial Conferences;^ and it could send as many delegates as it
wished to the all-India Congress sessions. In 1914 there had even
been a resolution passed at the Provincial Conference recommending
that the Provincial Congress Committee become a sub-committee of the
Indian Association."^ Certainly there was little for a separate
Provincial Congress Committee to do. The few District Associations
5which existed were inactive and, apart from the agenda for the 
Provincial Conference, all matters of importance were decided at the 
Indian Association.
The Besant/Mahmudabad election dispute, however, had shown how 
valuable control of the Provincial Congress Committee could be in a 
time of political crisis. On that occasion, the Extremists obviously 
commanded the larger following, but, had Mahmudabad’s election not 
required ratification by the Reception Committee, they would have been
1
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helpless. Their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs was
reflected in the Pravasi in September 1917s fThis ^Congress/ machinery, 
which is in the hands of Babu Surendra Nath Banerji and his party, 
has been lying unused for a long time and got rusted. They will 
neither use it nor admit their incapacity to use it and retire from 
the political field.1"*
The lack of an organisation through which to work was one of the
main problems facing the Extremists. Earlier in the year they had,
with some enthusiasm, taken up Annie Besant's idea of a Home Rule
League and under Chakravarti's control it had provided a useful 
2platform. The locus of power, however, was elsewhere, in the 
established political organisations, and, after the election dispute, 
it became apparent to the Extremists that they had to gain control of 
these.
Their answer was an attempt to capture the Indian Association
executive. Looking ahead to the election of office-bearers at the
annual general meeting to be held on 31 January 1918> they put forward
the names of 79 men for admission to the Association, but Banerjea
and his supporters replied by nominating 62 new members of their own,
and, at a committee meeting on 16 January, these 62 were accepted
3while the others were rejected.
1
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Despite this reverse, the Extremists went ahead with their plan.
The Indian Association hall was packed for the annual general meeting, 
with every notable Bengali nationalist present for this trial of 
strength. Fighting on his home ground, Banerjea was invincible. His 
nominee for president was Baikunthanath Sen, while Das put forward 
Byomkes Chakravarti. Sen received 86 votes to Chakravarti1 23s 23* 'The 
tale was the same right down the line. Das and Chakravarti both 
failed in their bids for the five positions of vice-president and 
Fazlul Huq was outvoted in his effort to enter the committee. Banerjea, 
with a final gesture of magnanimity, personally nominated Das and 
Chakravarti for the committee, and they then had to face the humiliation 
of gaining the bare minimum of votes necessary to secure their election.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report
The victory was Banerjea’s but it was to be one of his last. The
tide of public opinion was running against him and his policy of
moderation. Das and his fellow Extremists had made their mark as they
toured Bengal in the preceding months expounding their gospel of *no 
2compromise*. Although so thoroughly drubbed at the Indian Association 
in January, they had gained control of the Provincial Congress Committee 
by the middle of 1918^ and on 6 June they issued a circular in its
_
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The author has been unable to find evidence of how this was achieved.
name c a l l in g  fo r  g enera l o p p o s itio n  to  the  Montagu-Chelmsford p roposa ls
should th e se  f a l l  sh o rt of t h e i r  demands. Commenting in  th e  Bengalee
on th i s  c i r c u la r ,  B anerjea  shed a t e a r  over h is  l o s t  in flu en ces
The old  le a d e rs  a re  the  men of y e s te rd a y ; and they  of course  
should have no vo ice  or in flu en c e  over the  d e l ib e ra t io n s  o f 
the  New In d ia  which they  have helped  to  b u ild  up. For we a re  
always w iser th an  our f a th e r s ;  and to  acknowledge our 
indeb tedness to  them i s  to  b e l i t t l e  our own im portance, which 
must always be a prime c o n s id e ra tio n . There i s  only  one l i t t l e  
r i s k  which th e i r  p o licy  in v o lv es ; and they  may as w ell be 
reminded of i t  e a r ly ,  v i z . ,  th a t  they  may be paid  back in  
th e i r  own c o in , and w ith  compound i n t e r e s t ,  by those  who come 
a f t e r  them .2
The Moderates* p o s i t io n  was d e sp e ra te . The reform  p ro p o sa ls , on 
which they  had staked  t h e i r  f u tu r e ,  were about to  be pub lished  and, 
a t  th i s  ju n c tu re , they  had l o s t  c o n tro l o f Congress to  a group which 
was sworn to  r e j e c t  any m oderate scheme. T h e ir only p o ss ib le  course 
o f  a c t io n  -  and i t  was tantam ount to  an adm ission  of d e fe a t -  was to 
form a new p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n is a tio n  through which they  could f ig h t  fo r  
th e  refo rm s. E arly  in  June the  N ational L ib e ra l League was founded 
in  C a lc u tta  fo r  th i s  purpose, w ith  B anerjea  as i t s  f i r s t  p re s id e n t .^  
The E x trem ists  poured sco rn  on t h i s  new developm ent. A fte r t h i s ,  
they  asked , who could doubt th a t  th e  M oderates were p repared  to  p ick  
up any crumb th a t  f e l l  from th e  B r i t i s h  ta b le ? ^  By th e  end o f June,
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feeling between the two parties had become bitter, and personal insults
were being freely bandied back and forth. No hope was left of the
Montagu-Chelmsford report being' considered on its merits. It was
published on 8 July, to receive the plaudits of the Moderates and to
2be rejected out of hand by the Extremists. Both parties went to 
defend their position at the special session of the Provincial Conference 
on 14 July, but the Moderates got no hearing and a series of resolutions 
were passed condemning the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme.^
The Extremists’ argument was straightforward. They said that the 
proposed reforms were hedged about with so many provisions to protect 
the bureaucracy, British commerce and ’loyal* Indian groups, that the 
nationalists would be merely consenting to their own ensnarement should 
they accept them. The British would listen to no reasoned protest, 
hence the only hope of gaining anything worthwhile was to force their 
hand by rejecting the whole scheme. ’The British Government have not 
proposed to introduce the reforms of their own accord,’ observed the 
Millat on 24 July. ’You asked for them and they have opened the door 
a little in response to your knocking-. So the more you agitate for 
them the larger number of concessions will you get.’
_
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Again th e  M oderates were in  tro u b le . They too  were d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w ith  what was proposed, but they  were d e sp e ra te ly  a f ra id  th a t  
n a t io n a l i s t  o p p o s itio n  would p lay  in to  th e  hands o f th e  B r i t i s h  
’d ie h a rd s ’ , enab ling  them to  b lock  the reform s. A d i f f i c u l t  s i tu a t io n  
was made im possib le  fo r  them by th e  p u b lic a tio n  o f the  S e d itio n  
Committee’ s re p o r t  a t  th e  end o f Ju ly . This committee had been s e t  
up, under th e  chairm anship o f J u s t ic e  S.A .T. R ow latt, by th e  Government 
o f In d ia  in  December 1917 to  re p o r t  on th e  e x ten t of re v o lu tio n a ry  
co n sp iracy  in  In d ia  and to  suggest rem edial m easures. I t  recommended 
th a t  th e  Government arm i t s e l f  w ith  permanent l e g i s l a t i o n  to  enab le  
i t ,  whenever i t  f e l t  the  need, to  take  e x tra o rd in a ry  power to  d eal 
summarily w ith  s e d it io u s  o ffen d e rs . This brought a storm o f p ro te s t  
from a l l  p o l i t i c a l  groups in  In d ia . The M oderates po in ted  out r e ­
p ro a c h fu lly  th a t  no th ing  could have been b e t t e r  c a lc u la te d  to  lend
co lo u r to  th e  E x tre m is ts ’ a s s e r t io n  th a t  w ith in  th e  J e k y ll of th e
2reform s lu rk ed  th e  o ld  Hyde of re p re s s io n .
A sp e c ia l s e s s io n  of Congress had been c a l le d  fo r  29 August a t  
Bombay to  c o n sid e r the Montagu-Chelmsford re p o r t  but the  M oderates 
decided  no t to  a tte n d , knowing th a t  they  would be in  a hopeless  
m in o rity . In s te a d  th ey  would hold an a l l - I n d i a  conference of th e i r
1
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own to  support the  reform s. This a lso  met a t Bombay on 1 November,
The sep a ra te  m eetings emphasised the  d iv is io n  between th e  two p a r t i e s .
The In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  appealed to  th e  Congress to  open n e g o tia tio n s
2fo r  a r e c o n c i l i a t io n ,  bu t the only re p ly  i t  rece iv ed  was a c u r t  note
from th e  lo c a l  s e c re ta ry  inform ing  i t  th a t  i t s  r e p re s e n ta t io n  on the
P ro v in c ia l Congress Committee had been reduced from 40 to  15«^
When th e  F ranch ise  and S u b jec ts  Committees were formed a t  the  end
of 1918, th e  le a d in g  M oderates were asked to  serve  as members, b u t
th e i r  com pliance was proclaim ed by E x trem ists  to  be a f u r th e r  p roof o f
t h e i r  re a d in ess  to  lackey  f o r  the  B r i t i s h .^  In  January  1919 Montagu
appoin ted  S .P . Sinha as U nder-S ecretary  o f S ta te  fo r  In d ia  w ith  a s e a t
in  th e  House of Lords. This g e s tu re  o f goodw ill was w ell re ce iv ed  in
5
In d ia ,  b u t ag a in  the  e f f e c t  was ru in e d . A fo r tn ig h t  l a t e r  th e  
Government of In d ia  in tro d u ced  two B i l l s  to  th e  Im p eria l L e g is la t iv e  
Council to  implement th e  Rowlatt Com m ittee's recommendations, and, 
a g a in s t  th e  v o te  o f every In d ia n  n o n -o f f ic ia l  member, th ey  were fo rced  
th rough . The M oderates were ap p alled  by t h i s  s la p  in  th e  face to
1
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. . . .  th e re  w ill  be a g i ta t io n ,  in te n s e , b i t t e r ,
w idespread, accen tuated  by deep d i s c o n te n t ,1 lam ented B anerjea . ’I s
-j
th i s  a p ro sp ec t which the  Government contem plates w ith  unconcern?1
The a l l - I n d i a  Congress Committee c a l le d  fo r  h a r ta ls  in  p ro te s t  
a g a in s t the  A cts, and, as a r e s u l t ,  th e re  was r io t in g  in  a number of 
n o rth  In d ian  c i t i e s  in  the  f i r s t  and second weeks o f A p ril . In  
A m ritsar in  th e  Punjab f iv e  Europeans were murdered by a mob on th e  
10th and th e  c i t y  was p laced under th e  m i l i t a r y .  On th e  13th a 
p ro h ib ite d  m eeting held  in  a w alled sq u are , th e  J a ll ia n w a la  Bagh, was 
f i r e d  on w ithou t warning by B r i t i s h  tro o p s  and th e re  were heavy 
c a s u a l t ie s .  Two days l a t e r  m a rtia l law was proclaim ed in  A m ritsar and 
neighbouring  c i t i e s ,  under which flo g g in g s  and o th e r h u m ilia tio n s  
were imposed upon the  Ind ians as r e p r i s a l s  fo r  th e  lo s s  o f B r i t i s h  
l i v e s . 2
With the  news o f th i s  b r u t a l i t y ,  a wave of anger swept over th e  
co u n try . 1 . . .  what has happened can never be fo rg o tte n  o r f o r g iv e n ,1 
w rote C.P. Andrews w ith emotion to  h is  f r ie n d ,  R abindranath  Tagore.
' I  f in d  th a t  every In d ia n  I  meet i s  say in g  ’’Take away your d-d Reforms: 
we dont want them & we wont have them. Answer us t h i s ,  a re  we to  be 
t r e a te d  as s e r f s ,  w ith  no human r ig h ts  a t a l l ? ” ’ ^
1
B engalee ,* 4 Feb 1919*
2
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As Andrews was w riting-, th e  Government of In d ia  B i l l  was being  
prepared  in  London fo r  i t s  in tro d u c tio n  to  P a rliam en t. At long  l a s t  
th e  M oderates were to  have t h e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform s bu t th e re  was 
to  be no trium ph. In s te a d  of th e  ju b i la t io n  th ey  had expec ted , th e re  
was anger and d i s t r u s t .  They were abused no t acclaim ed fo r  t h e i r  
e f f o r t s .  They had l o s t  c o n tro l o f Congress and th e re  seemed no hope 
o f t h e i r  dom inating th e  new p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r .
The E xtrem ists*  Dilemma
On 23 December 1919 th e  ro y a l a ssen t was g iven  to  th e  Government 
o f In d ia  B i l l .  The E x trem ist p a r ty , a lthough triu m p h an tly  m asters o f 
th e  N ational Congress and th e  d a r lin g s  o f p u b lic  o p in io n , were faced  
w ith  a problem. Should they p e r s i s t  in  t h e i r  o p p o s itio n  to  the  reform s 
o r should they  accep t them as a f a i t  accom pli and use t h e i r  power to  
dom inate th e  new in s t i tu t io n s ?  C e r ta in ly  t h e i r  re p u ta t io n  in  th e  
p reced in g  two y ea rs  had been b u i l t  upon th e i r  s te a d fa s t  r e je c t io n  o f 
a l l  B r i t i s h  p ro p o sa ls  and t h e i r  condemnation o f th o se  In d ian s  who were 
p repared  to  c o -o p e ra te , bu t th ey  could con tend , w ith  some degree of 
t r u t h ,  th a t  t h i s  had been a s tra tagem  designed to  fo rc e  th e  B r i t i s h  
to  y ie ld  more power. That game was played out (so th e  argument ran) 
and th e  only  r e s u l t  o f a con tinued  r e f u s a l  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  would be th e  lo s s  of the  f i e ld  to  'a  t r i b e  of 
t im id , l i t t l e - s o u l e d  people who w il l  th in k  o f them selves f i r s t  and o f
1
th e i r  coun try  l a s t  o r not a t  a l l . ’ Even under th e  Morley-Minto
c o n s t i tu t io n ,  the E x trem ists  had had qualms about le a v in g  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e
2co u n c ils  to  the  M oderates and the  danger seemed g re a te r  now th a t  some 
of th e  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  p ro v in c ia l Governments were to  he t r a n s fe r re d  
to  In d ia n  m in is te rs .
On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  E x trem ists  asked , was th e re  any reaso n  to
b e lie v e  th a t  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  th e  new c o u n c ils  would be more p r o f i ta b le
than  i t  had been in  th e  old? No m a tte r  what concessions had been made
to  In d ia n  demands, th e  B r i t i s h  bureaucracy  was s t i l l  in  command and
(th e  E x trem ists  he ld ) A m ritsar had shown th a t  i t  was as re a c tio n a ry  as
ever. ' I f  the  fo u n ta in  rem ains as i t  i s , '  w rote M o tila l Ghose, 'th e
a d d itio n  o f a few more co n d u its  w il l  no t make the  w ater any more
3
d rin k a b le  th an  i t  w as .' What was needed was a change o f h e a r t ,  and 
t h i s ,  th e  E x trem ists  m ain ta ined , had no t happened. The r a c ia l  
a rro g an ce , which had c h a ra c te r is e d  B r i t i s h  In d ia n  p o lic y  in  th e  p a s t ,  
had been in  evidence throughout th e  reform s d is c u s s io n s . Even th e  
b a s ic  assum ption upon which th e  M ontagu-Chelmsford scheme r e s te d :  th a t  
In d ian s  had y e t to  le a rn  the  a r t  o f self-governm ent -  and i t s  c o ro lla ry :  
th a t  th ey  should  be g iven  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n  a g a in s t t h e i r  
ignorance  -  were considered  o f fe n s iv e .^
Amrita B azar P a t r ik a ,* 2 Ju l 1920.
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To accep t the  refo rm s, even under p r o te s t ,  would he to  acqu iesce
in  th is  judgment o f In d ian  i n f e r i o r i t y  and t h i s  would in ju r e  th e  growth
of n a tio n a l s e lf -c o n fid e n c e . Many o f the  E x trem ists  b e liev ed  th a t i t
was s e lf -c o n f id e n c e , above a l l  e ls e ,  th a t  In d ia  needed. As a su b jec t
peop le , In d ian s  had lo s t  f a i t h  in  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  a c t in d ep en d en tly .
For n e a rly  two c e n tu r ie s  they  had been tau g h t to  d i s t r u s t  t h e i r  own
judgment and to  accept w ithout demur th e  d ecrees o f a p a te r n a l i s t i c
fo re ig n  reg im e. To save th e i r  soul th ey  had to  re p u d ia te  th e  r ig h t
o f o th e rs  to  th in k  fo r  them. They had to  a c t fo r  them selves.
. . .  what makes th e  d if fe re n c e  between th e  Englishman and you? 
/Swami Vivekananda has asked h is  countrymen in  189?/ . . . .  The 
d if f e r e n c e  i s  h e re , th a t  th e  Englishman b e lie v e s  in  h im se lf , 
and you do n o t. He b e lie v e s  in  h is  be ing  an Englishm an, and 
he can do any th ing  . . . .  You have been to ld  and tau g h t th a t  you 
can do n o th in g , and n o n e n tit ie s  you a re  becoming every  day.
What we want i s  s t r e n g th ,  so b e lie v e  in  y o u rse lv es  . . . .  What 
we want i s  muscles o f iro n  and nerves of s t e e l .  We have wept 
long  enough. No more weeping-, b u t s tan d  on your f e e t  and be 
men. 1
Vivekananda had a profound in f lu e n c e  upon th e  development o f 
tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry  In d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  th o u g h t, and h is  gospel 
o f n a tio n a l s e l f - a s s e r t io n  found a p a r t i c u la r ly  r ic h  s o i l  i n  h is  
n a tiv e  B engal, where th e  ground had been  prepared  by the  novels of 
Bankim Chandra C h a tte r je a . His te ac h in g s  were g iven  p o l i t i c a l  ap­
p l ic a t io n  by Aurobindo Ghose, Bepin Chandra Pal and R abindranath 
Tagore, who c a l le d  upon t h e i r  co m patrio ts  to  prove th e i r  manhood by
1
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defying British power. This was the philosophy which inspired the 
swadeshi and national education movements, and the terrorists at the 
time of partition, and it was the underlying reason for the Extremists' 
rejection of the Morley-Minto reforms. They saw that merely to accept 
institutions provided by the British and work them as they instructed, 
would do nothing to advance India's self-reliance. This was just a 
new form of the old dependence. To prove their independence, to 
themselves as much as to the British, Indians had to reject what was 
proffered. They had to have the courage to cut their leading-strings.^ 
The question was* what then? In the Morley-Minto period some 
individuals had avoided this problem by turning away from politics - 
to religion like Aurobindo Ghose or to literature like Rabindranath 
Tagore - and for the Extremist party as a whole no satisfactory answer 
had been found. The years between 1909 and 1915> the years of negative 
opposition, had been full of frustration. Again in 1920 they had the 
chance to reject a British constitution and again they had to ask: 
what then? This time more depended upon their answer for now they had 
political pov/er, with all its opportunities and responsibilities. In 
1909 they had been outside the Congress, but in 1920 they had control 
of the organisation and commanded a large following. If they did not
T
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participate in the new councils, they had to formulate a satisfactory 
programme of political action of their own.
It was a measure of their uncertainty when faced with this 
difficult decision, that they vacillated for a year before finally 
rejecting the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution. The December 1919 
Congress at Amritsar resolved to work the reforms, but this decision 
was reversed by a narrow majority at a special session in Calcutta 
nine months later, and the plenary meeting- at Nagpur in December 1920 
voted overwhelmingly for withdrawal from all co-operation with the 
British. Between Amritsar and Calcutta, Calcutta and Nagpur, there 
were some remarkable changes of mind. At Amritsar the Bengal contingent, 
led by Das, Chakravarti and B.C. Pal, voted against the reforms; at 
Calcutta they voted for them; at Nagpur they were all for non-co- 
operation. This period of twelve months in which the bhadralok 
leaders wavered uncertainly between the alternatives of co-operation 
and non-co-operation with the British, was one of the great crises 
in the modern political history of the province, for the magnitude of 
the issues involved forced the bhadralok, for the first time, to 
examine the values underlying* their politics.
Gandhi
To understand the nature of the bhadralok* s dilemma, it is necessary 
to understand the person and policy of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.
It was Gandhi who commanded the majority at Amritsar and Calcutta,
where the  hhadralok  le a d e rs  voted w ith  the  m in o r ity , and i t  was to  
Gandhi th a t  they  c a p itu la te d  a t Nagpur.
Gandhi, a G u je ra ti law yer who had won a g re a t re p u ta t io n  in  South 
A frica  w ith h is  work fo r  In d ian  r ig h t s ,  had emerged in  th e  f i r s t  rank 
of n a t io n a l i s t  le a d e rs  a f t e r  a s p e c ta c u la r  success in  leading- a p ro te s t  
movement a g a in s t the  ind igo  p la n te rs  of B ihar in  1918. I t  was a t  h is  
in s t ig a t io n  th a t  the  h a r ta l s  o f A pril 1919 in  p ro te s t  a g a in s t the 
R ow latt Acts had been o rg an ised . The nationw ide response to  h is  appeal 
was testim ony  to  h is  ex tra o rd in a ry  in f lu e n c e , hu t th e  v io len ce  which 
r e s u l te d ,  shocked him deep ly . He was convinced th a t  w ithout g re a te r  
s e l f - d i s c ip l in e  In d ia  could not ch a llen g e  th e  B r i t i s h ,  and, fo r  t h i s  
re a so n , he demanded th a t  th e  Congress accep t th e  Montagu-Chelmsford 
c o n s t i tu t io n .  To th o se , l ik e  the  B en g a lis , who argued th a t  th e  1919 
Congress se s s io n  a t  A m ritsar should r e i t e r a t e  the  e a r l i e r  uncompromising 
r e s o lu t io n s  on th e  refo rm s, he re p lie d  th a t  th i s  would he i r r e s p o n s ib le  
i f  the  Congress had no th ing  c o n s tru c tiv e  to  o f f e r  in  t h e i r  p la ce .
Two in c id e n ts  in  January  1920 fo rced  him to  th in k  again : the  h e ro ’ s 
welcome accorded on h is  a r r iv a l  in  B r i ta in  to  General Dyer, th e  o f f ic e r  
re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  A m ritsar trag ed y , and the  r e je c t io n  by th e  B r i t i s h  
Government o f In d ian  Muslim p ro te s ts  over th e  'Turkish peace term s.
Gandhi was convinced t h a t ,  a f t e r  th ese  dem onstrations o f  B r i t i s h  d is ­
reg a rd  fo r  t h e i r  f e e l in g s ,  i t  would be deg rad ing  fo r  In d ian s  to m ain ta in
1
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t h e i r  co n tac t w ith  B r i t i s h  Im p eria lism . He th e re fo re  s e t  out to
form ulate  a programme of n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  which Congress could o f f e r
to th e  n a tio n  in  p lace  of th e  refo rm s.
F i r s t l y ,  support fo r  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f the  B r i t i s h  In d ia n
Government -  o f f ic e s ,  c o u n c ils , c o u r ts ,  c o lle g e s  and schools -  should
he withdrawn and Congressmen should devote them selves to  th e  c o n s tru c tio n
o f n a tio n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  t h e i r  p laces ’a government o f  one’ s own
2w ith in  th e  dead s h e l l  of the  fo re ig n  governm ent’ . R es is tan ce  -  non­
v io le n t  and symbolic -  might be o ffe re d  to  in d iv id u a l a c ts  o f  B r i t i s h  
o p p re ss io n , b u t th e  r e a l ly  im portan t work was in  n a tio n a l re c o n s tru c tio n .
For th e  n a tio n  as f o r  th e  in d iv id u a l ,  Gandhi ta u g h t, s a lv a t io n  
could be gained only by in te rn a l  re fo rm a tio n . S o c ie ty  had to  be r id  
of i t s  e v i l s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  those  o f d is se n s io n  and human e x p lo i ta t io n .
As a f i r s t  s te p ,  he c a lle d  fo r  a r e c o n c i l i a t io n  between r e l ig io u s  
communities and he took  up the  K h ila fa t is su e  as a means of cem enting 
Hindu-Muslim u n i ty .  ,T.Ve bo th  have now an o p p o rtu n ity  o f a l i f e - t i m e , '  
he w ro te . ’The K h ila fa t q u es tio n  w ill  not re c u r  fo r  ano ther hundred 
y e a rs . I f  th e  Hindus wish to  c u l t iv a te  e te rn a l  f r ie n d s h ip  w ith  the 
Mussalmans, th ey  must p e r is h  w ith  them in  th e  a ttem pt to  v in d ic a te  the  
honour o f  I s la m . ' He a lso  demanded th a t  c a s te - b a r r ie r s  be broken
1
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down and th a t th e  un touchab les be accep ted  in to  the  body o f Hinduism. 
Congressmen o f a l l  c a s te s  should work w ith  the  hari.jans ( th e  c h ild re n  
o f God, as Gandhi c a l le d  them) to  h e lp  them r i s e  from th e i r  d eg rad a tio n .
S im ila r ly  th e re  had to  be an end to  economic o pp ression . Gandhi 
was adamant th a t  self-governm ent fo r  In d ia  would be a t r a v e s ty  i f  the  
mass of th e  people were not fre e d  from th e  e x p lo i ta t io n  of c a p i t a l i s t s ,  
lan d h o ld e rs  and m oneylenders. The n a t io n a l i s t  movement had to  be th e  
p e o p le ’s movement, to  b e n e f i t  th e  mass of th e  people. ’I  don’ t  want 
Swaraj a t  th e  c o s t of the  dep ressed  c la s s e s  o r  o f any o th e r  c la s s e s  
fo r  th a t  m a t te r , '  he w rote. He th e re fo re  in s i s t e d  th a t  Congress 
dem onstrate  i t s  concern fo r  the  w e lfa re  o f th e  In d ian  poor by adopting  
a programme of economic r e h a b i l i t a t io n .  Congressmen should leav e  
t h e i r  urban p ro fe ss io n s  and go in to  th e  v i l la g e s  to  s t a r t  c o ttag e  
in d u s t r ie s .  The lo c a l m anufacture o f  c o tto n  c lo th  should be rev iv ed .
The sp in n in g  wheel should become th e  symbol o f I n d ia 's  new l i f e  and 
the  w earing o f khadi a g e s tu re  of the n a t io n ’s r e je c t io n  o f im p eria lism .
The B hadralok R eaction
Apart from having a ra re  a b i l i t y  to  sway g re a t masses of peop le , 
Gandhi was an a s tu te  p o l i t i c i a n ,  and th roughout 1920 he was g a th e r in g  
about him an in f lu e n t i a l  group o f pe rso n al ad h eren ts  on whose support 
he could  r e ly  when he put h is  programme o f n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  b e fo re
Gandhi to  Andrews, 23 Nov 1920, quoted , C haturvedi & Sykes, pp. 156-7*
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*)Congress. Despite this there remained powerful sections who were
opposed to the adoption of the scheme and who were determined not to
acquiesce in his domination of the nationalist movement.
Foremost amongst these were the hhadralok leaders. One obvious
reason for their opposition was that they saw Gandhi as a rival. Das
certainly aspired to national leadership and Chakravarti may have had
a similar ambition. Personal jealousy aside, however, there was reason
for them to be apprehensive, for Gandhi made it clear that there would
be no room for dissenters in any political organisation which he
commanded. * ... so long as you choose to keep me as your leader,' he
told a meeting of Muslims in 1920, ’you must accept my conditions,
2you must accept dictatorship and the discipline of martial law.'
This was something new to Indian nationalism. Formerly the great 
Congress leaders - Noaroji, Mehta, Banerjea, Gokhale, Lajpat Rai,
Tilak - had derived their power from one province and they had worked 
in alliance with leaders from other provinces, on the understanding 
that there should be a minimum of mutual interference in regional 
activities. Gandhi relied far less upon the support of any one area 
and his ambition was to subordinate regional differences to his national 
plan.
J. Nehru: Toward Freedom, pp. 51-3»
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This was too much for the hhadralok. As had often been observed
with regret by nationalists from other provinces, the hhadralok were
parochial and exclusive in their political loyalties. To submit to
dictation from outside, such as Gandhi sought to impose, came very hard
to them. Rationalising their emotional reaction, Bepin Chandra Pal
wrote: 'Blind reverence for Gandhiji's leadership would kill people's
freedom of thought and would paralyse by the deadweight of unreasoning
2reverence their individual conscience.'
There was also a personal element. As a Gujerati bania, Gandhi
was unacceptable to the hhadralok. Nirad Chaudhuri has pointed out
that we must take account of 'the class-conscious Bengali gentleman's
deep-seated aversion to a proletarian, which Gandhi was, if not by
3birth, at all events by theory and adoption.'
The hhadralok also despised his philosophy of non-violence and 
asceticism. Coming- from the trading-castes of western India, Gandhi 
had been strongly influenced by the quietist doctrines of vaisnavism 
and it was one of the secrets of his mass appeal that he customarily 
used popular vaisnavite images in his speeches. The hhadralok 
traditionally looked down upon the 'beggarly and cringing' vaisnavite,
1
E.g. Dinshaw Wacha to Dadabhai Naoroji, 25 Jan 1907» Wacha letters.
2
Pal to Motilal Nehru, n.d., quoted, Studies in the Bengal Renaissance, 
P. 577.
3
N. C. Chaudhuri: "Subhas Chandra Bose - His Legacy and Legend",
Pacific Affairs, vol. XXVI, 1953, p. 354.
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f o r  th e y  were S a k ta s , w orsh ip p ers  of th e  p r in c ip le  o f  s t r e n g th  i n  th e
goddess D urga. The neo-H induism  o f Bankim Chandra C h a t te r je a  and
Swami V ivekananda, by which th ey  had been so s t ro n g ly  in f lu e n c e d ,  had
a lso  em phasised th e  Brahmanic v i r t u e s  o f  s t r e n g th  and th e  av o id an ce  o f  
1
ex trem es . S e l f - a s s e r t i o n ,  no t s e lf-a b a se m e n t as Gandhi p re a c h e d , was
th e  d o c t r in e  o f  th e  b h a d ra lo k , and they  re fu s e d  to  accep t h is  p h ilo so p h y
o f p o l i t i c s .  'T h is  does n o t remove th e  in h e r i t e d  s la v e -m e n ta l i ty  w hich
2
i s  th e  ro o t  o f  a l l  our d e g ra d a tio n s  and m i s e r i e s , '  w rote P a l .
P a s s iv e - r e s is ta n c e  was a pow erful means o f c o e rc io n  when used  by 
a su p p re sse d  m a jo r i ty ,  b u t th e  b h a d ra lo k  were a dom inant m in o r i ty ,  
demanding a form o f p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  which en ab led  them to  e x e r t  them­
s e lv e s  a g a in s t  t h e i r  a d v e r s a r ie s ,  th e  B r i t i s h ,  and y e t  r e t a i n  t h e i r  
ho ld  on p o l i t i c a l  l i f e . ' "  These req u ire m en ts  were s a t i s f i e d  by 
l e g i s l a t i v e  p o l i t i c s  and te r r o r i s m , b o th  o f  w hich p ro v id ed  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  
to  s t r i k e  a t  th e  B r i t i s h  and y e t in v o lv ed  r e l a t i v e l y  sm all num bers.
I t  was i n  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  th e  b h ad ra lo k  were accustom ed to  engage. 
Thus G an d h i's  demand f o r  a b o y c o tt o f th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls  and h is  
i n s i s t e n c e  upon n o n -v io len ce  th re a te n e d  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  way o f  l i f e .
1
IT.C. C haudhuri; "Subhas Chandra Bose -  H is Legacy and L egend",
P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s , v o l .  XXVI, 1953? PP« 354- 5« Cf. R.N. Tagore to  
C .F. Andrews, 5 Mar 1921, L e t te r s  to  a F r ie n d , pp. 130- 1; and 
In d ia n  S t r u g g le , pp. 15 & 161- 4«
2
P al to  M o ti la l  N ehru, n . d . , qu o ted , S tu d ie s  in  th e  Bengal R e n a is sa n c e »
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I  am in d e b te d  to  Br D ietm ar Rothermund, M arburg U n iv e r s i ty ,  f o r  t h i s  
d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een  dom inant m in o r i t ie s  and su p p resse d  m a jo r i t i e s .
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It also threatened their political ideal. Gandhi was arguing 
that Congressmen should withdraw from the legislative councils and the 
other institutions of British Indian government Because those institu­
tions were alien and imposed. To the hhadralok, such an argument was 
nonsense. In the past when they had boycotted the legislative councils, 
it was not because the councils were foreign - because they were based 
on the English parliamentary model instead of an indigenous Indian 
model - but because they did not conform closely enough to the English 
model, their powers being so severely limited. The bhadralok wanted 
parliamentary self-government in Bengal, and terrorism was their 
protest against the British refusal to recognise the intensity of their 
desire or to admit their capacity for such a form of government.
This reveals the cultural gulf dividing Gandhi from the bhadralok: 
their political methods were European in inspiration, his were Indian. 
The bhadralok had evolved a synthetic culture (their politics being a 
part of it) which owed a great deal to Europe and which had taken them 
out of the main stream of Indian intellectual development. For this 
reason, they were shocked and offended when Gandhi insisted that India 
could regain its strength only if Anglican cultural excrescences were 
cut away. A return to simplicity of living to free the individual 
from the tyranny of material possessions; the renunciation of all non-
1
For a comment on this see D.F. Pocock: "Notes on the Interaction of 
English and Indian Thought in the 19th Century", Journal of horid 
History, vol. IV, no. 4> 195^? p. 846.
e s s e n t ia l s ;  a t o t a l  commitment to  the  s tru g g le  a g a in s t fo re ig n
dom ination -  th e se  were G andhi's demands. To the  b h ad ra lo k , th i s  was
p h i l i s t in is m . They were p a s s io n a te ly  proud of the  r ic h n e ss  o f t h e i r
c u ltu re  and were unconvinced th a t  th ey  should s t r i p  t h e i r  l i f e  hare
in  t h i s  way. Andrews, whose work w ith  .Rabindranath Tagore a t
S a n tin ik e ta n  had given  him a deep sympathy fo r  bhadralok  v a lu e s ,
d e sc rib ed  t h e i r  re a c t io n . W riting  to  Tagore in  January  1921 o f th e
joys o f p a in t in g , he remarked:
Here a re  th in g s  which Mahatma Gandhi f in d s  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  
u n d e rs tan d , and he would suspend them a l l ,  w hile we g e t 
Swaraj -  b u t not I ,  not I.' I  could never g ive up these.'
. . . .  Ho, th e re  i s  some fundam ental d if f e re n c e  th e re :  & 
perhaps i t  runs through th e  whole o f Bengal as compared w ith  
G u je ra t. Here, in  B engal, M ahatmaji i s  say ing  "Let every 
s tu d en t tak e  up sp inn ing  & weaving-, & drop ev ery th in g  e ls e " .
But th e  B engali s tu d e n ts  say "We w il l  tak e  up sp inn ing  & 
weaving, b u t we s h a ll  not drop ev ery th in g  e l s e ."  -  There 
a g a in , i s  th e  d i f f e r e n c e d
Tagore h im se lf spoke from the  h e a r t  o f th e  bhadralok  when he
demanded r h e to r ic a l ly  o f  Gandhi: 'The mind, s u re ly , i s  no t of le s s
2account th an  a le n g th  of c o tto n  th re a d  spun on a w h eel!’ In  a s e r ie s  
o f p u b lic  ad d resses  in  C a lcu tta  in  August 1921, on h is  r e tu rn  from an 
extended t r i p  abroad , he p ro te s te d  a g a in s t  G andhi's  a n t i - in te l le c tu a l i s m  
and narrow ness o f view. Let us not obscure our v is io n  o f the  wider
1
31 Jan  /T 9217 , Andrews MSS. Cf. Andrews to  Tagore, 26 Jan  1921, 
quo ted , C haturvedi & Sykes, p. 176.
2
"The C all o f T ru th " , speech a t  a p u b lic  m eeting in  C a lc u tta , 29 Aug 
1921, Towards U niversal Man, p. 267«
world w ith  th e  dust ra is e d  by p o l i t i c a l  p a ss io n , he s a id . Let us
seek u n iv e rsa l t r u th  fo r  'I n d i a ’s awakening i s  a p a r t of the  awakening
of the  w o r ld . ' E a r l i e r  he had w r it te n :  'Our p re sen t s tru g g le  to
a l ie n a te  our h e a r t  and mind from the  West i s  an a ttem pt a t  s p i r i t u a l
su ic id e  . . . .  Let us be r id  o f a l l  f a l s e  p rid e  and r e jo ic e  a t any lamp
being  l i t  in  any co rn e r of th e  w orld , knowing th a t  i t  i s  a p a r t  o f th e
2
common i l lu m in a tio n  o f our h o u s e .’ His a t ta c k  brought Gandhi h u rry in g  
to  C a lc u tta , bu t d isc u ss io n s  between th e  two men rev ea led  ( in  th e  
words o f a contem porary) 'a  d if f e re n c e  o f temperament so wide th a t i t  
was extrem ely  d i f f i c u l t  to  a r r iv e  a t  a common in te l l e c tu a l  under­
s tan d in g . '
These d if fe re n c e s  o f  c u ltu re  and temperament c e r ta in ly  s tood  as 
b a r r i e r s  between Gandhi and th e  b h ad ra lo k , b u t th e re  were o th e r ,  le s s  
unim peachable, reasons fo r  t h e i r  re lu c ta n c e  to  fo llow  h is  le a d . This 
had been brought home to  Andrews on a v i s i t  to  C a lcu tta  in  September
1920, when he had met a f r ie n d ,  Promothonath Chaudhuri, 'b i t t e r  beyond 
words & crying- out a g a in s t h is  countrymen fo r  t h e i r  f o l ly  in  fo llo w in g  
any one who i s  an A sc e tic , as though wisdom must n e c e s sa r ily  come from 
f a s t in g  & starv ing- Sc h u n g e r -s tr ik in g . *
1
"The C all o f T ru th " , speech a t  a p u b lic  m eeting in  C a lc u tta , 29 Aug
1921, Towards U niversal Man, pp. 270-3.
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Tagore to  Andrews, 13 Mar 1921, L e t te r s  to  a F r ie n d , p. 136.
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r) r1
C-i h  i
But though my i n t e l l e c t  went w ith  Promotho Babu & I  cou ld  
n ev er fo llo w  Mr Gandhi i n  h is  e x tra v a g a n c e s  /Andrews r e c a l le d  
l a t e r / j  I  could  no t h e lp  c o n t r a s t in g  th e  o th e r  s id e :  f o r  th e re  
was Promotho Babu . . .  and o th e rs  i n  th e  Camac S t r e e t  Club 
w ith  every  s in g le  lu x u ry  o f  a London C lu b - l i f e  around them , -  
p la y in g  b r id g e  & ta k in g  t h e i r  s t ro n g  g la s s e s  o f w hiskey & 
b randy . Say what one would to  j u s t i f y  i t ,  th e y  were p a r a s i t e s ,  
l i v in g  on immense fe e s  ta k e n  from  o th e r s .  And i f  one had to  
ch o o se , was no t t h e i r  judgm ent, -  t h e i r  m oral judgm ent, -  f a r  
more warped by lu x u ry  & lu x u r io u s  l i v i n g  th a n  Mr G andhi’s by 
s ta r v a t io n .^
T here was more th an  p o l i t i c s  and p o e try  to  th e  good l i f e  w hich th e  
b h a d ra lo k  were d efen d in g ]
T h e ir  memories o f th e  a n t i - p a r t i t i o n  a g i t a t i o n  was a n o th e r
d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  which Gandhi had to  con tend  in  h is  e f f o r t  to  win Bengal
f o r  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n . 1905 was upperm ost i n  b h a d ra lo k  minds as  th e y
fa c e d  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  1920. ’I  f in d  ou r countrym en a re  f u r io u s ly
e x c i te d  abou t N o n -c o -o p e ra tio n ,’ rem arked Tagore i n  Septem ber. ' I t
2
w il l  grow in to  som ething l i k e  ou r Sw adeshi movement i n  B e n g a l . '
' I n  Bengal we have passed  th rough  th e  s ta g e  o f  n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n , ' 
w ro te  B a n e rje a  a month l a t e r .  'We p r a c t i s e d  i t  i n  th e  days o f th e  
sw adesh i movement and th e  a n t i - p a r t i t i o n  a g i t a t i o n .  We were non-co­
o p e ra to r s  b e fo re  th e  r e s t  o f  In d ia  th o u g h t o f  i t . ' ^  As t h i s  s u g g e s ts ,  
th e r e  was a c e r t a i n  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i n  th e  th o u g h t t h a t  th e  r e s t  o f  I n d ia  
was now fo llo w in g  a p a th  which Bengal had tro d d e n  f i f t e e n  y e a rs  b e fo re ,
1
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2
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but there was also an element of pique at the temerity of an outsider 
like Gandhi in bringing forward as his own inventions and under labels 
of his own choosing', the old methods of boycott, swadeshi and national 
education.
Nor were the bhadralok leaders at all certain that they wished to 
retrace their steps. The campaigns of the partition period had been 
exhilarating but in retrospect the risks that had been taken seemed 
very grave. For a cause as dear to bhadralok hearts as the unity of 
Bengal, those risks had been worth while, but were they similarly 
justified for a ’political chimera’ such as Gandhi's swaraj?
It had to be admitted that the practical achievements of the 
partition period (as distinguished from the fillip given to Bengali 
’nationalism’) had been inconsiderable, while the effects of British 
retaliation had been serious. Public life in Bengal in the years 
following 1908 had suffered severely from the suppression of samitis, 
the imprisonment and deportation of political suspects, and the 
extended activities of the C.I.D. police.^ Bengal had pushed out its 
chin once and had been punched hard. It was still suffering from 
the after-effects and it was naturally reluctant to invite another blow.
1
An expression used in a manifesto opposing non-co-operation, which was 
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The Bhadralok and the Masses
■That carried even more weight in the thinking- of the bhadralok 
leaders was the social repercussions of the anti-partition agitation.
In trying new methods of direct action in 1906-1907 in an effort to 
involve more people in their agitation against the British, they had 
stirred up a hornet’s nest of regional, communal and class dissension.
To their acute embarrassment, their bhadralok followers had responded 
with an enthusiasm which they could not control and their leadership 
had been discredited by this failure, which alone was sufficient to 
make them chary of ever repeating such an adventure. Even more dis­
turbing was the political reaction (and a hostile reaction at that) 
which they had evoked from social groups which previously had had no 
part in politics. The bhadralok had always assumed that politics was 
their preserve, one of the proper functions of their class, and they 
were perturbed by this intrusion from below. The moral which they 
drew from the affair was that an incautious appeal for wider support 
might endanger their political, and even social, dominance. This 
reinforced their preference for the elitist and socially-secure forms 
of political action, such as legislative council politics and terrorism, 
to which they were accustomed.
Seen against this background, their reluctance to support the 
non-co-operation movement can be readily understood. It was bad enough 
that Gandhi should insist upon their discarding ’safe* political methods 
in favour of direct action, but it was adding insult to injury that he
should emphasise that it was the exclusive character of those old 
methods to which he objected. His aim was to take politics to the 
masses, and, by involving them in the nationalist movement, give them 
political education. He wanted to lead a people's movement. All of 
which was anathema to the bhadralok politicians. They had no taste 
for popular politics. Their attitude towards the lower orders being 
one of benevolent disdain, they set no store by democracy, either 
constitutional or agitational, as Gandhi advocated. Politics was a 
gentleman’s preoccupation and so it should remain.
It must be recognised that, apart from their aversion, there were 
real difficulties in the way of their leading a mass movement. The 
great bulk of the peasantry, who comprised 75 per cent of Bengal's 
population, were Muslims, and, even with the low-caste Hindus who made 
up the rest, the bhadralok had little in common. As we have already 
observed, the manual labourer in Bengal was separated from his 
superiors by a great social gap which the ’respectable people’ had 
striven for generations to widen by means of education. The peasantry 
shared nothing of the bhadralok culture and their values were neither 
understood nor appreciated by the English-speaking urban professional 
men who were engaged in politics. In Bengal, as in most other parts 
of twentieth-century Asia and Africa, there was a great problem of 
communication between the small westernised intelligentsia of the
cities, eager to build a nation free from European imperialism, and
-jthe rural masses, traditionalist and illiterate.
In an editorial published on the eve of the special Congress session
in Calcutta in September 1920, the Bengali declared: ’We Bengalis are
opposed to non-co-operation. For a period of 10 years, from 1906 to
1916, we played that game. And we are not prepared to take back what
we rejected on deliberation then. Even Gandhi has admitted that to
act up to this resolution would mean rebellion and revolution, and we
2are not ready to proceed to such a course.' This passage provides 
the clue to another reason for the bhadralok leader's reluctance to 
follow Gandhi to mass politics: 'this resolution would mean rebellion 
and revolution, and we are not ready to proceed to such a course.'
Mass politics would almost certainly lead to violence, and violence 
against the foreigner might quickly change to violence against the 
socially privileged. The bhadralok leaders were afraid of the social 
consequences of a disturbance of the established political order.
Andrews saw this. 'I want you all, who are absent,' he wrote, 'clearly 
to understand that the real thing is not the issue "Cooperation v 
non-Cooperation", but far more the question of "Fear v Non-Fear"'.^
_
See L . P y e :  "Communication Patterns and the Problems of Representative 
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The hhadralok were afraid because they had much to lose* A
minority of only five per cent, they held most of Bengal's land and 
a large part of its wealth. Their domination of all levels of the 
education system, gave them almost exclusive access to the professions 
and Government service. They controlled the press. They played a 
leading part in all forms of civic and village affairs. Politics was 
their business. They gave Bengal its literature, music and art. They 
were its cultural and social leaders. In city and countryside they 
were indeed the respectable people. All this they stood to lose from 
any social upheaval. 'Scratch a Hindu and you will find him a 
conservative,' remarked Surendranath Banerjea. Certainly Banerjea's 
Hindus - the bhadralok - were conservatives and well might they be.
It must be recognised that their fear was largely a fear of the 
unknown. They did not understand the masses and they felt no confidence 
in their ability to lead or even control them should the existing order 
of political and social relationships be shaken. Their fear was blind 
but it was not unreasonable. A leap into the political unknown could 
well be a leap into revolution and anarchy. In a society like the 
Indian in which there was no system of communication extending vertically 
through the community; in which there were few universally accepted 
social values; in which there was no general knowledge of the functions 
of the state; and in which there were great economic inequalities,
Nation in Making, p. 397*
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the l in e  between o rder and d is o rd e r  was th in .  I t  was a p e r ilo u s
u n d e rtak in g  to  rock  th e  sh ip  of s t a t e ,  even i f  i t  were o f f ic e re d  by
unwanted fo re ig n e rs . Gokhale had understood th i s .  D is tre sse d  by th e
v io len ce  in  Bengal in  1908, he had w ritte n : ’I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  a t
any tim e to  c re a te  d iso rd e r  in  our country  -  i t  was our p o r tio n  fo r
c e n tu r ie s  -  b u t i t  i s  no t so easy to  s u b s t i tu te  ano ther form of o rd e r
fo r  th a t  which has been evolved by Englishmen in  th e  course  o f a
cen tu ry .*  In  1920 th i s  was th e  bhadra lok  le a d e r s ’ re p ly  to  Gandhi
when he c a lle d  fo r  n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  to  put an end to  th e  B r i t i s h  Empire 
2in  In d ia .
The even ts  o f th e  years  im m ediately p reced ing  1920 had g iven  th e
bhad ra lo k  l i t t l e  reason  fo r  confidence . The war of 1914-18 had had a
profoundly  u n s e t t l in g  e f f e c t  on B engali s o c ie ty  and th i s  s o c ia l  u n re s t
was aggravated  in  th e  immediate post-w ar y ea rs  by economic d i f f i c u l t i e s .
A su ccess io n  o f  n a tu ra l  d is a s te r s  in  1918 and 1919? in c lu d in g  th e  g re a t
in f lu e n z a  epidem ic, le d  to  an e x tra o rd in a r i ly  sharp  r i s e  in  the  p r ic e s
3
o f fo o d s tu f f s  and c o tto n  goods, and e a r ly  i n  1920 a severe  slump 
brough t to  an end a f iv e -y e a r  boom in  C a lcu tta  tra d e  and in d u s t r y . “^
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Already there had been serious labour trouble in  Bombay;"' there were
2d istu rb in g  rumours o f peasant unrest in  the United Provinces; and
s t r ik e s  among the  m igrant in d u s t r ia l  w orkers o f Howrah and H ooghly-side
3
were becoming d is tr e s s in g ly  frequent.
Events in  R ussia  in  1917 Had l e f t  the  bhadra lok  extrem ely  s e n s i t iv e
to  any p o te n t ia l  th r e a t  to p ro p erty  from th i s  q u a r te r .  Indeed t h e i r
re a c t io n  to  th e  R ussian re v o lu tio n  had l a id  b a re  t h e i r  b a s ic  s o c ia l
conservatism . They had welcomed the success in  March of Kerensky and
h is  P ro v is io n a l Government in  deposing th e  Czar as an exemplar fo r
I n d ia ’s p o l i t i c a l  em ancipation ,^  but t h e i r  d e l ig h t  had tu rn ed  to  dismay
w ith  the  v io le n t  a t ta c k  on th e  p ro p e rtie d  c la s s e s  which follow ed th e
B olshev ik  re v o lu tio n  in  November. They were a f ra id  th a t  a s im ila r
5
d isa s te r  might b e fa ll  India.
The Muslims and the Masses
The C a lc u tta  Muslim r i o t s  of September 1918 had shown how much 
inflam m able s o c ia l  m a te r ia l was now a v a ila b le  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  in c e n d ia r ie s ,  
and th e  concern  o f th e  bhadralok  a t t h i s  development had been m an ifest
_
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in  th e  support accorded by the  Hindu newspapers to  the  Government in
1
i t s  use of fo rce  to  suppress th e  d is o rd e rs .  This in c id e n t had a lso  
u n d e rlin ed  th e  f a c t  -  a d i s t r e s s in g  f a c t  f o r , th e  bhadralok  -  th a t  in  
Bengal i t  was Muslim r a th e r  th a n  Hindu p o l i t i c ia n s  who were b e s t  ab le  
to  make use of a mass appea l. Although th e  Muslim le a d e rs  had to  
overcome th e  same problem of c la s s  d i s t i n c t io n ,  and, to  a le s s e r  deg ree , 
d if f e re n c e s  o f c a s te ,  se c t and c u l tu r e ,  they  could speak d i r e c t ly  to  
t h e i r  c o - r e l ig io n is t s  ( in  a way th e  Hindus could never do) in  th e  name 
of Is lam . There was a f r a t e r n i t y  amongst Muslims such as was unknown 
to Hindus. The b e s t  ground f o r  an appeal was, of co u rse , re l ig io u s  -  
Islam  in  danger -  (ag a in  cool com fort to  th e  Hindus) and in  the  p o s t­
war y e a rs  th e  p e r fe c t is s u e  was to  hand in  th e  K h ila fa t movement.
L a te  in  1919> K h ila fa t com m ittees were e s ta b lis h e d  in  v a rio u s  p a r ts
2
o f Bengal ' t o  c i r c u la te  news on th e  Moslem w o rld '. The o f f i c i a l  peace 
c e le b ra t io n s  in  December provided  an o p p o rtu n ity  to  i n c i t e  communal 
f e e l in g  a g a in s t  the  B r i t i s h .  'So f a r  as we are  a sso c ia te d  w ith  the  
"V ic to ry ” , i t  means d e fe a t fo r  M oslem s,' declaim ed the  Mohammadi 
a n g r i ly .  'The b ie r  of Moslem n a t io n a l i ty  i s  b e in g  c a r r ie d  out -  are  
we to  r e jo ic e  th e r e a t? '" 1 With th e  r e tu r n  to  C a lcu tta  in  January  1920 
o f Abul Kalam Azad, a young U rdu-speaking Muslim jo u r n a l i s t  who had 
been in te rn e d  f o r  fo u r y ears  a t  H anchi, the  movement took  a ra d ic a l
1
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2
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3
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tu rn . Azad and h is  fo llo w ers  went among the Muslim v/orkers in  th e  m ill 
towns of West Bengal sp read ing  propaganda about the  B r i t i s h  a t t i tu d e  
to  th e  K h ila fa t .  When moderate appeals f a i l e d  to  s t i r  up g en era l 
anger, r e s o r t  was had to  p rovocative  rum ours, such as th a t  the  Government
had ordered  p ray e rs  to  be sa id  on Sunday in s te a d  of F riday  and had
1
p ro sc rib ed  the  Koran.
The dangerous p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of such an e x p lo i ta t io n  of r e l ig io u s
fa n a tic ism  and ignorance were ev iden t to  th e  bhadralok  le a d e r s ,  and,
when Gandhi urged them to  support th e  K h ila fa t movement in  o rd er to
cement Hindu-Muslim u n ity , they  a n g r ily  p ro te s te d  a g a in s t encouraging
such a campaign. Andrews r e f le c te d  t h e i r  mood when he w rote: 'The
t r u t h  i s  th a t  the  " K h ila fa t” appeals to  th e  very  w orst s id e  o f Islam  -
th a t  r e l ig io u s  a rrogance , which i s  every  w hit as bad as r a c ia l  
2
a r ro g a n c e . ' The bhadralok  found i t  o b je c tio n a b le  th a t  Gandhi should
i n s i s t  upon co up ling  a communal is su e  of th i s  k ind  w ith n o n -co -o p e ra tio n
3
and acco rd in g  to  men l ik e  Azad a p lace  o f  prominence in  th e  movement.
More rem arkable than  t h i s  Hindu o p p o s itio n , was th e  a n tip a th y  
tow ards A zad's campaign d isp lay ed  by B engali Muslims. They made no 
s e c re t  of th e  f a c t  th a t  they  regarded Azad, and th e  U rdu-speaking
1
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C alcu tta  group which supported  him, as fo re ig n e rs .  I l l - f e e l i n g  between 
th e  le a d e rs  of th e  Urdu and B engali speak ing  communities which had 
f la r e d  up on v a rio u s  occasions in  th e  p a s t ,  had r e c e n tly  been aggravated 
by accu sa tio n s  in  the  Urdu p re ss  th a t  th e  B engali Muslims were so
1
p a ro c h ia l th a t  they  had lo s t  touch  w ith  t h e i r  c o - r e l ig io n is t s  elsew here.
I t  was i r o n i c a l ,  in  view o f th e  Hindu alarm  a t  th e  appeal to  re l ig io u s  
sen tim en t, th a t  what offended th e  B engali Muslims was A zad's stand  
a lon g sid e  Gandhi as an a p o s tle  o f inter-com m unal am ity. 'H ith e r to  th e  
whole h is to r y  o f In d ia  s in ce  the  advent o f th e  Mussalmans in  th i s  
coun try  i s  a h is to ry  o f a con tinued  antagonism  o f  th e  two communities 
and we need be very  cau tio u s  in  c la sp in g  too  eag e rly  th e  hand o f fe llo w ­
sh ip  s tre tc h e d  forward so very  g ra c e fu l ly  by the  o th e r community,1
2warned A li Chaudhuri.
A lthough u n w illin g  to  jo in  Azad in  h is  campaign among th e  in d u s t r ia l  
la b o u re r s ,  th e  B engali Muslim p o l i t i c i a n s  were not b lin d  to  th e  p o te n tia l  
advantages o f  securing- some form of mass support and they  were ex­
perim enting- w ith  o rg a n isa tio n s  which might win them a fo llo w in g  among 
the  Muslim p e asa n try . As e a r ly  as December 1917> F az lu l Huq and a 
group o f fe llo w  law yers and jo u r n a l i s t s  had formed the  C a lcu tta  A g ric u ltu ra l 
A sso c ia tio n  and a t  the beg inn ing  of 1920 an o th er body, th e  Bengal
1
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Jo a td a rs  and R a iy a ts 1 A sso c ia tio n , was founded, w ith o f f ic e -b e a re r s
1
drawn from C a lcu tta  and th e  towns o f E a s te rn  Bengal* 'The t a lk  of
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  reform , in  p a r t i c u la r  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of an extended
f ra n c h is e , had awakened fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e an in t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c s
2among- s e c tio n s  of th e  B engali p easan try  and i t  was alm ost c e r ta in ly  
in  the  hope of taking- advantage o f t h i s  new awareness th a t  th e se  
o rg a n is a tio n s  were formed. They achieved no th ing  o f  immediate im portance 
bu t they  were s ig n if ic a n t  as the  f i r s t  a ttem p ts  in  Bengal to  e s ta b l i s h  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n tac t w ith th e  r a iy a t s * They were th e  p re c u rso rs  of the 
peasan t o rg a n isa tio n s  formed by Muslim p o l i t i c ia n s  in  the  m id - tw en tie s , 
which provided  a backing in  th e  fo llow ing  decade fo r  F az lu l Huq*s 
K isan P ro ja  P a rty  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council*
These were d is tu rb in g  developm ents fo r  th e  bhad ra lok* I t  was bad 
enough th a t  th e  peasan try  should be ta k in g  an i n t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c s  but 
i t  was f a r  worse th a t  i t  should be th e  Muslim le a d e rs  who were ab le  to  
b e n e f i t  by i t .  The bhadra lok  p o l i t i c ia n s  were a t  a s e r io u s  d isad v an tag e . 
U nlike th e  Muslim p ro fe s s io n a l men, who had th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  keep in  
touch  w ith  a t  l e a s t  the l a r g e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s  through t h e i r  D is t r i c t  
communal a s s o c ia t io n s ,  they  had no re g u la r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n tac t w ith  
the  p e a s a n ts .^  M oreover, as a r e n t i e r  and land h o ld in g  c la s s ,  t h e i r
1
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interests and those of their tenantry were too obviously opposed for 
them to come forward as champions of the peasant interest. However 
hurtful it may have been to their nationalist pride, they had to face 
the fact that they were regarded by the lower orders as representatives 
of the upper 'exploiting' castes.
In the decade preceding- 1920, there had been a remarkable develop­
ment in the organisation, among the lower castes in Bengal, of caste 
-)sabhas, which had given them a new sense of self-reliance. During the 
reforms discussions - to the embarrassment of the bhadralok politicians - 
these low castes had rejected all suggestions that high-caste men 
might speak on their behalf.
The Namasudras were the most adamant. This agricultural caste,
the largest in Bengal, had had the assistance of British missionaries
in the establishment of schools, hospitals and dispensaries, and in the
formation of District Unions in Eastern Bengal where it was most
numerous. A few of its members had secured sufficient education to
enter the professions and in 1912 they had established the Bengal
1'Tamasudra Association with its headquarters in Calcutta, but their
attempts to interest their castemen in politics had been unsuccessful
2until the talk of constitutional reforms captured their attention.
1
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The C a lc u t ta  group th e n  s t a r t e d  a B en g a li m onthly jo u rn a l o f  p o l i t i c a l
and s o c ia l  d is c u s s io n  u nder th e  ch alleng ing - t i t l e  o f P a ta k a , "The 
B an n er" , and th e y  o rg an ised  c a s te  m ee tin g s  th ro u g h o u t th e  p ro v in ce  to  
c o n s id e r  th e  a t t i t u d e  which t h e i r  community shou ld  adopt tow ards th e  
re fo rm s .^
I n i t i a l l y  th ey  had to  overcome w idesp read  s u sp ic io n  t h a t  th e y  
in te n d e d  to  s e l l  ou t t h e i r  community to  h ig h -c a s te  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  and 
th e y  were a t  p a in s  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  bona f id e s  in  t h i s  re g a rd . 
W ritin g  to  th e  Government o f B engal in  December 1913, Mukunda B ehari 
M a ll ic k , th e  p r e s id e n t  o f th e  A s s o c ia t io n , em phasised th a t  he and h is  
fe l lo w s  were opposed to  th e  M ontagu-C helm sford p ro p o sa ls  b ecau se  t h e i r  
im p lem en ta tio n  would mean in c re a s e d  power f o r  h ig h -c a s te  men. I s  th e  
p a s t  l o y a l ty  o f  th e  N am asudras, he asked ’now to  be rew arded by a sk in g  
them to  seek  th e  r e d r e s s  o f t h e i r  g r ie v a n c e s  a t  th e  hands o f an  un­
sy m p a th e tic  o lig a rc h y  o f a few l im i te d  c a s te s  s p e c ia l ly  o f  B rahm ins, 
K ayasthas  and B a id y a s '?  H is p e o p le , he s a id ,  were alarm ed a t  th e  
a p p a re n t r e a d in e s s  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  to  g iv e  way b e fo re  'a  v o c ife ro u s  and
sm all band o f  o rg a n ise d  c a s te s  p re te n d in g  to  r e p re s e n t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  
2
o f  th e  m a sse s ’ .
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For the bhadralok nationalist politicians such talk was extremely
embarrassing, to say the least, and, while they could save face by
explaining- away the meetings of protest against self-government as
machinations of the British, they could not dismiss so easily the
democratic notions which were now abroad among the Namasudras and other
low-caste groups. Democracy was a revolutionary concept in a caste-
ordered society, and that revolution would be hastened once inferior
groups realised how much they stood to gain. As an early number of the
Pataka had pointed out in 1 9 1 if in future the governance of India
were to depend upon the counting of heads, power would go to the biggest
castes instead of the highest as in the past.
... we ^Namasudras/ have now realised what we are, and how 
great is our strength £it had declared with a pugnacity 
calculated to chill bhadralok blood/. A caste with a population 
of 25 lacs cannot remain asleep for ever. We had been put to 
sleep by the blind Hindu kings who ruled over Hindu society.
Today we have woken up from that slumber through the grace of 
the mighty British, who believe in the equality of men and not 
in caste.2
For the time being, the bhadralok were protected from the most 
dire consequences of such democracy by a severely restricted franchise 
(which they were determined to maintain, as we shall see) and the 
Namasudras* demand in 1920 for the reservation for their caste of one 
third of the Non-Muhammadan seats in the Bengal Legislative Council
1
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2 ' ... * " ... .........
Quoted IT.K. Bose: ’’Some Aspects of Caste in Bengal”, Traditional 
India: Structure and Change, (ed. M. Singer), p. 200.
cou ld  be n o th in g  more th a n  a g e s tu r e . 1 N o n e th e less  f o r  th e  e x c lu s iv e
h ig h  c a s te s ,  th e  w r i t in g  was on th e  w a ll ,  and th e  b h a d ra lo k  q u a ile d  
as th e y  re a d  i t .
The h a tre d  betw een Brahmans and non-Brahmans i n  Madras -  th e  
s p i r i t  o f enm ity i n  Bengal among- many o f  th e  Namasudras 
a g a in s t  th e  h ig h e r  c a s te s  -  u n d e r ly in g  a l l  t h i s  i s  n o t th e r e  
th e  i n s t i g a t i o n  o f s t r a n g e r s  -  o f  co n q u ero rs?  /a sk e d  th e  
Kayak b i t t e r l y . /  U nless ou r s o c ie ty  i s  r e v o lu t io n iz e d  and 
th e  s o c ia l  bonds r e la x e d ,  b u s in e s s  canno t f l o u r i s h  and money 
canno t be earned  e a s i l y .  That i s  why s te p s  a re  b e in g  ta k e n  
to  d em olish  th e  b a r r i e r s  betw een th e  d i f f e r e n t  c a s te s .  When 
we g e t th e  Montagu R eform s, th e  s p i r i t  o f  s t r i f e  and q u a r re l  
and enm ity  among us w i l l  be ag g rav a ted  and a t e r r i b l e  s o c ia l  
r e v o lu t io n  b rough t aboutJ ^
r a t i o n a l i s t  and S o c ia l R ad ica lism
A ll t h a t  has been  s a id  abou t th e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  th e  b h a d ra lo k  
p o l i t i c i a n s  tow ards th e  m asses, p o in ts  a le s s o n  o f  g e n e ra l a p p l ic a t io n :  
th a t  n a t i o n a l i s t  r a d ic a lis m  i s  n o t to  be eq u a ted  w ith  s o c ia l  r a d ic a l is m .
I t  would seem to  be a s ta te m e n t o f  th e  obv ious to  observe  th a t  th e  
d e s i r e  o f  c o lo n ia l  n a t i o n a l i s t s  to  r i d  t h e i r  co u n try  o f  im p e r ia l  
d o m in a tio n  i s  n o t ,  o f n e c e s s i t y ,  accom panied by any d e s i r e  to  r e c o n s t r u c t  
th e  s o c ia l  o rd e r ;  y e t th e  f a i l u r e  to  g ra sp  t h i s  p o in t  o r ,  a t  b e s t ,  
to  s t a t e  i t  e x p l i c i t l y ,  has been  a f re q u e n t so u rce  o f  th e  m isu n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  n a t io n a l is m .
T here co u ld  be no more s t r i k i n g  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f t h i s  th a n  th e  
c o n fu s io n  w hich p r e v a i l s  o v e r th e  rea so n s  f o r  th e  B en g a li r e a c t io n  to
1
G I, Reforms O f f ic e ,  Bundle 1920 August A( 6 ) ,  A54-119» Aug 1920.
2
K ayak,* 22 Aug 1919*
2 :r
Gandhi’s n o n -co -o p era tio n  p ro p o sa ls . B lin d ly  fo llow ing’ th e  le ad  of
•j
Subhas Chandra Bose, commentators have ap p lied  th e  term ’’R ight wing-”
to  th e  Moderates and o th e rs  who favoured co u n cil e n try , and "L eft v;ingM
2to  th e  E x trem ists  and t e r r o r i s t s .  By the  lo g ic  o f  t h e i r  metaphor 
they  a re  th en  convinced th a t  G andhi's n o n -v io len t n o n -co -o p era tio n  
movement must be of th e  "C en tre", and i t  i s  to  t h e i r  astonishm ent th a t  
they d isco v e r t h a t ,  w hile th e  B engalis  favoured  bo th  council e n try  and 
te r ro r ism  (" th e  R igh t"  and "the L e f t " ) ,  they  were most r e lu c ta n t  to  
accep t n o n -co -o p era tio n  (" th e  C en tre" ).
I t  i s  ev id en t th a t  th e se  w r i te r s  have been le d  a s tr a y  in  t h e i r  
in te r p r e ta t io n  by t h e i r  f a i lu r e  to  d is t in g u is h  between n a t io n a l i s t  and 
s o c ia l  ra d ic a lism . The term s "Right and L e f t wing" which th ey  employ 
have socio-econom ic co n no ta tions acqu ired  from th e i r  European usage.
I f  th ese  term s a re  to  have any meaning in  t h i s  co n tex t (and t h e i r  va lue  
i s  d o u b tfu l)  bo th  co u n cil e n try  and te r ro r is m  must be regarded  as 
"Right wing", fo r  th ey  were esteemed by th e  bhadra lok  as e l i t e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
and n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  as 'L e f t  Wing", fo r  i t  was regarded  as s o c ia l ly  
hazardous.
Gandhi h im se lf was aware of the  im portance of th i s  d i s t in c t io n  
between n a t io n a l i s t  and so c ia l  ra d ic a lism . 'I n  f ig h t in g ’ th e  Government
1
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th e  m otives o f co -w orkers  can  "be m ix e d ,’ he e x p la in e d . ’In  f ig h t in g
1
th e  d e v i l  o f u n to u c h a b i l i ty  I  have a b s o lu te ly  s e le c t  com pany.1 Here 
in  a n u ts h e l l  i s  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  b h a d ra lo k  r e a c t io n ,  w hich we 
have been  se e k in g . Gandhi was n o t sim ply  o ffe rin g - a f i g h t  a g a in s t  th e  
Government. He was a lso  c a l l i n g  f o r  an a t t a c k  on th e  d e v i ls  i n  In d ia n  
s o c ie ty ,  and th e  c o n s e rv a t iv e  b h a d ra lo k  were convinced  t h a t  th e se  d e v i l s  
sh o u ld  be l e f t  w ell a lo n e  l e s t  a l l  h e l l  be l e t  lo o s e .
Looking- back  from t h i s  v an tag e  p o in t ,  we can see  th e  p re c e p t w hich 
governed  ev ery  a c t io n  o f th e  b h a d ra lo k  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  M oderates and 
E x tre m is ts  a l i k e ,  in  th e  y e a rs  o f re fo rm , 1 9 1 9 20s th e  p r e s e rv a t io n  
o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  dom inance o f  th e  b h a d ra lo k . W hatever th e  
form o f th e  c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  s e t t l e m e n t  w hatever th e  p o l i t i c a l  m ethods 
r e q u ir e d ,  th e  b h ad ra lo k  ascendancy  was to  be m a in ta in e d .
At f i r s t  th e r e  was no a p p re h e n sio n  t h a t  th e r e  would be any need 
f o r  e x e r t io n  to  a ch iev e  t h i s .  No m a tte r  w hich group  o f p o l i t i c i a n s  
emerged v ic to r io u s  from th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  d o g f ig h t ,  th e  b h a d ra lo k  p o s i t io n  
would s u re ly  be  s e c u re . But t h i s  c o n fid e n ce  was shaken by th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  
th a t  th e r e  w ere s o c i a l ,  a s  w e ll as  p o l i t i c a l ,  r e p e rc u s s io n s  from th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e c o n s t r u c t io n .  The d e la y  i n  re a c h in g  a s e t t le m e n t;  
th e  hopes and f e a r s  a ro u sed ; th e  c o n c e ss io n s  g a in ed  by some g ro u p s; 
th e  lo s s  o f  f a i t h  in  B r i t i s h  g o o d w ill;  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  p o l i t i c i a n s ’ 
a p p e a ls ;  th e  f a i l u r e  o f communal n e g o t ia t io n s ;  th e  u se  o f  v io le n c e  as
Gandhi to  Andrews, 23 Nov , q u o te d , C h a tu rv ed i & S ykes, p. 157*
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a p o l i t i c a l  to o l -  th ese  were not sim ply q u estio n s  o f p o l i t i c s ,  on which 
depended the fu tu re  of one p a rty  or an o th e r. In  th e  extended period  
o f u n c e r ta in ty , th ese  is su e s  assumed a s o c ia l  s ig n if ic a n c e  as 
de term inan ts  in  the changing r e la t io n s h ip s  o f c la s s e s  and communities.
r '.7hen we g e t th e  Montagu Reforms, th e  s p i r i t  o f s t r i f e  and q u a rre l 
and enmity among us w ill  be aggravated  and a t e r r i b l e  s o c ia l  re v o lu tio n  
brought a b o u tJ ' The hayak was r ig h t  in  i t s  b e l i e f  th a t  th e  reform s 
would p r e c ip i ta te  so c ia l change and i t s  c h a r a c te r is a t io n  o f th i s  as 
’a t e r r i b l e  r e v o lu t io n ’ was a t ru e  r e f l e c t i o n  o f bhadralok  c o n s te rn a tio n . 
The new a s s e r t iv e n e s s  o f the low er c la s s e s  and the  a ttem p ts by Muslim 
p o l i t i c ia n s  to  e x p lo it  th i s  fo r  communal ends, awakened them w ith  a 
j o l t  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  t h e i r  c la s s  ascendancy was unchallenged no lo n g e r. 
For the  f i r s t  tim e, i t  seemed p o ss ib le  th a t  t h e i r  voice might be 
drowned by th e  clam ant demands o f o th e r  s o c ia l  groups.
H o rr if ie d  by such a p ro sp e c t, t h e i r  le a d e rs  hastened  b e fo re  th e  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  enquiry  committees o f 1918-19 w ith  p roposa ls  to  p ro te c t 
the  bhadra lok  p o s it io n . A r e s t r i c t e d  f ra n c h is e  based on a p ro p e rty  
q u a l i f i c a t io n  should be m ain ta ined , they  i n s i s t e d ,  ' i n  o rd er to  secure  
competent v o te rs  and manageable e l e c t o r a t e s ' .  The towns which were 
t h e i r  s tro n g h o ld , p a r t i c u la r ly  C a lcu tta  where they  formed ^ 0  per cen t 
o f th e  Hindu p o p u la tio n , should be g iven  co n sid e rab le  o v e r- re p re s e n ta tio n ,
1
Evidence Taken b efo re  th e  Reforms Committee (F ra n c h ise ) 1 v o l. I I ,
p .~3W -
’because men of p o l i t i c a l  c ap a c ity  and p u b lic  s p i r i t  and in te l l ig e n c e
were to  be mainly found in  the  towns. I f  th e  towns were not g iven
se p a ra te  s e a ts ,  the  town cand ida tes  would be overwhelm ed.’ For a
s im ila r  reaso n , they  argued th a t  no r e s id e n t i a l  q u a l i f ic a t io n  should be
2re q u ire d  fo r  e le c to ra l  c an d id a te s .
They re je c te d  on p r in c ip le  the  demand fo r  sep a ra te  communal 
e le c to ra te s ^  and opposed every concession  suggested  fo r  th e  Muslims.
’They on no account should be allow ed to  have the  balance  o f power in  
t h e i r  h a n d s ,’ wrote a member of th e  Bengal L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, Shib 
Shekhareswar Ray. ’Such a s ta t e  of a f f a i r s  would not only s p e ll  d is ­
a s t e r  to  the  cause of good Government in  th e  co u n try , b u t would s e r io u s ly  
je o p a rd ise  th e  in te r e s t s  of th e  non-Muhammadans.*^ Nor should the  
Hindu lo w er-cas te s  be given sp e c ia l r e p re s e n ta t io n .
There i s  a tendency in  some q u a r te rs  to  make a f a n c ifu l  l in e  
o f cleavage between th e  masses and th e  educated community 
^Surendranath  B anerjea exp lained  to  th e  J o in t  S e le c t Committee/.
The educated community are  the  n a tu ra l  p ro te c to rs  o f the  m asses, 
and I  d e s ire  to  emphasise th a t  f a c t  . . . .  Me a re  the  n a tu ra l  
p ro te c to rs  of the  m asses, and have always been so , because they  
are  our people -  the bone o f our bone and the  f le s h  o f our 
f l e s h . . .5
1
Evidence Taken before  the  Reforms Committee (F ra n c h is e ) , v o l. I I ,
p. 39°*
2
N ation  in  Making, pp. 318-9«
3
PP, 1919» (203), vo l. IV, ev idence , pp. 70-1»
4
BLCP, 1 Dec 1921, v o l. V, p. 531*
5
PP, 1919» 1203), v o l. IV, ev idence , p. 68.
Underlying all these hhadralok demands was the determination to
secure the interests of the privileged classes. This conservatism is 
revealed clearly if a comparison is made with the Government of Bengal’s 
counter-proposals (as outlined earlier in this work), which show the 
hhadralok politicians for what they were: most reluctant democrats.
The Appeal to the Small Bhadralok
’In all this,’ wrote the Government of India in its first despatch 
on constitutional reforms, ’we feel that we are moving with a spirit 
which is stronger than our calculations; and we accept whatever lies 
ahead.’ The hhadralok leaders were also moving with a spirit stronger 
than their calculations, and, in spite of their protests, they too had 
to accept what lay ahead, whether as a result of the Government of 
Bengal’s radical franchise proposals or Gandhi’s will to mass politics. 
Reluctant democrats, they were swept helplessly along.
This gives us a clue with which to approach the last major problem 
posed by the events of that crucial year, 1920. Why, after opposing 
Gandhi for twelve months (more particularly at the Calcutta Congress in 
September), did the bhadralok politicians capitulate at Nagpur in 
December? The answer, basically, is that Gandhi had undercut them by 
capturing the support of the poorer, semi-educated ’small’ bhadralok. 
Here the Bengal Extremists were hoist with their own petard, for, in
_
Government of India’s Despatch of March 5th, 1919< p. 5*
their early efforts to force a way into the reforms debate in 1916 
and 1917? it was to this group that they had appealed, and, in so doing, 
they had aroused a political enthusiasm upon which Gandhi was later to 
capitalise.
The poorer bhadralok, as an aspiring but frustrated sub-class, 
looked with an intense jealousy upon their successful superiors, the 
English-speaking Government servants and professional men. The enmity 
was encouraged in the schools and university colleges by under-paid and 
discontented teachers, and it was rjlayed to by the vernacular press, 
which found its most attentive readers among the semi-educated, under­
employed urban lower middle-class. These papers developed stereotyped 
lines of criticism, with a terminology which is highly misleading if 
read out of this context. When, for instance, they spoke of the 'babus* 
they referred to those objects of righteous scorn, the successful 
bhadralok; ’’the people” or ’’the mass” were their approving readers, the 
small bhadralok. Their criticism was usually levelled at the ”babu’s” 
selfish disregard for ’’the people”; their ’’Anglicisation” and divorce 
from ’’true Bengali Hindu society”; and their concern with British 
institutions, titles and honours. Two passages will serve as an 
illustration.
Dainik Chandrika, 30 December 1914
This is the Congress of the Babus. These irreligious, luxury- 
loving beggars are the creation of English education. The 
country and society have nothing to do with them. The mass do 
not know them, neither do they care for the mass. By virtue of 
their begging through the Congress they secure high posts, start 
subsidised papers and try to win fame and respect in the country.
9,. Q
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Basumati, 17 April 1915
... whatever our Babus do, they do for the furtherance of their 
own self-interest and not for the benefit of the people at 
large. The Congress and conferences and what not keep these 
agitators perpetually before the public eye and bring them 
something for their pockets also. And that is all that our 
"patriots" care for.
For the Extremists - leaders in search of a following - the dis­
contented but politically-unattached small bhadralok offered a great 
opportunity, especially as the means of appealing to them were to hand, 
ready-made. Play to their prejudices, focus their enmity upon the 
Moderates, and they were yours. Looking back, we find that this is 
precisely what C.R. Das did in his Provincial Conference speech of 
April 1917) which won the acclaim of the vernacular press and launched 
him on his political career. Delighting his listeners with his frequent 
allusions to the familiar teachings of Swami Vivekananda, he spoke out 
boldly against the errors of "babu" politics.
We have many dangers and difficulties in the path; but our 
chiefest danger is this that we have become largely and 
unnecessarily Anglicised in our education, culture and social 
practices. The mere mention of "politics" conjures up before 
our eyes the vision of English political institutions; and we 
feel tempted to fall down before and worship the precise form 
which politics has assumed under the peculiar conditions of 
English history .... Only we neglect the one thing essential.
We never look to our country, never think of Bengal or the 
Bengalees, of our past national history, or our present 
material condition. Hence our political agitation is unreal 
and unsubstantial - divorced from all intimate touch with the 
soul of our people .... We boast of being educated: but how 
many are we? 'That room do we occupy in the country? «That is 
our relation to the vast masses of our countrymen? Do they 
think our thoughts or speak our speech? I am bound to confess 
that our countrymen have little faith in us. And what is the 
reason of this unfaith? Down in the depths of our soul, we, 
the educated people, have become Anglicised: we read in
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English, think in English and even our speech is translated 
from English. Our borrowed anglicism repels our unsophisticated 
countrymen: they prefer the genuine article to the shoddy 
imitation. ^
In this way, the Extremists quickly won the allegiance of the small
bhadralok and this support was of great advantage to them in the local
Congress meetings of late 1917 and 1918, when they needed a numerous
and noisy backing to outvote and outshout the Moderates. There was
danger, however, in what they were doing. The nature of their appeal,
especially the terms they were using-, gave them a false appearance of
social radicalism, which might expose them to a charge of hypocrisy
should there arise a demand for radical action. In fact the Extremist
leaders were as much a part of *tBabudomM ^as the kayak described the
2Anglicised society of the successful) as were the Moderates, and, 
should there be an attack upon that society, they were bound to turn 
in its defence - which, of course, is what happened when Gandhi 
appeared on the scene.
Here was a man who spoke of ’the mass’ and ’the people’ without 
any mental reservations; who attacked Anglicisation root and branch; 
and who would sever all ties with British institutions. He offended 
the bhadralok leaders and they turned against him, but, in so doing, 
they lost the support of their own lower middle-class, who saw in this 
yet another example of ’babu' betrayal.
C.R. Das: About Bengal, pp. 4—5 •
kayak,* 8 Aug 1916.
1
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The Babus open ly  advoca te  dem ocracy to  o b ta in  cheap n o to r i e ty ,  
w h ile  th e y  s e c r e t ly  a s s o c ia te  w ith  Government, w ith  a view  to  
s e c u r in g  t i t l e s  and h ig h  p o s ts  c a r ry in g  f a t  s a l a r i e s  ^ sn ee red  
th e  k a y a k /. When t h e i r  o b je c t  i s  accom plished  th e y  id e n t i f y  
them selves w ith  Government. T h is  i s  th e  re a so n  why one who i s  
an E x tre m is t today  becomes a M oderate tom orrow. Mr G an d h i's  
n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  movement s t r i k e s  a t  th e  ro o t o f  t h i s  tu r n ­
c o a t p o l ic y ,  and t h i s  i s  why th e  Babus a re  opposed to  i t . -'
With t h e i r  exc item en t ru n n in g  h ig h  a t  t h e i r  new sh a re  in  p o l i t i c s ,
th e  sm all b h a d ra lo k  were in  no mood to  t o l e r a t e  d i f f id e n c e .  I f  th e
’b ab u s ' la c k e d  th e  courage to  le a d  them a g a in s t  th e  B r i t i s h ,  th e  Mahatma
c e r t a in l y  d id  n o t ,  and e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  th e y  d e c la re d  f o r  him. They
became av id  r e a d e rs  o f h i s  sp eeches and w r i t i n g s ,  and th e  S e rv a n t , a
C a lc u t ta  d a i ly  e s ta b l is h e d  to  su p p o rt n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n , was soon o u t-
2
s e l l i n g  th e  o ld e r  new spapers. The c a u t io n s  o f  th e  b h a d ra lo k  le a d e r s
went unheeded. 'No one i s  l i s t e n i n g , '  w ro te  Andrews: ' a l l  i s  clam our
3
and n o is e  & s t r i f e . '
The p o l i t i c i a n s  were now face d  w ith  a p a in fu l  c h o ic e . Should th e y
s ta n d  by t h e i r  p r in c ip le s  a t  th e  r i s k  o f  com m itting  p o l i t i c a l  s u ic id e ,
o r  sh o u ld  th e y  r id e  w ith  Gandhi on th e  r i s i n g  wave o f  p o p u la r  en thusiasm ?
F a z lu l  Huq, p r e s id in g  a t  th e  1920 P ro v in c ia l  C onference in  A p r i l ,  had
g iv e n  a word o f  ad v ice  on th e  m a tte r :
I t  i s  o f  co u rse  open to  u s  to  ap p ea l to  th e  peo p le  to  g iv e  up 
view s w hich we th in k  to  be wrong b u t i f  th e  peop le  i n s i s t  on
1
k a y a k ,* 24 Dec 1920.
2
Andrews to  R ab in d ran a th  T agore , 8 Dec 1920, Andrews MSS.
3
Same to  same, 3 Aug 1920, ib id .
252
adhering- to  w ell d e f in e d  v iew s on p u b lic  q u e s t io n s ,  i t  i s  no 
lo n g e r  open to  us to  b re a k  away from th e  peop le  and form by 
o u rs e lv e s  a sm all c o t e r i e  o f  p ru d en t p o l i t i c i a n s  and r e p re s e n t in g  
view s whose m e rit l i e s  n o t in  b e in g  p o p u la r b u t o n ly  i n  b e in g  
a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  E x ec u tiv e  Government . . . .  L ead ers  o f  th e  
peop le  must alw ays have th e  courage to  fa c e  th e  peo p le  and i f  
th e y  f in d  th a t  they  can  no lo n g e r  l e a d ,  th e y  must e i t h e r  g iv e  
up t h e i r  p o l i t i c s  o r  be p rep a red  to  be le d .
As th e  y e a r  passed  and G andhi’s fo llo w in g  grew , many o f  th e  B en g a li
p o l i t i c i a n s  d ec id ed  th a t  th e y  would have to  co n sen t to  be le d .  ’The
whole c o u n try  i s  w ith  Mr G andhi, b u t th e  p o l i t i c i a n s  a re  h o ld in g  back .
Yet one by one th ey  a re  o b lig e d  to  d e c la r e  th e m s e lv e s ,’ r e p o r te d  Andrews
2
e a r ly  in  Septem ber.
By th a t  s ta g e ,  G andhi, a m a ste r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  t a c t i c s ,  had 
manoeuvred h i s  opponents in to  a c o rn e r .  In  A p ril and May he had 
a rra n g e d  f o r  th e  C e n tra l K h i la fa t  Committee and th e  a l l - I n d i a  C ongress 
Committee to  d is c u s s  n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n , and i t  was announced t h a t  a 
s p e c ia l  s e s s io n  o f  Congress would be h e ld  in  Septem ber to  d e c id e  fo r  
o r  a g a in s t  h i s  scheme."' In  th e  m eantim e, he went ahead w ith  h i s  own 
p re p a ra t io n s  and on 1 August began  p e rso n a l n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n .^  T his 
fo rc e d  th e  p ro v in c ia l  C ongress Comm ittees to  re a c h  some d e c i s io n ,  and , 
w ith  th e  know ledge th a t  o v e r t o p p o s i t io n  to  Gandhi would b r in g  down
1
3
2
3 Apr 1920 a t  M idnapore, A zizu l Huq c o l l e c t i o n .
Andrews to  R a th in d ra n a th  T ago re , 6 Sep ^19207, Andrews MSS. 
J .S .  Sharma; In d ia n  N a tio n a l C o n g ress , p.
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upon them p u b lic  w ra th , th ey  co u ld  do n o th in g  more th a n  se a rc h  fo r  some
form o f  com prom ise. The Bengal Committee d ec id ed  f o r  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  
i n  p r in c i p l e  b u t u rged  th a t  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls  shou ld  be b o y c o tte d  
from w ith in .  The A m rita B azar P a t r ik a  had argued  th e  ca se  i n  th e  
p re v io u s  month:
\7e th in k  t h a t  even i f  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  were to  be th e  g e n e ra l 
p o lic y  adop ted  by th e  c o u n try , a b e t t e r  co u rse  f o r  th e  peop le  
would be to  c o n te s t  th e  e l e c t io n s  w h o le sa le , to  c a p tu re  as 
many s e a t s  as p o s s ib le ,  and th e n  to  s ta n d  a s id e  i n  a body, 
le a v in g  to  th e  b u reau c ra cy  th e  odium o f making th e  new scheme 
a  f a i l u r e  by t h e i r  o b s t in a te  p e r s is te n c e  i n  a p o lic y  o f  e v i l . ^
A ll th e  le a d in g  Bengal E x tre m is ts  were c a n d id a te s  fo r  th e  f i r s t
e l e c t i o n s  f o r  th e  new l e g i s l a t u r e s  to  be h e ld  a t  th e  end o f th e  y e a r
and th e  u n c e r t a in ty  as  to  th e  p o lic y  w hich th e  Congress would adopt
was a h an d icap  to  them in  t h e i r  c a n v a ss in g . Worse s t i l l , t h e i r
advocacy o f  c o u n c il e n try  -  even i f  th e  pu rpose  were to  o b s t r u c t  from
w ith in  -  p u t them p e r i lo u s ly  c lo s e  to  th e  M odera tes, and t h a t  was to
c o u r t  p o l i t i c a l  d i s a s t e r . ^
They went to  th e  Septem ber C ongress i n  t h i s  awkward, compromised 
s i t u a t i o n ,  w h ile  G andhi, w ell aware o f  h i s  s t r e n g th ,  went f u l l  o f 
c o n f id e n c e . The main d eb a te  on n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n  to o k  p la c e  in  th e
1
HP, Aug 1920.
2
A m rita B azar P a t r i k a ,* 2 J u l  1920.
3
’The th r e e  s ta lw a r t s  o f  ’’C o o p e ra tio n ’' now, a re  S i r  N arayan 
C h an d av a rk ar, S u re n d ra n a th  B a n e rje a  & Mrs B esantJ That i s  now in  
I n d ia  enough to  damn any m ovem ent.’ (Andrews to  H a th in d ra n a th  
T ag o re , 6 Sep 19 2 0 /, Andrews MSS.)
S u b je c ts  Committee. F or th r e e  days th e  B e n g a lis  s tru g g le d  v a in ly  to
sw ing th e  m a jo r ity  a g a in s t  G andhi, who was o b d u ra te  i n  h i s  in s i s t e n c e
th a t  Congress g iv e  im m ediate su p p o rt to  every  item  o f  h is  programme.
’.Then h is  r e s o lu t io n  came b e fo re  th e  f u l l  s e s s io n  on th e  8 th ,  B ep in
Chandra Pal moved an amendment to  a c c e p t th e  p r in c ip le  b u t d e la y  th e
im p lem en ta tio n  o f n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n . H is c o n ce rn , he e x p la in e d , was to
av o id  a f a i l u r e  on a n a t io n a l  s c a le  such  a s  had o ccu rred  i n  B engal
during- th e  sw adeshi cam paign o f  th e  p a r t i t i o n  p e r io d . In  th e  v o tin g
on th e  fo llo w in g  day , P a l ’ s amendment was r e je c te d  and G andhi’ s
r e s o lu t io n  c a r r ie d  by a l a r g e  m a jo r i ty ,  a g a in s t  th e  v o te  o f  ev e ry  le a d in g  
•j
B en g a li d e le g a te .
What were they  to  do now? Should th e y  w ithdraw  from th e  C ongress 
and go ahead w ith  t h e i r  p re p a ra t io n s  f o r  th e  e l e c t io n s ?  Should th e y  
rem ain  in  th e  C ongress in  th e  hope th a t  th e y  cou ld  r e v e r s e  th e  d e c is io n  
a t  th e  annual s e s s io n  in  December? Or shou ld  th e y  fo r g e t  t h e i r  qualms 
and a cc ep t n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n ?  They were i n  a quandary  b u t th e y  cou ld  
n o t d i t h e r  f o r  lo n g , f o r  th e y  w ere u n d er p re s s u re  from  th e  G andhians 
to  d e c la re  th e m se lv es .
L e t th e  Bengal L ead ers  be d e f i n i t e  and speak  o u t t h e i r  mind in  
c l e a r  u n eq u iv o ca l lan g u ag e  ^w ro te  th e  H industhan  on 9 S ep tem ber/.
L e t them say th a t  th e y  w i l l  n o t be a b le  to  adopt th e  n o n -co - 
o p e ra t io n  o f Gandhi. L e t them say  th a t  th e y  a re  u n ab le  and 
no t p rep a red  to  make th e  enormous s a c r i f i c e s  w hich th e  ad o p tio n  
o f  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  in v o lv e s .  We r e a l l y  p i t y  th o se  who canno t 
fo rego  th e  te m p ta tio n  o f b e in g  ch ee red  w ith  c la p p in g s  o f th e  
hands.
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A fte r  a week o f  agon ised  d e b a te , th e  main g roup in  th e  Bengal C ongress, 
u n d er th e  le a d e r s h ip  o f Das and C h a k ra v a r t i ,  d ec id ed  to  adop t th e  
second co u rse : th e y  would bow to  th e  m a jo r i ty  d e c is io n  f o r  th e  p re s e n t 
b u t would work f o r  i t s  r e v e r s a l  a t  th e  end o f th e  y e a r .  T h is  m eant, 
how ever, t h a t  th ey  would be u n ab le  to  c o n te s t  th e  e l e c t io n s  and on
•)
15 Septem ber th e y  is su e d  a m a n ife s to  w ithd raw ing  t h e i r  c a n d id a tu re .
I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t ,  o f  th e  23 s ig n a to r i e s  to  t h i s  m a n ife s to , 
no t one was a Muslim. U nlike t h e i r  c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s  e lsew h ere  who were 
i n  th e  van o f th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  movement, th e  B en g a li Muslim 
p o l i t i c i a n s  were d o u b tfu l o f th e  wisdom o f b o y c o tt in g  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  Government.
The Hindu M odera tes, under t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  g u ru , th e  Hon’b le  
Mr S u ren d ra  Hath B a n a r j i  i n  a body a re  de te rm in ed  to  g iv e  a 
f a i r  chance to  th e  Reforms by e n te r in g  in to  th e  C ouncils  
^/warned A li Chaudhuri/« I n  such  a c a s e , i f  th e  Mussalmans 
keep them selves  a lo o f  from th e  p r e c in c t s  o f  th e  C ouncil chamber 
i t  w i l l  n e i th e r  rem ain  v aca n t no r w i l l  th e  Government be 
p a ra ly se d  th e re b y  b u t i t s  o n ly  d i s a s t r o u s  r e s u l t  would be 
th e  t o t a l  e x t in c t io n  o f th e  p o l i t i c a l  e x is te n c e  o f th e  
M ussalm ans.2
Abul Kalam Azad, how ever, was as  a c t iv e ly  engaged in  p e rsu a d in g  
Muslim c a n d id a te s  to  w ithdraw  from th e  e l e c t io n s  and h is  la r g e  
fo llo w in g  o f  v o c ife ro u s  K h i l a f a t i s t s  was, i n  i t s e l f ,  an argum ent which 
few p o l i t i c i a n s  could  ig n o re . F a z lu l  Huq, w ith  h is  e a r l i e r  maxims 
abou t le a d e r s h ip  c o n v e n ie n tly  f o r g o t t e n ,  was a b ig  enough f ig u r e  to
1
S e rv a n t ,* 15 Sep 1920.
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Views on P re s e n t P o l i t i c a l  S i t u a t i o n , p. 23»
speak openly ag a in s t n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  -  he could even h u rl p u b lic  
abuse a t  Azad and h is  p a r ty  ( ‘th e  w ises t amongst them do not possess
-j
the  b ra in s  o f a barndoor fow l1 ) -  b u t fo r  sm alle r men such o p p o s itio n
2would have been foo lhardy  in  th e  extreme* One by one the  Muslim 
Leaguers and the  Muslim members of Congress withdrew t h e i r  nom inations.
The V ic to rio u s  S urrender
In  the  twelve weeks th a t  remained b e fo re  Congress met ag a in  a t
Nagpur, th e re  was much confused a c t i v i t y  among Bengal Congressmen and
K h i la f a t i s t s .  Azad's  p a r ty  was busy d isco u rag in g  Muslim v o te rs  from
3
going to  the  p o l l s ,  w hile Das, C h ak rav arti and Pal t r a v e l le d  e x te n s iv e ly  
in  E a s te rn  Bengal in  an a ttem pt to  r a l l y  t h e i r  d isp e rse d  su p p o rte rs .^
The popular excitem ent over G andhi's  a c t i v i t i e s ,  which had been mounting 
s te a d i ly  throughout th e  y e a r , had reached such a p itc h  th a t  i t  had 
engulfed  many who e a r l i e r  had been s c e p t ic a l .  ' I t  i s  good to  be a l iv e  
in  th e se  d a y s , ' wrote Andrews d e lig h te d ly  on 1 November, 'ev en  i f  one
5
has not th e  heaven, which 7/ords w orth speaks o f ,  o f be ing  y o u n g .’
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L e t te r  to  th e  e d i to r ,  Englishm an» 24 Aug 1920.
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' I  re tu rn ed  from England in  1920 and thought of e n te r in g  p o l i t i c s ,  bu t 
the N on-co-operation  movement and K h ila fa t was very  s tro n g  ju s t  th en . 
Although I  d id n 't  agree w ith  th o se  g roups, I  r e a l is e d  th a t  th e  pub lic  
was opposed to  council e n try ; so I  decided  not to  c o n te s t th e  e l e c t i o n s . ' 
( S i r  Khwawja Nazimuddin in  in te rv ie w  w ith  a u th o r , Dacca, 10 Feb 1962.)
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In  th i s  atmosphere th e re  was no p lace  f o r  equ iv o ca tio n  and th e  c ry  
’For or a g a in s t? ’ became in s i s t e n t .  ’Are you a w hole-hogger? I f  so 
you a re  a non-cooperato r. Do you contend th a t  some o f the  item s in  
th e  programme are c a lc u la te d  to  do more harm to  th e  people th an  to  th e  
bureaucracy? W ell, damn you, you a re  no non-cooperato r bu t a re n e g a d e .’ 
This mood augured i l l  fo r  the  success of the  r e v i s io n is t  p a r ty  a t 
Nagpur, bu t i t  was determ ined not to  l e t  th e  is su e  go by d e fa u l t  and 
i t  was as a c tiv e  as i t s  opponents in  o rg a n is in g  su p p o rte rs  f o r  th e  t r i p  
to  B ih ar. The r e s u l t  was an e x tra o rd in a ry  m ig ra tio n . ’ . . .  w h ils t 
many of the prominent p o l i t i c ia n s  -were p r e s e n t , ’ re p o rte d  th e  Government 
o f In d ia , ' t h e  Bengal co n tin g en t inc luded  hundreds of ex -detenus and th e  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ,  which dominated e a r l i e r  C ongresses, seems to  have been 
swamped in  a mass of sem i-educated persons swept up from a l l  p a r ts  of 
I n d i a .1 2
W ithin the  Bengal d e le g a tio n  th e re  were a number o f w arring  groups
manoeuvring fo r  ascendancy, and fe e l in g  betw een them was so em b itte red
th a t  two m eetings held  on 26 and 27 December to  e le c t  th e  p ro v in c e 's
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  on th e  S u b jec ts  Committee, bo th  ended in  ug ly  f r e e - f o r -
3
a l l  f ig h t s .  Order was re s to re d  only when Gandhi in te rv en ed  in  person . 
Amrita Bazar P a t r ik a ,* 24 Nov 1920.
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GI, Home P o l i t i c a l ,  D eposit 3 (C o n fid e n tia l)  & K-W, Ju l 1921.
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N.C. B an e rji: At th e  Cross-H oads, p. 146. B engalee,* 30 Dec 1920 
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O  i • r
n  u  C
Das had come to  ITagpur de te rm in ed  to  o f f e r  a s to u t  r e s i s ta n c e  to
n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  h u t i t  was now c l e a r  t h a t  he cou ld  n o t even c a r ry  th e
whole Bengal c o n tin g e n t w ith  him i f  he opposed Gandhi* W ith a grand
g e s tu r e  he tu rn e d  d e fe a t  in to  v ic to r y .  H aving se c u re d  G an d h i's  p r iv a te
a ssu ra n c e  th a t  he would he l e f t  f r e e  to  pu rsu e  h is  own p o l i t i c a l
p ropaganda , he made th e  d ram a tic  announcement t h a t  he would move th e
1
m ain r e s o lu t io n  in  su p p o rt o f n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n .
With one s tro k e  Das had d ish e d  h i s  r i v a l s .  P rov ided  he co u ld  c a r ry  
h i s  own group  w ith  him -  and h is  p e rso n a l in f lu e n c e  was s u f f i c i e n t  to  
en ab le  him to  do t h i s  -  he now had a chance to  u n i t e  th e  whole Bengal 
c o n t in g e n t under h is  le a d e r s h ip .  He had s to le n  h is  o p p o n en ts ' p la tfo rm , 
and , hy s e c u r in g  G andh i's  endorsem ent, had clim bed a s te p  above them . 
They rem ained m erely  p ro v in c ia l  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  w h ile  he had secu red  a 
n a t io n a l  s ta n d in g . Most im p o rtan t o f  a l l ,  he cou ld  now r e tu r n  to  Bengal 
w ith  a r e u n i te d  b a t t a l i o n  a t  h i s  b ack  and a  job  o f work in  hand. Sven 
had he been  su c c e s s fu l in  p e rsu ad in g  th e  C ongress i n  fav o u r o f c o u n c il 
e n t r y ,  he would have been u n ab le  to  p ro v id e  a c t io n  f o r  h is  p a r ty ,  f o r  
th e  f i r s t  e le c t io n s  were over and th e  M oderates esconced i n  th e  c o u n c i ls  
f o r  a th r e e  y e a r  term . With n o n -c o -o p e ra t io n , he had a t a s k  f o r  h i s  
e a g e r  fo llo w e rs  -  and a p o p u la r t a s k  a t  t h a t .
P. C. Rays L i f e  & Times o f C.R. D as, p. 1p9*
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CHAPTER VI
THE MODERATES« FAILURE
The Council and the Politicians
At this stage the reader may feel constrained to point to the 
title of the thesis and protest that in the preceding three chapters 
his attention has been directed away from legislative affairs* 
Certainly the Council proceedings have contributed little to that 
narrative. This is a true reflection of their relative unimportance 
to Bengal politics in the years 1917 to 1920 but this is not to say 
that the Council as an institution was unimportant. It has been the 
argument of these three chapters that the Council was so important 
that its reconstruction precipitated a major political and social 
crisis. Had it been regarded as unimportant, the suggestion of 
reforms would not have excited such exaggerated hopes and fears 
throughout Bengali society; the Moderates would not have staked their 
political future on its satisfactory reconstruction; and, most 
significant perhaps, the Extremists would have had no hesitation in 
rejecting the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution.
In fact the Bengal Legislative Council, for all its shortcomings 
and the abuse which was heaped upon it as a consequence, was the focal 
point of bhadralok politics - as Gandhi discovered to his chagrin
9 r: g
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when he a ttem p ted , l ik e  th e  P ied  P ip e r  o f Hamelin, to  le ad  th e  B engali 
E x trem ists  away to  th e  joyous land  o f n o n -co -o p e ra tio n . They could 
h e a r th e  promise in  h is  tune but were r e lu c ta n t  to  leav e  th e  f a m il ia r  
p o l i t i c a l  haun ts o f t h e i r  peop le. They follow ed Gandhi, b u t w ith  many 
a r e g r e t f u l  backward g lance a t  th e  land  th ey  were le a v in g  to  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  and so c ia l  r iv a l s .
The s i tu a t io n  a t  the  beg inn ing  o f  1921 was not u n lik e  th a t  o f 
1909 o r ,  fo r  B engal, 1913« Again th e re  was a new c o n s t i tu t io n  and 
renewed hope o f a s ta b i l i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r. Again th e  Government and 
one s e c t io n  of p o l i t ic ia n s  were eag er to  work th e  reform s to  achieve 
t h i s  s t a b i l i t y  and to  b u ild  fo r  them selves a commanding p o s i t io n  in  
the  new o rd e r . Again th e re  was a group o u ts id e  th e  Council determ ined 
to  p reven t t h i s .
There w ere, however, s ig n if ic a n t  d if f e r e n c e s . The prom ise of 
fu tu re  self-governm ent had now been made by th e  B r i t i s h  and under th e  
c o n s t i tu t io n  of 1919> as a f i r s t  in s ta lm en t o f r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  th e  
Council had been g iven  g re a t ly  extended powers, in c lu d in g  c o n tro l over 
th e  a d m in is tra tio n  o f a number o f departm ents o f the  p ro v in c ia l 
Government. These advances encouraged th e  Government and th e  M oderates
1
The tr a n s fe r r e d  s u b je c ts ,  as they  were c a l le d ,  were: lo c a l  s e l f -  
governm ent, m edical a d m in is tra tio n , p u b lic  h e a l th ,  s a n i t a t io n ,  v i t a l  
s t a t i s t i c s ,  p ilg rim ag es , ed u ca tio n , p u b lic  works, a g r ic u l tu r e ,  c i v i l  
v e te r in a ry  departm ent, f i s h e r i e s ,  c o -o p e ra tiv e  s o c ie t i e s ,  f o r e s t s ,  
e x c is e , r e g i s t r a t io n  o f deeds, documents, b i r t h s ,  d eath s and m a rria g e s , 
r e l ig io u s  and c h a r i ta b le  endowments, development o f  in d u s t r ie s ,  s to r e s  
and s ta t io n e r y  re q u ired  fo r  t r a n s fe r re d  departm en ts, a d u l te ra t io n  o f 
fo o d s tu ff s  and o th e r a r t i c l e s ,  w eights and m easures, and l i b r a r i e s  and 
zo o lo g ica l gardens. (PP, 1 9 2 0 ,  ^Cmd. 8917» v o l. XXXV, p. 56O .)
to  hope th a t  th e  workings o f the  new Council would be f r e e  from the  
f r u s t r a t i n g  l im i ta t io n s  which had done so much to  d is c r e d i t  the  
Morley-Minto le g i s l a tu r e s .
A gainst t h i s  had to  be p laced  th e  g r e a te r  s tre n g th  o f the  o p p o s itio n  
o u ts id e  th e  C ouncil. There was no com parison between the  sm all d is ­
o rgan ised  group of E x trem is ts , d i s p i r i t e d  by p o lic e  p e rse c u tio n , which 
had made a s e r ie s  o f haphazard v e rb a l a t ta c k s  on the  members o f the  
o ld  c o u n c ils , and the  n o n -c o -o p e ra to rs , f u l l  o f sh in in g  zea l fo r  a 
g re a t cau se , u n ite d  in  a campaign o f d e s tr u c t io n  under an acknowledged 
n a tio n a l le a d e r  whose charism a enabled him to  appeal even to  th e  mass 
o f the  p e asa n try  a t  tim es o f c r i s i s .
I t  i s  the  purpose of th i s  c h ap te r to  t r a c e  th e  e f f o r t s  made by 
th e  Government and th e  v a rio u s  groups o f p a r t ic ip a t in g  p o l i t i c ia n s  to  
g e t th e  new in s t i t u t i o n s  o f l e g i s l a t i o n  and government working s a t i s ­
f a c to r i ly  in  th e  period  1921 to  1923, a g a in s t th e  background o f th i s  
h o s t i l e  n a t io n a l i s t  a g i ta t io n  -  the  a ttem p t to  tune  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
o rc h e s tra  in  s p i te  o f 'th e  savage jazz-band  o u t s id e ',  to  borrow a 
phrase from David Lloyd-George.** The s to ry  o f th e  non -co -o p era tio n  
movement, which w il l  appear here  only  in c id e n ta l ly ,  w ill  be to ld  in  
f u l l  in  th e  fo llow ing  ch ap te r as a p re lu d e  to  the  S w a ra jis ts ' trium ph 
a t  th e  1923 e le c t io n s  and t h e i r  dom ination o f th e  second Montagu- 
Chelmsford C ouncil.
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Quoted H.E.A. C otton: " P a r tie s  and P o l ic ie s  in  In d ia " , Contemporary 
Review, v o l. CXIX, 1921, p. 175*
The Character of the Relationship
Surveying the political prospect in January 1921, Tej Bahadur 
Sapru, Law Member of the Government of India and a leading Moderate 
politician, wrote:
I believe that one of the most important determining factors 
in the situation will be the character of the relationship 
which is established between the Government and the Legislative 
Assembly and the Council of State, and in the provinces, the 
manner in which the Ministers work and are allowed to work.
If at the end of the forthcoming legislative session the 
country finds that the new Councils have given a good account 
of themselves, and have exercised a more decisive influence 
than their predecessors, there is, I feel, every chance of a 
corresponding change in public sentiment towards the Government 
making itself manifest.1
The importance of this observation is that it was made, just as 
the reformed constitution was inaugurated, by one who was intimately in 
touch with the two parties most vitally concerned with the new institu­
tions: the Government and the Moderates. It gives an insight into the 
attitude with which they approached their task. The assumptions under­
lying Sapru's comment are significant. He believed that if the 
Government and the Moderate nationalists concentrated their attention 
upon the reformed legislatures, if they evolved a relationship which 
allowed the Indian Ministers and M.L.Cs. a decisive and demonstrable 
influence in the government of the country, and enabled them to 
implement measures which would secure wide public approval, they could 
effect a shift of opinion in political society at large in favour of
1
Minute, 25 Jan 1921, GI, Home Political, Deposit 3 (Confidential) k 
K-W, Jul 1921.
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  methods and co -o p e ra tio n  w ith  th e  B r i t i s h .  Presumably 
he hoped th a t  th i s  'change in  pu b lic  sentim ent* would r e s u l t  in  th e  
c o lla p se  o f non -co -o p era tio n  and th e  r e u n if ic a t io n  of th e  N ational 
Congress to  work the  reformed le g i s la tu r e s  a f t e r  the second g en era l 
e le c t io n  in  1923*
Sapru had put h is  f in g e r  on one spot on th e  b lu e p r in t  of th e  
re c o n s tru c te d  p o l i t i c a l  system and saids t h i s  i s  the  v i t a l  p o in t. Work 
t h i s  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  and the  system as a whole w il l  be a su ccess . By 
im p lic a tio n  he was say ing  th a t  o th e r p a r ts  o f th e  system  were o f le s s  
im portance. The Government need g ive  le s s  a t te n t io n  to  o th e r 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  th a n  to  the  l e g i s l a tu r e .  I t s  han d lin g  o f n a t io n a l i s t  
a g i ta t io n ,  v io le n t  o r n o n -v io len t, o u ts id e  th e  l e g i s l a tu r e  was no t of 
equal im portance to  i t s  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  n a t io n a l i s t s  in s id e . The 
work o f the  M oderates in  th e  Council was more im portan t than  t h e i r  
work in  o th e r  p u b lic  o r p o l i t i c a l  b o d ie s . T h e ir v ic to ry  a t  the  next 
e le c t io n s  would be secured by t h e i r  achievem ent in  th e  Council chamber 
and not p rim a rily  by th e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  in  t h e i r  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s . Although 
we must not d ism iss  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  Sapru was wrong, i t  i s  
in c o n te s ta b le  th a t  h is  a t t i tu d e  was shared by most Government members 
and Moderate p o l i t i c i a n s .  As we fo llow  the  s to ry  o f th e  reform ed 
Council in  Bengal from 1921 to  1923» we s h a l l  see th a t  th ey  ac ted  on 
th e se  assum ptions.
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The Governor and h is  M in iste rs
The most im portan t i n i t i a l  event fo r  a l l  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  th e  new 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  was th e  G overnor's s e le c t io n  o f  M in is te r s , fo r  th e  men he 
chose would form the  l in k  between the  Government and th e  L e g is la t iv e  
C ouncil, and th e  p r in c ip le s  by which he made h is  choice would determ ine 
th e  c h a ra c te r  o f the  r e la t io n s h ip  which was e s ta b lis h e d , Ronaldshay 
has l e f t  no sta tem en t of the  p r in c ip le s  upon which he ac ted  and we must 
p iece  to g e th e r  what s c a t te re d  c lues we have. F i r s t l y ,  we know th a t  
th e re  was c o n s u lta t io n  among the  heads o f th e  p ro v in c ia l Governments 
and between them and the  Government o f In d ia  on th e  p o l ic ie s  to  be 
adopted tow ards th e  reform ed in s t i tu t io n s .^  T herefore  we may p r o f i ta b ly  
examine the  re le v a n t proceedings o f the Government o f In d ia . These, 
we f in d ,  were concerned w ith  the problem o f r e s to r in g  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y - 
I t  was recogn ised  th a t  p o l i t i c a l  o rd er had been endangered by th e  
extended p erio d  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  re c o n s tru c tio n , d u ring  which th e re  
had been no s a t i s f a c to r y  in s t i tu t io n s  to  c o n ta in  p o l i t i c a l  e n e rg ie s , 
and th a t  t h i s  danger had been re a l is e d  in  th e  d iv is io n s  which had 
developed w ith in  the  N ational Congress, th e  s tr e n g th  which th e  non- 
c o -o p e ra tio n  movement had acqu ired  and th e  u n m itig a ted  abuse d ire c te d  
a t  the  Government. The Government o f In d ia  considered  i t  e s s e n t ia l  
to  g e t th e  reform ed in s t i tu t io n s  working w ith  w hatever m a te r ia l was to
1
E .g . conference o f heads o f Governments h e ld  a t  V iceregal Lodge, 
D e lh i, 22 Jan  1920. (GSB, Appointment, 6R-2 (1 - 8 ) ,  A3-10, Apr 1920.)
hand, and to  keep them working, fo r  th ese  in s t i t u t i o n s  would re l ie v e
i t s  i s o la t io n  and exposure to  c r i t ic is m ;  they  would o f f e r  a c e n tre  of
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  to  r iv a l  th e  n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  movement; and, i n  time
i t  was hoped, they  would g a in  s u f f ic ie n t  s ta tu r e  to  convince th e  non-
1
c o -o p e ra to rs  th a t  they  could not a ffo rd  to  s tan d  a lo o f .
Ronaldshay appears to  have accepted  t h i s  reaso n in g . A ddressing th e
f in a l  m eeting o f th e  o ld L e g is la t iv e  Council on 1 September 1920, he
emphasised th a t  the  reform ed c o n s t i tu t io n  would be worked no m a tte r
who opposed i t  and he suggested  th a t  those  who d id  would soon f in d
them selves lam enting  t h e i r  fo o lh a rd in e s s .
We sometimes h ear i t  s ta te d  th a t  th e  reform s a re  no t worth having . 
W ell, th e re  i s  no com pulsion upon anyone to  take  p a r t  in  them 
a g a in s t h is  own w ishes. Let those  who th in k  th a t  they  a re  not 
worth having stand  a s id e . There a re  even some who seem to  th in k  
th a t  they  can wreck th e  Reform Scheme. I  th in k  th a t  such persons 
have an a l to g e th e r  exaggerated  id e a  of t h e i r  own im portance. I  
b e lie v e  th a t  the  time i s  no t f a r  o f f  when they  w il l  d isco v e r 
th a t  they  a re  b u t f l i e s  upon th e  wheel o f th e  c h a r io t  o f p o l i t i c a l  
p ro g re s s , which they  a re  pow erless e i th e r  to  wreck o r to  s ta y  
upon i t s  onward c o u rs e .2
While d ism iss in g  th e  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  w ith  such nonchalance in  
p u b lic ,  Ronaldshay was c a re fu l to  keep open h is  p r iv a te  l in e s  o f 
communication w ith  them, fo r  he reco g n ised  th a t  they  commanded wide 
p u b lic  support and, i f  p o s s ib le ,  he wished to  persuade them to
3
p a r t i c ip a te  in  th e  new in s t i t u t i o n s .  They r e je c te d  h is  o v e rtu re s  and
1
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he th e n  tu rned  to  the  M oderates, w ith  th e  e x p l ic i t  in te n t io n  th a t  they
should  serve  as a co u n terp o ise . There could  he no q u e s tio n  o f t h e i r
re fu s in g  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  the  form ation  o f th e  new Government fo r
they  were committed to  the  reformed c o n s t i tu t io n ,  having fought fo r
the  reform s fo r  f iv e  y ears  and f i n a l ly  having withdrawn from the
Congress to  support them. The B r i t i s h ,  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  r e a l is e d  th a t
2such d ev o tio n  to  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  id e a l  should not go unrewarded 
and th a t  t h e i r  o b lig a tio n  to  the  M oderates could  b e s t be d ischarged  
by ap p o in tin g  th e i r  le ad e rs  as p ro v in c ia l M in is te rs .
With t h i s  as h is  c r i t e r io n ,  Ronaldshay had a s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  
ta s k .  ’I  had no d i f f i c u l t y ' ,  he reco rd ed , ' i n  s e le c t in g  as my c h ie f  
M in is te r ,  my o ld  c r i t i c ,  Babu S urendranath  B a n e r je a '.^  He was a lso  
w il l in g  to  accep t fo r  the  second m in is te r ia l  post B a n e r je a 's  nominee, 
Provas Chandra M itra , S ec re ta ry  of th e  N ational L ib e ra l League who had 
earned  th e  Government's g ra ti tu d e  by b rav in g  p u b lic  obloquy to  serve 
on th e  Eow latt Committee. To m ain ta in  a communal ba lance  amongst 
h is  M in is te rs  as he had done in  h is  E xecu tive Council w ith  Rahim 's 
appoin tm ent, Ronaldshay chose A li Chaudhuri fo r  th e  rem aining p o s it io n . 
Chaudhuri was an East B engali, which th e  Government considered  an
1
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advantage, and he had recently published a forthright attack on 
non-co-operation, ^
The Ministers’ Aspirations
For the Ministers, their appointment was both a goal attained and
an opportunity for further achievement. Chaudhuri's aspirations were
communal. He had fought hard to secure advantages for the Bengal
Muslims in the reformed constitution and then to persuade them that
they could further their communal interests by entering the new
institutions. As the Nawab of Dacca had done ten years before, he
argued that the Government held power independently of the two great
Indian communities and that it could be influenced to use that power
2to the Muslims’ advantage. His ministerial appointment gave him the 
opportunity of exerting this influence personally. He saw himself 
in a position similar to that which the Dacca Nawab had occupied 
under Carmichael's Administration: able to talk privily with the 
executive and, at the same time, gain information which would assist 
his community in determining- its course of action. In the new order 
he would have an additional role: that of political broker. By 
trading the votes of his communal bloc in the Legislative Council he 
would be able to secure direct concessions for his community from his 
fellow Ministers and Executive Councillors.
1
In a pamphlet entitled Views on Present Political Situation in India. 
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If the vision which Banerjea and Mitra had of their task was not 
as clear as Chaudhuri's, it was also not as limited. As lifelong 
campaigners for constitutional advance, they felt a sense of personal 
achievement in the new powers which had been secured in 1919 and they 
took up their portfolios happy in the knowledge that at last they could 
turn from agitation to construction. By a positive achievement they 
might prove to the British, on the one hand, that Indians could govern 
themselves, and to the non-co-operators, on the other, that the Moderates 
had been justified in supporting the reforms.^
For Banerjea in particular January 1921 was a great milestone.
He was an old tired man of 72, who had travelled a long way and taken 
many hard knocks from the Government and, latterly, from a younger 
generation of Indian nationalists. But now it all seemed worthwhile.
He was to be the first Indian ’chief minister' of Bengal, with a 
protege as one of his colleagues and a knighthood to boot. It was a 
great triumph for a man who had been dismissed ignominiously from the 
I.C.S. and who had spent most of his days at daggers drawn with the 
alien rulers of his country.
He was in good heart as he approached his new work. Revealing 
himself as a true son of bhadralok Bengal, he asked for the portfolios 
of Education and Local Self-Government but was told that secretariat 
arrangements would not permit of this combination. So he chose
Nation in Making, pp. 312-3.
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Local Self-Governm ent w ith P ub lic  H ealth , fo r  h is  am bition was to  
b r in g  down a B i l l  to  amend C urzon's C a lcu tta  M unicipal A ct, in  op­
posing  which he had staged  h is  famous w alk-out from the  C orporation  
in  1899» The reform ing Act was to  be h is  magnum opus: the  p roof 
th a t  th e  day had come when, by c o n s tru c tiv e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  endeavour, 
In d ian s  could r e c t i f y  th e  wrongs from which th ey  had su ffe re d  f o r  so 
long .^
The 1920 e le c t io n s  had ap p aren tly  g iven  him what he needed: a
Council composed la rg e ly  o f M oderates. I t  was h is  good fo r tu n e  th a t
th e  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  had ab sta in ed  from th e  c o n te s t fo r  they  were
e x tr a o r d in a r i ly  popular. As i t  was they  had shown t h e i r  s tre n g th  by
p u tt in g  up f iv e  lov^-class can d id a tes  in  th e  C hittagong and Noakhali
e le c to r a te s ,  hav ing  them re tu rn ed  by la rg e  m a jo r i t ie s  and th e n  ho ld ing
2t h i s  up as p roo f o f the  d is re p u te  of the  reform ed C ouncil. I f  th i s  
somewhat c y n ica l dem onstration  were d is re g a rd e d , as a lso  th e  success 
o f  th e  K h i la f a t i s t s  in  d issu ad in g  many Muslim urban  v o te rs  from going 
to  th e  p o l l s , J the  e le c t io n  r e s u l t s  could be considered  fav o u rab le  to  
th e  M oderates.
_
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The new Council comprised 139 members, o f whom 26 were nominated
or e x -o f f ic io  members, and 18 Europeans and A nglo-Ind ians. Of the
-|
rem aining 95 e lec te d  s e a ts ,  the  Muslims had 39 and the Hindus 56*
B anerjea  had the s a t i s f a c t io n  of see ing  26 of th ese  56 Hindu s e a ts
f i l l e d  w ith  fellow-members of the In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  and Moderate
p a r ty , and another 16 with B r itish  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  members. I t
seemed reasonab ly  c e r ta in  th a t  the M in is te rs  would command a m a jo rity
b u t th e re  was a group among- th e  new members which openly sym pathised
w ith  th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  and ta lk ed  of o b s tru c tio n  w ith in  th e  C ouncil.
Ho one could o f f e r  more than  a guess as to  i t s  p o te n tia l  s tre n g th .
I t  w ill  be ap p rec ia ted  by the Government o f In d ia  th a t  i t  i s  
extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  to  d esc rib e  p re c is e ly  o r in  a sm all compass 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  lean in g s  of pub lic  men a t th e  p re sen t time 
^/explained the  p ro v in c ia l Chief S ec re ta ry  in  a re p o r t  to  the 
deforms O ffice  i n  D elhi on 3 February 1921/ •  There are  no 
c le a r ly  defined  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s ,  and in d iv id u a ls  a re  swayed 
co n sid e rab ly  by th e i r  own personal p re d ile c t io n s  and o p p o r tu n i t ie s .  
The term  Moderate has been app lied  to  th o se  who, so f a r  as i s  
known, a re  not adheren ts  of the Congress as now dominated by 
M essrs. Gandhi and the  A li B ro th e rs , b u t w ith in  th i s  ca tego ry  
th e re  a re  many who have subscribed  to ,  and a re  s t i l l  in  
sympathy w ith  many of the  Congress p a rty  views p r io r  to  t h e i r  
most re c en t developm ents. Again, e s p e c ia l ly  on th e  case of 
th e  less-know n men, th e re  may be marked changes in  t h e i r  op in ions 
a f t e r  th e  in flu en ces  o p e ra tiv e  in  the  co u n c ils  are brought to 
b e a r .2
The p o l i t i c a l  complexion of the  Council was somewhat obscu re , 
bu t th e re  was no doubt about i t s  so c ia l  com position. D esp ite  the
PP, 1920, /Cmd. 8127, v o l. XXXV, pp. 295-9.
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e x ten s io n  of th e  f r a n c h is e ,  th e re  was a re a s s u r in g  s im i la r i ty  "between 
th e  su c c e ss fu l Hindu can d id a te s  a t  th i s  e le c t io n  and the  membership 
o f th e  M orley-M into c o u n c ils . H igh -caste  men again  took  most of th e  
s e a t s ,  w ith  zam indars and law yers predom inant. Almost tw o -th ird s  o f 
th e  Hindu members were u n iv e r s i ty  educated and approxim ately  th e  same 
p ro p o rtio n  had experience  in  lo c a l  government. I t  appeared , m oreover, 
th a t  th e  d e c is iv e  f a c to r  in  e le c t io n s  was s t i l l  lo c a l  in f lu e n c e , from 
la n d h o ld in g , c a s te ,  fa m ily , co n n ec tio n , w ealth  o r p e rs o n a lity . I t  
was s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  th e  one Hindu can d id a te  who campaigned on a p la t ­
form o f lan d  reform s in  an attem pt to  win th e  v o te s  o f the  newly- 
en fran ch ised  c u l t i v a to r s ,  had been thoroughly  trounced  by the  lo c a l  
m aharaja.^
The c o n te s ts  fo r  th e  Muslim s e a ts  rev ea led  many o f th e  o ld
2c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  a b ew ild erin g  number o f c an d id a te s  and in  West Bengal 
th e  m an ip u la tio n  o f th e  e le c to r a l  re g u la tio n s  by in f lu e n t i a l  C a lcu tta  
f a m il ie s ,  w ith  th e  Suhrawardy connection  proving  most a d e p t.^  In  
E a s te rn  and N orthern  B engal, however, th e re  was a s ig n i f ic a n t  develop­
m ent. Of th e  19 Muslims e le c te d  from ru r a l  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  th e se  
a re a s , te n  came from c u l t iv a t in g  fa m ilie s  and stood as re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
o f ' t h e  a g r ic u l tu r a l  i n t e r e s t ' . ^  This was a straw  in  the  wind.
_
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A ddressing a m eeting of Ind ian s  in  London in  1909 Baner je a  had
s a id ; 'Next to  the approbation  of h is  own co n sc ien ce , th e  h ig h e s t
reward to  which a pu b lic  man a sp ire s  i s  th e  applause of h is  fe llo w -
countrym en '. For B anerjea and h is  Moderate fo llo w ers  th e re  was no
applause  in  1921 • For once the  lo c a l  Hindu and Muslim p re ss  was
2u n ite d  and i t s  sympathy was wholly w ith  the  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs . I t
poured i t s  scorn  upon the  'c h a ra d e ' o f the  e le c t io n s .
Any Moderate o r "Jo hukum" who has tak en  in to  h is  head to  be 
e le c te d , has sen t h is  nom ination paper and, a f t e r  "due s c ru tin y "  
o f i t ,  has been d ecla red  e lec ted ] The e le c t io n  has been to  them 
ju s t  l ik e  a s t r o l l  in  the 'foaidan". And whom do th e se  w orth ies 
re p re se n t?  None but them selves. The supposed e le c to r s  have 
no t e le c te d  them. They have perhaps never heard of t h e i r  
" re p re s e n ta t iv e s " .3
The fo rm ation  of the  new Government brought even lo u d e r howls o f 
d e r is io n .  H ere, i t  was s a id , was the  p roof o f the  hollow ness o f B r i t i s h  
p ro te s ta t io n s  of a new re sp ec t fo r  In d ian  o p in io n . The appointm ent 
of a re a c tio n a ry  communalist l ik e  Chaudhuri and a d is c r e d i te d  tim e­
s e rv e r  l ik e  M itra  could only be in tended  as an a f f ro n t  to  p o l i t i c a l  
B engal.^  As fo r  B anerjea , w ith  h is  com fortab le  b i l l e t  and h is  k n ig h t­
hood, th e  b e s t th a t  could be done was to  b id  him a sad fa re w e ll from 
th e  n a t io n a l i s t  camp. 'S u rren d er Not B an e rjea ' o f th e  p a r t i t i o n  period
1
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was now ‘Sir Surrender1. ’ "The Lost Leader'*. I am sending you, Mr
Editor, a copy of the poem, a no more appropriate greeting than which,
I believe, could be addressed to the erstwhile leader of Bengal.
"Just for a handful of silver he left us, ^
Just for a riband to stick in his coat
The effect of this attack upon the Ministers - and this was true
for the Moderates as a whole - was to force them on to the defensive
from the beginning. When all their energies were required for the
problems of initiating the reforms, they were obliged to devote time
and effort to the profitless business of self-justification. And
this was a cross that they had to carry for the duration of their term
of office.
Financial Difficulties
On 11 January 1921 Ronaldshay convened the first meeting of his 
new Government. To the dismay of the Ministers, the Finance Minister 
J.H. Kerr presented a draft budget which showed an estimated deficit 
of more than two crores of rupees. He revealed that the provincial 
finances were in a desperate condition.
This was partly the result of the war, which had reduced the 
flow of British capital to India, had caused enormous inflation and 
had left the Government of India with a heavy deficit. In the same 
period the provincial Governments had been instructed to suspend all
1
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major development schemes and the salaries of civil servants had 
been pegged. Thus with the return of peace there was the need for 
extra expenditure to make up this leeway but in the immediate post­
war years there was a succession of poor harvests and finally a trade 
slump, which hit Bengal particularly hard because of the importance 
which the export of jute, tea and coal had assumed in its economy.^ 
Sven before the war the Bengal Government had found it increas­
ingly difficult to meet the growing demands upon the provincial 
revenues because the Permanent Settlement denied to the public purse 
any share in the increment in land values. For this reason Bengal 
had come to rely far more than any other province upon income tax 
and customs duties.
In 1920? however, the Meston Committee, which was formed to 
consider the financial changes which should accompany the introduction 
of the reformed constitution, recommended that these sources of 
revenue be given to the Government of India and that the provinces be 
left solely with the land revenue. Considering the contribution 
which each province should make to meet the Imperial deficit, it took 
account of the relatively low yield of the land revenue in Bengal and 
for this reason it set the initial contribution of the province at 
only six and a half per cent of the deficit. It insisted, however,
1
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th a t  th e re  was g re a t scope fo r  expansion in  th e  Bengal revenues and
i t  imposed a s l id in g  sca le  to  r a is e  B engal’ s c o n tr ib u tio n  to  19 per
1
cen t in  seven y e a rs . The Government o f Bengal o b jec ted  s tro n g ly  to
th e se  recommendations and in  view of i t s  p ro te s t  th e  J o in t  S e le c t
Committee suggested th a t  the p rov inces should r e t a in  th e  b e n e f i t  o f
any increm ent in  income tax . This p roposal was accep ted  by th e
Government o f In d ia  but th e  concession  proved o f l i t t l e  r e a l  advantage
2
because o f th e  tra d e  re c e s s io n .
Confronted w ith th i s  dism al p ro sp e c t, th e  M in is te rs  im m ediately 
ta lk e d  o f re s ig n in g  fo r  they  could see a l l  too  c le a r ly  th e  a l te r n a t iv e s  
fa c in g  them: e i th e r  to  impose new ta x a t io n ,  a su re  way o f  provoking 
th e  w rath  of the  p ro p e rtie d  c la s s e s ,  o r to  re tre n c h . This would mean 
abandoning developm ental schemes on which th ey  had pinned t h e i r  hopes 
o f g a in in g  c r e d i t  fo r  th e i r  a d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  tr a n s fe r re d  d e p a r t­
ments and i t  would a lso  mean th a t  th e  number o f jobs a v a ila b le  fo r  
d i s t r ib u t io n  as patronage would be reduced. In  e i th e r  case  the  success 
o f th e  reform s seemed to  be in  jeopardy .
E x e rc is in g  a l l  h is  n a tu ra l g e n ia l i ty ,  K err persuaded th e  M in is te rs  
to  tak e  a l e s s  p e ss im is tic  view o f  the  s i tu a t io n .  He ex p la in ed  th a t  
the  province had a c re d it  ba lance  o f n e a rly  th re e  c ro re s , th e  r e s u l t
1
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o f th e  f re e z in g  o f p ro v in c ia l funds d u rin g  th e  war, and th a t  th i s  
could he used to  t id e  th e  Government over the  f i r s t  y e a r . In  th e  
meantime he suggested th a t  every e f f o r t  should be made to  persuade 
th e  Government of In d ia  and th e  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  to  modify the  
Meston award.^
The M in is te rs  accepted h is  p ro p o sa l. They agreed to  e n l i s t
n o n -o f f ic ia l  support fo r  the  Government's re p re se n ta tio n s  and to  sponsor
a r e s o lu t io n  in  the  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. They had no d i f f i c u l t y  in
secu rin g  back ing  fo r  th i s  from t h e i r  fe llo w  M .L .C s., fo r  th e re  was
g en era l anger a t  the  way in  which Bengal had been t r e a te d  in  th e
2
f in a n c ia l  s e tt le m e n t, and when S urendranath  Ray reso lv ed  on 9 February 
th a t  the  a t te n t io n  o f th e  Government o f In d ia  be drawn to  the  J o in t  
S e le c t Committee’s recommendation th a t  Bengal rece iv e  sp e c ia l con­
s id e r a t io n ,  th e re  was not one d is s e n t ie n t  v o ice  in  th e  chamber.^
The M in is te rs  and the Council
What the  M in is te rs  had not reckoned w ith  were th e  demands which 
were th en  made fo r  economy in  th e  Government. At f i r s t  th e re  were one
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o r two m isguided su ggestions fo r  a g en era l re d u c tio n  in  th e  number of 
p u b lic  employees but such a p roposal was anathema to  the  bhadra lok  
and i t  was re je c te d  out o f hand. we have come up w ith  m otions
a g a in s t the  b e s t in t e r e s t s  o f th e  co u n try , a g a in s t the  educated 
community, a g a in s t p lead e rs  and a g a in s t th e  Subord inate  Judges and 
M unsifs. What i s  th i s ?  I t  i s  worse th a n  a n a rch y '.^  The same te n d e r­
n e ss , however, was not f e l t  fo r  th e  h igh  o f f i c i a l s  and th e re  was a
sp a te  of re s o lu tio n s  to  reduce th e  number o f Executive C o u n cillo rs
2
and M in is te rs , and to  cu t the l a t t e r s *  s a l a r i e s .  These had th e
3
support o f th e  p re ss .
The most d is t r e s s in g  fe a tu re  fo r  th e  M in is te rs  was th e  d i f f i c u l ty  
which they  experienced in  o rg an is in g  an o p p o s itio n  in  the  Council to  
th e se  r e s o lu t io n s .  They found th a t  t h e i r  success in  secu rin g  t h e i r  
p o r t f o l io s  was re se n te d  by many of t h e i r  s e n io r  co lle ag u es . The 
Suhrawardys, fo r  example, considered  th a t  one o f t h e i r  fam ily  should have 
been appoin ted  in s te a d  o f Chaudhuri,^ and Surendranath  Ray, fo r  so 
long  B auerj e a 's  r ig h t-h an d  man in  th e  l e g i s l a tu r e ,  was angered by th e
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l a t t e r * s  nom ination of M itra  as E ducation  M in is te r . As a sop he was
o ffe re d  the  p o s it io n  of D epu ty -P residen t o f th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council.
He accep ted  th i s  hut re fu sed  to  tak e  any s a la r y ,  em phasising th a t  he ,
2fo r  one, recogn ised  the  need fo r  economy.
I t  was soon eviden t th a t  the  o ld  in fo rm al c o n ta c ts  between 
c o u n c il lo rs  which had su ff ic e d  fo r  th e  conduct o f n o n -o f f ic ia l  b u s in ess  
in  th e  Morley-Minto l e g i s l a tu r e ,  were u n s a t is fa c to ry  in  th e  reform ed 
C ouncil, w ith  i t s  en larged  membership and extended powers. As th e  
Government observed l a t e r ,  th e  tro u b le  la y  p a r t ly  in  th e  u n rea l 
e x p e c ta tio n s  of the  o rd in a ry  M.L.C.: 'Each in d iv id u a l member except 
fo r  a few experienced hands i s  out to  run  Bengal in  h is  own way and 
to  in te r f e r e  in  every d e ta i l  o f th e  ex ecu tiv e  o r ju d ic ia l  a d m in is tra tio n  
and in  p a r t i c u la r  o f the  " n a tio n -b u ild in g  departm en ts’’. ’ "^ The e x is ten c e  
o f an e x tre m is t group of 25-30 Hindu members, whose sym pathies la y  
w ith  th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  and who were determ ined to  o b s tru c t th e  
Government,^ and th e  re lu c ta n c e  of th e  g re a t m a jo rity  o f th e  Muslims
5
to  co -o p e ra te  w holehearted ly  w ith  th e  H indus, were added d i f f i c u l t i e s ,
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but the crucial problem was the absence of organisation among the 
main body of Hindu Moderates - in Capital's words: 'a rabble of 
freelances whose personal and parochial jealousies are a bar to 
concerted action*.
The Ministers' experience in the old councils and on local bodies, 
where their personal influence had been sufficient to give them control 
had not prepared them for this situation and at first they were at a 
loss for an answer. Banerjea, suggesting that the appointment of 
Council Secretaries might be of some assistance, underlined this 
ineptitude:
My information is that parties are being formed today to be 
broken up the next day. Babu Surendra Nath Ray has, I 
understand, been deposed from the leadership of a party which 
he said he claimed as his own. Babu Radha Charan Pal tried 
to step into his shoes. Mr D.C. Ghose tried to throw oil 
upon the troubled waters. Everything seems to be in a fluid 
condition, and one or two Under Secretaries devoting themselves 
to the task of party organisation would help to evolve order 
out of chaos and form a strong party organisation for 
Government.2
The attempt to cut their salaries, coming as it did before they 
had had time to find their feet, sapped the Ministers' confidence and 
gave them an uncomfortable feeling of isolation from the Council.
As a result they turned for support to the officials, whom they 
implored to take up cudgels for them.
1
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I  regard  the  attem pt to  reduce th e  s a la r i e s  o f th e  M in is te rs  
as an e x tre m is t movement in s p ire d  by a s e c tio n  of th e  ex trem is t 
P ress  /B an erjea  to ld  h is  c o lle a g u e s /. They t r i e d  to  boyco tt 
the  C ouncils; and now th a t  the  a ttem p t has f a i l e d ,  the  a t ta c k  
i s  le v e l le d  ag a in s t the  moderate le a d e rs  who have been 
appoin ted  M in iste rs  . . . .  I  hope th e  Government w ill  oppose th e  
m otions and th a t  Members of the E xecu tive Council w ill  speak 
in  support of th e  Government view. I t  w ill  show th e  s o l id a r i ty  
th a t  e x is t s  between the two wings o f th e  Government, o f f i c i a l  
and popu lar. I t  w ill  in s p ire  p u b lic  confidence in  the  fu tu re  
o f re sp o n sib le  Government fo r  Bengal by dem onstrating  the  sense 
o f u n ity  and the  s p i r i t  o f c o -o p e ra tio n  th a t  p re v a il  in  th e  
counsels o f the  Government as a w h o le .1
The Executive C ouncillo rs accepted B an e rje a ’s argument and th e  heavy
a r t i l l e r y  was ro lle d  out to  shoot down the  re s o lu t io n s  when they  were
2
put to  th e  Council on 10 and 11 February .
Ronaldshay, however, d is l ik e d  u s in g  th e  o f f i c i a l  b loc  in  th i s  
way. He in s is te d  th a t  support fo r  the  M in is te rs  should be o rgan ised  
in  th e  Council and he encouraged S.R. Das, S tanding-Counsel to  the  
Government, to  ac t as a m in is te r ia l  whip. Das accepted  th e  ta s k  and 
s e t  about a rran g in g  conferences o f members to  d is c u s s  forthcom ing 
b u s in e s s ,“' bu t he had g re a t d i f f i c u l ty  in  overcoming the  su sp ic io n  
w ith  which he was regarded by many M.L.Cs. as a ’Government man’ . 
There was s t i l l  a widely held  c o n v ic tio n  th a t  th e  proper duty of a 
Council member was to  a g i ta te  a g a in s t th e  Government and, w ith  the  
n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  winning such acclaim  fo r  t h e i r  open d e fian ce  o f the
1
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Administration outside the Council, it seemed essential to keep
1attacking inside if all initiative were not to be lost.
The Extremist group encouraged this thinking and from the 
beginning were on the alert for an issue on which they could unite 
the non-officials to defeat the Government. The voting on the budget 
seemed a likely opportunity and they chose the police grant for a 
trial of strength. On 17 March, before a packed Chamber, Wasimuddin 
Ahmed, Muslim member for Pabna, moved that the demand for this depart­
ment be reduced by Rs. 23,32,700 to the budget figure of 1920-21. He 
was offering the Government an opportunity, he said, to demonstrate 
its respect for the opinions of the M.L.Cs. and thus refute the 
non-co-operators' assertion that the reformed Council was a puppet 
show. The abolition of some of the senior ranks in the police force 
would be a popular move and, at the same time, it would effect a 
worthwhile saving of funds.
The Extremists had chosen their ground well for even the old hands
would join in an attack on the police. Surendranath Ray declaimed:
For the last 8 years ray friend Maulvi Fazl-ul Haq and myself 
have condemned the increased expenditure on the police, but 
nobody heard us. It was a cry in the wilderness. We were on 
the alert, but as our mouths were stopped on account of the 
anarchist movement we could not say anything. Now that there 
is nobody who can say that the anarchists are still flourishing 
in the country, we have every right to ask the Government not 
to increase but to reduce the grant.
1
'If they did not go to the length of bearding the lion like their 
countrymen outside they might at least tweak his tail now and then.' 
(Drummond, pp. 119-20.)
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W heeler was in fu r ia te d  by th i s  unconcealed attem pt to  em barrass the  
Government. 'T h is  i s ,  i f  I  may say so , one o f th e  most ir r e s p o n s ib le  
re s o lu t io n s  which I  have heard moved in  t h i s  C ouncil, and ag a in , i f  
I  may say so , I  have seldom heard a s e r ie s  o f more i r r e s p o n s ib le  
s p e e c h e s ',  he thundered. His words were w asted. The m otion was c a r r ie d  
by 51 v o te s  to  42.
Ronaldshay regarded th i s  re s o lu t io n  as a s t r i c t l y  u n c o n s ti tu tio n a l 
in v a s io n  o f th e  powers of th e  reserv ed  h a l f  o f th e  Government and he 
co n sid ered  h im se lf ju s t i f i e d  in  e x e rc is in g  h is  s ta tu to ry  r ig h t  to  
r e s to r e  the  g ra n t. He r e a l is e d ,  however, th a t  such a c tio n  would d is ­
c r e d i t  th e  Moderates and give th e  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  an o th er hand le  w ith  
which to  b e a t the  Council. So he decid ed , a g a in s t th e  adv ice o f 
Wheeler and K err, to  t r y  to  m anipulate th e  Council p roceedings and 
have th e  g ra n t revo ted . He d ra f te d  a s e r ie s  of q u estio n s  fo r  S.R. Das 
to  put to  th e  Government and the  r e p l ie s  which Wheeler should g iv e .
Das: W ill th e  Hon'ble the  Member in  charge o f th e  P o lice  
Departm ent be pleased to  s ta t e  what a c tio n  w ill  be n e ce ssa ry , 
i f  e f f e c t  i s  given to  the  re c en t vo te  o f t h i s  Council reducing  
th e  P o lic e  g ran t by Rs. 23 lakhs?
W heeler: I f  e f fe c t  i s  g iven  to  th e  v o te  re fe r re d  to  as i t  
s ta n d s , i t  w ill  be necessary  to  abandon a l l  new schemes, and 
im m ediately  to  reduce e i th e r  the  pay o r th e  numbers of the  
F orce , o r bo th .
Das: Would Government be prepared to  m a in ta in  th e  Force a t 
th e  s tre n g th  and on the pay and term s o f se rv ic e  proposed by 
them, when the  Budget was su bm itted , u n t i l  the  Council has 
had f u r th e r  time to  consider th e  m a tte r?
BLCP, 17 Mar 1921, v o l. I ,  no. v , pp. 196-206.
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flh ee le r: I t  would obviously be im proper fo r  Government to  in c u r 
expend itu re  upon a sca le  which was in e v ita b ly  and pa lpab ly  in  
excess o f th e  sum voted, and, should th ey  do so , th e  a u d it 
a u th o r i t ie s  would most c e r ta in ly ,  and p ro p e rly , comment ad v erse ly  
upon th e i r  a c tio n . Moreover, i f  such an a c tio n  was taken  in  the 
e a r l i e r  months o f the  y e a r , subsequent re d u c tio n s  would 
n e c e s sa r ily  be s t i l l  more d r a s t i c .
I t  was arranged th a t  C.W. Rhodes, a Bengal Chamber o f Commerce
r e p re s e n ta t iv e ,  should then  move fo r  an adjournm ent to  d isc u ss  th e
grave s i tu a t io n  revealed  by th ese  replies.**
The b u s in ess  came befo re  the  Council on 1 A pril and a l l  went
acco rd ing  to  p lan . The Government had been a c tiv e  in  the  p reced ing
te n  days e n l i s t in g  support among th e  M.L.Cs. and th e  adjournment
2d ebate  was c h a ra c te r is e d  by a more c o n c i l ia to ry  to n e . This gave th e
Governor th e  excuse he wanted to  avoid c e r t i f y in g  th e  p o lic e  demand
and b e fo re  the  middle of the  month he had persuaded th e  Council S tand ing
Committee on P o lice  to  recommend a supplem entary g ra n t ,  which was
3
c a r r ie d  through th e  Council on 21 A p ril.
•On th e  whole I  th in k  th a t  we may c o n g ra tu la te  o u rse lv es  upon 
having  got round a ra th e r  awkward co rn e r s a t i s f a c t o r i l y * , wrote 
Ronaldshay to  Montagu a week l a t e r . ^  He had avoided a d i r e c t  c la sh  
between th e  Government and the  Council which, a t  th a t  e a r ly  s ta g e ,
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would have endangered the workings of the institution and he had, 
he hoped, enabled the Moderates to retreat without losing face« He 
was unduly sanguine. In fact his device was so transparent that it 
was treated with derision by the non-co-operationist press. ’Are we 
to call this trickery by the name of co-operation?1 asked the Nayak.
’Do you mean to achieve the salvation of the country through these 
means? If that be so, we must frankly say that non-co-operation is a 
thousand times better than this servile form of co-operation’.
-)’Shamelessness, thy name is ’’Council membership”, * declaimed Swat antra.
At the same time, scorn was heaped upon the Ministers for their
apparent inability either to influence the reserved side of the
Government or to control the Council. ’... as cockroaches are to
birds our ’’Reform” Ministers are to the English and Dominion Ministers’,
2sneered the Amrita Bazar Patrika. In the Nayak* s opinion Bannerjea 
was ’now nothing but a black edition of Sir Henry Wheeler’ and Liberty 
spoke of the Ministers as ’mercenary partisans’.^
The Testing Time
Writing to Sapru from London on 1 June 1921, Evan Cotton, a member 
of the India Office Advisory Committee, ventured the opinion that the
T
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reformed institutions would shortly face their severest trial.
'I do feel that while the reforms have been attended with remarkable 
success, the danger point has not yet been passed1, he said. 'lid 
year will see the testing time: when Ministers have matured their plans 
and the question of providing funds becomes insistent. Finance has 
always been present to my mind as the great difficulty in the way.
I should be sorry therefore if the public attention were in any way
Idistracted’.
The Ministers also realised that although the conclusion of the 
Budget session gave them a breathing space they could not afford to 
remain idle. In particular they had to consolidate their position in 
the Council if they were not again to be forced into a humiliating 
dependence upon the officials. Bannerjea therefore set about organising 
a legislative party, with S.R. Das as his chief whip, and an M.L.Cs. ’ 
club - the Constitutional Club - as a rallying point. The Extremists 
refused to participate. Ali Chaudhuri was willing to lend the support 
of his Muslim followers, but made it clear that they remained, first 
and foremost, a communal bloc. The European and Anglo-Indian non­
officials pledged their allegiance to the Ministers, and the balance 
of the Hindu members, 30 or so in number, expressed their willingness 
to co-operate with Bannerjea and Mitra, although they were reluctant
_
Sapru papers
to  extend th i s  to  Chaudhuri.^ They were a lso  chary  o f becoming
invo lved  in  a formal p a rty  o rg a n is a tio n , fo r  th i s  suggested  a p u b lic
commitment to  the Government and th a t  was no way of advancing* o n e 's
p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r  in  the  atmosphere o f h o s t i l i t y  th en  p re v a il in g .
Consequently th e  C o n s titu tio n a l Club was no g re a t  success and in  the
Council th e  M in is te rs  could be assured  o f support only fo r  th e  le s s
2c o n tro v e rs ia l  q u estio n s  concerning the  t r a n s fe r r e d  departm ents.
The non -co -o p era to rs  a lso  regarded m id-year as a te s t in g - t im e  
and t h e i r  d e te rm in a tio n  was to  d i s t r a c t  p u b lic  a t te n t io n  from th e  
L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. In  the e a r ly  months o f  1921 they  had been 
s t i r r i n g  up labou r tro u b le  and they  achieved th e i r  g r e a te s t  success in  
A p ril and May when they  persuaded a la rg e  group of Assam te a  la b o u re rs  
to  le av e  the  gardens fo r  th e i r  homes in  B ihar and the  U nited P ro v in ces . 
The m a jo rity  o f th e se  co o lie s  became s tran d ed  a t  Chandpur, a s team er- 
s t a t io n  on th e  r iv e r  Padma in  E aste rn  B engal, and th ey  su ffe re d  severe 
h a rd sh ip  b e fo re  arrangem ents were made f o r  t h e i r  forward t r a n s p o r t .  
There was g en era l anger a t  the  Government's h and ling  o f the  s i tu a t io n  
and th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  secured much p u b l ic i ty  fo r  th e i r  work among 
th e  d is t r e s s e d .
The M oderates came badly out of th e  a f f a i r .  For th e  two months, 
May and June, when i t  dominated th e  news h e a d lin e s , th e  Council was
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not in session and the issue was fought out between the officials and 
the non-co-operators. The latter were quick to draw attention to the 
Moderates' absence and to point the moral that they were no longer of 
any significance.
When the Council met again in July they were faced with the awkward
choice of either joining in the popular attack on the Government and
thereby enhancing the non-co-operators' victory, or echoing the
Government's strictures on the non-co-operators and being' written off
by their countrymen as lackeys of imperialism. They vacillated between
the two - alternately criticising- the Government and the non-co-
operators - with the result that they got the worst of both worlds.
2Each side dismissed them as tools of the other, and they were even 
upbraided by the Calcutta European press, which up until this time 
had commended them for their support of the reforms.^
Elated by this success, the non-co-operators pressed home their 
advantage. They kept the agitation in Eastern Bengal going through 
strikes on the railways and in Calcutta they organised a series of 
demonstrations and hartals. In October the Congress leader in 
Chittagong, J.M. Sen Gupta, and a number of his followers were arrested 
and brought to Calcutta for trial. Nothing could have been more
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embarrassing for the Moderates than the sight of their rivals, bedecked
with the martyr’s garlands, being cheered triumphantly to gaol - and
well the non-co-operators knew it. These are the fruits of the reforms,
they said, the products of a mixed brown and white bureaucracy: a
costlier administration, an unending prospect of new taxation and,
1worst of all, repression. ’There are only two parties in India just
now and not more', declared the Dainik Basumati. 'One is the
2nationalist party and the other the traitors’.
The disorders continued and after serious violence in Calcutta in 
November 1921 the provincial Government applied the Indian Criminal 
Law Amendment Act and the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act. Wide- 
scale arrests were made in the second week in December. Now the 
Moderates were in serious trouble. The enforcement of this repressive 
legislation offended their nationalist sentiment but how could they 
voice their anger without appearing to be merely spokesmen for the 
non-co-operators? When on 19 December a Calcutta member, Surendranath 
Mallick, moved for an adjournment to discuss the matter, Wheeler had 
no hesitation in accusing him and his supporters of irresponsibility. 
R.M. Watson-Smyth, a Bengal Chamber of Commerce representative, was 
more outspoken. ’Government has now taken action and its authority 
has been challenged, and the time has come when we must declare our­
selves on one side or the other', he said. 'We have come to the
1
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p a r t in g  of the  ways . . . .  H atred , u n fo r tu n a te ly , i s  a t  th e  bottom  of 
a g re a t deal of th is  movement ag a in s t th e  Government. R acial h a tre d , 
th e  b lin d  h a tred  of the  East fo r  the  West’ . This brought angry d e n ia ls  
from th e  In d ian  n o n -o f f ic ia ls  and Burdwan, r i s in g  l a t e  in  th e  d eb a te , 
f e l t  th e  need fo r  a r a l ly in g  speech. He was c o n fid e n t, he s a id ,  th a t  
the  s p i r i t  in  the  country  was not as bad as i t  was re p re se n te d  and 
th a t  many re sp o n sib le  men approved o f th e  a c t io n  th a t  had been taken . 
' I ,  fo r  m yself, wish to  s ta t e  c le a r ly  th a t  what has been done by th e  
Government of Bengal has had my f u l l e s t  s u p p o rt’ . A v o ice : ’What 
about th e  M in is te rs ? ' 1
This in te r j e c t io n  touched a so re  p o in t. I t  was s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  
none of the  M in is te rs  had taken  p a r t in  th e  d eb a te . They h e ld  t h e i r  
peace fo r  of a l l  the  Moderates they  were i n  th e  most w retched p o s it io n . 
R epressive  le g i s l a t i o n  was no more ag reeab le  to  them th an  to  t h e i r  
fe llo w  n a t io n a l i s t s  but in  the l ig h t  o f th e  in fo rm atio n  about th e  r i o t s  
th a t  was a v a ila b le  to  them as members o f th e  Government, they  saw the  
q u e s tio n  in  a d i f f e r e n t  p e rsp ec tiv e . With th e  whole o f p o l i t i c a l  
Bengal up in  arms a t  the Government's a c t io n ,  however, i t  would have 
been  s u ic id a l  fo r  them to  speak out as Burdwan had done; y e t they  
could not jo in  in  th e  a tta c k s  w ithout be in g  d is lo y a l  to  Ronaldshay and 
th e  E xecu tive Council. They were not c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  re sp o n s ib le  
fo r  the a c tio n s  of the  reserved  h a l f  o f th e  Government b u t in  the  
popu lar view they were im plica ted  in  what had been done.
1
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Their position was made especially difficult "by the practice 
prevailing in the Government of Bengal of joint consultation between 
Executive Councillors and Ministers on all important questions of 
policy* This system had been initiated by Ronaldshay, with the -best 
of intentions and the full approval of the Ministers, to assist in 
the creation of a spirit of mutual confidence within his Government. 
The responsibility for a decision lay solely with one or other half of 
the Government, but by encouraging free discussion between both sides 
Ronaldshay hoped to build a team spirit. He considered it vital to 
keep the reformed institutions working and this system, although it 
offended against the strict division of functions, seemed to assist in 
doing that. Ronaldshay was pleased with the result. 'The relations 
between the two halves of my Government have been excellent', he 
told Montagu in April 1921, 'and I have invariably discussed matters 
of importance round a table at which Members of the Executive Council 
and Ministers sat. Sweet reasonableness has been the outstanding 
feature of all such discussions'.
Initially the Ministers were well pleased with an arrangement 
which brought all administrative issues within their cognisance but 
it was soon public knowledge that they participated in the discussion 
of reserved subjects and, when unpopular decisions were taken, they 
were considered blameworthy. Their only loophole was the fact that
1
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no v o te  was tak en  a t  the  jo in t  m eetings. The f in a l  d e c is io n  on 
re se rv ed  su b je c ts  re s te d  w ith  the  Governor and Executive C ouncil.
T his one rem aining means o f escape , however, was c losed  by R onaldshay 's 
su cc e sso r, th e  E arl o f L y tto n .
Another Man w ith  a M ission
L y tto n  came to  Bengal in  March 1922 f re s h  from th e  In d ia  O ff ic e ,
where, as U nder-S ecre tary  fo r  two y e a r s ,  he had been in s p ire d  by
Montagu*s enthusiasm  fo r  th e  reform s. In  ta k in g  up the  governorsh ip
he had a s tro n g  sense o f m ission . ’At th a t  tim e I  f e l t  th a t  th e
moment was c r i t i c a l  in  the  h is to ry  o f In d ia , and th a t  i t  was a l l -
im portan t to  g e t the Reforms s ta r te d  on the r ig h t  l in e s * ,  he wrote
in  h is  memoirs. ' I  b e liev ed  th a t  I  might ren d e r v a lu ab le  s e rv ic e  in
t h i s  c a p a c ity , and the  c a l l  seemed to  me one which I  could not r e f u s e '.
He f e l t  th a t  he was making a g re a t s a c r i f i c e  in  in te r ru p t in g  a t  th e
age of 45 a d is tin g u ish e d  p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r  which could be expected to
g ive  him a p o s i t io n  in  th e  Cabinet a t  an e a r ly  d a te . His in te n t io n
2was to  re tu rn  to  England as soon as he had accom plished h is  ta s k .
Although he had no experience  o f  In d ia , he had a c le a r  v is io n  
o f what th a t  ta s k  invo lved : the  p re p a ra tio n  o f Bengal fo r  a fu r th e r  
t r a n s f e r  o f power by th e  development o f th e  p a rliam en tary  system and
1
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the provision of opportunities for Indians to influence all decisions 
of Government.
With the first end - the development of the parliamentary system •
in view, he drought Evan Cotton out from England to succeed the ailing
Shamsul Huda as President of the Bengal Legislative Council. Cotton
came of a family which had served the Company and Crown in India for
more than 150 years. Following in the footsteps of his father, Sir
Henry, he had given up a successful career at the Calcutta Bar in
1906 to work in England for Indian constitutional reforms. He had
lived off interest from investments and devoted his time to lobbying
on behalf of the Indian National Congress. From 1910 he had also
served on the London County Council. As a member of the India Office
Advisory Committee he had assisted Montagu with the work involved in
implementing the new constitution and from 1920 he had been Honorary
Secretary of the Indian Reforms Committee, *a British Organisation in
2support of the Moderate Party in India*. Eager as he was to return 
to India and holding opinions similar to Lytton's own, he seemed the 
very man to assist the new Governor in his liberal undertaking.^
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'The Morning; Post has been holding up its hands in horror at the 
notion that the British, who came to India as conquerors and remained 
on as sahibs, should continue as servants. But that, and none other, 
is the inner meaning of the reforms which have come into being: nor 
is there anything in the appellation of "servant of India" of which 
an Englishman need feel ashamed'. (Cotton: "Parties and Policies in 
India", Contemporary Review, vol. CXIX, 1921, p. 176.)
O  ( , r
» J l
In pursuing his second aim - the provision of opportunities
for Indians to influence administrative decisions - Lytton was
following* a line marked out hy Montagu. ’I am quite sure now, that
we have got to go in for Indianization’, Montagu had written in
July 1921. ’We have got to realize that self-government does not
merely mean political reform, but the substitution of an indigenous
administration for a foreign administration*. It was this spirit
of Indianization that Lytton intended to promote and he would give
evidence of his intention by taking his Indian Ministers into his
full confidence. He would conduct his Government as a unit, treating
both Executive Councillors and Ministers as members of a single
Cabinet. Henceforth there would be joint decision as well as joint
2discussion on all matters of substance. And determined that his 
intention should be publicised, he informed the members of the 
Legislative Council of his decision in his reply to their address of 
welcome on 31 March 1922.^
The comparison with Carmichael is remarkable. Here again was 
a British Liberal with a sense of mission, coming full of goodwill 
and determined to press ahead faster than a strict interpretation of 
the constitution would allow because of his conviction that Bengal
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was ready for a further transfer of power. Unfortunately there were 
the same heartbreaking- disappointments in store for him and, like 
Carmichael, he was to leave Bengal a disillusioned man. In his memoirs 
he wrote of his decision to accept the appointment as Governors 
’Had I known then what I came to know later - that the discontented 
Indian Nationalists, whom I hoped to win by sympathy, did not want a 
sympathetic Government, but either a Government of their own making or 
one which they could abuse as tyrannical - I would never have gone to 
India. Had my decision been different it would have been no worse for
•tIndia and certainly very much better for myself*.
Disappointments
His troubles began even before he reached Calcutta. On embarking
for India at Marseilles he learnt that Montagu had been forced to
resign from the India Office following a dispute with the Cabinet.
Lytton was unhappy at the prospect of working with his successor,
2Lord Peel.
As a further blow to his optimism he found that his initial 
efforts to win public support in Bengal were regarded with suspicion. 
Replying to the address of welcome from the British Indian Association, 
for instance, he described the reformed constitution as a bridge over
1
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which In d ia  might walk to  the  promised land  o f self-governm ent. This
provoked what to  L y tton  seemed a c h u r l is h  r e t o r t  from the  Amrita
B azar P a tr ik a  under th e  heading ’B ridge o r  t r a p ? ’ : ’The mirage of a
b rid g e  i s  thrown over the  r iv e r .  And th e  m a jo rity  o f our countrymen
f e a r  th a t  they  w ill  be drowned in  trying* to  c ro ss  i t .  A few have made
2th e  a ttem p t and a re  s in k in g  in  t h e i r  f u l l  v iew ’ .
When L y tto n  tu rned  h is  a t te n t io n  to  th e  d e ta i l s  of a d m in is tra tio n , 
he was ap p a lled  by the  s t a t e  o f th e  p ro v in c ia l f in a n c es . As expected 
th e  d e f i c i t  fo r  1921-22 had exceeded two c ro re s  thereby  d e p le tin g  the  
p ro v in c ia l  b a lan ces . The Government o f  In d ia  had re m itte d  the  
p ro v in c ia l  c o n tr ib u tio n  fo r th e  y e a r b u t i t  had re fu sed  to  re c o n s id e r  
th e  Meston award and continued com plain ts from Bengal had provoked a 
sharp  reprim and from the  V iceroy in  December 1921.^ The p ro sp ec t of 
red u c in g  expend itu re  on the  t r a n s fe r r e d  departm en ts, so v i t a l  to  th e  
su ccess o f the  reform s; o f im posing new ta x a t io n ;  and o f conducting  a 
runn ing  f ig h t  w ith  the Government o f In d ia  over th e  Meston award 
was alm ost too  much fo r  L y tton  and fo r  some months he ta lk e d  des­
pondently  o f re s ig n a tio n .^
_
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He was a lso  d is t r e s s e d  by th e  a n tip a th y  towards h is  p o lic y  of
In d ia n iz a t io n  d isp lay ed  by B r i t i s h  I .C .S . o f f i c e r s ,  in s id e  and o u ts id e
h is  Government, and by th e  end o f h is  f i r s t  y e a r  in  Bengal he had
reached the  co n c lu sio n  th a t  f u r th e r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  advance would have
to  aw ait th e  growth o f a new s p i r i t  among- th e  o f f i c i a l s .
The im plem entation  o f the Montagu-Chelmsford reform s had been
accompanied by w holesale re s ig n a tio n s  from the  s e rv ic e s , e s p e c ia l ly
2of s e n io r  I .C .S . o f f ic e r s ,  and w ith  a growing problem of rec ru itm en t 
in  England, g riev an ces  over s a la r ie s  and resen tm ent a t  th e  a t ta c k s  made 
by Congress p o l i t i c i a n s ,  morale in  the  s e rv ic e s  was p a r t i c u la r ly  low 
in  1922*^ From th e  o f f i c i a l s '  v iew point no th ing  could have been more 
un tim ely  th a n  th e  new G overnor's p u b lic ise d  d e te rm in a tio n  to  g ive  
In d ia n s  in c re a se d  say in  Government p o lic y . T h e ir sen tim en ts  were 
f a i t h f u l l y  rep re se n te d  in  th e  subm ission o f a Bengal D is t r i c t  Super­
in te n d e n t o f P o lice  to  th e  Royal Commission on S u p erio r P u b lic  S erv ices  
in  1923s 'The b i t t e r  a tta c k s  made upon our S erv ice  by Members o f  the 
C ouncils and in  the  N a tio n a lis t  P re s s , the  g ro s s ly  b ia sse d  and ly in g  
re p o r ts  re g a rd in g  "P olice  o p p ress io n " , . . .  a l l  th ese  compel me to  
b e lie v e  th a t  we are  u n lik e ly  to  be g iven  f a i r  p la y , should we be p laced
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under the control of any Body likely to he influenced hy the voice of 
the audible minority’.
From the members of the Bengal Executive Council, who had previously 
kept their grumbles to themselves, Lytton’s policy provoked open ob­
jections. They complained that ’the ’’decisions of joint meetings”
have substantially influenced the ’’orders of the Executive Council”
2in a way that they were not intended to do' and they protested at the 
amount of their working time that was wasted ‘in the present state of 
fusion between politics and administration'.^ Their disagreements 
with Lytton came to a head over a suggestion from the Government of 
India to reduce the size of the provincial Executive Council. They 
thought this a reasonable proposal but they were angry when Lytton 
suggested that it would be a nice gesture to submit the matter to the 
Legislative Council for consideration. 'I consider it a very dangerous 
practice to allow the Legislative Council to have a finger in the pie 
with regard to appointments by the Crown, and I would strongly deprecate 
that procedure', wrote Burdwan as senior member of the Executive 
Council. The two British members were of the same opinion and Lytton 
had to drop the idea.^
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His Ministers fully approved of his policy but after a time even 
they were forced to admit that their difficulties had been increased. 
The practice of joint decision left them wide open to attack in the 
legislature and, at the same time, they were subjected to increasing 
pressure from the Executive Councillors to give public support to the
-jmeasures of which they had approved in private.
The refusal by the members of the Legislative Council to recognise
the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects greatly 
2annoyed Lytton, and dissolving the first reformed Council in August 
1923 he told them that this had been their chief shortcoming. 'There 
is no very marked difference of attitude towards that portion of the 
Executive which is responsible and that which is still irresponsible', 
he said. 'Both are indescriminately classified as the Bureaucracy and 
regarded as a fair target for invective'.^ His complaint was unreason­
able in view of his own determination to disregard dyarchy and, by 
the time he left Bengal in 1927» he had realised that the error was 
his own. He wrote in his memoirs:
Looking back at the end of my five years, I thought that I had 
probably made a mistake in treating my Government as a single 
unit and making no distinction between the Reserved and 
Transferred Departments. I had hoped by so doing to give my 
Ministers a voice in the whole policy of the Government and to 
make the Legislative Council feel that they too were concerned
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w ith  the  po licy  of Government as a whole. The only r e s u l t ,  
however, was to  id e n t i fy  the M in is te rs  w ith  a Government th a t  
was d is l ik e d ,  and to  weaken in s te ad  of strengthening- t h e i r  
p o s i t io n .1
U n iv e rs ity  of C a lcu tta
L y tto n f s d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  the Executive and L e g is la t iv e  C ouncils 
were h is  most se r io u s  hut they received  le s s  p u b lic  a t te n t io n  than  a 
d isp u te  in  which he was involved w ith th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f C a lc u tta . This 
was a s ig n if ic a n t  a f f a i r  fo r  i t  arose from a c la sh  between th e  Montagu- 
Chelmsford Government and le g i s la tu r e  -  new in s t i t u t i o n s  e x e rc is in g  
new powers -  and th e  V ice-C hancellor and Senate o f th e  U n iv e rs ity  -  
o ld  i n s t i t u t i o n s  try in g  to  co n so lid a te  t h e i r  powers.
The d isp u te  revolved around th e  commanding f ig u re  of S i r  Asutosh 
M ukherjea, th e  most ou ts tan d in g  and c o n tro v e rs ia l  p e rs o n a lity  in  
bhad ra lo k  so c ie ty . M ukherjea's l i f e  had been ru le d  by two lo v e s : th e  
High Court and th e  U n iv e rs ity . His devo tion  to  th e  form er had been 
rewarded w ith  a judgeship  and to  the  l a t t e r  w ith  the  p o s i t io n  o f V ice- 
C hance llo r. He had been g iven  th i s  appointm ent f i r s t  in  1906 a f t e r  
h is  u n su ccessfu l but o u ts tan d in g  campaign a g a in s t Curzon’s U n iv e rs i t ie s  
A ct, and he served fo r  an unprecedented term of e ig h t y e a r s ,  d u rin g  
which tim e he was in s tru m en ta l in  widening th e  u n iv e r s i ty 's  range o f 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  f i e ld  of p o s tg rad u a te  te ac h in g  which 
was h is  c h ie f  p reoccupation .
1
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A u to c ra tic  by n a tu re , be made many enemies and when, a f t e r  h is
replacem ent as V ice-C hancellor in  1914} he continued  to  use  h is  in flu en ce
to  c o n tro l th e  development o f th e  p o s t-g ra d u a te  departm en ts, a p a r ty  was
o rgan ised  in  the  Senate to  oppose him. I t  was un su ccessfu l in  p rev en tin g
h is  having a l l  p o s t-g rad u a te  teach in g  co n so lid a ted  under th e  u n iv e r s i ty 's
c o n tro l and th i s  development rece iv ed  th e  approval o f th e  C a lcu tta
•)
U n iv e rs ity  Commission which re p o rte d  in  1919»
The Commission a lso  recommended th a t  ju r i s d ic t io n  over th e  u n iv e r s i ty  
be tr a n s fe r r e d  from the  Government o f In d ia  to  th e  Government o f Bengal 
and th i s  was e ffe c te d  in  March 1921, w ith  th e  Governor o f Bengal r e ­
p la c in g  th e  Viceroy as C hancellor and th e  p ro v in c ia l M in is te r  o f 
E ducation  assuming re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  u n iv e r s i ty  a f f a i r s .
At the  same tim e, Mukherjea was in v ite d  by Ronaldshay to  serve  
ag a in  as V ice-C hancello r. This p e rtu rb ed  h is  opponents and, in  search  
o f a course o f a c tio n , they h i t  upon the  id ea  o f a tta c k in g  h is  
a d m in is tra tio n  through th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, which now had a u th o r i ty  
over th e  u n iv e r s i ty .  They were ab le  to  e n l i s t  a l l i e s  amongst th e  
E a s te rn  Bengal members who fea red  th a t  M ukherjea 's  ex p an s io n is t p o l ic ie s
would d ra in  fin an ce  from the  new U n iv e rs ity  o f Dacca, which had a lso
2
been t r a n s fe r re d  to  th e  co n tro l o f th e  Government of Bengal. In  
August 1921 R ish in d ran a th  S a rk a r, a High Court law yer and member fo r
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Bankura West, moved fo r  an enquiry  in to  the  f in a n c ia l  a d m in is tra tio n
o f th e  u n iv e r s i ty ,  a lle g in g  grave i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  in  the  expend itu re
on th e  p o s t-g rad u a te  departm ents. A fte r a heated  debate  l a s t in g  two
days in  which charges of personal m alice were made, th e  m otion was
1
c a r r ie d  by a narrow margin.
This brought a v igorous c o u n te r -a tta c k  from Mukherjea and h is
su p p o rte rs . At m eetings o f th e  u n iv e r s i ty  Senate and in  a r t i c l e s  in
\
2the  C a lcu tta  Review, which had ju s t  been tak en  over by th e  u n iv e r s i ty ,  
they  accused th e  L e g is la tiv e  Council and the  Government o f p a r t i a l i t y  
tow ards Dacca U n iv e rs ity  and a d e s ir e  to  ru in  th e  o ld  c e n tre  o f le a rn in g . 
The E ducation  M in is te r , M itra , was angered by what he considered  
u n ju s t c r i t ic is m  and, in tro d u c in g  th e  ed u ca tio n  budget in  th e  Council 
on 1 March 1922, he d escribed  the  f in a n c ia l  a d m in is tra tio n  o f the 
u n iv e r s i ty  as ’d e p lo ra b le '.  In  h is  o p in io n  i t s  d e f i c i t  o f n e a r ly  f iv e  
lakhs was due to  'th o u g h tle ss  expansion ' o f p o s t-g rad u a te  studies.*^ 
M ukherjea took th i s  as a personal a f f ro n t  and l e t  i t  be known 
th a t  he had no in te n t io n  o f aggreeing  to  th e  Government's in te r fe re n c e  
in  u n iv e r s i ty  a f f a i r s .  He was supported  by th e  Senate which en tered  
in to  an acrim onious correspondence w ith  th e  E ducation  Department on 
the  su b jec t o f u n iv e r s i ty  fin an ce . A c r i s i s  was reached in  August
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1922 when the Government offered the university monetary assistance 
on condition that there he no further expansion of its activities
until it was solvent once more. This was too much for Mukherjea.
'There is a sinister, perfidious campaign against this University', he 
told the Senate* 'Take it from me that as long as there is one drop 
of blood in me, I will not participate in the humiliation of this
University .... We shall not be a part of the Secretariat of the
1Government'•
The Government's reply was to frame two Bills, one for the creation
of a board to take control of secondary education from the university
and the other for the reform of the university itself. Lytton, who
took very seriously his ex officio position as Chancellor, told
Mukherjea of his personal interest in the legislation and asked for
his support, but the Vice-Chancellor replied that he could not
acquiesce in what appeared to be an effort to destroy the university's
independence. There followed a lengthy correspondence and a number
of interviews between the two men, with neither willing to give an
inch, and finally in March 1923 Lytton told Mukherjea, whose two-year
term of office was almost up, that he and Mitra would not reappoint
2him as Vice-Chancellor unless his opposition ceased.
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In taking this action Lytton had made a grave mistake. He could 
reasonably expect to have the support of Mukherjea’s powerful enemies 
in an attack upon the person of the Vice-Chancellor, but in threaten­
ing the independence of the office he was bound to arouse the hostility 
of the bhadralok as a class. The bhadralok were jealous of their 
control of the University of Calcutta, for the preservation of their 
cultural identity depended upon their continued monopoly of higher 
education. Moreover, as one of the few avenues of constructive public 
activity available to them in their circumscribed colonial society, 
university politics had assumed an extraordinary significance. For 
these reasons the Vice-Chancellorship was considered one of the most 
important and respected public offices in Bengal"* and the bhadralok 
would not countenance an attack upon its powers by an English Governor.
Mukherjea realised that Lytton had taken a false step and he 
penned a thumping rejoinder:
You complain that I have hitherto given you no help. I maintain 
that I have constantly offered you my help and advice which, 
for reasons best known to you alone, you have not accepted ....
I am not surprised that neither you nor your Minister can 
tolerate me. You assert that you want us to be men. You have 
one before you, who can speak and act fearlessly according to 
his convictions, and you are not able to stand the sight of 
him. It may not be impossible for you to secure the services 
of a subservient Vice-Chancellor, prepared always to carry out 
the mandates of your Government, and to act as a spy on the 
Senate. He may enjoy the confidence of your Government but 
he will not certainly enjoy the confidence of the Senate and 
the public of Bengal. We shall watch with interest the 
performances of a Vice-Chancellor of this type, creating a
E.g. B.C. Fal: "Ashutosh Mookherjea”, Character Sketches, pp. 211-6.
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new t r a d i t io n  fo r the  o f f ic e .
I  send you w ithout h e s i t a t io n  th e  only answer which an 
honourable man can send, an answer which you and your a d v ise rs  
expect and d e s ir e ;  I  d e c lin e  th e  in s u l t in g  o f f e r  you have made 
to  m e.1
Unshaken by th i s  b ro ad s id e , L y tto n  o ffe re d  the  V ice-C hancello rsh ip
to  Bhuprendranath Basu. Mukherjea then  read  th e  G overnor's l e t t e r  and
h is  own to  th e  u n iv e rs i ty  Senate and th e  u p ro a r which follov^ed th e
p u b lic a tio n  of the  two l e t t e r s  in  th e  p re ss  was extrem ely  em barrassing
fo r  th e  Government. L y tton  and M itra  were h e ld  to  have come bad ly  
2out of th e  a f f a i r  and i t s  e f f e c t  was to  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  d is c r e d i t  
o f a l l  connected w ith  the  reform ed Government and Council in  th e  
o p in io n  o f the  bhadralok a t la rg e .
C orpora tion  o f C a lcu tta
While M itra  was in  tro u b le  w ith th e  u n iv e r s i ty ,  B anerjea  was 
s tru g g lin g  w ith  problems of lo c a l  se lf-governm en t. In  h is  f i r s t  
months in  o f f ic e  he had offended h is  departm en tal o f f i c i a l s  and added 
to  the  number of h is  p o l i t i c a l  enemies by ap p o in tin g  r e la t io n s  and 
f r ie n d s  to  p o s it io n s  a t  h is  d isp o sa l in  lo c a l  b o d ie s .-' This was a 
minor i s s u e ,  however, compared w ith  th e  storm  which blew up over the  
reform  of the  C a lcu tta  C orpora tion .
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The legislation to effect this reform had been in preparation for
some years before Banerjea took up his portfolio but he immediately set
to work to mould the secretariats product into a shape conformable to
his nationalist ideals. He was particularly concerned to reduce to a
minimum communal and other special representation on the Corporation.^
The Bill which he introduced to the Legislative Council on 22 November
1921 provided 13 reserved seats in general electorates for the Muslims
2and 12 seats in special electorates for the Europeans. Banerjea 
explained that he had avoided separate communal electorates because 
they were a hindrance to ‘the upbuilding of a united Indian nationality 
’In their own interests, I would ask the representatives of the 
Muhammadan community to discourage the system’, he said.^
There was no debate at this stage but 20 Muslims and one low-caste 
Hindu member voted against the motion as a protest against Banerjea’s 
neglect of the principle of the representation of minorities through 
separate electorates.^ The succeeding motion for the circulation of 
the Bill, which was moved a week later, brought down the wrath of the 
minorities upon the head of the Minister. Muslims, Marwaris and
1
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Europeans all demanded, recognition of the principle of separate 
communal electorates. The Muslims were particularly incensed, 
accusing the Hindus of a plot to destroy the political existence of 
the Muslim community. 'It is a pity that in the first year of the 
Reforms the Muhammadans have been compelled to feel what swara.j in 
India will be', declaimed Syed Nasim Ali. Exercising great tact, 
Banerjea assured his opponents that the question of communal repres­
entation would be reconsidered if the public so demanded and he 
persuaded them to agree to the motion without a division.**
The public discussion of the Bill which followed was characterised
by a narrow sectional spirit, with each community striving to increase
2its representation at the expense of others.^ For the first time in 
Bengal there was evidence of overt Hindu communalism, and Muslim anger 
was aggravated by a campaign against cow killing led by a member of 
the Corporation, Amulya Dhone Addy. Addy was also an M.L.C. and his 
inclusion on the select committee to consider the Bill brought the 
charge from the Muslims that Banerjea was packing it with opponents of 
communal electorates."
The committee's report was not presented until February 1923 
and in the interim communal relations had deteriorated. The alliance
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between the  Congress and the  K h ila fa t p a r ty , which had g iven  Hindus
and Muslims a common ground, had been s tra in e d  by G andhi's sudden
d e c is io n  in  February 1922 to  end c iv i l  d iso b ed ien ce . With h is
imprisonment in  the  fo llow ing  month, one r e s t r a i n t  upon Hindu communal-
ism was removed and th e  o ld  fe a rs  o f Hindu ra.j were rev iv ed  in  Muslim
minds. The c o lla p se  of th e  K h ila fa t movement a t  th e  end of th e  y e a r ,
fo llo w in g  th e  overthrow of th e  C aliph in  Turkey, added to  th e  general
te n s io n . In  Bengal th e re  was tro u b le  between Hindus and Muslims over
appointm ents to  Government jo b s . The Hindu m a jo rity  in  th e  s e le c t
committee on th e  M unicipal B i l l  re fu sed  to  co n sid e r the  p ro v is io n  of
communal e le c to ra te s  and, a t th e  same tim e , accepted  a p roposa l o f
Addy's to  g ive the  C orporation  power to  r e s t r i c t  the s la u g h te r  of
2c a t t l e  in  th e  c i ty .
For the  Muslims th i s  was th e  l a s t  straw  and when th e  Council 
ag a in  took  th e  B i l l  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n  in  February 1923 they  m arshalled  
a l l  t h e i r  fo rc e s  a g a in s t i t .  The a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  Hindu communalists 
had a lso  u p se t the  lo w -caste  Hindus and th e  Europeans, and th e i r  
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  decided to  support th e  campaign fo r  communal e le c to r a te s .  
The Government was d iv ided  on th e  q u e s tio n , w ith  Rahim and Chaudhuri 
i n s i s t i n g  upon th e  o f f i c i a l s  be in g  allow ed a f r e e  v o te . F in a lly  a 
sm all group of bhadralok  M.L.Cs. announced t h a t ,  in  th e  i n te r e s t s
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of communal harmony, they too would support the Muslims* claim for 
separate electorates.
Defeat stared Banerjea in the face. To save what he could of the
principle he held so dear, he accepted a compromise suggested by a
European member: the Muslims would have separate communal electorates
for the first nine years, after which they would have only reserved
2seats in general electorates.
This was regarded by the great majority of the bhadralok as an 
outright victory for the Muslims, and Banerjea was reviled as a traitor 
to his own principles. Even the Indian Association and his old news­
paper, the Bengalee, condemned him.^ It was a tragedy that his last 
and greatest work should have been marred by those communal antagonisms 
with which he had struggled throughout his political life. His 
service as a Minister, which was to have set the seal upon a great 
career, had brought him disappointment and unpopularity.^
The dissension aroused by the Municipal Act was not simply 
Banerjea*s private tragedy. It was also evidence that the lines 
separating the communal groups in the Legislative Council were now
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drawn hard and fast. The suspicion which prevailed between the three 
main sections - Hindus, Muslims and .Europeans - hindered the smooth 
working of the institution and poisoned the main stream of public 
life. Communalism had even divided the Government against itself.
The compromise on Muslim representation, to which many of the Hindu 
M.L.Cs. had assented, was bitterly resented by the bhadralok as a 
whole, with the effect, once again, of discrediting the reformed Council 
and Government.
A Revelation of Weakness
The despondency which filled the hearts of the members of the
first Montagu-Chelmsford legislatures as they approached their last
year's work is reflected in a letter which Sapru received in June
1922 from Sir Devaprasad Sarvadhikari, a Bengal representative in the
Indian Legislative Assembly. 'You must have realised that moderates -
real moderates - are having a bad time of it and will have worse',
wrote Sarvadhikari. 'They are no favourites of the Government & the
officials, nor of the people. Any protest against Government &
official action mark them down as "not different from Extremists".
They are disorganised among themselves and mutual jealousy is not
•)the least of the weaknesses of some'.
i
30 Jun 1922, Sapru papers.
One man in  Bengal who was determ ined not to  g ive way to  t h i s  
despondency was S.R. Las, now p ro v in c ia l Advocate G eneral. In  th e  
l a t t e r  h a l f  o f 1922 he made an o th er e f f o r t  to  r a l l y  support fo r  the  
Government in  the L e g is la tiv e  Council and o u ts id e  he o rgan ised  a 
C o n s ti tu tio n a l P arty  to  work fo r  the r e fo m s . He had s u rp r is in g  
success in  e n l i s t in g  among h is  fo llo w ers  a group o f e x - t e r r o r i s t s ,  men 
who had been in te rn e d  d u ring  th e  war and who now assu red  him th a t  they  
had seen  the e r ro r  o f th e i r  o ld  ways. His work was commended by 
L y tto n  who gave i t  h is  f u l l  support u n t i l  he was inform ed by h is  
p o lic e  o f f ic e r s  in  mid-1923 th a t  the  C o n s ti tu tio n a l P a rty  was a cover 
fo r  a t e r r o r i s t  consp iracy . The c o n sp ira to rs  had shrewdly reasoned 
th a t  nowhere could they  be s a f e r  than  in  an o rg a n is a tio n  headed by 
th e  A dvocate-G eneral. To h is  m o r t i f ic a t io n ,  Las d iscovered  th a t  f a r  
from in f lu e n c in g  o th e rs  as he had in ten d ed , i t  was he who was be ing  
used .^
His f a te  was shared in  l e s s e r  degree by h is  fe llo w  M.L.Cs. By 
1923 they  too were being  used. They had been so thoroughly  d is c re d ite d  
in  th e  p u b lic  e s tim a tio n , they  were so d iv id ed  amongst them selves 
and t h e i r  m orale was so low th a t  they  had no re so u rce s  w ith  which to  
r e s i s t  the  p re ssu re s  put upon them by th e  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs , who had 
a la rg e  popular fo llow ing . Most of the  members saw no p ro sp ec t of 
r e - e le c t io n  to  the new Council a t  th e  end o f th e  y ear u n le ss  they
P u n d its  & E lephan ts , pp. 57- 8.
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made their peace with the non-co-operators and many concluded that 
their best course was to put themselves at the disposal of their 
local Congress leader. As a result there was a sizeable and growing 
section of the Legislative Council acting under orders from the 
non-co-operators: asking questions and moving resolutions at their 
behest; speaking and voting as they instructed.
This display of pusillanimity gained the Councillors nothing. By 
selling their souls they had further injured their public reputation 
and destroyed the Government's confidence. The humiliating position 
to which they were reduced is illustrated by the actions of Khan 
Bahadur Rahamatjan Chaudhuri, Muslim representative for Faridpur North, 
in connection with the Council enquiry into the Charmanair affair in 
July 1923.
Charmanair, a village near Shibohar in the Faridpur District of 
Eastern Bengal, was the scene of a struggle between a gang of dacoits 
and a police party in the early hours of the morning of 17 May 1923*
Only three of the gang were captured and, before they could be taken 
away, the police were unexpectedly set upon by the villagers, severely 
beaten and tied up. They were not released until further police 
arrived later in the day. Initial attempts to discover why the villagers 
had behaved in this extraordinary fashion were frustrated by the fact 
that many had gone into hiding and for that reason a sudden descent
1
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upon the village was made by 48 constables and twelve officers on 
5 June.
In the house to house search which followed there may have been 
brutality and there was certainly rough handling of both men and 
women, with frequent intrusions into purdah quarters of Muslim homes.
This was regarded by the village men as an outrage upon the modesty 
of their womenfolk and a few days later the local Congressmen took 
up the matter. They sent telegrams to the Provincial Congress Committee 
and the Calcutta press, alleging murder, rape and torture by the police. 
This caused a great stir. The District Magistrate, G.P. Hogg, 
conducted a personal enquiry at Charmanair, which convinced him that 
the allegations were grossly exaggerated but, in spite of the publication 
of his findings, the charges against the police found wide credence.
On 4 July there was an adjournment debate in the Legislative 
Council on the affair and, writing a few days later to his Divisional 
Commissioner, Hogg commented on the part played by the local Muslim 
member;
Before Khan Bahadur Rahamatjan Choudhuri, M.L.C. went down to 
Calcutta for the last Council meeting, he came to see me. I 
took advantage of the opportunity to give him a few details 
about Char Manair, and in particular told him the real facts 
surrounding the principal allegations. My idea, of course, 
was that he might be able to correct any false rumours that 
might reach him.
This morning the Khan Bahadur called on me and I casually 
remarked that he had spoken in the Char Manair debate. He 
asked to be ’’excused'’, and told me that two Mahommedans, one 
giving the name of Lai Meah, from some village in Shibchar 
P^ölice7» S^tation7* had called on him in Calcutta and told 
him he"’would get no votes in the next election unless he said
som ething. Some Shibchar s tu d e n ts ,  now in  C a lc u tta , a lso  
came to  him (on a sep a ra te  o c c a s io n ) , and gave him th e  same 
in tim a tio n . Mr J.N . M aitra , M.L.C. a lso  asked him to  say- 
som ething.
The Khan B ahadur's words inc luded  th e  fo llo w in g , -  which 
I  jo t te d  down on a s l ip  as they  were mades-
"I know I  have committed an o ffence  a g a in s t you, -  bu t 
i t  was only fo r  fe a r  o f not g e t t in g  v o te s  and no th ing  e ls e .
I  was not only req u ested  to  say som ething, -  but th rea ten ed  
th a t  I  could expect no v o te s  next e le c t io n .
Only fo r  fe a r  of t h i s ,  I  s a id  som ething, but m o dera te ly”.
As a m a tte r of f a c t ,  h is  speech was very  m oderate. I t  i s  
p a th e t ic ,  more than  any th ing  e ls e ,  to  r e f l e c t  th a t  he had not 
the  nerve to  make any use o f th e  in fo rm atio n  which was in  h is  
p o sse ss io n , p a r t ic u la r ly  as he was convinced of the  f a l s i t y  of 
th e  charges.
L y tto n ’ s comment when he read th i s  re p o r t  was» ’A most lam entable 
r e v e la t io n  o f weakness.'
A F a ilu re  and a Success
In  th e  g en era l e le c tio n  held  fo u r months l a t e r  the  Khan Bahadur
rece iv ed  no reward fo r  h is  a c tio n . He was resound ing ly  d e fea ted  by a
2s ta lw a r t  n o n -co -o p era to r. Most of h is  fe llow  c o u n c il lo rs  fa re d  as 
bad ly  and, looking- fo r  an excuse, they  n a tu ra l ly  blamed th e  reform ed 
c o n s t i tu t io n .  M itra  was v o ic in g  th e i r  g en era l op in ion  when he complained 
in  June 1924? ' . . .  our p a rty  t r i e d  to  work dyarchy lo y a l ly ,  but 
dyarchy k i l le d  our p a r ty '.^  Whether o r not th e  form o f th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  
was th e  v i t a l  f a c to r ,  th e  M oderates were j u s t i f i e d  in  b e lie v in g  th a t
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membership o f the  Council had d is c re d i te d  them. They had been unable 
to  dem onstrate  complete co n tro l over th e  Government which would have 
enabled them to  re tu rn  to  the  e le c to r s  w ith  th e  b o ast th a t  th ey  were 
m asters  of th e  s i tu a t io n  and, in  d isch a rg in g  th e i r  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  as 
l e g i s l a to r s  to  a s s i s t  the  M in is te rs  in  c a r ry in g  on th e  a d m in is tra tio n , 
they  had in ju re d  th e i r  re p u ta tio n s  as n a t io n a l i s t s .  The a r t i c u l a t e  
s e c tio n  o f p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty  in  Bengal s t i l l  demanded o f i t s  n a t io n a l i s t  
p o l i t i c ia n s  a g i ta t io n  a g a in s t th e  Government, and th e  M oderates’ 
e f f o r t s  in  th e  Council on th i s  score  had paled  in to  in s ig n if ic a n c e  
a lo n g sid e  th e  sp e c ta c u la r  d isp la y s  o f th e  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs .
For the  M in is te rs  th e  record  o f the  f i r s t  reform ed Council was 
no more s a t i s f a c to r y  than  i t  was fo r  th e  o rd in a ry  member. Looking 
back from th e  end of 1923) t h e i r  o r ig in a l  hope o f v in d ic a t in g  t h e i r  
accep tance of th e  reform s by an o u ts tan d in g  a d m in is tra tiv e  achievement 
and th e reb y  e s ta b lis h in g  th e i r  p a r ty  in  a commanding p o s i t io n ,  seemed 
r a th e r  absurd . At every tu rn  th ey  had met o b s ta c le s . T heir develop­
m ental programmes had been s tu n ted  by th e  sho rtag e  o f funds and th e i r  
l e g i s l a t i o n  had been tw is ted  out o f shape by s e c tio n a l p re s su re s .
They had been unable to  co n tro l th e  Council w ith  t h e i r  o ld  methods and 
t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  develop a s a t i s f a c to r y  o rg a n is a tio n  had f a i l e d .
They l e f t  o f f ic e  w ith the knowledge th a t  th e i r  work had c o n tr ib u te d  
to  communal enmity and th a t  they  were h e ld  in  contempt by many o f
t h e i r  com patrio ts
I
I«
Sapru’s hope of 1921 that at the end of the first session ’the 
country' would find that the new councils had ’given a good account of 
themselves’ had obviously been disappointed. But the question arises: 
need this necessarily have meant electoral defeat for the Moderates? 
vThat was 'the country' of which Sapru spoke? if/hat was the section of 
political society with which the Moderates were discredited by their 
actions in the Council? Simply it was the urban educated classes, the 
newspaper readers, the bhadralok. These were the people who were heard 
in politics but the important fact was that under the 1919 constitution 
they were not the only people who voted, and many of those who did had 
no concern with what happened in the Legislative Council in Calcutta.
A District Officer writing from Chittagong as late as 1929 testified 
to this:
The vote is regarded, perhaps, as a sign of respectability and 
so far from being a privilege, as one amongst other inexplicable 
duties imposed upon them by Government. They exercise their 
votes not in favour of a policy, but to satisfy the demands of 
friendship or the insistence cyf canvassers, though they have, 
perhaps, some vague impression that the candidate selected may 
be able to secure some favours for themselves and their localities 
in the way of exemption from taxes or improved local conditions. 
The more highly educated, of course, have a better idea of the 
potentialities of the Council and of their votes, but even with 
them the determining factor is personal friendship; they are not 
sufficiently interested in politics other than local to follow 
the debates in the Council and to appreciate the attitude 
adopted by their member.1
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ISeen in  th i s  l i g h t  the  M oderates' d e fe a t a t  the 1923 e le c tio n s  
appears le s s  th e  r e s u l t  o f t h e i r  in e f f e c tu a l  perform ance in  th e  Council 
than  of t h e i r  f a i lu r e  to  r e a l i s e  th a t  th e re  were two le v e ls  in  th e  
p o l i t i c s  of the  reformed o rd e r: th e  le v e l o f th e  bhadra lok  and the  
le v e l  o f  the  new mass e le c to r a te .  By c o n c e n tra tin g  th e i r  a t te n t io n  
on th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council they  had d is re g a rd ed  th i s  second le v e l and 
ensured th e i r  own dow nfall. A few men l ik e  S.R. Das had seen th e  danger 
o f n e g le c tin g  th e  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  and had urged t h e i r  fe llo w  M.L.Cs. to  
g e t to  work o u ts id e  th e  C ouncil,^ hut t h e i r  adm onitions had been d is ­
regarded  fo r  most members shared  Rahamatjan Chaudhuri’s b e l i e f  th a t  an 
o ccasio n a l dem onstra tion  in  th e  l e g i s l a tu r e  would s a t i s f y  t h e i r  
e le c to r s .^
A ll th i s  p o in ts  to  a la c k  o f u n d ers tan d in g  among the  Moderate 
n a t io n a l i s t s  o f th e  com plexity of th e  ta s k  o f working th e  reform ed 
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  was not sim ply a q u e s tio n  o f  making a good showing 
in  th e  Council o r reach ing  a s a t i s f a c to r y  modus v ivend i w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  
as Sapru had suggested . To win e le c t io n s ,  n a t io n a l i s t  p o l i t ic ia n s  
re q u ire d  not only zeal and a good reco rd  bu t o rg a n is a tio n  and d is ­
c ip l in e ,  in s id e  and o u ts id e  th e  l e g i s l a tu r e .  They needed money fo r  
lo c a l  p u b l ic i ty  and canvassing . They needed a le a d e r  who could appeal
1
E .g . Das' l e t t e r  to  th e  Englishm an,* 12 Feb 1921.
2
See Reading to  Montagu, Ju l 1921, Reading, v o l. I I ,  p. 202; &
B.F. Singh Roy: P arliam en ta ry  Government in  I n d ia , pp. 70-1.
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to  th e  w ider e le c to ra te ;  they  needed to  re sp e c t the symbols and term s 
of th e  new mass p o l i t i c s .
The p o l i t ic ia n s  were not a lo n e , however, in  t h e i r  f a i lu r e  to  
comprehend th e  ex ten t o f t h e i r  ta s k . L y tto n  had a lso  rev ea led  a la c k  
o f u n d e rs tan d in g , most no tab ly  in  h is  c la sh  w ith  the  u n iv e r s i ty .  This 
in c id e n t had un d erlin ed  the  co n tin u in g  im portance of in s t i t u t i o n s  o th e r  
th an  th e  L e g is la tiv e  C ouncil. The f r u s t r a t io n s  and d isappoin tm ents 
which L y tton  had encountered in  h is  f i r s t  two y ea rs  in  Bengal had l e f t  
him d is i l lu s io n e d .  I t  seemed th a t  n e i th e r  h is  o f f i c i a l s  nor h is  
l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c il lo rs  ap p rec ia ted  h is  crusading- s p i r i t ,  and h is  
i d e a l i s t i c  d esig n  had been s p o i l t  by th e  hard f a c ts  o f B engali p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e .  By th e  tim e he d isso lv ed  the  L e g is la t iv e  Council in  August 
1923, h is  f a i t h  was so badly  shaken th a t  he was prepared to  a ssen t to  
th e  o f f ic ia ls *  p ro p o s itio n  th a t  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  was most u se fu l as 
a c o n s u lta t iv e  body. 'Looked a t  from th e  p o in t o f view of the  Governm ent', 
he s a id ,  'th e  ex is ten ce  of a re sp o n s ib le  elem ent has been o f the  utm ost 
v a lu e , as i t  has provided us w ith  th e  means o f t e s t in g  th e  a cc e p t-  
a b i l i t y  o f our m easu res '.
For th e  o f f i c i a l s  alone th e  sky was not com pletely  b la ck . They 
had had t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  an u n r e a l i s t i c  Governor, inexperienced  
M in is te rs  and a r e c a lc i t r a n t  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, bu t th e se  had not 
been unexpected. What was more im portan t was th e  f a c t  th a t  th e
BLCP, 21 Aug 1923, v o l . X III, p. 478.
1
stockade which Ronaldshay had helped them throw up around the bureau­
cracy had held against the assaults of the politicians. Although'the 
Moderates had proved to be a disappointingly irresolute set, they had 
provided the human raw material necessary to work the constitution, 
and the officials were proud of having kept the reformed institutions 
functioning throughout the period.
Indeed this was a significant achievement. Despite the stresses 
and strains of internal dissension, and the severe battering to which 
it had been subjected by the non-co-operators, the Council had survived 
to shield the Government from the hazards of rule by ordinance, and, 
equally important, to provide the nationalist movement with an al­
ternative to mass action. As we shall see, this was an alternative with 
C.R. Das and his Swaraj party in Bengal were glad to accept after the 
collapse of non-co-operation in 1922. The Government had been right 
to emphasise the importance of keeping the reforms working, and the 
decision of the leading section of Congress to contest the 1923
elections was its reward
CHAPTER VII
HE WHO RIDES A TIGER
The Questions
Surveying the results of the general election for the second
reformed Council, the Statesman of 1 December 1923 wrote: 'Bengal
has declared itself Swarajist. In every kind of Bengali constituency
the Swarajists have triumphed. Even the Muhammadan electorate, which
was considered to be a safe asset for Government, has been rent 
1
asunder*.
How did the non-co-operators gain sufficient strength to inflict 
such a humiliating defeat upon the Moderates? This chapter offers 
an answer to that question and to its corollary: why, after abjuring 
council entry in 1920, did C.R. Das form the Swaraj Party to contest 
the 1923 elections?
Uncertainty
Das returned from the Nagpur Congress in January 1921 to be 
greeted in Calcutta with excitement and enthusiasm. To symbolise his 
conversion to non-co-operation he gave up his law practice, donated
1
Statesman,* 1 Dec 19 23-
c"’i c
h is  p ro p e rty  and possessions to  th e  n a tio n  and donned khad i. These
g e s tu re s  o f s e l f - s a c r i f i c e ,  so markedly in  c o n tra s t  to  th e  behaviour
-j
of th e  new ly-appointed Moderate M in is te r s , f i r e d  th e  popular 
im ag in a tio n . Das’ fo llo w ers  gave him the  t i t l e  o f Deshbandhu, ’fr ie n d  
o f th e  c o u n try ',  and the  v e rn a cu la r  p re ss  acclaim ed him as th e  new
2
A dvaitacharyya , 'th e  p ro te c to r  o f B engalis  and the  sav io u r of B en g a l'.
D esp ite  t h e i r  apparent s e lf - a s s u ra n c e , Das and h is  immediate 
c o lle ag u e s  faced  the  new y e a r w ith  co n sid e ra b le  u n c e r ta in ty . I t  had 
been a bold  move to  tu rn  away from th e  secure  and w e ll-tro d d en  paths 
o f co u n c il p o l i t i c s  to  th e  u n fa m ilia r  ju n g le  o f d i r e c t  a c tio n  w ith  
i t s  demand fo r  a new s ty le .  The B engali le a d e rs  had now grasped  the  
concept o f mass support fo r  th e  n a t io n a l i s t  movement and they  were 
aware o f popular d is c o n te n ts , so c ia l  and economic, bu t th ey  were unsure  
o f how to  communicate w ith th e  masses o r how to  make p o l i t i c a l  c a p i ta l  
from t h e i r  g riev an ces . Das had no p repared  p lan  o f a c t io n , fo r  h is  
v o lte  face  a t  Nagpur had su rp rise d  him alm ost as much as i t  had 
su rp r is e d  h is  opponents. There were many id e a s  b u t no agreement among 
th e  o th e r  members of th e  p ro v in c ia l Congress h ie ra rc h y .
1
They were busy w ith th e  f e s t i v i t i e s  connected w ith  th e  v i s i t  to  
C a lc u tta  o f H.R.H. the  Duke o f Connaught and were g u ests  a t  a Government 
House garden p a rty  on 1 February . (E ssay ez , pp. 138-9) As th e  non- 
c o -o p e ra t io n is t  p re ss  fre q u e n tly  no ted , they  a lso  enjoyed th e  Rs.
64>000 s a la ry  which accompanied t h e i r  new o f f ic e .  (E .g . L ib e r ty ,*
13 Mar 1921.)
2
Nayak,* 21 Jan  1921.
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The Montagu-Chelrasford Council had been e le c te d  and a Government 
formed, w ith  th e  le ad e rs  of the  Moderate p a r ty  p a r t ic ip a t in g .  For the  
n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  th e re  was an elem ent o f menace in  th ese  new i n s t i t u ­
t io n s  fo r  t h e i r  p o te n tia l  was unknown. They might prove to  he a 
source o f power and in flu en ce  fo r  th e i r  members and th e  B r i t i s h  would 
undoubtedly  t r y  to  use  them in  some way a g a in s t th e  n o n -co -o p era tio n  
movement. Das and h is  men had the  uncom fortab le  fe e l in g  th a t  p o ss ib ly  
th ey  had thrown away a chance.
The le a d e rs  o f the  o th e r  s e c tio n s  of p o l i t i c a l  so c ie ty  were eq u a lly
u n c e r ta in . The Moderates were i l l - a t - e a s e  in  the  en larged  l e g i s l a tu r e ,
‘r a th e r  l ik e  a s e t  of c h ild re n  anx iously  le a rn in g  a new d r i l l*  as
1
an I .C .3 . o f f ic e r  desc rib ed  them, and th e  C a lc u tta  European community
2was ta lk in g  h y s te r ic a l ly  o f the  danger o f a second M utiny. The 
Government of Bengal was a lso  alarmed now th a t  n o n -co -o p era tio n  had 
been accep ted  by the  lo c a l Congress le a d e r s .  I t  lacked  confidence 
in  th e  a b i l i t y  o f the  M oderates, a ’ tim id  and le th a rg ic *  group, to  
co u n te r th e  movement and i t  in s is te d  th a t  th e  Government o f In d ia  
should tak e  immediate a c tio n  to  d e s tro y  i t s  c e n tra l  o rg an isa tio n # ^
The Government o f In d ia  was r e lu c ta n t  to  accep t t h i s  counse l.
I t  knew th a t  even Gandhi was unsure  o f h im se lf in  the  new medium
1
C.H. Bompas to  J.G . Drummond, /T9 217, quoted Drummond, p. 109.
2
Andrews to  R abindranath Tagore, 21 Dec ^192^7» Andrews MSS.
3
C hief S e c re ta ry , GB, to  GI, 19 Feb 19 21, GI, Home P o l i t i c a l ,  D eposit 
3 (C o n fid e n tia l)  & K-W, Ju l 1921.
of mass p o l i t i c s  and i t  though t i t  b e s t  to  w a it and w atch th e  n a tu re  
o f th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  which developed  betw een th e  C ongress le a d e r s  and 
th e  p eo p le . The ev en ts  o f th e  preceding- tw elv e  months had d e s tro y e d  
i t s  co n fid e n ce  in  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  gauge changes o f a t t i t u d e  ’ i n  th e  
v a s t  u n d er-w o rld  o f I n d ia ' and i t  fe a re d  th a t  h a s ty  a c t io n  a g a in s t  
th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra to rs  m ight p r e c i p i t a t e  a r e v o lu t io n .  I t  had no d e s i r e  
to  pu t an end to  th e  g e n e ra l s t a t e  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  by m artyring- th e  
n a t i o n a l i s t s . ^
P u b l i c i ty  and R e o rg a n isa tio n
I t  was l e f t  to  th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra to rs  to  make th e  f i r s t  move. ' //hen
u n su re  o f  y o u r s e l f ,  r i d i c u l e  y ou r opponent* . They accep ted  t h i s  as
t h e i r  maxim and poured t h e i r  s c o rn  on th e  reform ed c o n s t i t u t i o n  and
2
th e  M od era tes , th a t  'h a n d fu l o f  f l a t t e r e r s  o f  G overnm ent'. Das knew 
t h a t  th e  most d i r e c t  and c e r t a in  way to  in f lu e n c e  b h ad ra lo k  o p in io n  
was th ro u g h  th e  B engali and E n g lish - la n g u a g e  p r e s s ,  and he made i t  h is  
f i r s t  o b je c t iv e  to  secu re  i t s  f irm  b a c k in g . He e s ta b l i s h e d  a C ongress 
Hews S e rv ic e  to  supp ly  th e  p ap e rs  w ith  in fo rm a tio n  about n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  
and he made p re p a ra t io n s  fo r  th e  p u b l ic a t io n  o f  a B en g a li p ap er o f 
h is  own.'4 The su ccess  o f h i s  p re s s  cam paign may be judged from th e
1
G I, Home P o l i t i c a l ,  D eposit 3 ( C o n f id e n t ia l )  & K-W, J u l  1921.
2
S w a ta n tra ,» 3 Feb 1921.
3
GB, P o l ic e ,  P-4A-5, B3-18, Oct 1923.
4
The B ang lar Katha which b ro u g h t ou t i t s  f i r s t  e d i t io n  on 30 Sep 1921.
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following report from P.H. Waddell, District Magistrate of Bakarganj,
dated 9 June 1921s '‘The people in the town read nothing but violent
journals like the Amrita Bazar Patrika and the Servant. Even the
Bengalee is avoided as being moderate, and anyone who asks for it is
looked upon with suspicion. These violent journals publish nothing
in favour of Government, so that the public never learn the true facts'.
At Nagpur Gandhi had insisted that Congress should be reorganised
with stronger executive committees to direct its national and provin-
2cial affairs and with active branches extending to the villages. Das 
undertook this reorganisation in Bengal. It was to his advantage 
that his lieutenants came from a generation which had had little ex­
perience of the old Indian political associations and therefore had no 
fixed idea of the 'proper form' of political organisation. They had 
followed his example in giving up their employment and he was thus 
able to use them full-time in his new organisation.
He established an office in Calcutta to direct non-co-operation 
and he divided the city into four districts, with district commanders 
to supervise canvassing for funds and propaganda for the spinning 
campaign. He encouraged his followers in the mofussil to form District 
committees,^ or, where they already existed, to organise the local
1
GB, Political, 123-4(1-43), A11-53, Oct 1921.
2
Young India, 1919-1922, pp. 833-9 & 842-5.
GI, Home Political, Deposit 63, Jun 1921.3
b h ad ra lok  youth and w ith  i t s  backing oust th e  o ld e r  o f f ic e -b e a r e r s .
The S uperin tenden t o f P o lic e , Pabna, d esc rib ed  the  methods used in  
h is  D is t r i c t :  Kumud Nath S arkar ’ soon in fu sed  a s p i r i t  o f d e fian ce  
among th e  so -c a lle d  v o lu n tee rs  towards th e  a u th o r ity  of th e  Government 
and in  no time he found h im se lf ra is e d  to  th e  rank  of P re s id e n t of 
th e  lo c a l  Congress Committee w ith  two p r in c ip a l  a s s i s ta n t s  in  Pravash 
and N aresh Chandra L a h ir i  . . . .  The whole committee was a t  th i s  tim e 
re -o rg a n ise d  -  the  e ld e r ly  members o f th e  same ap p aren tly  making room 
fo r  th e  younger ones’ . ”*
Das p e rso n a lly  v is i te d  th e  main m ofussil towns accompanied whenever
p o s s ib le  by lo c a l  men who had won a r e p u ta t io n  in  C a lcu tta . He ta lk e d
to  le a d in g  members of th e  p ro fe s s io n s , u rg in g  them to  g ive  up th e i r
jobs and support the  new D is t r i c t  o rg a n is a tio n . He he ld  freq u en t
ou tdoor m eetings which a t t r a c te d  la rg e  crowds eager to  see th e  g re a t
2Deshbandhu. With im passioned speeches and symbolic dona tions fo r  the  
Swaraj Fund, th ese  g a th e rin g s  were an e x c i t in g  change from th e  monotonous 
ro u tin e  of m ofussil l i f e . 1 23 The n o v e lty  o f an a c tiv e  Congress
1
GB, P o l i t i c a l ,  12C-126 o f 1922, B506-510, Jan  1923.
2
A D is t r i c t  O ff ic e r  rep o rted  th a t  one Congressman, S ara t Kumar Ghosh, 
’a v is io n a ry  f a n a t i c ' ,  was such an im p e llin g  speaker th a t  'Even I .B . 
In sp e c to rs  have been moved to  te a r s  when ta k in g  down h is  sp e e c h e s '. 
(P.H. Waddell to  T. Emerson, 5 Jun 1921, GB, P o l i t i c a l ,  12S-13, B3OO- 
352, Sep 1921.)
3
H.N. Das Gupta: Deshbandhu C h itta ra n ja n  Das, pp. 60-1. N.C. B a n e rji: 
At th e  Cross-Roads, pp. 55-1öS.
organisation at the District level also captured public interest and 
gave the rural bhadralok, in particular, a new feeling of involvement 
in the nationalist movement.
The Congress leaders tried to persuade the Muslims to unite their
Khilafat committees with the new District Congress committees but they
refused, insisting that the two organisations existed for different 
1purposes. They had resented the Bengali Hindus' refusal in the 
previous year to support their movement and, although they were willing 
to work with the non-co-operators, they were determined to leave them­
selves room for manoeuvre by keeping their organisation intact.
At this time they were also consolidating their position by in­
filtrating the executives of the local Muslim anjumans, whereas the 
Congressmen were concentrating all their energies upon their party 
reconstruction. This left the Moderates in command of the established
2phadralok bodies: the Ratepayers', Peoples' and District Associations. 
Although for the time being these lost their influence, they were later 
to provide a base from which the Moderates could reassert themselves 
in local affairs.
1
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The B oycotts
Gandhi had given  an o th er le ad  to  th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  w ith  h is  
c a l l  fo r  the  t r i p l e  b o y co tt: o f c o u n c ils , c o u rts  and sch o o ls . Once 
Das had overcome h is  doubts about th e  f i r s t  item  he had no h e s i t a t io n  
in  accep tin g  th e  o th e r two, fo r  in  im plem enting th is  programme he 
would be re q u ired  to  address h im se lf only  to  th e  bhadra lok .
His own s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  was a powerful example and Subhas Chandra 
Bose was speaking- fo r  sco res o f B engalis  of h is  g e n e ra tio n  when he 
w rote in  February 1921: ' I f  C.R. Das a t  h is  age can give up ev ery th in g  
and face  th e  u n c e r ta in t ie s  of l i f e  -  I  am su re  a young man l ik e  m yself, 
who has no w orldly  ca res  to  tro u b le  him, i s  much more capable  of 
doing s o ' .   ^ In  the  e a r ly  months o f 1921 the  s tu d en ts  and law yers of 
Bengal responded m ag n ificen tly  to  th e  Congress c a l l  to  jo in  non-co- 
o p e ra tio n . S tr ik e s  in v o lv in g  f iv e  c o lle g e s  in  C a lcu tta  were follow ed 
by s im ila r  dem onstrations in  a l l  b u t th re e  D is t r i c t s  of th e  Province 
and more than  te n  per cent of the  s tu d e n ts  in  Government schools
and c o lle g e s  were withdrawn. There were numerous re s ig n a tio n s  among
2th e  te ac h in g  s t a f f .  In  some D i s t r i c t s  a l l  law yers suspended p ra c t ic e  
and th e  work o f the  c o u rts  was sev e re ly  handicapped everywhere except 
in  C a lc u tta  where the  le g a l p ro fe s s io n  was s tra n g e ly  u n resp o n siv e .^
1
Subhas Chandra Bose to  S a ra t Chandra Bose, 16 Feb 1921, In d ian  
P ilg r im , p. 129.
2
Simon Commission R eport, v o l. V III , p. 99*
3
GB, J u d ic ia l ,  J .6 C -1 18( 1 -30 ), A130-159, Nov 1921. BLCP, 21 Nov 1921, 
v o l. V, p. 54.
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The r e c r u i t s  were o rgan ised  in to  v o lu n te e r "brigades, q u a s i-m il i ta ry  
fo rm ations which owed th e i r  in s p i r a t io n  to  M azz in i's  Red S h ir ts  o f the
1
R iso rg im en ti and which had f i r s t  been used in  th e  p a r t i t io n  a g i ta t io n .
Where t h e i r  o rg a n isa tio n  was e f f i c i e n t ,  they  were commanded by a
D i s t r i c t  c a p ta in  and fo u r v ic e -c a p ta in s  supported  by two su b o rd in a te
2
o f f ic e r s  in  each thana and w ith  a r e g u la r  budget and funds. Eleven 
hundred v o lu n te e rs  were e n ro lle d  in  C a lc u tta  in  February 1921 and by 
May th e re  were 19 re g u la r  corps in  v a rio u s  p a r ts  o f th e  p ro v in ce .^
The v o lu n te e rs  were put to  work sp read in g  propaganda, c o l le c t in g  d o n a tio n s , 
b o y c o ttin g  Government o f f i c i a l s  and c o -o p e ra to rs , running a r b i t r a t io n  
c o u rts  and n a tio n a l schools to  re p la ce  th e  B r i t i s h  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and 
a s s i s t in g  in  v i l la g e  re c o n s tru c tio n .
I t  was a sp e c ta c u la r  achievement which had th e  Government thoroughly  
frightened^" bu t i t  could not be s u s ta in e d . The p lann ing  of th e  n a tio n a l 
schoo ls and a r b i t r a t io n  c o u rts  had been inadequate  and one by one 
th ey  co lla p se d . Spinning, le a rn in g  Hindi and lab o u rin g  among th e  
v i l l a g e r s ,  a c t i v i t i e s  by which Gandhi s e t  g re a t s to r e ,  had no a t t r a c ­
t io n  fo r  th e  so p h is tic a te d  bhadra lok  youth  and th e re  was growing 
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  among them a t  the  la c k  of o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  more h e ro ic
1
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means o f  d em o n stra tin g  t h e i r  p a t r io t i s m .  A f te r  th e  f i r s t  f lu s h  o f
en th u sia sm  had gone, th e  s tu d e n ts  and law yers had second th o u g h ts
abou t th e  wisdom of d e s e r t in g  th e  Government i n s t i t u t i o n s  w hich were
so im p o rta n t to  t h e i r  c la s s  and hy m id -y ear most were back  in  t h e i r
2
schoolroom s and c o u rth o u se s .
I n  t h i s  f i r s t  p h ase , th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  movement was s t r o n g e s t  
i n  th e  towns o f  E a s te rn  ‘Bengal where th e  Hindu le a d e r s  had found them­
s e lv e s  equ ipped  w ith  a mass fo llow ing ' by th e  p ro -K h ila fa t  m u lla h s .
The b h a d ra lo k  were i l l - a t - e a s e  in  t h i s  unaccustom ed s i t u a t i o n ,  b u t ,  
i n  s e a rc h  o f  a cou rse  o f a c t io n ,  th e y  were a b le  to  draw upon e x p e rien ce  
g a in ed  in  th e  p a r t i t i o n  p e r io d . At t h a t  tim e , i n f l u e n t i a l  Hindus 
( la n d h o ld e r s  and p ro fe s s io n a l  men) i n  E a s te rn  Bengal had u sed  t h e i r  
s o c ia l  p o s i t i o n  to  impose s a n c tio n s  upon th e  opponents o f sw ad esh i.
The v ic t im s  had been  den ied  th e  u se  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  such as shops and 
w harves u n d e r th e  c o n tro l  o f  a lo c a l  m agnate and , f r e q u e n t ly ,  they  
had been  t r e a t e d  as o u tc a s te s ,  lo sing - th e  s e rv ic e s  o f  th e  washerman, 
th e  p r i e s t  and th e  b a rb e r .
1
Andrews to  R ab in d ran a th  T ago re , 13 Mar j T921/, Andrews MSS.
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Simon Commission R ep o rt, v o l .  V I I I ,  p. 99*
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G r I ,  Home P o l ic e ,  A140-148, May I9O6 , & B112-114, May 1906. The 
1911 cen su s r e p o r t  no ted  th e  grow th o f  th e  power and in f lu e n c e  o f 
th e  lo c a l  zam indar i n  Bengal and observed  th a t  he was ta k in g  over 
many o f  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f  th e  c a s te  p a n c h a y a ts . ( Census o f  I n d ia ,  
1911 1 v o l .  V, p t .  i ,  p. 488. )
L i c
With a much la rg e r  fo llow ing  th e  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  in  1921 were 
ab le  to  extend th ese  a c t i v i t i e s .  R e lu c tan t c o n tr ib u to rs  to  th e  
Swaraj Fund were in tim id a ted  and even Government o f f i c i a l s  were 
b o y co tted . In  a number of towns th e  v o lu n te e r  b rig ad es  p ick e ted  th e  
m arkets, re fu s in g  access to  Government se rv a n ts  and su p p o rte rs , and 
s e l l in g  t i c k e t s  to  o th e rs , th e  money going in to  p a rty  funds. The non­
c o -o p e ra to rs  gained such a hold  on some a re a s  th a t  the  lo c a l  B r i t i s h  
o f f ic e r s  were forced  e i th e r  to  arrange  fo r  t h e i r  d a i ly  requ irem ents
to  be brought in  from neighbouring  D is t r i c t s  o r to  s u f f e r  th e
2h u m ilia tio n  of going in  person  to  th e  m arket.
The d isadvan tage of s o c ia l  b o y co tts  and p ic k e tin g  was th a t  they  
inconvenienced so many innocent p a r t i e s .  The b arber and th e  p r i e s t ,  
fo r  in s ta n c e , su ffe re d  as much as th o se  who were denied t h e i r  s e rv ic e s ;  
th e  shopkeepers were out of pocket because o f th e  in te r ru p t io n  in  
tra d e ; and the  general p u b lic , no m a tte r how fe rv e n tly  n a t io n a l i s t i c ,  
were bound to  re se n t having to  pay a t r i b u t e  to  th e  Congress p a rty  
whenever they  used the  m arket. Consequently th e re  was support fo r  th e  
Government when i t  o rgan ised  co u n ter-m easu res.^
In  some p laces  th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra to rs ’ a c t i v i t i e s  a lso  aggravated  
e x is t in g  s o c ia l  a n im o s itie s . For example in  F arid p u r D is t r i c t  th e re
1
GI, Home P o l i t i c a l ,  D eposit 1, Sep 1921.
2
GB, P o l i t i c a l ,  12S-13, B300-352, Sep 1921.
3
Ib id . Gandhi was opposed to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  u se  of so c ia l  boyco tt fo r  
th i s  reason . (See Young In d ia , 1919-1922, pp. 299“ 302.)
was a lo n g -s tan d in g  r iv a l r y  "between th e  two main peasant com m unities, 
th e  Muslims and the Namasudras. In  1921 th e  Namasudras opposed non- 
c o -o p e ra tio n  and when the  Muslims excluded them from one of th e  main 
m arkets because o f th e i r  r e fu s a l  to  forego fo re ig n  m erchandise they 
e s ta b lis h e d  t h e i r  own shops. The o ld  market su ffe re d  as a r e s u l t  and 
fe e l in g  between the  communities was em b itte red . Prom th i s  tim e onwards 
th e re  were freq u en t r i o t s  between th e  two g roups, u n t i l  p u n itiv e  p o lic e  
were s ta t io n e d  in  th e  D is t r i c t  in  th e  l a t e  1920s in  an a ttem pt to 
r e s to re  o rd er.^
In  th e  Midnapore D is t r i c t  of West Bengal th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  scored
a rem arkable success by ta k in g  advantage of a fa c t io n  f ig h t .  In
January  1921 the  f i r s t  e le c tio n s  were h e ld  in  th e  D is t r i c t  fo r  Union
B oards, new lo c a l  bodies provided by th e  Bengal V illag e  Self-Governm ent 
2
Act o f 1919» The e le c to rs  were u n c e r ta in  as to  what they  were v o tin g  
fo r  bu t they  had a vague id ea  th a t  they  were e le c t in g  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  
to  a r b i t r a t e  v i l la g e  d isp u te s  and thus save law yers and c o u rt fe e s .
They were dismayed when they d iscovered  th a t  they  had in  f a c t  a s s is te d
1
GB, P o lic e , P .5R -2(4-12), B95-103, Mar 1926.
2
GB, Local Self-Government D e p t., Local Self-Governm ent (Local 
Boards) Branch, L2U-17(1-15), A10-27, Jan  1921.
in  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f new b o d ie s  empowered to  le v y  ta x e s .  They were
conv inced  t h a t  the  b h a d ra lo k  would u se  th e s e  to  sw indle them.
A lo c a l  n o n -c o -o p e ra to r , B ire n d ra  N ath S asm al, saw h is  o p p o r tu n i ty .
He o rg a n is e d  m eetings a t  which he warned th e  p eo p le  th a t  th e  Act
opened th e  way f o r  c ru sh in g ’ ta x a t io n  and o th e r  o p p re ss io n s  by th e
Government. Oppose now o r  fo r e v e r  be ta x e d , he s a id .
To win th e  a l l - im p o r ta n t  su p p o rt o f  th e  educa ted  c la s s e s  he
u t i l i s e d  a f a c t io n a l  r i v a l r y .  I n  th e  G ontai s u b d iv is io n ,  to  which
he b e lo n g ed , th e  b h ad ra lo k  were d iv id e d  in to  two g roups: th e  l o c a l s ;
and peo p le  from o u ts id e  d i s t r i c t s  who had e s ta b l is h e d  them se lv es  in
p r a c t i c e  in  th e  G ontai c o u r ts  o r  in  o th e r  p ro fe s s io n s .  The L e g i s la t iv e
C ouncil and Union Board e l e c t i o n s  had b een  fo u g h t ou t betw een c a n d id a te s
from  th e s e  two groups and th e  'im m igran ts*  had trium phed . S asm al,
2
who was a member o f th e  dom inant M ahishya c a s te ,  now to o k  th e  le a d e r ­
s h ip  o f  th e  l o c a l s  and c a r r i e d  them w ith  him in  h is  a t t a c k  on th e  
Union B oards.
1
S.N. Ray, J o in t  M a g is tr a te ,  M idnapore, 1 Nov 1921: 1 2I  went in to  th e  
C on ta i b a z a a r . I  soon had a crowd round me v ig o ro u s ly  showing t h e i r  
d is a p p ro b a t io n  o f  Union B oards. They had no t had good c ro p s  f o r  
y e a r s ,  th e y  cou ld  h a rd ly  a f fo rd  to  pay f o r  t h e i r  food and c lo th in g  
in  th e  p re s e n t s t a t e  o f th e  m arket and now they  were asked to  pay 
more ta x e s .  They could  n o t p o s s ib ly  coun tenance  a se v e n fo ld  in c re a s e  
o f  ta x e s .  I t  was a l l  very  w e ll to  say  t h a t  i t  r e s te d  w ith  them to  
d e c id e  w hether they  should  r a i s e  ta x e s  o r  n o t ,  b u t th e  "Babus” were 
g o in g  to  r a i s e  i t  a l l  th e  sam e '. (GB, L ocal Self-G overnm ent D e p t.,  
L oca l Self-G overnm ent (L ocal B oards) B ranch , L2U -5(1-7)> A36-49>
J u l  1922.)
2
The M ahisbyas were an a g r i c u l tu r a l  c a s te  o f  good s t a t u s ,  many o f 
whose members had e n te re d  th e  p ro fe s s io n s .  I t  was most numerous in  
th e  M idnapore D i s t r i c t .
r ' f
f ’ i
The people were persuaded to refuse to pay taxes under the 
Village Self-Government Act and the members of the Boards were 
'•encouraged’* to reconsider the wisdom of their operating the Act.
By late June the Contai bazaar and the walls along the village roads 
carried inflammatory posters threatening the members with violence. 
Resignations soon followed and those who held out had social and 
religious boycotts applied to them. Some were even prevented from 
securing labour to reap their paddy.
Having- brought the operation of the Act to a standstill in Contai, 
Sasmal turned his attention to other parts of the Midnapore District 
with similar success and by November the Government was forced to 
admit that it would be better to withdraw the Act than fight Congress 
on such shaky ground.
All these activities brought fame to the non-co-operators. Never 
before had British authority been challenged so openly and with such 
impunity, and the insolence with which Das and his party treated 
Englishmen delighted their compatriots. However there were evident 
disadvantages about the methods they had used. The boycott of courts 
and colleges had demanded too great a sacrifice of the bhadralok, 
and its corollary, the organisation of arbitration boards and national 
schools, required of the Congress leaders a genius for construction
1
GB, Local Self-Government Dept., Local Self-Government (Local 
Boards) Branch, L2U-5(1~7)> A36-49» Jul 1922.
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which they did not possess. ’... the difficulty does not lie in 
breaking, - any fool can do thatJ' remarked Andrews to Rabindranath 
Tagore, ’it lies in rebuilding-, and only poets can do that.’ And 
today we have far too few poets, - and far too many fanatics.' ... Now 
the whole movement is reaching that constructive stage <k men like 
G.R. has are not able to do the building’. Social boycotts and 
picketing- had unwelcome side-effects and even where the non-co-operators 
worked with the grain, as in Sasmal’s case, and not across it, one 
section of society was left as an enemy of the non-co-operation movement.
Labour Agitation
One course of action which avoided all these pitfalls was the
provocation of labour disturbances. The industrial workers in Bengal
were Muslims and low-caste Hindus, and most were migrants from
2neighbouring provinces. Strikes could therefore be organised with the 
expenditure of comparatively little bhadralok effort and no matter 
what their outcome it was not likely to disturb the politically- 
important strata of Bengali society.
The conditions for industrial labour were poor. During the war, 
wages had not kept pace with the inflationary rise in prices. In the 
same period there had been a rapid expansion in industry but this had
_  -  _
/307 Jan Andrews MSS.
2
Indian Industrial Commission Report, pp. 10-11.
< ’ ti.
1“been arrested suddenly by the post-war trade recession. The workers
had real grievances but they needed leaders and an organisation to give
expression to them. These the non-co-operators were willing to supply.
Starting in the industrial complex around Calcutta where the ground
had been prepared by the Khilafat agitators, and then moving into the
mining areas of West Bengal, they formed trade unions and encouraged
2the workers to press for the amelioration of their conditions. As 
a result there were dozens of strikes throughout the province in the 
early months of 1921.^ The main victims were British firms who were 
the largest employers of industrial labour in Bengal,^ and they 
naturally turned for assistance to their compatriots the officials.
The effect was to implicate the Government and this enhanced the non- 
co-operators’ success for they could claim that they were striking 
at both pillars of British imperialism: trade and rule.
They realised that nothing was better calculated to alarm the 
Government, especially at a time of political crisis, than stoppages 
in the transport and communications services. They found that they 
could cripple Calcutta by bringing the tramway workers out on strike
1
Census of India 1921, vol. V, pt. i, p. 34*
2
GB, Police, P5R-7(1“2), A39-40, Jun 1921. Andrews to Rabindranath 
Tagore, 22 Mar ^1921/» Andrews MSS.
3
There were 108 strikes in Bengal between January and October 1921. 
(BLCP, 23 Nov 1921, vol. V, pp. 182-3.)
4
Indian Industrial Commission Report, p. 12.
bu t th i s  had th e  d isadvan tage  o f inconveniencing" too many b h ad ra lok . 
More s a t i s f a c to r y  were stoppages a ffec tin g - the  ra ilw ay  and steam ship  
s e rv ic e s .
The g re a t advantage o f th i s  tra d e  un ion  work fo r  th e  non-co- 
o p e ra to rs  was th a t i t  enabled them to  s tan d  forward as le a d e rs  of a 
mass movement. In  one p lace  a t  l e a s t  they  had broken through th e  
b a r r i e r s  to  communication and they  now had some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  t h e i r  
sym bolic use o f the  concept o f ’th e  m asses’ . The B anglar K atha,
Das’ new B engali weekly, made th e  p o in t in  one o f i t s  e a r ly  numbers 
in  O ctober 1921:
No one i s  ab le  to  s to p  th i s  world-wide awakening of th e  m asses, 
fo r  t h i s  i s  no t a m eaningless c o n tro v e rsy , but th e  e f f o r t  of 
a s e l f - f o r g e t f u l  race to  know i t s e l f .  These s t r ik e s  o f th e  
tea -g ard en  c o o lie s  and m il l - o p e r a t iv e s ,  th i s  r i s in g  of th e  
r a iy a ts  a g a in s t th e  ex ac tio n s  o f th e  zam indars -  i s  not th e re  
a t  the  bottom of a l l  th ese  an im p a tien t e f f o r t  of an 
i r r e p r e s s ib le  fo rce  to  b u rs t  ou t o f i t s  confinem ent? The 
people a re  s ta rv in g , Government i s  p e n n ile ss  to  g ive them 
food and c lo th in g , and we have no vo ice  in  th e  m a tte r o f our 
tra d e  and commerce. This i s  th e  ro o t-ca u se  o f the  p re sen t 
lab o u r problem. Bengal has s le p t  fo r  ages. She must be 
roused from her s le e p . This i s  our r e s o lv e .1 2
There were r is k s  in  what the  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs  were doing . They 
had n e i th e r  the  o rg a n isa tio n  nor th e  experience  to  ensure th a t  th e  
lab o u r u n re s t which they  were fom enting could be stopped sh o rt o f 
v io le n c e . For the  same reasons th ey  were unable  to  p ro te c t th e  workers
1
1
A tram  s t r ik e  always brought loud p ro te s ts  from th e  C a lcu tta  p re s s . 
(See e .g . UP, 12 & 26 Nov 1921.)
2
B anglar K atha,* 21 Oct 1921.
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a g a in s t  th e  h a rd sh ip s  w hich accom panied th e  s t r i k e s  and as  t h e i r  
p rim ary  o b je c t iv e s  were p o l i t i c a l  th e y  w ere to o  o f te n  n e g le c t f u l  o f 
th e  r e a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f la b o u r .
Gandhi was aware o f th e se  d an g ers  and he warned h is  fe llo w
Congressmen a g a in s t  e x p lo itin g ' th e  w o rk e rs ’ g r ie v a n c e s :
. . .  th e re  a re  no t wanting' la b o u r  le a d e r s  who c o n s id e r  th a t  
s t r i k e s  may be en g in ee red  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p u rp o ses .
I n  my o p in io n , i t  w i l l  be a most s e r io u s  m istak e  to  make 
u se  o f la b o u r  s t r i k e s  f o r  such  a p u rp o se . I  don’t  deny 
th a t  such  s t r i k e s  can se rv e  p o l i t i c a l  ends. But th e y  do 
no t f a l l  w ith in  th e  p la n  o f n o n -v io le n t  N o n -c o -o p e ra tio n .
I t  does no t r e q u ire  much e f f o r t  o f  th e  i n t e l l e c t  to  p e rc e iv e  
t h a t  i t  i s  a most dangerous thing- to  make p o l i t i c a l  u se  o f 
la b o u r  u n t i l  la b o u re rs  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n d it io n  
o f  th e  co u n try  and a re  p rep a red  to  work f o r  th e  common good.
T h is  i s  h a rd ly  to  be exp ec ted  o f them a l l  o f  a sudden and 
u n t i l  th e y  have b e t te r e d  t h e i r  own c o n d i t io n  so as to  en ab le  
them to  keep body and so u l to g e th e r  in  a d ece n t m an n er.1
Andrews was a lso  p e r tu rb e d  by th e  e f f e c t s  o f th e  a g i t a t i o n .  He
had alw ays ta k e n  a keen  i n t e r e s t  in  In d ia n  la b o u r ,  in  In d ia  and in  
2
th e  c o lo n ie s ,  and , convinced in  1921 t h a t  th e  w orkers were s u f f e r in g  
u n d u ly , he in te rv e n e d  to  p ro te c t  them . He e x p la in e d  to  Tagore e a r ly  
i n  May: ’I  had to  f i n i s h  a l l  th e s e  s t r i k e s  on th e  R ailw ays w hich have 
caused  u n to ld  m is e r ie s  and have been  e n t i r e l y  due to  th e  ferm en t 
o f th e  n o n -c o o p e ra tio n  movement & a re  one o f  i t s  bad e f f e c t s ' . '"
The more he saw o f th e  s i t u a t i o n  in  B en g a l, th e  more he was convinced
1
’’S t r ik e s " ,  16 Feb 1921 , Young; I n d ia ,  1919- 1922 , pp. 736-9-
2
He had made a number o f  t r i p s  to  v a r io u s  p a r t s  o f  A f r ic a  and F i j i ,  
on b e h a l f  o f th e  C ongress, to  s tu d y  In d ia n  la b o u r  c o n d i t io n s .
(See G hatu rved i & S y k e s .)
10 May 217? Andrews MSS.
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th a t  th e  bhad ra lok  p o l i t i c ia n s  were u s in g  th e  masses in s te ad  of 
working fo r  them. Speaking in  C a lc u tta  a t th e  end of May, he c a lle d  
upon f th e  educated le a d e r s ’ to  tak e  s to ck : ' I t  w ill  not he enough 
to  e x c ite  th e  poor in  th e i r  d i s t r e s s  in to  a m eaningless s t r i k e .  That 
may add more to  th e i r  m isery . I  speak sad ly  because I  have been 
dealing- v /ith  s t r ik e  a f t e r  s t r ik e  d u rin g  the  l a s t  few months, which 
have brought very  l i t t l e  but m isery and s ta r v a t io n  to  th e  p o o r '.
The Chandpur A ffa ir
He made t h i s  appeal du rin g  th e  Chandpur a f f a i r ,  an in c id e n t
which we must study in  d e ta i l  fo r  i t  was here  th a t  the  Bengal non-
c o -o p e ra to rs  scored  th e i r  most s p e c ta c u la r  success a g a in s t th e
Government by an unconcealed e x p lo i ta t io n  of lab o u r g riev an ces .
I n  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  of A p ril 1921 a group o f Congressmen from
C a lc u tta  moved in to  th e  te a  garden  a re a s  of Assam and s ta r te d  an
2
a g i ta t io n  f o r  h ig h e r wages among th e  te a  c o o l ie s ,  who were s u f fe r in g
3
severe  h a rd sh ip  because o f a slump in  th e  in d u s try . Towards the
1
Quoted B engalee ,* 31 May 1921.
2
Except fo r  th o se  in c id e n ts  which have been s e p a ra te ly  fo o tn o ted , th e  
whole account o f the Chandpur a f f a i r  i s  based on th e  fo llow ing  sou rces: 
GI, Home P o l i t i c a l ,  D eposit 51, Jun 1921. I b id ,  D eposit 63 , Jun 1921. 
I b id ,  D eposit 46 , Jun 1921. GB, P o l i t i c a l ,  12C -70 (l-2 ), A24-25,
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Sep 1921. I b id ,  12 S -4 ( l-4 3 ) , A ll-5 3 , Oct 1921. BLCP, 8 & 11 Ju l 
1921, v o l . I l l ,  pp. 3, 383-427, & 452-85.
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end of the month there were strikes on many of the gardens, and, because 
the planters refused to meet their demands, the coolies accepted the 
non-co-operators’ offer to arrange transport for their return to their 
homes in Bihar and the United Provinces. In the following- three weeks 
six to seven thousand workers, including the entire labour-force of 
some gardens, left Assam and trekked more than 100 miles to Chandpur, 
a steamer station on the river Padma in Eastern Bengal, to find that the 
Congressmen had failed to keep their promise to provide transport for 
the onward journey.
Faced with a growing crowd of half-starved and exhausted coolies/ 
among whom disease might quickly spread, the Divisional Commissioner,
K.C. Be, authorised their shipment at the Government’s expense to 
Goalundo, whence they could be moved by rail to their homes. This 
offended the tea planters who sent representatives post-haste to appeal 
to the Government of Bengal, then in summer residence at Darjeeling, 
not to assist in the removal of their labour-force. The Government 
accepted their plea and censured De for his action. No more free 
passages were to be granted.
The exodus from Assam continued and by the middle of May there 
were 3000 coolies and their families stranded at Chandpur. Cholera 
was reported among them and on 19 May De came up from his headquarters 
at Chittagong- to review the situation. That evening a large mob of
i
Andrews, report in Bengalee, 22 May 1921.
desperate coolies attempted to rush a steamer which was preparing to
sail for Goalundo and a number narrowly escaped drowning. De decided
that if order were to be maintained and the spread of disease checked,
the coolies would have to be shifted from the railway station, where
they were camped in insanitary conditions, to a football field outside
the town. They refused to move. A troop of Gurkha armed police was
therefore brought to Chandpur from Dacca and on the night of the 20th
the coolies were chased out of the station yard. A number were injured
in the scuffle and in the ensuing stampede to the football field.
The following- day Andrews arrived on his way to the tea gardens.
.Then he discovered how serious matters had become at Chandpur, he
decided to go to Darjeeling" in an attempt to persuade the Government
to revoke its order prohibiting the repatriation of the coolies. He
was met with a cold refusal and returned to Calcutta convinced that
the Government was listening only to the tea planters."'
In the meantime the ’Gurkha outrage’ at Chandpur had captured the
press headlines. V/ildly distorted accounts were printed, with frequent
comparisons being made with the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy of 1919»
At Chandpur, the blood of inoffensive and unarmed Indian 
labourers was shed in consequence of the incompetence of 
short-sighted officials; and starving labourers, both male 
and female, were prevented from leaving the spot and met
1
Andrews, speech in Calcutta, 29 May 1921, quoted Bengalee g*
4 Jun 1921.
w ith  an untim ely  d ea th . But t h i s  dark  cloud has a s i lv e r  
l in in g .  I t  has u n ite d  th e  educated community and th e  
p o v e r ty -s tr ic k e n  lab o u re rs  in  a bond of sympathy and fe llo w - 
f e e l in g . 1
With p u b lic  anger running h ig h , th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  saw th e i r
o p p o rtu n ity . I f  they  could keep th e  c o o lie s  a t  Chandpur and f ix  the
blame fo r  t h e i r  su ffe r in g s  f irm ly  upon th e  Government they  would have
the  B r i t i s h  in  a very nasty  sp o t. They were fo r tu n a te  th a t  the  non-
c o -o p e ra tio n  movement in  the C hittagong D iv is io n  was e x c e p tio n a lly
s tro n g . I t s  le a d e r  was J.M. Sen Gupta, a C a lcu tta  High Court law yer
who had given  up h is  p ra c tic e  in  March 1921 and re tu rn e d  to  C hittagong
2
to  s t i r  up lab o u r tro u b le . As p re s id e n t o f th e  Railway iiknployees 
Union he was ab le  to  c a l l  fo r  an immediate s t r i k e  on the Assam Bengal 
Railway in  p ro te s t  ag a in s t th e  Gurkha o u trag e . On 24 May a l l  t r a i n  
se rv ic e s  in  Assam and th e  C hittagong D iv is io n  were stopped. This cut 
the  l in k  between the  te a  gardens and Chandpur, and l e f t  a lm ost 1000 
c o o lie s  stranded  along th e  l i n e .  Four days l a t e r  the  steam ship  
crews s tru c k , thereby  c lo sin g  th e  c o o l ie s ' only  o th e r  ro u te  out of 
Chandpur.
Andrews, who was campaigning in  C a lcu tta  fo r  funds to  r e p a t r ia te  
th e  c o o lie s ,  was h o r r i f ie d  by t h i s  c a llo u s  d is re g a rd  fo r  t h e i r  s u f fe r in g , 
bu t h is  appeals to  the  n o n -co -o p era to rs  went unheeded. 'A few
_
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thousand c o o lie s  might he s a c r i f ic e d  i f  I n d ia ’s 320>(XX)>000 could 
o b ta in  S w ara jy a ', he was to ld  a t  a m eeting o f Congress le a d e rs  on 
29 May.^
On the  same day th e  D is t r i c t  M ag is tra te  of F a rid p u r , G.P. Hogg,
w ritin g  from Goalundo, advised  h is  Government to  take  a s tan d  ag a in s t
the  n o n -co -o p e ra to rs . The aim o f the  s t r i k e ,  he s a id , was to  fo rce
th e  Government to  r e p a t r ia te  th e  c o o lie s  a t i t s  own expense. He
adm itted  th a t  i f  th a t  were no t done the  c o o lie s  would s u f f e r  bu t he
could see  no way of avoid ing  th i s  w ithou t g iv in g  in  to  Congress.
The consequences of su rren d e r a t  th i s  s tag e  a re  obvious. The 
non-cooperato rs would claim  a g re a t v ic to ry . They have a 
w ide-spread o rg a n isa tio n  which has been look ing  a f t e r  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  co n tin g en ts  of c o o lie s  a t every  s tag e  of t h e i r  
jou rney , and, to  put i t  b r i e f ly ,  they  would claim  th a t  they  
have, in  a sen se , rep laced  the  Govt. That i s  to  say , they  
w ill  have imposed th e i r  w il l  on the Govt, and on th e  p u b lic , 
and would be, w ith  regard  to  th i s  p a r t i c u la r  m a tte r , a s o r t  
o f "de f a c to ” governm ent.2
Wheeler a r r iv e d  from D arje e lin g  on 30th and he accepted  Hogg's e s tim a te  
of th e  s i tu a t io n .  The Government would stand  firm  on i t s  d e c is io n  
not to  p rovide the  c o o l ie s ' f a r e s .
He was follow ed in to  E a s te rn  Bengal by C.R. Das and a la rg e  group 
o f C a lc u tta  Congressmen who went from town to  town o rg an is in g  h a r ta ls  
in  an e f f o r t  fu r th e r  to  d is lo c a te  the  a d m in is tra tio n . Andrews was
1
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already back from Calcutta attempting unsuccessfully to persuade the 
steamer and railway employees to return to work. He was obstructed 
by both the non-co-operators and Wheeler, who resented the criticism 
which he had levelled at the Government after his Darjeeling- visit.
With the assistance of Pakenham Walsh, the Anglican Bishop of Assam, 
and S.R. Das, he opened a public subscription to assist the coolies 
and by 7 June he had obtained the guarantee of sufficient funds to send 
off the first group from Chandpur. The only route open was the railway 
line via Mymensingh to Bahadurabad 250 miles north on the Brahmaputra. 
The non-co-operators immediately started a new strike among the 
steamer crews at the rail head and once more blocked the coolies’ 
exit. A day or so later, however, a private steamer was found to 
make the journey from Chandpur to Goalundo and by the middle of the 
month all the coolies were on their way home.
For C.R. Das and his party the affair had gone admirably. The 
Government had played into their hands by attempting to maintain its 
prestige at the coolies' expense. It had published two long com­
muniques to give its version of events but Bengal was in no mood to 
accept official accounts and the non-co-operationist press could 
write as it wished. The Congressmen were praised for their heroic 
opposition to the Government, for their self-sacrificing relief 
work among the sick and dying at Chandpur, and even for providing the
(•
1final transport for the coolies. The affair could not have been 
better timed for the non-co-operators, for it distracted public 
attention from the drift of lawyers and students back to their old 
occupations.
Das was brimming with confidence. He announced that the railway
and steamer strikes would continue and he proudly asserted that their
2purpose was 'national' not economic. This angered Andrews who 
considered it offensive that the bhadralok leaders should talk so 
glibly of defending national honour and the people's rights. 'Honour 
is very cheap when another person has to maintain it]1 234 he remarked 
bitterly.^ Speaking at a meeting in Calcutta on 16 June he appealed 
for a more responsible labour policy.^- A few days later he wrote 
to Gandhi and asked him to use his influence with the provincial 
Congressmen:
1
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E ast Bengal i s  on the very  b o rd e r l in e  of v io len ce  . . .  i t  i s  
h ig h ly  em otional, quick tem pered, hot and p a ss io n a te . These 
s t r ik e s  in  such inflammable m a te r ia l a re  l ik e  straw  to  a 
f i r e ,  and I  have been g re a t ly  anxious about an ex p losion .
What I  f e l t  was th a t  only you could r e a l ly  preach ahim sa.
I  have done my very  b e s t  and they  have g iven  me such 
tr e a s u re s  o f love . Time a f t e r  time th e  pass io n  has d ied  
down as I  have spoken about you. They do r e a l ly  understand  
th a t  in  my presence no word even of v io len ce  must be u t te r e d .  
But when I  am not a t t h e i r  m eetings o r  leav e  a f t e r  speaking  
I  have c o n s ta n tly  heard th a t  th e  o ld  p ass io n  flam es up.
The term s o ffe red  by both  th e  steam ship  and ra ilw ay  companies 
a re  honourable term s. But . . .  th e re  i s  a s t r ik e  mania. At 
a m eeting I  held  about Chandpur ( in  C a lcu tta )  th e  whole m eeting 
was a g a in s t me except th re e  o r fo u r , who were such c o -o p e ra to rs  
as K rishna Kumar M itte r  and one or two M arwaris.^
Gandhi came to  Bengal in  August bu t he was too l a t e  to  p reven t the
2v io le n c e  in  th e  e a s te rn  D is t r i c t s  which Andrews had fe a red .
An A ttack  from W ithin
In  th e  meantime, however, Das' le a d e rs h ip  of th e  p ro v in c ia l
Congress had been challenged . Ever s in ce  Nagpur th e re  had been a
3
group w ith in  th e  B.P.C.C. which had follow ed Das w ith  re lu c ta n c e , 
suspecting- th a t  he was not a convinced d is c ip le  o f Gandhi. The group 
was confirm ed in  i t s  su sp ic io n s  by h is  encouragement of lab o u r 
d is tu rb a n c e s  and when in  June he openly adm itted  th a t  he was u s in g
1
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The ab b rev ia ted  form of Bengal P ro v in c ia l Congress Committee. 
S im ila r ly , A .I.C .C . has been used fo r  A ll- In d ia  Congress Committee.
th e  s t r ik e s  in  E astern  Bengal fo r  p o l i t i c a l  g a in , i t s  le a d e r ,
J i t e n d r a l a l  B anerjea , re s ig n ed  from th e  B .F.C .C . in  p ro te s t*
The re b e ls  were supported  by th e  C a lcu tta  Marwaris who were
devoted fo llo w ers  of the  Mahatma. As employers they  were opposed
to  th e  s t r ik e s .  Up to  th i s  tim e they  had been th e  main c o n tr ib u to rs
to  th e  Swaraj Fund b u t they  now accused Das of m isap p ro p ria tio n  o f
2the  money and w ithheld  t h e i r  c o n tr ib u tio n s .
In  m id-Ju ly  the  Gandhians made a b id  to  oust t h e i r  opponents from
3
th e  p ro v in c ia l Congress ex ecu tiv e  b u t th ey  f a i l e d .  C o u n te r-a tta ck in g  
Das f i l l e d  every o f f ic e  w ith  h is  su p p o rte rs . He a lso  e s ta b lis h e d  a 
s e r ie s  o f c e n tr a l  boards to  g ive  him t i g h t e r  c o n tro l over th e  p a r ty 1s 
a c t i v i t i e s . ^  As d i r e c to r  of p u b l ic i ty  he appoin ted  a new r e c r u i t ,
24 y e a r old Subhas Chandra Bose, who had ju s t  re s ig n ed  from the  
I .C .S . and re tu rn e d  from Cambridge U n iv e rs ity  to  jo in  n o n -co -o p e ra tio n .
Throughout th e  fo llow ing  th re e  months th e re  was a v igorous debate  
in  th e  Bengal p ress  between the  Gandhians and th e  Das group. The
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S ervan t was the  main spokesman fo r  th e  form er. I t  demanded th e
- ' ‘ t l
su b o rd in a tio n  of the  p ro v in c ia l Congress to  th e  n a tio n a l le a d e r s h ip .”*
In  th e  papers which supported  Las th e re  were freq u en t a tta c k s  on Gandhi
and th e  M arwaris, and th e re  was a marked s p i r i t  of p ro v in c ia l
e x c lu s iv e n ess . The Kayak was in  th e  van as u su a l:
. . .  many young B engalis  and a d u lts  s t i l l  c h e r ish  th e  p a in fu l 
memories of the  tre a tm e n t which B urra Bazar people and 
H industan is accorded to  B engalis  du rin g  th e  p a r t i t io n  
a g i t a t i o n ; “ and to  add to  a l l  t h i s ,  w hatever Mahatma Gandhi 
i s  do ing , i s  but an im ita t io n  of what Bengal once d id . He 
has shown no sympathy fo r  what happened in  East Bengal and 
C hittagong. C onsequently, the Hindus and Musalmans of 
Bengal, youths and a d u lts  a l ik e ,  a re  in d i f f e r e n t  to  th e  
p re sen t p o l i t i c a l  movement; and, we a re  a f r a id ,  Bengal w il l  
no t -  cannot -  take k in d ly  to  th e  c u l t  o f b o y c o tt, Sw adeshi,
Khadri and Gandhism.^
I t  was a t  th i s  time th a t  Das brought out h is  new weekly, w ith  
th e  s ig n i f ic a n t  t i t l e ,  B anglar K atha, 'V oice o f B en g a l'. The f i r s t  
e d i t io n  made i t  c le a r  th a t  he was ap p ea lin g  to  p ro v in c ia l sen tim en t: 
'W hether Hindu, Musalman or C h r is tia n  a B engali i s  a B engali fo r  a l l  
t h a t .  He has a d i s t i n c t  temperament o f h is  own and a d i s t i n c t  
r e l ig io n .  He has a p lace  in  th e  world and a m ission  to  perform . A 
B engali must become a t ru e  B e n g a l i '.^  I t  was a l in e  t a i lo r e d  to  
b h ad ra lok  ta s t e s .
1
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The H a r ta ls
1 i t h  t h e i r  ho ld  on th e  C ongress s e c u re ,  Das and h i s  p a r ty  looked
about f o r  a new course  o f a c t io n .  At th e  end o f  J u ly  th e  A .I.C .C .
had g iv en  sh ad esh i _recedence  over o th e r  C ongress a c t i v i t i e s ,
and, a lth o u g h  th e  B en g a lis  were u n e n th u s ia s t ic  about th e  sp in n in g
cam paign, th e y  accep ted  th e  com m ittee’s d i r e c t i o n ,  re a so n in g  th a t
th e  b o y c o tt o f fo re ig n  m anu fac tu res  would o f f e r  good o p p o r tu n i t ie s
fo r  an ti-G overnm ent d e m o n s tra tio n s . They d ec id ed  to  c o n c e n tra te
upon C a lc u tta  f o r  i t  was th e re  th a t  th e y  cou ld  a t t r a c t  most a t t e n t i o n .
Das chose Subhas Chandra B ose, th e  new hero  o f B en g a li y o u th ,
to  le a d  th e  f i r s t  band o f  v o lu n te e rs  i n  th e  p ic k e t in g  o f  shops
s e l l i n g  im ported  c lo th .  There were soon groups p a t r o l l i n g  a l l  th e
2
main trad ing- a r e a s .  At th e  same tim e D as’ w ife ,  B a sa n ti D evi, 
to u re d  th e  c i t y  e x h o rtin g  B en g a li women to  d em o n stra te  t h e i r  su p p o rt 
f o r  th e  n a t io n a l  s t ru g g le  by o f f e r in g  t h e i r  g o ld  je w e lle ry  f o r  th e  
Sw araj Fund. There were h o u se - tc -h o u se  c o l l e c t io n s  o f  r i c e  fo r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  to  ‘needy m id d le -c la s s  f a m i l i e s ’ . H ost e x c i t in g  o f a l l  
were th e  sym bolic b o n f ir e s  o f  im ported  c lo th  l i t  on th e  i n t e r s e c t i o n s  
o f main th o ro u g h fa re s  to  sh o u ts  o f  Bande K a ta ram and Deslibandhu 
Das k i  j a i .^
_
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I t  was dangerous to  o f f e r  such  open encouragem ent to  la w le s sn e s s  
in  a c i t y  l i k e  C a lc u tta  "but n e i th e r  th e  Congressmen nor t h e i r  a l l i e s ,  
th e  K h i l a f a t i s t s , were in  any mood to  accoun t d i s c r e t io n  as th e  
"b e tte r  p a r t  o f  v a lo u r . The b e h a v io u r o f th e  v o lu n te e rs  became in ­
c r e a s in g ly  a g g re s s iv e  and shopkeepers  com plained o f in t im id a t io n .
The M arwari Chamber o f Commerce ap p ea led  to  Gandhi fo r  p r o te c t io n  
b u t he was p o w erless  to  h e lp  them.
The movement reached  i t s  clim ax in  November w ith  th e  c a l l  from
2
th e  A .I.C .C . f o r  a campaign o f c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e . On 4 th  th e re  was 
a f i e r c e  r i o t  in  Howrah, when th e  mob b a t te r e d  a p o l ic e  s e rg e a n t to  
d e a th  and was f i r e d  on as a r e s u l t . " 1 The tramway w orkers v^ere a lre a d y  
o u t on a m onth-long  s t r ik e ^  and on 1 7 th , th e  day th e  P r in c e  o f  Wales 
a r r iv e d  in  Bombay to  s t a r t  a to u r  o f I n d ia ,  th e re  was a t o t a l  h a r t a l  
i n  C a lc u t ta .  A ll shops were c lo se d  and no p u b lic  o r  p r iv a te  t r a n s p o r t  
was allow ed  to  move i n  th e  s t r e e t s .  The p o l ic e  l o s t  c o n tro l  o f  th e  
c i t y  to  th e  v o lu n te e r  b r ig a d e s  b u t th e y , in  t h e i r  tu r n ,  found th a t  
th e y  were u n ab le  to  manage th e  gangs o f f a c to r y  la b o u re r s  who had 
been  b rough t in to  th e  c i ty  from th e  o u t ly in g  m ill  towns by th e  
K h i l a f a t i s t s .  A ss is te d  by g o o n d as, th e se  gangs lo o te d  sh o p s,
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molested pedestrians and at Kalighat in South Calcutta fought a pitched 
battle with the police.^
The Government of Bengal saw the spectre of red revolution. The
Prince of Wales was due in Calcutta in a month’s time. Unless order
could be guaranteed, his visit would have to be cancelled and the
non-co-operators conceded a complete victory, which could conceivably
mean the end of British authority in the province. The time had come
for action. On 19 November the Government declared the volunteer
brigades illegal and prohibited public meetings in Calcutta. The
2offices of the Congress and Khilafat parties were raided. With official 
approval the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the British Indian 
Association formed a Citizens Protection League to supply armed assist­
ance to the police."'
There was great excitement in the Bengal Congress. The Gandhians 
were afraid of further violence and they argued that civil disobedience 
should be suspended. Das himself was aware of the danger but there 
could be no question of drawing back at that stage, for his followers’ 
blood was up. *We had been spoiling for a fight in Calcutta and the 
official notification therefore was thrice welcome to us’, wrote Bose 
in The Indian Struggle.^
_
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Das had to act carefully to prevent the situation getting out of
hand. His tasks, as he saw them, were twofold: to get some control 
over the Khilafatists and to delay for as long as possible another 
mass demonstration. He persuaded both the Congress and Khilafat 
committees to appoint him as provincial dictator and he then announced 
that only token resistance would be offered to the Government’s 
ordinances. Each day from 1 December small groups of volunteers 
were sent out to hawk khadi and to enlist support for a planned hartal 
on 24th, the day the Prince of Wales was due to arrive in the city.
For a week the police made no move to interfere with the Congressmen 
and Das’ followers grew increasingly restive. On the 8th, however, 
a group of women led by Basanti Devi were arrested and, as they refused 
to give bail, they were taken to the Presidency Gaol. Ronaldshay 
quickly intervened and had them released on the pretext of giving 
them 'time for further reflection1,^ but the damage had been done.
There was an outcry at this 'victimisation of innocent women' and the 
volunteers began openly provoking the police.^
Ronaldshay called Das for an interview and offered to make con­
cessions if the hartal on 24th were called off. He touched the Congress
_
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le a d e r  on th e  raw by in s i s t in g  th a t  in  ta k in g  a c tio n  a g a in s t non- 
c o -o p e ra tio n  he had follow ed th e  advice o f th e  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  th e  
people in  th e  l e g i s la tu r e .  When Das p ro te s te d  th a t  they  were not th e  
p e o p le 's  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s ,  Ronaldshay r e p l ie d  th a t  as Congress had not 
co n te s te d  th e  e le c t io n s  i t  could not ch allen g e  th e i r  re p re s e n ta t iv e  
c h a ra c te r .  I t  was an e x tr a o rd in a r i ly  shrewd argument to  use a g a in s t 
a man who i n i t i a l l y  had supported  co u n c il e n try  and who was now 
s tru g g lin g  to  c o n tro l the  movement w ith  which he had become involved  
in s te a d . But Das was in  no p o s i t io n  to  c o n sid e r a compromise w ith  th e  
Government. ’He who r id e s  a t i g e r  i s  a f ra id  to  d ism o u n t'. His re p ly  
was th a t  the  h a r ta l  would be en fo rced .
On 10 December Das and h is  c h ie f  l ie u te n a n ts  were a r r e s te d .  In
the  fo llo w in g  twelve days hundreds o f n o n -co -o p era to rs  throughout
Bengal were thrown in to  p r is o n  and by the  time th e  P rince  o f  Wales
2a rr iv e d  on Christm as Eve alm ost a l l  r e s is ta n c e  had been broken.
The Loss of Confidence
The a r r e s t s  had been made ju s t  in  tim e to  a v e rt a c a ta s tro p h e  
in  C a lc u tta . The n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  movement, which th e  p o l i t i c ia n s  had 
labou red  so hard to  s t a r t ,  had ga th ered  a momentum of i t s  own and was 
now p e r i lo u s ly  c lo se  to  runn ing  out o f c o n tro l .  Andrews w rote to  
Tagore:
1
H.N. Das Gupta: Deshbandhu C h itta ra n ja n  Das, pp. 70-1.
E ssay ez , p. 154*
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Here i s  Christm as Day and I  am on my way to  th e  Congress, and 
th e  n o ise  of b a t t l e  and s t r i f e  i s  a lread y  m eeting me a l l  along 
the  way. C iv il d isobed ience  tre a d s  upon th e  very b rin k  of 
v io len ce  the  whole tim e; and y e t th e re  a re  th in g s  which a re  
t r u ly  h e ro ic  -  a new s p i r i t  i n f i n i t e l y  beyond the  s e r v i le  
s p i r i t  o f the  p a s t .
My own mind i s  to rn . I  have to  speak out a t  Ahmedabad, but 
i t  i s  very  d i f f i c u l t  indeed  to  know what to  say . I  must speak 
a g a in s t th ese  v e ile d  v io le n c es  -  th e se  in t im id a tio n s , so c ia l  
b o y c o tts , burn ings . . . .  I  th in k  o f Aurobindo Chose say ing :
" I t  i s  u se le s s  to  speak: th e  people have gone mad”. I s  s ile n c e  
b e s t  when one i s  t i r e d  out and o n e 's  f a i t h  dim?*'
Gandhi was a lso  p e rtu rb ed  by th e  course of even ts and he decided
to  s h i f t  th e  emphasis of th e  movement once more, th i s  tim e to  th e
re fu s a l  o f ta x e s . This would d iv e r t  a t te n t io n  from th e  c i t i e s ,  where
2non-v io lence  had f a i l e d ,  to  th e  v i l la g e s .
In  B engal, Das' p a r ty  had never d isp lay ed  enthusiasm  fo r  work 
o u ts id e  the  towns but now th a t  i t s  members were in  p riso n  the  Gandhians 
could tak e  over the  p ro v in c ia l Congress machinery and use i t  fo r  a 
campaign among the  p easan try , w ith th e  a s s is ta n c e  of those  K h ila fa t 
w orkers who were s t i l l  a t  la r g e ,  they  began a g i ta t in g  a g a in s t the  
payment o f th e  ch au k id ari ta x  and land  revenue.^
The p easan ts  were a t t e n t iv e  p u p ils , fo r  econom ically  th ey  had had 
a bad y e a r and p o l i t i c a l l y  a very  a c tiv e  one. Indeed th ey  had th e i r  
own id e a s  as to  where th e  l in e  should be drawn in  th e  payment of
1
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revenue. To the dismay of the politicians, many peasants were soon 
refusing all rent, whether to the Government or to individual land­
lords. In some districts there were also outbreaks of violence 
against the zamindars.
The bhadralok were appalled by these developments. The disaster
which they had always feared seemed imminent: an uprising- by the rural
masses which would destroy the economic and social superiority of the
educated classes. They would be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers
and their culture swept away. The political movement had gone too
far. Gandhi had stirred up a social revolution. In the early months
of 1922 the Bengal Hindu press was full of foreboding:
Tippera Guide, Comilla, 24 January 1922 
The spirit of non-co-operation has spread into the lower 
stratum of society. The non-co-operation movement has 
assumed threatening proportions and the storm of unrest 
is blowing over the villages. Unless the leaders are re­
leased, it is difficult to say how long the movement will 
retain its non-violent nature. We are fearful of the 
future of our district from accounts which we are getting 
from the interior.
Herald, Dacca, 9 February 1922
If the proportion of private owners of land be taken to be 
10 per cent., it would be much more in Eastern Bengal, 
then the campaign of non-payment of taxes would at once 
mean a fight between this 10 per cent, on one side and the 
90 per cent, on the other. On one side will be skill, 
resource and accumulated strength and on the other shall 
be numbers to swamp the other side. And there will set 
in the country a regular civil war.
1
UP, Jan 1922*
I'layak, Calcutta, 11 February 1922
This is the great blunder made by the ruling- class. If 
the masses can once lift their heads, then you, English 
ruling class, will sink and, along with you, we, the 
classes, will sink to the bottomless deep. Mahatma Gandhi 
is playing with the masses. These masses are beyond all 
reason and argument, all debate and dispute.
Atrna Sakti, Calcutta, 5 April 1922
Playing with the Mob
A social revolution without political freedom will be 
injurious to a dependent country. Those who in their 
eagerness to build up the nation and systematise national 
strength are inciting- the masses to agitate for political 
freedom, seem to forget that, if at their suggestion the 
masses succeed in humbling' the power of the foreign ruler, 
they will not stop simply by completing the work wanted by 
the educated classes. Who will deny that if the ire of 
the masses is once roused against the social oppressions, 
etc., to which they have been subjected for centuries, it  ^
will consume the whole community like a volcanic eruption.’
Gandhi was also losing confidence. The peasants seemed no more
ready for satyagraha than the townspeople had been. Worst of all it
was often the Congress workers who incited them to violence. On
5 February 1922 at Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces a band of
volunteers led a mob in an attack on a police station. The buildings
were set alight and 22 policemen killed. Gandhi immediately called a
meeting of the Congress Working Committee at Bardoli in Gujerat and
announced that civil disobedience was to be suspended until such
time as non-violence could be ensured. Congressmen were instructed
to concentrate on the constructive programme: spinning, a temperance
All from IIP. Cf. Young India, 1919-1922» pp. 981-3«1
1campaign, v i l la g e  work and the  u p l i f t  of the  depressed  c la s s e s .
J u s t i f y in g  h is  a c tio n , Gandhi emphasised th a t  Congress had f a i le d
in  many p laces  o th e r than  Chauri Chaura. ’In  C a lcu tta  J a m n a la lji
t e l l s  me th e re  i s  u t t e r  d is o rg a n is a t io n , th e  v o lu n te e rs  w earing
2fo re ig n  c lo th  and c e r ta in ly  not pledged to  n o n -v io le n c e '.
The re a c t io n  in  Bengal to  Gandhi’s d e c is io n  was c u rio u s ly  am­
b iv a le n t .  The bhadralok  were re lie v e d  th a t  the  dangers o f mass 
p o l i t i c s  had been recognised  and th a t  Congressmen had been d ire c te d  
to  hold th e  people in  check.^ T heir p o l i t i c ia n s  could r e jo ic e  in  th e  
knowledge th a t  someone e ls e  had tak en  th e  d i f f i c u l t  d e c is io n  to  suspend 
the  movement -  th a t  Gandhi had le a p t  o f f  the  t i g e r  f i r s t .  There was 
no th ing  to  be g a in ed , however, in  ad m ittin g  even to  o n e se lf  th a t  one 
had s tay ed  on more out o f f e a r  th an  o f b o ld n ess , and among the  
p o l i t i c a l  p r iso n e rs  in  the  A lipur C en tra l Gaol th e re  was a d isp la y  
o f anger a t Gandhi’s ’w eakness'. What r ig h t  had he to  d e s tro y  th e  
n a tio n a l movement fo r  which they  had s a c r i f ic e d  th e i r  freedom , m erely 
because he had lo s t  h is  nerve?^ ' I f  you unmoored your boat and came
rowing along to  face the  sto rm , why a re  you a f r a id  now th a t  th e  storm
5
has b u r s t? ' demanded the  Ban l a r  K atha.
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And what s o r t  of a s u b s t i tu te  fo r  c i v i l  d isobed ience  was the
c o n s tru c tiv e  programme? I f  th e  v o lu n te e rs  were not to  leav e  th e  move­
ment in  d is g u s t ,  they  had to  be o ffe re d  som ething more e x c it in g  than  
sp in n in g  or p o p u la ris in g  p ro h ib it io n . 'They a re  ask in g , what they  a re  
to  do now th a t  a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  have been stopped and how th ey  w ill  
stand  w ith  the  ignominy of d e fe a t on t h e i r  h e a d s ', w rote th e  Mohammad!. 
The Bengal Muslims were p a r t ic u la r ly  angry fo r  they  had acqu ired  a 
t a s t e  fo r  mass a c tio n  and some of t h e i r  le a d e rs  had r e a l is e d  how 
much th e  community s tood  to  g a in  from an a t ta c k  on th e  e x is t in g  s o c ia l  
o rd e r. F in a l ly ,  th e re  was a g en era l f e e l in g  th a t  G andhi's c r i t ic is m s
of Bengal were an in s u l t  to p ro v in c ia l honour. ' . . .  th e  B ard o li
2
r e s o lu t io n  i s  hum iliating- to  th e  prowess o f B engalis* . The p ress  
tu rned  upon Gandhi, h is  "G u jera ti p o l i t i c s "  and h is  b an ia  su p p o rte rs , 
th e  M arw aris.^ I t  was suggested th a t  i t  was no co incidence th a t  the  
l a t t e r  favoured the  c o n s tru c tiv e  programme. 'How the  Marwaris a re  
p r o f i t in g  by the  khaddar movement.''^
What n e x t?
The Government of In d ia  considered  th a t  th e  tim e had come when 
i t  could s a fe ly  s t r ik e  a t  Gandhi. P rev io u s ly  i t  had been re s t r a in e d
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by the  knowledge th a t  even i f  h is  a r r e s t  d id  not provoke o u tr ig h t
r e v o l t ,  i t  would almost c e r ta in ly  a l ie n a te  th e  M oderates who might
then  withdraw th e i r  support from th e  reform ed in s t i t u t i o n s ,  le a v in g
the Government is o la te d  and exposed to  a t ta c k .  In  i t s  judgment
th a t  danger was p ast fo r  Gandhi had l o s t  much o f h is  in f lu e n c e . He
2was a r re s te d  a t  Ahmedabad on 10 March 1922 and the  m ildness of the  
p ro te s ts  a g a in s t th i s  a c tio n  proved the  Government's p o in t.^
Among th e  Bengal Congressmen a debate  had begun on what should 
now be done. With a l l  th e  le ad in g  n a t io n a l i s t s  in  p riso n  and th e  
n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  movement in  r u in s ,  the  o u tlook  was b le ak . The Gandhians 
in s is te d  th a t  the  f i r s t  e s s e n t ia l  was fo r  B engalis  to  reco g n ise  th a t  
th e  f a i lu r e  was t h e i r  own. They had no t heeded G andhi's in ju n c tio n  
to  work w ith  th e  masses nor had they  le a r n t  s e l f - c o n t r o l .  The p ro v in c ia l 
Congress should now devote i t s e l f  to  th e  c o n s tru c tiv e  programme. I t s  
members should humble them selves and go out in to  th e  v i l l a g e s .  'Ours 
i s  a s p i r i t u a l  s tru g g le  and l i k e  tru e  w orshippers we must purge our­
se lv e s  of a l l  f a i l in g s  and im p erfec tio n s  b e fo re  we are  p r iv i le g e d  
to  e n te r  the  Temple o f L ib e r ty '.^
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This view was contested by another section of the party which
maintained that it would be retrograde for the province to follow
Gandhi, ' ••• in view of the stage of attainment that the life of
the Bengalis have reached, they will have to fall back if they have
“1to follow the dictates of the Mahatma*. This group argued that 
Bengal had supported non-co-operation in a temporary state of over­
excitement and that now that good sense was returning it would realise 
that it could gain its objectives only by terrorism. ’Bengalis cannot 
give up the creed of fire'. The samitis which had worked so heroically 
in the partition period should be revived. 'Forming these organisations 
is now the only work in the country; and, the more they become well 
established, the more will they be able to improve the country. The 
real thing is that the country must be free .... Many paths will come 
and go in order that the nation may gain experience, but it will not
be possible for the nation of the Bengali to stick to the wrong path
2in their attempt to show reverence to an individual'.
C.R. Das offered a third courses to enter the legislative 
councils and destroy the reforms from within. The idea of council 
entry had never been discarded by a group among the Bengal non-co- 
operators. As early as March 1921 Bepin Chandra Pal had suggested 
that the Nagpur resolution should be reconsidered. Speaking as
Nava Sangha,* Chandernagore, 23 Jul 1922.
1
2
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p re s id e n t of th e  P ro v in c ia l Conference a t B a r isa l he warned h is  
fe llow  B engalis  not to  accep t o u ts id e  d ic ta t io n ,  fo r  th i s  would 
d e s tro y  p ro v in c ia l in d iv id u a l i ty .  A lready, he s a id ,  a m istake had 
been made in  ask ing  law yers to  suspend p ra c t ic e .  There was a lso  a 
m isconcep tion  about the  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c ils . In d ian s  c e r ta in ly  d id  
not want th e  B r i t i s h  p a rliam en ta ry  system . 'But we a re  to  some ex ten t 
h e lp le s s  in  t h i s  m a tte r . We a re  a t  th e  mercy of the  s tra n g e r  w ith in  
our g a te s .  Any B r i t i s h  c h a r la ta n  can , th e re fo re ,  make any experim ent 
w ith  our f a te  and fu tu re . This i s  th e  trag ed y  of our p re sen t u n fo rtu n a te  
p o s it io n * .
The remedy, as Pal saw i t ,  was to  persuade th e  B r i t i s h  to  amend
th e  preamble of the  Government o f In d ia  Act to  inc lude  a promise of
self-governm ent fo r  In d ia  a t  th e  end o f te n  y e a rs . To ach ieve  th i s
co n cession , Congress had to  be w il l in g  to  compromise w ith  th e  B r i t i s h
and i t  had to  reach  a compromise qu ick ly  because i t  had promised
the  n a tio n  swara.j w ith in  tw elve months. M oreover, th e  people had to
be persuaded th a t  swara.j had th i s  l im ite d  meaning.
I t  w ill  s p e l l  d i s a s te r  to  our cause i f  we allow  th e  masses 
to  in te r p r e t  th i s  d e c la ra t io n  in  any o th e r  sense. That 
w il l  be bound to  c re a te  a re a c t io n  a g a in s t the  whole move­
ment when th e  y ear i s  o u t, and they  see th a t  the B r i t i s h  
a re  s t i l l  in  p o ssess io n  o f t h e i r  coun try  . . . .  i t  w il l  c re a te  
deep and widespread d is c o n te n t th a t  may e i th e r  le ad  people 
back to  t h e i r  o ld  h o p e less  in d if fe re n c e  and l i s t l e s s n e s s ,  
o r k i l l i n g  th e i r  f a i t h  in  n o n -v io len t n o n -co -o p e ra tio n , 
d r iv e  them towards v io le n t  re v o lu tio n a ry  ways as th e  only 
p o ss ib le  way to  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  red em p tio n .”'
1
B.C. P a l: Bengal P ro v in c ia l Conference Session« B a r is a l ,  1921. 
P re s id e n t ia l  Address.
He was a brave man who would c r i t i c i s e  Gandhi’s programme a t  th a t
ju n c tu re , and, a lthough th e re  were many in  th e  Bengal Congress who
agreed w ith  P a l, none would support him p u b lic ly . He re s ig n ed  in
2d isg u s t from the  B.P.C.C. and the  A .I .C .C ., and l a t e r  en te red  the  
In d ian  L e g is la t iv e  Assembly a t  a b y -e le c t io n .
That th e re  was no disagreem ent in  p r in c ip le  between Pal and the  
Das group was dem onstrated in  A pril 1921 when th e  l a t t e r  c a r r ie d  a 
m otion in  th e  B.P.C.C. re v e rs in g  a d e c is io n  of the  B a r isa l conference 
to  bo y co tt lo c a l  b o d ie s .J These i n s t i t u t i o n s  were a source o f lo c a l 
power -  they  had provided more th an  h a l f  the  e le c te d  members o f the  
Bengal L e g is la t iv e  Council a t  th e  1920 genera l e le c t io n  -  and the  Das 
group saw no reason  to  leave  them, as w ell as th e  C ouncil, to  th e  
M oderates.
That Das a lso  shared P a l ’s b e l i e f  in  the  need fo r  compromise to  
secure  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  concessions was rev ea led  a f t e r  h is  imprisonment 
in  December 1921. The mass a r r e s t s  in  th e  second week o f th a t  month 
had offended th e  M oderates so se r io u s ly ^  th a t  the  Government o f In d ia
The whole B engali p ress  was a g a in s t him. (NP, Mar-Apr 1921.)
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On 17 December the  In d ian  A sso c ia tio n  and n a tio n a l L ib e ra l League 
jo in t ly  issu ed  a m anifesto  p ro te s t in g  a g a in s t th e  a r r e s t s  and c a l l in g  
fo r  a round ta b le  con ference , w ith  the  Government and a l l  In d ian  
p a r t ie s  re p re se n te d . ' V/e fe e l  a b so lu te ly  convinced th a t  in  the  event 
of the  Government re fu s in g  or f a i l i n g  to  a l la y  th i s  in c re a s in g  u n re s t 
by w ithdrawal of the  p re sen t p o lic y , a l l  s e c tio n s  o f th e  community 
w il l  be d riv e n  in to  th i s  s tru g g le , p u tt in g  a s id e  fo r  th e  tim e being- 
a l l  d if fe re n c e s  of p o l i t i c a l  o p in io n '.  ( S ta tesm an ,* 17 Dec 1921. 
B enyalee,* 17 Dec 1921.)
?üi
had decided th a t  i t  would have to  come to  term s w ith  the  non-co- 
o p e ra to rs  to  prevent the  c o lla p se  of th e  Montagu-Chelmsford c o n s t i tu t io n .  
I t  th e re fo re  sen t em issa rie s  to  Gandhi and Das w ith  th e  o f f e r  of a 
round ta b le  conference to  d isc u ss  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  advance, on c o n d itio n  
th a t  th e  h a r ta l  of 24 December was c a lle d  o f f .
Das saw in  th i s  an o p p o rtu n ity  to  tu rn  th e  n o n -co -o p era tio n  
movement to  p o s i t iv e  g a in  and he was w il l in g  to  accep t th e  o f f e r ,  w ith  
th e  p rov iso  th a t  a l l  p r iso n e rs  a r re s te d  fo r  c i v i l  d isobed ience  should 
be re le a s e d  im m ediately. He convinced th e  o th e r  inm ates o f th e  A lipur 
Gaol th a t  he was r ig h t  by p o in tin g  out the  need f o r  a dem onstrable
1
achievem ent by 31 December, th e  day fo r  which swara.j was prom ised.
He had le s s  success w ith  Gandhi who m is tru s te d  B r i t i s h  in te n t io n s .
The Mahatma challenged  the  Government to  prove i t s  good f a i t h  by
s t a t i n g  what c o n s t i tu t io n a l  concessions i t  would make and by r e le a s in g
im m ediately a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p r is o n e rs .  This was ask ing  too much and
2th e  o f f e r  was withdrawn.
There was g en era l d isg u s t in  th e  B engali camp a t  G andhi's  f a i lu r e  
to  tak e  advantage of th e  opportunity"* and Das considered  i t  a good 
tim e to  reopen the q u es tio n  o f council e n try . He canvassed the  id ea  
among h is  fe llo w  p riso n e rs  and soon had a group of su p p o rte rs . When
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J.M. Sen Gupta was re le a se d  from p r iso n  in  January  1922, he was charged
w ith  th e  ta s k  o f ta lk in g  w ith  M o tila l Nehru, a le ad in g  U nited Provinces
Congressman who was known to  favour council e n try , and o f o rg an is in g
1
support fo r  th e  new scheme. With th e  c o lla p se  o f c iv i l  d isobed ience
a f t e r  th e  B ard o li re s o lu t io n  and G andhi's a r r e s t ,  th e  Das group was
w il l in g  to  put the  id ea  to  th e  p u b lic . B asan ti Devi p res id ed  a t  the
P ro v in c ia l Conference held  a t  C hittagong in  A pril 1922 and in  her
ad d ress  she suggested  th a t  Congressmen should s e t  out to  cap tu re  a l l
2s e a ts  on lo c a l  bodies and th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil.
The Case fo r  Council Entry
The case in  favour of co u n cil e n try  which the  Das group developed 
over th e  fo llo w in g  e ig h t months deserves our c lo se  a t te n t io n ,  fo r  by 
p ro v id in g  an in s ig h t  in to  th e i r  m otives i t  w il l  h e lp  us answer the  
second of th e  two qu estio n s  w ith  which we opened th i s  c h ap te r.
In  the  f i r s t  p lace  they  ex p la in ed  th a t  they  could not accep t 
G andhi's  c o n s tru c tiv e  programme because i t  was not su ite d  to  th e  
p ro v in c ia l c h a ra c te r . ’Not we a lo n e , bu t S r i j u t  B ip in  Pal too has 
been say ing  from th e  beginning  th a t  G uzrati p o l i t i c s  w ill  not agree 
w ith  th e  n a tu re  of th e  B e n g a l is '.^  Council e n try  was B en g a l's  way,
1
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th ey  i n s i s t e d ,  h u t Gandhi and h i s  a d h e re n ts  were too  d o c t r in a i r e  to
adm it p ro v in c ia l  d if fe re n c e s*  They were a lso  in c a p a b le  o f  d i s t in g u is h in g
betw een  symbolism and r e a l i t y  in  t h e i r  own movement. Das observed ;
I t  i s  o f te n  s ta te d  th a t  Khaddar a lo n e  w i l l  b r in g  us S w araj.
I  a sk  my countrym en to  c o n s id e r  in  what way i t  i s  p o s s ib le  
f o r  Khaddar to  le a d  us to  S w araj. I t  i s  in  one sense  o n ly  
th a t  th e  s ta tem en t may be sa id  to  be t r u e .  We must re g a rd  
Khaddar as th e  symbol o f  S w araj. But what would th a t  symbol 
s ig n if y ?  To my mind such a symbol w orsh ip  r e q u ir e s  th e  
sp re a d in g  out o f a l l  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  a c t i v i t i e s  in  every  
p o s s ib le  d i r e c t io n .^
The Das group a lso  warned t h e i r  fe llo w -b h a d ra lo k  a g a in s t  th e  
d an g ers  o f G andhi’s m ethods, w hich depended upon a reaw akening  o f
th e  m asses. ’Reawakening means th e  e x t in c t io n  o f  th e  m iddle c l a s s e s .
2
Are we read y  to  pay th e  p r i c e ' .  A lready  th e  n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  
movement had weakened th e  p o s i t io n  o f  th e  ed u ca ted  c la s s e s  who 
p re v io u s ly  ’were b e in g  fo rced  in to  a g r e a t  In d ia n  n a t io n  . . . .  O ne 's  
h a i r  s ta n d s  on end to  th in k  o f what w i l l  become o f th e  E n g lis h -  
ed u ca ted  c la s s e s  in  th e  f u t u r e J 1 2^ To avo id  th e se  d a n g e rs , p o l i t i c s  
shou ld  be  r e d i r e c te d  in to  th e  o ld  s a fe  c h an n e ls  .
There were p o s i t iv e  argum ents f o r  c o u n c il e n try .  The aim o f  th e  
n o n -c o -o p e ra tio n  movement had been to  d e s tro y  th e  system  o f  government 
w hich made p o s s ib le  o u tra g e s  l i k e  A m ritsa r . D e sp ite  a l l  i t s
1
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achievem ents i t  had f a i le d  to  do t h i s .  The B r i t i s h  au to cracy  had 
been shaken but i t  had not been broken. Worst of a l l  i t  was s t i l l  
ab le  to  d isg u ise  the n a tu re  of i t s  despotism  behind th e  sc reen  of 
th e  reform ed in s t i t u t i o n s .  Having f a i l e d  to  d e stro y  th e se  from 
o u ts id e , the  no n -co -o p era to rs  should now e n te r  them and d e s tro y  them 
from w ith in . Das w rote:
H ith e rto  we have been b o y co ttin g  th e  C ouncils from o u ts id e .
We have succeeded in  doing much. The p re s t ig e  of th e  
C ouncils i s  d im in ished , and th e  country  knows th a t  th e  
people who adorn the  Council Chambers a re  not the  tru e  
re p re s e n ta t iv e s  of the  people. But although  we have suc­
ceeded in  doing much, th e se  c o u n c ils  a re  s t i l l  th e re . I t  
should be the  duty  o f th e  Congress to  boyco tt the Council 
more e f f e c t iv e ly  from w ith in  as a lso  from w ithou t.
The Reformed Councils a re  r e a l ly  a mask which th e  bureau­
cracy  has put on. I  conceive i t  to  be our c le a r  duty  to  
t e a r  th i s  mask from o f f  t h e i r  fa c e . To end th e se  co u n c ils  
i s  the  only e f fe c t iv e  b o y co tt.^
That Das used th i s  as h is  main argument i s  of g re a t s ig n if ic a n c e  
fo r  i t  shows th a t  th e  n o n -co -o p era to rs  in  Bengal were as concerned 
w ith  th e  workings o f th e  reform ed i n s t i t u t i o n s  as were th e  Government 
and the  M oderates, fo r  op p o site  re a so n s . The Government considered  
i t  v i t a l  th a t  i t  should never again  have to  ru le  w ithout th i s  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  su p p o rt. The n o n -co -o p era to rs  were determ ined to  fo rce  
i t  to  do so . ' I  am aware o f th e  la rg e  powers o f ve to  which th e  
Governors can e x e rc ise  under th e  Reforms A c t ',  wrote Das. 'L e t 
them govern by veto  t i l l  th e  tim e must come when they  must e i th e r
1
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1yield to our demands or withdraw the Reforms Act’. The Moderates
were concerned to maintain the reformed institutions as a means of
justifying their political style. The non-co-operators were resolved
to prevent them; 'The Council has practically become a place for
personal advertisement', warned the Kayak. 'Let those who, boycotting
2it, are sitting silent, get up. It will not do to sit inactive'.
*1 warn my countrymen against the policy of allowing these Reformed 
Councils to work their wicked will', said Das. ' ... there is an 
apprehension in my mind. I desire to express it with all the emphasis 
that I can command, that if we allow this policy of drift to continue, 
the result will be that we shall lose the people who are with us 
today'•^
Das knew that the criterion by which the bhadralok judged its 
nationalist politicians was their skill in harrying the Government.
He recognised that the non-co-operators had lost their ability to 
do this with the collapse of civil disobedience. For that reason, 
they would be inviting defeat if they sat in the villages spinning 
yarn, and left the Moderates to goad the British in the Council.
'We are realising at every step that unless we can bring in a feeling
T
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of s tru g g le  a g a in s t th e  bureaucracy , th e  n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  movement 
w il l  not l iv e  lo n g ’ , wrote the  B anglar K atha. 'The o b s t r u c t io n is t  
p o lic y  in  th e  Councils i s  a g re a t in strum ent fo r  f ig h t in g  w ith  the  
ru l in g  pow ers’ .*'
Holding A tte n tio n
'This problem of g e t t in g  to  g r ip s  w ith  th e  B r i t i s h ,  o f keeping
them selves a c t iv e ly  in  th e  p u b lic  eye, w orried th e  Bengal Congressmen
throughout th e  rem ainder o f 1922. While in  p r iso n  they  gave th e
Government as much tro u b le  as they  could by provoking- t h e i r  g a o le rs
and in c i t in g  the  o rd in a ry  c rim in a ls  to  r i o t .  T h e ir e f f o r t s  were
2
rewarded w ith  a number o f s e r io u s  ou tbreaks o f v io len ce  and th e  
f lo g g in g s  which the  Government ordered in  r e t a l i a t i o n  won them much 
p u b lic  sympathy. They a lso  had th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f see in g  S i r  Abdur 
Rahim re s ig n  h is  p o r tf o l io  of g ao ls  in  p ro te s t  a g a in s t th e se  punish­
m ents. ^
'When they  were re le a se d  in  August they  organ ised  r a l l i e s  which 
brought young bhadralok  men from a l l  over Bengal to  t a s t e  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  d e l ig h ts  o f C a lc u tta .^  A chance fo r  p u b lic  s e rv ic e  was
1
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provided early in October by disastrous flooding in Northern Bengal. 
The Government was in Darjeeling at the time and, as in the Chandpur 
affair, was slow to act. Congress saw its opportunity and immediately 
despatched Bose and Sen Gupta to the disaster area to organise 
relief. Supported by a fund raised in Calcutta by Sir Prafulla 
Chandra Hay, the great Bengali chemist, they enlisted more than 200 
volunteers to rescue peasants and their livestock, and to distribute 
food, medicines and clothing. As the floodwaters receded they 
helped the villagers repair their devastated homes. With his inde­
fatigable energy and outstanding organising ability, Bose in 
particular earned praise from all quarters for two months invaluable 
work. Banerjea, as Minister of Public Health, provided a pathetic 
contrast by making a one day excursion through the area and returning 
to Darjeeling to collapse with pneumonia.
The Council Entry Debate
Throughout 1922 and the early months of 1923 there was a battle 
royal in the Bengal Congress over council entry. When the Das group 
came out of gaol they found themselves for the first time at a 
disadvantage in the B.P.C.C., which had been taken over in their
_
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absence by th e  Gandhians. This group accused them of m is in te rp re t in g
n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  by su b sc rib in g  to  ’th e  old  Moderate f a l la c y  th a t  the
so le  end of p o l i t i c a l  a g i ta t io n  i s  to  em barrass the  Government . . . .
The o b je c t of th e  n o n -co -o p era to r i s  not to  annoy the o f f i c i a l s  or to
o b s tru c t th e i r  work tem p o ra rily  . . .  i t  i s  h is  aim to  so t r a i n  up h is
countrymen by means of s a c r i f i c e  and suffering- as to  be ab le  a t  a
g iven  moment to  stand  com pletely  a lo o f from a l l  th e  v a rio u s  ra m if ic a tio n s
2of th e  Government a d m in is tra tio n * . Council e n try , whether to  
o b s tru c t o r c o -o p e ra te , was a d e n ia l of th i s  aim. ^
Few of the Bengal newspapers favoured th e  c o n s tru c tiv e  programme 
bu t th ey  were no more e n th u s ia s t ic  about co u n cil e n try , fo r  i t  
resem bled too c lo se ly  th e  M oderates’ p o licy  of co -o p e ra tio n  on which 
they  had been pouring th e i r  e d i to r ia l  sco rn  fo r  th e  p reced ing  18 
m onths.^ Das knew th a t  he had to  have newspaper support i f  he were to  
c a r ry  the  day. He rev ived  th e  B anglar K atha, which had been fo rced  to  
cease p u b lic a tio n  in  m id-year because o f la c k  o f s t a f f ,  and, a f t e r  
an a b o r tiv e  a ttem pt to  g a in  c o n tro l of the  G andhians’ main paper,
1
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th e S e rv a n t, he formed a company to  produce a new E ng lish -language
d a i ly  Forward. 2
He a lso  re a l is e d  th a t  a p ro v in c ia l p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r  could no lo n g e r 
a ffo rd  to  r e s t r i c t  h is  a c t i v i t i e s  to  h is  home p rov ince . The o ld -  
s ty le  Congress -  a fe d e ra t io n  of p ro v in c ia l grandees -  had been des­
tro y ed  by G andhi’s c o n so lid a tio n  of the  powers o f th e  A ll- In d ia  
Congress execu tive  and h is  freq u e n t in tr u s io n s  in to  p ro v in c ia l p o l i t i c s .  
There were now two in te r-d ep en d en t power s t ru c tu re s  -  th e  n a tio n a l and 
the  p ro v in c ia l -  and to  m ain ta in  h is  in flu en c e  th e  n a t io n a l i s t  
p o l i t i c i a n  had to have a secu re  p o s i t io n  in  b o th .
For Das th e  time seemed opportune fo r  a c o n ce n tra tio n  of e f f o r t  
a t  th e  n a tio n a l le v e l .  The p ro v in c ia l ex ecu tiv e  was out o f h is  
c o n tro l ,  tem p o ra rily  a t  l e a s t ,  and th e  a l l - I n d i a  le a d e rs h ip  was vacant 
because of Gandhi’s im prisonm ent. At a m eeting o f the A .I.C .C . in  
C a lc u tta  in  November he supported  M o tila l Nehru in  a r e s o lu t io n  in  
favou r o f council e n try , b u t t h e i r  opponents had th e  m a tte r  postponed 
to  th e  p lenary  se ss io n  of Congress to  be held  a t  Gaya in  the  fo llo w in g  
m onth.^ Das p re s id ed  a t  Gaya and in  h is  opening address on 26 December 
1922 he appealed fo r  support fo r  council e n try .^  His main opponent
2
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was th e  Tamil p o l i t i c i a n ,  C. R a jag o p a la ch a ri, who su c c e ss fu lly  
c a r r ie d  a re s o lu t io n  a g a in s t co u n cil e n try . M o tila l Nehru and Das 
th e re fo re  decided to  form a new p a r ty  which would c o n te s t the  
e le c t io n s .  I t  was g iven  the  name Sv/araj P a rty  and Das was e le c te d  
le a d e r .  On 1 January 1923 Re inform ed th e  new A .I.C .C . o f th e i r  a c tio n  
and tendered  h is  re s ig n a tio n  from th e  p residency  of Congress. The 
p ro sp ec t o f th e  d is in te g ra t io n  of Congress alarm ed h is  opponents and 
they  d ec lin ed  to  accep t the  re s ig n a t io n .  They a lso  t r i e d  to  persuade 
the co u n cil en try  group to  compromise bu t Das and Nehru stood th e i r  
ground. For th e  fo llow ing  s ix  months the  le a d e rs  of bo th  groups 
to u red  the  coun try  seeking  support fo r  t h e i r  view s. By May Das' 
opponents had been fo rced  in to  a m in o rity  on th e  A .I.C .C . and a 
sp e c ia l s e s s io n  o f Congress in  September reco g n ised  council e n try  as
'  "  -j
a le g it im a te  l in e  of a c tio n  fo r  Congressmen.
In Bengal a l l  th e  m ajor newspapers had swung over to  support
2the S w a ra jis ts  by the  middle o f th e  y ea r and Das was slow ly bu t 
su re ly  winning r e c r u i t s  from among h is  opponents in  th e  B.P.C.C.
In  August he succeeded in  re p la c in g  the  Gandhian o f f ic e -b e a re r s  
w ith  a group o f n e u tra ls  bu t th e  Gandhians re fu sed  to  y ie ld  and fo r  
a month th e re  were two p ro v in c ia l ex ecu tiv es  c la im ing  a u th o r i ty  in  
C a lc u tta . The A .I.C .C . f in a l ly  s e t t l e d  th e  d isp u te  in  favour o f th e
1
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new men. When the  B .P.C .C. was r e - e le c te d  tow ards the end o f th e
y ea r th e  S w a ra jis ts  gained an o u tr ig h t m a jo rity  and Das resumed the
2presid en cy  w ith  S.C. Bose as h is  s e c re ta ry .
1
The R eaction
Andrews wrote to  R ath in d ran ath  Tagore on 11 August 1920:
. . .  th ese  In d ian  le a d e rs  . . .  a re  l iv in g  from hand to  mouth 
on every f re s h  excitem en t. Sadly enough, th ese  f a ls e  
ex c item en ts , coming one a f t e r  a n o th e r , produce a morbid 
atm osphere, l ik e  drug o r dram d rin k in g . People cannot 
b ear to  be w ithout them, and one excitem ent must fo llow  
an o th er in  quick su ccess io n . This means, in  the long  - 
ru n , a t e r r i b l e  re a c t io n  and an a p p a ll in g  waste of energy.
The re a c tio n  to  the  p o l i t i c a l  ex c item en ts  o f 1920-21 came in  l a t e  
1922 and e a r ly  1923» As a r e s u l t  Das and h is  p a r ty  faced  some 
d i f f i c u l t  problems o f appeasement as they  prepared  fo r  th e  L eg is­
l a t i v e  Council e le c t io n s  to  be held  in  November 1923*
Prom th e  le a d e rs  o f th e  lo w -caste  Hindu communities came th e  
com plaint th a t  th e  bhadralok  had run  t ru e  to form in  d e s e r t in g  
n o n -co -o p e ra tio n . Nirode B ehari M ailick , a Namasudra re p re s e n ta t iv e  
in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, had voiced th e  g en era l d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  
o f h is  community in  the  1922 budget d ebate : * So f a r  as mere sweet
words are  concerned, I  admit th a t  from th e  h ig h e s t r u le r s  o f th e
1
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province to the so-called Leagues, every one shows sympathy with 
the condition of the backward classes. But when the time for practical 
action comes, all sympathy evaporates1. The Raiyat Bandhu, a 
Calcutta newspaper, was of the same opinion. In January 1923 it 
advised its peasant readers that the nationalist movement was not 
for them, fbut for those who have not to toil for their bread; who, 
seated in the midst of plenty, dream pleasant dreams, and who would 
live in the dirtiest lane of the town, rather than forego the charms 
of town life1.^
The Swaraj party decided that it could safely ignore these 
complaints for it considered that the lower castes were too poorly 
organised to exercise any decisive influence at the polls. Its 
judgment was borne out at the 1923 elections by the defeats inflicted 
by its bhadralok candidates in Khulna and Bakarganj South, two 
Namasudra strongholds, on Nirode Behari Mallick and his brother 
Mukanda Behari, Vice-President and President of the Bengal Namasudra 
Association.^
Less easily disregarded were the fears expressed by many caste 
Hindus that Congress had endangered Hindu society by allying with 
the Muslims during the non-co-operation movement. The Kayak wrote
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of th e  Muslims on 19 February 1923:
W ithin the  next te n  or tw enty y ears  they  a re  su re  to  oust 
the  Hindus from th e i r  le ad in g  p o s i t io n  in  B engal, i f  they 
a re  i n t e l l i g e n t ly  gu ided , w hether they  secu re  communal 
re p re se n ta tio n  or n o t. Our Babus can make very dex terous 
use of the ca tch p h rases  of in te rn a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  such as 
"mandate'’, " f ra n c h ise ” , " p r o le ta r i a t " ,  e t c . ,  bu t they  do 
not understand  t h e i r  household m a tte rs . They a re  sp read ing  
E n g lish  h a tre d  b roadcast in  th e  co u n try , w ith  th e  r e s u l t  
th a t  Muhammadans are  d a ily  growing s tro n g e r  and more u n ite d .
The Congress has become an in s ig n i f ic a n t  t a i l  o f the 
K h ila fa t conference; the  b ig  le a d e rs  are  eager fo r  the  
sympathy o f K h ila fa t c h ie f s .  The 2% c ro re s  of Hindus o f 
Bengal a re  s c a tte re d  and fe e b le  l ik e  f lo c k s  of sheep w ithout 
a w atcher by the  s id e  o f th e i r  Muhammadan c o m p a tr io ts .1
This co n v ic tio n  of th e  need to  o rg an ise  th e  Hindus a g a in s t th e
r i s in g  power of the Muslims le d  to  th e  fo rm ation  in  Bengal in  1923
of a number of communalist o rg a n is a tio n s , th e  most im portan t o f which
2was th e  Hindu Mahasabha. Das had l i t t l e  sympathy w ith  th e  o b je c ts  
o f th e se  bodies and he offended t h e i r  o rg a n ise rs  by in s i s t i n g  th a t  
p o l i t i c a l  and so c ia l  s e c u r ity  in  Bengal could be ensured only i f  th e  
b h ad ra lok  were w il l in g  to  admit th e  low er o rd e rs , Muslim as w ell as 
Hindu, to  some form of p a r tn e rs h ip .^  With th i s  as h is  a t t i t u d e ,  
he could not count upon e le c to ra l  support from th e  communali s t s but 
he could tak e  h e a r t  from the  f a c t  th a t  th e  M oderates had made them selves 
even more unpopular w ith th e se  men because of t h e i r  concessions to  
the  Muslims in  th e  C a lcu tta  M unicipal Act.
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By 1923 the  t e r r o r i s t s  were again  a c t iv e  in  Bengal, working in
groups modelled on th e  re v o lu tio n a ry  sa m itis  o f the p a r t i t i o n  period
and, in  many c ase s , c a rry in g  the  same names. They were composed
m ainly o f young bhadralok men and they  had th e  support of the
communalist Hindus. Das p e rso n a lly  d isapproved o f th e i r  a c t i v i t i e s
h u t some o f h is  fo llo w ers  in  th e  Swaraj p a r ty , Suhhas Chandra Bose
2
among- them, favoured v io le n t  methods and th e se  men served as h is  
l i a i s o n  w ith  th e  t e r r o r i s t s .  The connection  was l a t e r  to  prove an 
embarrassment to  h is  p a r ty  when i t  a ttem pted  to  move tow ards co­
o p e ra tio n  w ith  the Government bu t in  th e  sh o r t run  i t  was a co n sid e rab le  
e le c to r a l  a s s e t  as i t  secured  bhad ra lok  sympathy.
While a p p re c ia tin g  th e  continued  im portance o f c u l t iv a t in g  the  
bhad ra lok  v o te , Das r e a l i s e d  th a t  no p a rty  could  hope to  command a 
m a jo rity  in  the  reform ed Bengal L e g is la t iv e  Council u n le ss  i t  had 
Muslim back ing . His p o s i t io n  v is  a v is  the  Muslims a t th e  beg inn ing  
o f 1923 was not strong-. Even a t  the  h e ig h t o f th e  n o n -co -o p era tio n  
and K h ila fa t movements, th e  Muslim a l l ia n c e  in  Bengal had never been 
as c lo se  as i t  was in  many o th e r  p ro v in ces , and in  1922 w ith  Gandhi’ s 
r e t r e a t  and the co llap se  of the  K h ila fa t a g i ta t io n  i t  had d is in te g ra te d .  
The Muslims re sen ted  th e  open contempt which th e  bhadralok  d isp lay ed
1
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fo r  the  masses"' and the  growth of Hindu communalism convinced many of
2th e i r  le a d e rs  th a t  t h e i r  communal id e n t i ty  was endangered.
At th i s  tim e th e re  was no enthusiasm  d isp lay ed  by th e  Muslim 
p re ss  fo r  th e  id ea  o f council entry*^ bu t Das was determ ined to  g a in  
the community's support fo r  th e  Swaraj p a r ty . The M oderates made 
h is  t a s k  e a s ie r  by th e i r  re lu c ta n c e  to  concede th e  Muslims' demands 
w ith  reg ard  to  the C a lcu tta  M unicipal B i l l  and the  manner in  which 
the  Muslims f in a l ly  achieved th e i r  v ic to ry  over communal e le c to ra te s  
convinced many of t h e i r  le a d e rs  th a t  the  community's i n t e r e s t s  could 
b e s t be secured  by o rg an is in g  a s o l id  Muslim b lo c  in  th e  C ouncil, 
which might then  a l ly  w ith  o th e r groups on i t s  own term s.
There follow ed a v igorous intra-com m unal debate  over council 
e n try , which Das attem pted to  swing in  h is  fav o u r by campaigning in  
th e  Muslim c e n tre s  o f E a s te rn  B engal.^  He made i t  c le a r  th a t  he was 
w il l in g  to  n e g o tia te  term s w ith  th e  Muslims as a community i f  in  
r e tu rn  they  would support th e  Swaraj p a r ty . I t  was on th i s  b a s is  
th a t  d is c u ss io n s  were begun in  September 1923 to  s e t t l e  th e  d e ta i l s  
o f a Hindu/Muslim a l l ia n c e  in  Bengal. These were not f in a l i s e d  
u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  e le c tio n s  bu t in  the meantime many Muslim can d id a tes
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had accepted the Swarajist label and the party had the general goodwill 
of the community in its election bid.
The communal and class dissensions which had appeared in 1923 
were to have a disastrous influence on the political future of Bengal 
but, temporarily at least, Das had shielded his party from their most 
harmful effects and enabled it to contest the 1923 elections strong 
and united.
The Swarajist Election Campaign
The Swarajists approached the elections with many advantages.
They were the heroes of the greatest anti-Government agitation India 
had ever seen and they proudly bore the new title of honours prison 
graduates. They had symbols, such as the wearing of khadi, by which 
they could appeal to the new mass electorate and they could offer 
themselves to the people as Mahatmaji’s disciples. By contrast the 
Moderates could be represented as ’Government men* and this had the 
hue of truth, for was it not a fact that they had been absent in 
Calcutta for the last three years on Government business?
Because of the time they had spent in their localities organising 
support for non-co-operation, the Swarajists were known in person 
to the electors in a way politicians in Bengal had never been before. 
Moreover they had at their disposal the reformed Congress organisation 
extending to the villages and the volunteer brigades, although but a 
remnant of their former strength, could be used for the hack work
o f e le c t io n  propaganda. By se c u rin g  a sweeping v ic to ry  in  the  lo c a l  
body e le c t io n s  in  A pril 19239 th e  S w a ra jis ts  had secured an a d d itio n a l 
source of lo c a l  power.
P o ss ib ly  even more im portan t f a c to rs  were the  personnel and 
o rg a n is a tio n  of the  p a rty  i t s e l f .  In  Das i t  had a le a d e r  o f o u t­
s tan d in g  a b i l i t y  -  a p o l i t i c i a n  w ith  a f l a i r  fo r  the  d ram atic  and 
an a cu te  sense o f tim ing ; a man who could command the  un q u estio n in g
2
obedience of h is  fo llo w ers  and who could y e t d e leg a te  power w ise ly .
He was an e x c e lle n t judge o f men and had g a th ered  a group o f l i e u ­
te n a n ts  who were sc a rc e ly  l e s s  capable than  h im se lf: J.M. Sen Gupta, 
Subhas Chandra Bose, B.N. Sasm al, Nirmal Chandra Chandra, and K iran 
Sankar Ray. Das was 53« His s e n io r  o f f ic e r s  were a l l  in  th e i r  
t h i r t i e s  o r f o r t i e s  w ith  the  excep tio n  o f Bose who was 26. They were 
the  a b le s t  members o f a young g e n e ra tio n  which acknowledged them as 
i t s  le a d e rs .
For th e  f i r s t  tim e in  Bengal th e re  was a p a r ty  which approached 
a g en e ra l e le c t io n  w ith  an unchallenged  le a d e r  and a c e n tra l  
o rg a n is a tio n  to  nominate i t s  c a n d id a te s . I t  could fu rn is h  them w ith  
e le c t io n  workers and ample funds fo r  cam paigning, fo r  i t  had i t s
_
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hands in  many f u l l  pockets. I t  could a lso  p rovide e le c tio n e e r in g
e x p e r t is e ,  fo r  th re e  a t l e a s t  o f i t s  members (Das, Bose and Dr Bidhan
Chandra Ray) had a s s is te d  B r i t i s h  L ib e ra l c an d id a te s  in  p a rliam en tary
2e le c t io n s  w hile study ing  in  England. As a r e s u l t ,  the p a r ty  ap p lied  
tech n iq u es  new to In d ian  p o l i t i c s .  These can be i l l u s t r a t e d  from 
Dr R ay 's campaign in  the  24-Parganas M unicipal North c o n s titu e n c y , 
where he gained a sp e c ta c u la r  v ic to ry  over S urendranath  B anerjea .
At 41 Bidhan Chandra Ray was one of I n d ia 's  le ad in g  surgeons.
As a s tu d en t he had had a b r i l l i a n t  c a re e r  in  C a lcu tta  and London, 
and on h is  r e tu rn  to  Bengal in  1911 he had d iv id ed  h is  tim e between 
p r iv a te  p ra c t ic e  and u n iv e r s i ty  teach in g . In  1916 he had been e le c te d  
to  the  C a lc u tta  U n iv e rs ity  Senate where he jo in ed  S ir  Asutosh 
M ukherjea 's group. I t  was P.C. M i t r a 's c r i t ic i s m  of M ukherjea in  
1922 th a t  f i r s t  gave Ray the id ea  of e n te r in g  th e  L e g is la tiv e  Council.
His am bition was encouraged by S urendranath  Ray, who was look ing  
fo r  a cand ida te  to  s e t  up a g a in s t B anerjea  to  even the  old sco re  over 
h is  non-appointm ent as E ducation  M in is te r .^  He o ffe red  Dr Ray the  
support of h is  purse and h is  in flu en ce  i f  he would c o n te s t th e  
24-P arganas M unicipal North s e a t .  Ray accep ted  th e  o f f e r ,  reaso n in g
1
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th a t  a v ic to ry  a g a in s t B anerjea  would be an e x c e lle n t s t a r t  to  a 
p o l i t i c a l  c a re e r  w hile a d e fe a t a t  h is  hands would be no d isg ra c e .
Das recognised  Ray’s a b i l i t y  and gave him th e  S w a ra jis t nom ination 
fo r  th e  c o n stitu en c y .
He opened h is  campaign in  May 1923 and in  th e  fo llow ing  seven 
months spent most of h is  evenings and h is  Sundays among h is  e le c to r s .
In  th e  same period  B anerjea  v is i te d  the co n stitu en cy  tw ice only fo r  
he was in  D a rje e lin g  throughout th e  summer. Ray had th e  h e lp  o f 
the  Congress v o lu n te e rs  and Das p e rso n a lly  supported  him a t a number 
o f h is  m eetings.
He o ffe re d  the v o te rs  a choice between a re p re s e n ta t iv e  who would
devote  h im se lf to  t h e i r  se rv ice  and one who was bound to  th e  Government.
In  In d ia  th e re  were only two p a r t i e s ,  he s a id ; the  p a rty  o f the  few
who supported  the  Government and p ro f i te d  from i t s  every a c t io n ,
and the  p a rty  of the  many who su ffe re d . ’I  do not belong to  th e
p a r ty  of th e  Government'. On the  o th e r hand, S i r  S urendranath  B anerjea
2’by accep tin g  o f f ic e  . . .  has id e n t i f ie d  h im se lf w ith  the  B ureaucracy’ .
S o c ia lly  the  24-Parganas M unicipal N orth c o n stitu en cy  was a 
mixed bag. Lying on the  o u ts k i r t s  of C a lc u tta , i t  comprised a number 
of s a t e l l i t e  towns which had grown up around th e  ju te  m il ls  along  
the  Hooghly. I t s  c en tre  was B arrackpur which had a B r i t i s h
f
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cantonment and to  which many bhadralok  were a t t r a c te d  because o f th e
e x c e lle n t r a i l  se rv ice  to  C a lc u tta . Between the  towns were numerous 
v i l la g e s .^
Ray attem pted to  reach  a l l  c la s s e s  o f v o te rs  w ith  h is  appea l.
To th e  bhadralok  he spoke o f h is  keen i n t e r e s t  in  h ig h e r ed u ca tio n  and
he pledged h im se lf ' t o  s t r iv e  to  p reserv e  th e  p o s i t io n  o f the
U n iv e rs ity  and oppose any attem pt to  d es tro y  th e  le g it im a te  autonomy
or in  any way to  reduce i t s  s ta tu s  o r u t i l i t y  as an i n s t i t u t i o n  fo r
h ig h e r r e s e a r c h '.  He inform ed th e  m ill  o p e ra tiv e s  th a t  he was opposed
to  'th e  fo rce s  and re so u rce s  o f the  S tate*  b e in g  'more r e a d i ly  p laced
a t th e  se rv ic e  of C ap ita l than  fo r  due p ro te c t io n  of the v i t a l
i n t e r e s t s  o f la b o u r '.  He was c a re fu l to  add, however, th a t  he would
s e t  h is  face  's t e r n ly  a g a in s t the  fom enting of c la s s  war o r th e
o rg a n is a tio n  o f in d u s t r ia l  s t r ik e s  fo r  th e  p u rs u it  of p o l i t i c a l  e n d s '.
He would encourage 'h e a lth y  c o -o p e ra tio n  between c a p i ta l  and la b o u r '.
His f in a l  appeal was to  th e  te n a n try , whom he promised to  p ro te c t
2a g a in s t the  ty ra n n ie s  of zamindars and o f f i c i a l s  a l ik e .
E le c tio n  day in  C a lcu tta  and th e  surround ing  towns was an 
e x c it in g  occasion . There were no isy  dem onstrations by th e  su p p o rte rs  
of th e  r iv a l  p a r t ie s  and hundreds of motor c a rs  p lie d  th e  s t r e e t s  
a t  th e  c a n d id a te s ' expense, b e a rin g  p la ca rd s  and ca rry in g  v o te rs  to
L .S .S . O 'M alley: Bengal D i s t r i c t  G aza teers . 24-Par^canas, pp. 215-9»
K.P. Thomas: Dr B.C. Roy, pp. 92-3»
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*1the polls. The results were announced on 30 November. In 24-Parganas 
Municipal North Banerjea had suffered a humiliating defeat, securing 
only 2283 votes to Ray’s 5689« The new Swarajist daily, Forward, 
was jubilant: the Barrackpur contest ’represents the clash between 
the limitations of the real and the vision of an idea. The issue 
is plain and simple - Diarchy or a free and unfettered India with a 
soul and a nationality; a dead horse or a full manhood. Sir Surendra 
Nath represents Diarchy and, in his fall, was voiced the free will of 
the people."
Throughout the province the Swaraj party had triumphed. In the 
Hindu constituencies its candidates had captured three-quarters of 
the seats and in the Muslim electorates, where there was considerable 
reluctance to acknowledge any but a communal allegiance, they had 
secured half. The Moderate party had been reduced to a rump and 
nearly all its leaders had been kept out of the Council.^
To what did the Swaraj party owe its victory? Primarily to its 
success in spanning the two levels of politics - the old level of 
bhadralok society and the new level of the mass electorate. The
_
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p a r ty  had re ta in e d  the  confidence o f th e  hhadralok  because i t  was
i t s e l f  la rg e ly  hhadralok in  com position b u t i t s  members had a lso  won 
a popular fo llow ing  through t h e i r  d i s t r i c t  work. They had tak en  th e  
o ld  hhadra lok  Congress and re fa sh io n ed  i t  to  meet the  demands o f mass 
p o l i t i c s .  They had used symbols which d id  not offend th e  hhadralok  
and y e t could be understood by th e  m asses. They had a w atchcry which 
was sim ple and ab so lu te : ’We want sw ara j: we want freedom. Small 
r ig h t s  w ill  not s a t i s f y  u s 1J
1
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CHAPTER VIII
REAPERS OF THE WHIRLWIND
Strategy & Organisation
Das had brought his party triumphantly into the Legislative 
Council but he had now to face new tasks. He had first to devise a 
strategy which would satisfy his party and enable it to retain the 
confidence of the electors. He had then to bind his following 
securely together so that the unity of the party would not be 
destroyed in the division lobbies. As he was well aware, neither task 
had been successfully accomplished by his predecessors in the Council.
In working the reformed institutions in Bengal nationalist 
politicians were confronted with grave problems. In the first place 
they had to serve two masters: the bhadralok, a tightly structured 
class with clearly formulated and exacting demands, and the new mass 
electorate, which was fractured and inarticulate. Secondly, the 
legislature in which they had to work was divided by its constitution 
into groups responsible to separate communal and sectional electorates. 
There was thus no single ’bar’ before which all members could be 
’arraigned’ for their actions in the Council and no sense of a common 
allegiance. The Muslims who occupied 30 per cent of the seats and 
the Europeans who occupied 14 per cent preferred their communal
interests to wider considerations of general social welfare. These 
difficulties had proved too much for the Moderates. Das had now to 
wrestle with them.
Lytton forced him into an immediate decision on strategy hy 
calling him to Government House as soon as the election results were 
finalised and offering- him the ministerial portfolios as leader of 
the majority party. The Governor was holding- open a door which Das 
dared not enter no matter how tempted he may have been. He had 
persuaded the hhadralok. to tolerate council entry by arguing that it 
was in the Council that the Government could best be fought, and the 
Swaraj party was pledged to destroy dyarchy. Any hint from Das at 
that stage of a willingness to co-operate with the British would have 
split his party and alienated its hhadralok support. In his reply 
to Lytton he nailed his colours to the mast of obstruction. ’The 
members of this party are pledged to do everything in their power, 
by using their legal rights granted under the Reform Act, to put an 
end to the system of diarchy. This duty they cannot discharge if they 
take office’.^
What did Das hope to gain by his policy of obstruction? He 
believed that if he could bring the working of the reforms to a 
standstill the British would be forced to come to him cap in hand 
with an offer of constitutional concessions. He would then be in a
C.R. Das to Lytton, i/T6 Dec 19237) Pundits & Elephants, p. 44*
1
position to dictate his own terms. His belief was not unjustified 
for since 1920 the British had been obsessed with the importance of 
keeping the reformed institutions working and it was their fear of a 
collapse which had brought them to Das and Gandhi in December 1921 
with the suggestion of a round table conference.
Successful obstruction would depend upon party solidarity and 
as soon as the elections were over Das turned to this work. He had 
first to make good his promises to the Muslims. In this regard he 
could not afford to be niggardly for a considerable number of the 
40 Muslim M.L.Cs. were as yet uncommitted and some might join the 
Swaraj party if it proved itself willing to give generously to their 
community. On the other hand, any suggestion of partiality for 
Hindu interests would almost certainly drive the existing Muslim 
members out of the Swaraj party into a communal organisation.
Early in December 1923 in discussions with a number of leading 
Muslims the terms of a Hindu-Muslim pact were settled and these were 
accepted by a meeting of the Swaraj Council party on the 16th. They 
were published two days later over the signature of S.C. Bose as 
secretary of the B.P.C.C. 'It is resolved that in order to establish 
a real foundation of Self-Government in this province it is necessary 
to bring about a pact between the Hindu and the Mahomedans of 
Bengal dealing with the rights of each community when the foundation 
of Self-Government is secured'. Representation in the Legislative 
Council was to be in proportion to population and through separate
e le c to r a te s .  In  lo c a l bodies the  m a jo rity  community in  each D is t r i c t
was to  have 60 per cent o f the  s e a ts  and th e  m in o rity  community 40
per c en t. F i f ty - f iv e  per cen t o f government p o s ts  were to  he reserv ed
fo r  th e  Muslims and u n t i l  th a t  percen tage  was reached th e  community
might supply up to  80 per cen t o f a l l  r e c r u i t s .  No re s o lu t io n
a f f e c t in g  the  r e l ig io n  o f any community was to  he passed hy th e
L e g is la t iv e  Council w ithout th e  consent o f th re e -q u a r te rs  of th e
e le c te d  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f th a t  community. There v/as to  he no music
in  p ro cess io n  b efo re  mosques and c o w -k illin g  was not to  he in te r f e r e d
w ith . Das paid  d e a rly  fo r  th e  21 Muslims who follow ed him in to  the  
2C ouncil.
He had secured one f la n k . To secu re  the  o th e r  he formed an 
a l l ia n c e  w ith  a group nom inally le d  hy Byomkes C h ak rav a rti, h is  o ld 
r iv a l  from the  1917-20 period  who had played hu t a minor ro le  in  
p o l i t i c s  s in ce  Das’ trium ph a t Nagpur. However C hakravarti had main­
ta in e d  h is  in flu en ce  in  C a lcu tta  through h is  p o s i t io n  in  the  Bengal 
L andho lders’ A sso c ia tio n  and th e  Bengal N a tio n al Chamber o f Commerce, 
and i t  was to  re p re se n t the  l a t t e r  th a t  he was re tu rn ed  to  the
1
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Council in  1923. Im m ediately a f t e r  the  e le c t io n s  he had g a th ered
around him a group of 24 M .L .C s., some form er M oderates and o th e r s
renegade S w a ra jis ts , who shared  l i t t l e  a p a r t from th e  t i t l e  Independent
N a tio n a l is ts  and a common d e s ire  to  hold o f f ic e .  I t  was to  th i s
group th a t  L y tton  tu rned  a f t e r  Das had r e je c te d  h is  m in is te r ia l  o f f e r
bu t he found th a t  C hakravarti would accep t o f f ic e  only i f  a l l  th re e
M in is te rs  were chosen from h is  p a r ty . As th e  Independent N a t io n a l is ts
would be dependent upon Moderate vo tes f o r  a m a jo rity  in  the C ouncil,
2L y tton  re fu sed  to  agree to  t h i s .
With th e  p rospect of o f f ic e  gone, th e  main bond u n i t in g  th e  
group was destroyed  and C hakravarti b ea t a h a s ty  r e t r e a t  to  th e  Swaraj 
p a r ty , whence f iv e  o f h is  s ix  Muslim fo llo w ers  had preceded him, 
a t t r a c te d  no doubt by the  Hindu-Muslim p a c t. D isplaying' g re a t t a c t ,
Das t r e a te d  C hakravarti as th e  le a d e r  o f a s e p a ra te  group w hile a t 
th e  same time p rov id ing  him w ith  a new c o n stitu en c y  to  re p la c e  the  
Bengal N ational Chamber o f Commerce se a t o f which he had been deprived  
because of th e  c o rru p tio n  by which he had secured  h is  o r ig in a l  
e le c t io n .^  The rem ainder o f h is  fo llo w e rs , most o f whom re je c te d  
the  Hindu-Muslim p a c t, remained o u ts id e  th e  Swaraj p a rty  bu t Das
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and C hak rav arti were u s u a lly  ab le  to  secure  t h e i r  v o tes  on v i t a l  
i s s u e s .  Thus Das en tered  the  nev/ Council supported  by 46 S w a ra jis ts  
and 19 Independent N a t io n a l is ts .
Town w ith  the  M in is te rs
I n  sea rch  o f M in is te rs  L y tton  had now to  tu rn  to  the  M oderates, 
a d iso rg a n ise d  group o f 10 M.L.Cs. who had no acknowledged le a d e r .
In  th e se  c ircum stances the  only  p o ss ib le  b a s is  fo r  s e le c t io n  was 
p e r s o n a li ty . L y tto n 's  cho ices were S urendranath  M allick , an ex trem is t 
in  the  f i r s t  Council whose c o n sid e rab le  in flu en c e  in  C a lcu tta  had 
been in c re a se d  by h is  appointm ent under B a n e r je a 's  regime as f i r s t  
In d ia n  n o n -o f f ic ia l  Chairman o f th e  C orpora tion ; F az lu l Huq, who 
now commanded a personal fo llow ing  o f e ig h t Muslim members; and 
Abdul Karim Ghuznavi, a form er Im p eria l L e g is la t iv e  C o uncillo r and 
a la rg e  la n d h o ld e r in  Mymensingh.
The S w a ra jis ts  regarded L y tto n 's  appointm ent of M in is te rs  as a 
ch a llen g e  -  a c h a llen g e , m oreover, which they  were g lad  to  accept 
fo r  they  knew th a t  few of t h e i r  e le c to r s  drew any d i s t in c t io n  between 
th e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  in  the  Government and th e  i n s t i tu t io n s  o f Government. 
For t h i s  re a so n , a su ccessfu l p ersonal a t ta c k  on a M in is te r  would be 
regarded  as a success ag a in s t th e  reform ed i n s t i t u t i o n s .  They s e t  
out to  knock down the  M in is te rs  and Surendranath  M allick  was s e le c te d
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as t h e i r  f i r s t  v ic tim . A p e t i t io n  was f i l e d  c o n te s tin g  the  l e g a l i t y
o f h is  r e tu rn  to  the  Council from th e  C a lc u tta  South c o n s ti tu e n c y , as
a r e s u l t  o f which a r e - e le c t io n  was o rdered . To oppose M allick  in  the
new co n te s t th e  S w a ra jis ts  and Independent N a tio n a l is ts  jo in t ly
nominated Surendranath  H aidar, who had g re a t in flu en ce  in  South C a lcu tta
as a member of th e  p r i e s t ly  c a s te  o f the  K alighat tem ple. With th e
S w a ra jis t e le c t io n  machine working fo r  him, he was ab le  to  d e fe a t
M allick  com fortably  and th e  M in is te r  was fo rced  to  re s ig n  w ithout
•}
having  taken  h is  sea t in  th e  C ouncil.
The a t ta c k  on Huq and Ghuznavi was begun through the  p u b lic  p re s s , 
which d esc rib ed  th e  two M in is te rs  as a p a ir  o f s e lf - s e e k in g  o p p o rtu n is ts . 
The S w a ra jis ts ' experience du rin g  the  n o n -co -o p e ra tio n  movement had 
tau g h t them th e  value o f a w ell-conducted  campaign o f defam ation , 
and w ith  th re e  major newspapers a t t h e i r  d is p o s a l ,  th e  E n g lish - 
language Forward, the  H indu-edited  v e rn a cu la r  Nayak, and th e  B engali 
Muslim Mohammadi,  ^ they  were ab le  to  p i l lo r y  every le ad in g  p e rs o n a lity  
connected w ith  th e  reform ed i n s t i t u t i o n s .  L y tto n  and h is  Executive 
C o u n c illo rs  were rep re sen ted  as re p re s s iv e  a u to c ra ts ;^  th e  P re s id e n t
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o f the  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, Evan C otton , was re v ile d ^ a s  an enemy of
In d ia n  freedom -  'th e  unworthy son o f S i r  Henry Cotton* ; the
2M in is te rs  were r id ic u le d  fo r  t h e i r  every a c tio n ; and the o rd in a ry  
M.L.C. who had the  te m e rity  to  c a s t a vo te  f o r  the  Government was 
named in  bold type in  th e  c en tre  of th e  f ro n t  page o f th e  fo llow ing  
d a y 's  p a p e rs .^
The new L e g is la tiv e  Council was sworn in  on 22 January  1924» The 
S w a ra jis ts  made a s t r ik in g  im pression . They came in  a body, d ressed  
u n ifo rm ly  in  white khad i, bareheaded and c lean  shaven. They s a t  
to g e th e r  in  the  c en tre  of th e  o p p o s itio n  benches and in  the  proceed ings 
which follow ed showed a v igour and p o ise  which was unusual in  new 
members. They had a w e ll-p rep ared  p a rty  o rg a n is a tio n , w ith  a caucus 
and w hips, in c lu d in g  one fo r  the  M uslim s.* 234^
T h e ir p o licy  was to  lop  o f f  th e  t a l l  poppies -  to  h i t  a t  th e  
main p e r s o n a l i t ie s  opposing them -  and th e i r  method was to  m isuse 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  m achinery. In  b o th  ways they  would earn  bhadralok  
app lause and impede, i f  not wreck, th e  working o f the  i n s t i t u t i o n .
T h e ir f i r s t  a c t was a mark o f d is re s p e c t  fo r  the Governors they  
absen ted  them selves from the  Council du rin g  h is  speech of welcome on
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23 January . They follow ed th i s  w ith  an attem pt to  c r i t i c i s e  h is
appointm ent o f M in is te rs  by moving fo r  th e  p re s e n ta tio n  o f a form al
2
add ress from th e  Council. Cotton ru le d  th e  m otion out o f o rd e r and 
th i s  was the  beginning- of a running f ig h t  between th e  S w a ra jis ts  and 
th e  P re s id e n t over p o in ts  o f p rocedure. Every p o ss ib le  ru l in g  from 
th e  C hair was co n tes ted  in  an attem pt to  d is c r e d i t  Cotton and h is  
o f f ic e .  There were rowdy dem onstrations from the  o p p o s itio n  benches, 
which f re q u e n tly  had vocal support from th e  v i s i t o r s ’ g a l l e r i e s ,  and 
on a number o f occasions the  S w a ra jis ts  walked out o f the  Chamber 
when they  f a i le d  to  ge t th e i r  way.^
The M in is te rs  were su b jec ted  to  a b a rrag e  o f in te r je c t io n s  when­
ever they  addressed  the  Council and freq u en t use was made o f supplem entary 
q u estio n s  in  an attem pt to  ca tch  them o f f  b a lan ce . When they  voted 
w ith  th e  m in o rity , even on a reserv ed  q u e s tio n , the  S w a ra jis ts  
c a l le d  fo r  t h e i r  re s ig n a t io n s .^  Those few item s o f l e g i s l a t i o n  which 
the  Government was ra sh  enough to  t r u s t  to  th e  C ouncil’ s te n d e r
5
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The clim ax to  th e  campaign came in  March 1924 w ith  the S w a ra j is ts ’ 
a t ta c k  on the  Government’s f in a n c ia l  demands. On the reserv ed  s id e  
they  r e je c te d  every demand except th a t  fo r  p o lic e  and on th e  t r a n s fe r re d  
s id e  they  re fu sed  g ra n ts  to  pay the s a la r ie s  o f the  Education  
Department in s p e c to ra te ,  the M edical Department e s ta b lish m e n t, and
i
the  M in is te rs . The c o n te s t over th e  l a s t  item  was regarded  by both
s id e s  as a m ajor t r i a l  o f s t re n g th , fo r  the  c o n s t i tu t io n  would have
to  be suspended i f  no money was provided to  pay th e  M in is te rs . The
S w a ra jis ts  were a t pains to  ensure th a t  th e  e le c to ra te  understood why
they  were opposing th i s  g ra n t. At p u b lic  m eetings and in  th e  p re ss
2
they  exp lained  th e i r  m otives, and as a r e s u l t  th e i r  r e je c t io n  o f the  
M in is te r s ' s a la r ie s  was acclaim ed as a trium ph fo r  n a tio n a lism . ’The 
o p p o s itio n  in  th e  Bengal L e g is la t iv e  Council has a lread y  begun to  
prove too s tro n g . Mr B. C h ak rab a rtti and Deshbandhu Das a re  r e a l ly  
making t h e i r  presence f e l t  by t h e i r  le g a l  acumen and th e i r  g i f t  of 
the  gab. Who i s  th e re  on th e  Government s id e  to  match any o f th e se  
two g ia n ts ?  The s tre n g th  o f th e  o p p o s itio n  means th e  s tre n g th  o f 
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  in  the  p ro v in c e '.^
March 1924 a lso  brought the  Swaraj p a r ty  a v ic to ry  o u ts id e  the  
L e g is la t iv e  Council. In  th e  e le c t io n s  fo r  th e  C a lcu tta  C orpo ra tion ,
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reform ed under B a n e rje a 's  M unicipal A ct, i t  cap tu red  n e a rly  th r e e -
q u a r te rs  o f the  s e a ts .  At th e  f i r s t  m eeting of th e  new C orpo ra tion ,
Das was e le c te d  Mayor and Subhas Chandra Bose appointed C hief E xecutive
O ff ic e r . As a g e s tu re  towards th e  Muslims, the  Deputy-Mayor was
chosen from C a lc u tta ’s le ad in g  Muslim house: th e  Suhrawardys. He
2was 31 y e a r  o ld  Huseyn Shaheed, who was to  have a checkered a s s o c ia t io n  
w ith  th e  c i t y ’s a f f a i r s  throughout the  fo llow ing  q u a r te r  cen tu ry .
C ontrol o f the  C orporation  provided th e  S w a ra jis ts  w ith  the  
power th a t  was denied to  them in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council because o f 
t h e i r  p o licy  of o b s tru c tio n . They now had p u b lic  funds a t  t h e i r  
d isp o sa l and jobs to  d i s t r ib u te  as pa tronage. They began by rew arding 
f iv e  p a rty  su p p o rte rs  w ith appointm ents as c i t y  alderm en, and, w ith  
an eye to  th e  communal q u e s tio n , they  found p o s ts  on the  C orpora tion  
s t a f f  fo r  25 M uslims.^ The b u s in ess  of th e  m u n ic ip a lity  fu rn ish ed  
e x c e lle n t o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r  dem onstrations o f n a t io n a l i s t  a rdou r. The 
C o rp o ra tio n ’s employees were o u t f i t t e d  in  khadi and much p u b l ic i ty  
was g iv en  to  th e  purchase o f swadeshi goods in  p re fe ren ce  to  im ported 
equipm ent. Many of the c i t y ’s s t r e e t s  and parks were renamed a f t e r  
th e  n a t io n ’s heroes and c iv ic  re c e p tio n s  were h e ld  fo r  Congress le a d e rs  
in s te a d  o f B r i t i s h  d ig n i ta r ie s  as in  th e  p a s t .  To g r a t i f y  p ro p erty
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h o ld e rs , b u ild in g ’ ru le s  were re lax ed  and, when i t  s u ite d  the  p a r ty ,
ta x  a r re a r s  were d is re g a rd ed . Popular support was gained  by heavy
ex p en d itu re  on f r e e  prim ary schools and m edical d is p e n s a r ie s  in  many
p a r ts  o f the c i ty .  A weekly jo u rn a l -  th e  C a lcu tta  M unicipal G azette  -
1
was s ta r te d  to  p u o lic is e  the  new reg im e 's  achievem ents. The a c t i v i t i e s  
o f th e  S w a ra jis ts  in  the  C orpora tion  were a p e r fe c t f o i l  to  t h e i r  
work of d e s tru c t io n  in  the  Council and i t  served  to  c o n so lid a te  t h e i r  
hold  on C a lc u tta , s t i l l  the  key to  p o l i t i c a l  B engal.
The Governor in  P o l i t i c s
Every S w ara jis t success in  the  Council o r C orpora tion  was g a l l in g
fo r  L ytton  fo r  he had s e t  out determ ined to  p reven t th e  p a rty  succeeding
in  i t s  a ttem pt to  wreck the  c o n s t i tu t io n .  From th e  beg inn ing  he had
regarded  the  a f f a i r  as a f ig h t  in  which he was p e rso n a lly  involved
and he was f u l ly  prepared to  come down in to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a rena  to
g rap p le  w ith  Das and h is  fo llo w e rs . When in  December 1923 the
S w a ra jis ts  and Independent N a t io n a l is ts  r e je c te d  h is  o f f e r  o f th e
m in is te r ia l  p o r t f o l io s ,  he had pub lished  a long  p re ss  communique
d e ta i l in g  h is  n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  them and ex p la in in g  why he had f in a l ly
2
chosen h is  M in is te rs  from the  Moderate p a r ty . In  h is  f i r s t  address
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to  th e  Council a month l a t e r  he threw out a d i r e c t  challenge  to  th e  
S w a ra jis ts .
I  s e le c te d  my new M in is te rs  from among those  who b e liev ed  th a t  
th e  b e s t way of ach iev in g  the  end which i s  d e s ire d  by a l l  i s  
no t to re fu se  bu t to  accep t r e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  not to  d e s tro y  the 
fo u n d a tio n s , bu t to  b u ild  upon them, not to  o b s tru c t bu t to  
c o n s tru c t . . . .  Throughout th e  se ss io n s  of th i s  Council th e re  
w ill  be only one main is su e  be fo re  you, namely, whether you 
w il l  s id e  w ith the  p a rty  of o b s tru c tio n  o r whether you w ill  
s id e  w ith  the  p a rty  of c o n s tru c tio n .^
Once b a t t l e  was jo in ed  in  th e  C ouncil, L y tton  took an a c tiv e  p a r t
in  a d v is in g  h is  o f f ic e r s  on t a c t i c s  and supplying- them w ith  tro o p s .
He ta lk e d  p e rso n a lly  w ith  M.L.Cs. in  an a ttem pt to  persuade them to
vo te  w ith  the  M in is te rs  and on one occasion  he h e ld  a te a  p a r ty  a t
Government House fo r  a l l  n o n -S w ara jis ts  and le c tu re d  them on th e  need
2fo r  p a r ty  o rg a n is a tio n . Im m ediately b e fo re  the  Government subm itted  
i t s  demands fo r  g ra n ts  on 18 March, he appeared unheralded in  the  
Council to  warn the  members th a t  i f  they  re fu sed  fin an ce  fo r  th e  
t r a n s fe r r e d  item s he would have no h e s i t a t io n  in  c lo s in g  down th e se  
d ep artm en ts, w ith  the  r e s u l t  th a t  many p u b lic  employees would be 
thrown out o f work.
I t  may be though t, perhaps, th a t  Government would not dare 
to  face  such a s i tu a t io n  and would make any concessions 
r a th e r  th an  allow  i t  to  co n tin u e . Let th e re  be no i l lu s io n s  
on t h i s  p o in t -  my Government would not be em barrassed by 
such a s i tu a t io n  which was not of our c re a t io n ,  and from 
which we would in  no way s u f f e r ,  w hile i t  l a s te d .  Those
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who "brought i t  about 'would have to  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  a c tio n  as 
b e s t they  may to  those whom they  re p re s e n t ,  and the f in a l  
d e c is io n  in  the m a tte r would, r e s t  w ith  the  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  
which w ill  be v i t a l l y  a ffe c te d  by the consequences.^
There was an u p roar in  the  p re ss  a t what was v a rio u s ly  d esc rib ed
2as ’b l u f f ’ and an ’u n c o n s ti tu tio n a l a ttem pt to  coerce th e  members’ , 
b u t L y tton  was convinced th a t  h is  speech had had a s a lu ta ry  e f f e c t  
and had f o r e s ta l le d  even more d r a s t ic  cu ts  in  the  bud g e t.^  M oreover, 
he considered  th a t th e  r e fu s a l  of the  m edical and educa tion  demands 
provided him w ith  an e x c e lle n t o p p o rtu n ity  to  te ach  th e  S w a ra jis ts  
a le s s o n . He promptly gave the  school in s p e c to rs  and m edical s t a f f  
s ix  months n o tic e  of d ism issa l^  and th en  published, a p re ss  communique
which sa id  in  e f f e c t :  ’Look bhadralok  a t  what Jthe S w a ra jis ts  a re  doing
5
to  your employment’ .
From D elhi and London th e  V iceroy and S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  were 
w atching Lytton* s a c t i v i t i e s  w ith  growing u n eas in e ss  fo r  they  were 
a f r a id  th a t  h is  p rovoca tive  in te rv e n tio n s  in  p o l i t i c s  might aggravate  
what was a lread y  a se r io u s  s i tu a t io n .  Both c r i t i c i s e d  h is  a c tio n  in  
d ism iss in g  Government s t a f f  and Reading adv ised  him to  use h is
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c o n s t i tu t io n a l  power to  c e r t i f y  the  funds re q u ire d  to  pay the  s a la r ie s .
L y tto n  re fu se d , in s i s t in g  th a t  th e  p o l i t i c ia n s  had to  le a r n  th e i r
2r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  t h e i r  e le c to r s .  In  t h i s  case  h is  gamble paid  o ff  
fo r  th e re  was deep concern expressed  in  the  bhadra lok  p ress  a t  th e  
p ro sp ec t of in c reased  m id d le -c la ss  unemployment"^ and when the  g ra n ts  
were resu b m itted  to  the  Council in  August 1924 they  were re s to re d  
w ithout o p p o s itio n .^
Of g re a te s t  concern to  L y tto n  was the  r e fu s a l  o f th e  M in is te r s ’
s a l a r i e s ,  but he was determ ined not to  accept th i s  as a f in a l  v e rd ic t
on dyarchy. Consequently he allow ed Huq and Ghuznavi to  remain in
5
o f f ic e  w ithout pay and work to  secure a m a jo rity  a t  a re v o tin g . He 
even toyed w ith  the  id e a  of s t r e tc h in g  h is  own powers o f expend itu re  
to  a u th o r is e  an in te rim  payment fo r  them, b u t Reading re fu sed  to 
perm it th i s  as i t  was s t r i c t l y  u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l .  He warned L y tton  
th a t  he was running  a grave r i s k  by involving- h im se lf in  p o l i t i c s  
in  t h i s  manner, fo r  he was p lay in g  in to  th e  S w a ra jis ts ' hands by ex­
posing  h im se lf to personal a t ta c k . The V iceroy exp lained  to  th e  
S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  Lord O liv ie rs  *My o b je c t io n  . . .  was in tended  to
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protect him against the risk of charges he might find it difficult to 
answer* These might seriously impair his position as Governor’•
The Ragged Search for a Majority
While Lytton was arguing the point with Delhi, his Ministers
were out in search of a majority. The officials gave them every
assistance, relieving them of all administrative duties and interceding
with M.L.Cs. on their behalf. Huq. and Ghuznavi ’worked their power
2of patronage for all it was worth'w and the vacant ministership was 
held out as an inducement to those with ambitions.^ Their trump 
card, however, was communal. They made great play of the fact that 
the Hindu-dominated Swaraj party was attempting to strike down a 
Muslim ministry. In reality this is a communal attack, they told 
their co-religionists, and all Muslims must unite to oppose the 
Hindus.^
The official members of the Government had already agreed that 
their best hope of breaking the Swaraj party lay in encouraging 
communal divisions. Their experience in the first Council had 
convinced them that the reformed institutions could be kept functioning
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by a s e r ie s  o f t a c t i c a l  ex p ed ien ts . A dm ittedly communalism was an
ug ly  weapon to  u se , b u t ,  as they  hastened  to  p o in t o u t, i t  was not
they  bu t the  S w a ra jis ts  who had d e c la re d  to t a l  war. How could they
be expected to  f ig h t  c lean  when t h e i r  opponents were b reak ing  every
ru le  o f decen t p o l i t i c a l  behaviour?
They were provided w ith  a moral sa n c tio n  fo r  the  use of communalism
by t h e i r  Muslim co lleagues -  Rahim, Huq and Ghuznavi -  who a s se r te d
th a t  in  the  general in te r e s t s  o f th e  Muslim community i t s  re p re s e n ta t iv e s
in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council should be u n ite d  a g a in s t th e  Swaraj p a r ty .
They argued th a t  Das had been ab le  to  in v e ig le  Muslims in to  h is
p a rty  because o f the  fa c t io n s  which d iv id ed  Muslim p o l i t i c ia n s .
U nless th ese  could be overcome, they  s a id ,  th e  community would remain
2weak and a l i a b i l i t y  to  the  Government.
The b e s t  means of drawing o f f  Das’ Muslim fo llo w ers  was obv iously  
to  d e s tro y  t h e i r  f a i t h  in  th e  Swaraj p a r ty ’s Hindu-Muslim p a c t ,  and 
to  t h i s  end a Muslim su p p o rte r of the  Government, Khan Bahadur 
M usharruf H usain, had been persuaded e a r ly  in  th e  C ouncil’ s f i r s t  
s e s s io n  to  submit a re s o lu t io n  fo r  th e  immediate im plem entation of 
the  p a c t ’s p ro v is io n s  w ith regard  to  th e  employment o f Muslims under 
the  p ro v in c ia l Government. His m otion c a l le d  fo r  th e  re s e rv a tio n
1
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fo r  Muslims of 80 per cen t of Government appointm ents u n t i l  such time
as they  occupied 55 per cen t of a l l  o f f ic e s ,^  S i r  Ahdur Rahim
exp lained  what the o f f i c i a l s  hoped to  g a in  from th is»
I t  was f e l t  in  Government c i r c le s  and among those  who 
were anxious to  d e fe a t and d es tro y  the  S w a ra jis t p a rty  
th a t  Mr C.R. Das would, "by th i s  r e s o lu t io n ,  he pushed 
in to  a t ig h t  co rner; he would lo se  e i th e r  h is  20 
Muhammadan fo llo w e rs , to  a l l  o r to  most of whom th e  Pact 
had been a strong' inducement to  jo in  h is  p a r ty , or th e  
support of the N a tio n a l is ts  w ithout whose h e lp  he would 
never have secured a m a jo rity  a g a in s t th e  Government, 
h u t who would, on no accoun t, accep t th e  term s of the  
P a c t. Khan Bahadur M ushruff H ossain rece iv ed  every s o r t  
o f encouragement from th e  su p p o rte rs  o f Government and 
a lso  from in d iv id u a l members of Government to  p re ss  
h is  r e s o lu t io n .^
I t  was arranged th a t  th e  m otion should he put to  the  Council 
in  th e  week preced ing  the v o tin g  on the  budget and during  th e  debate 
every e f f o r t  was made to  fo rce  the  S w a ra jis ts  to  commit them selves. 
Spokesmen fo r  the  Government and the  European n o n -o f f ic ia ls  expressed 
th e i r  support fo r  the  o b je c ts  o f the  re s o lu t io n  and emphasised th a t  
i t  was m erely a res ta tem en t o f the  term s of th e  S w a ra jis ts ’ own 
Hindu-Muslim p a c t. Here, they  s a id , was an o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  th e  
Hindu members o f th e  Swaraj p a r ty  to  prove t h e i r  good f a i t h .
From th e  speeches of th e  Independent N a t io n a l is ts ,  who rep u d ia ted  
the  p a c t ,  and th e  Muslim S w a ra jis ts , who rev ea led  a p a in fu l c o n f l ic t  
of l o y a l t i e s ,  i t  was ev iden t th a t  Das was in  a very  t ig h t  co rn e r.
He could escape only by avo id ing  a d iv is io n  on the  main q u es tio n  and
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he therefore moved for an adjournment of the discussion sine die«
His excuse was that there had as yet been no time to place the pact 
’before the country’. '.Then the budget session was over he intended 
to tour Bengal to secure popular support for the agreement. Until 
this had been done, any action in the Council was precipitate.
He succeeded in carrying his amendment but the damage was done. 
The Ministers were able to say to the Muslim M.L.Cs.* now you can see 
how you were misled with empty promises. The cry was taken up in the 
press.
He have all along been saying that the Swarajya pact is 
only a bait to allure the Moslem members of the Council to 
the Swarajya party. Had Mr C.R. Das really desired that 
the pact would be put into practice, he and his party 
would certainly not haveproposed to postpone indefinitely 
the resolution of Khan Bahadur Musharruf Hossain. Mr C.R.
Das has said that if the terms of the pact be not 
fulfilled after the attainment of Swaraj, the Musalmans 
will be quite entitled to realise their dues on the strength 
of the lathi. In the meantime the Hindus will become 
completely skilled in the use of the lathi, so that the 
Musalmans will never be able to realise their dues. The 
Hindus are already organising themselves in the name of 
the Hindu Sangathan, and some sections of them have become 
proficient in the use of revolvers and in making bombs.
The Sudhi movement has also been started to convert the 
Musalmans to Hinduism. We ask our fellow-Musalmans to 
note the names of those Moslem members of Council who have 
voted against the resolution of Khan Bahadur Musharruf 
Hossain.^
There were angry replies from the Hindu newspapers and bitter attacks 
on the British for their attempt to divide and rule.J
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To co n so lid a te  th e i r  advan tage, th e  Government’ s Muslim
su p p o rte rs  began o rg an is in g  a communal p a rty  in  th e  C ouncil,
a m eeting of the  C entral N ational Mohammedan A sso c ia tio n  on 24 A p ril ,
Khan Bahadur Abdus Salam, th e  A ss o c ia tio n 's  honorary s e c re ta ry  and
M.L.C. fo r  Je sso re  N orth, argued th a t  a p a rty  to  u n ite  a l l  Muslim
c o u n c il lo rs  was the lo g ic a l  c o ro l la ry  o f communal e le c to r a te s ,
. . .  i t  i s  now, th e re fo re , opportune fo r  th e  Moslem Members 
o f the  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, i f  they  a re  tru e  to  th e  ra is o n  
d e tre  o f sep a ra te  Moslem communal e le c to r a te s ,  i f  th ey  a re  
tru e  to  Islam  and i t s  t r a d i t i o n s ,  i f  they  a re  h o n estly  
anxious to  promote i t s  p re s t ig e  and w e ll-b e in g , s id e  by 
s id e  w ith  th e  advancement of the  country  as a whole, to  
re c o n s id e r th e i r  p o s i t io n , to  shake them selves f r e e  from 
the  shack les o f Non-Moslem in f lu e n c e s , and to  o rgan ise  
them selves in to  one u n ite d  Moslem P a rty  and to  fo rm ulate  
a p o licy  w ith  programme of work, and to  c a l l  upon Moslem 
M in is te rs  to  a ssen t to  such a p o lic y  and programme.
O therw ise, Moslem in te r e s t s  w il l  become in c re a s in g ly  th e  
fo o tb a ll  o f Non-Moslems, to  the  lo s s  o f Moslem p re s tig e  
and to  the e te rn a l shame o f p re sen t-d ay  Moslem l e a d e r s .1
The p a r ty 's  prom oters ran  in to  th e  o ld  problem of 'p e rso n a l je a lo u s ie s
and r i v a l r i e s  /w h ich j b u lk  la rg e ly  in  Bengal Moslem S o c ie ty ' bu t
th ey  were su ccess fu l in  persuad ing  fo u r S w a ra jis t su p p o rte rs  to  jo in
t h e i r  ran k s , in c lu d in g  two of th e  Suhrawardys, Dr Abdulla-al-Mamun
3
and Huseyn Shaheed.
This was a g re a t encouragement to  the  M in is te rs  fo r  every  vo te  
would count when the  demand fo r  t h e i r  s a la r ie s  was resu b m itted  to  th e
4 rC
1
C en tra l N ational Mohammedan A sso c ia tio n , O ctenn ia l R eport, 
1917-1924, p. 61.
2
Ib id ,  p. 20.
Ib id ,  p. 63.
3
Council on 7 Ju ly  . As th e  day approached th e re  was v igorous lobbying
•j
by bo th  p a r t i e s . 1 The M in is te rs  played the  communal is su e  fo r  a l l  i t
was w orth , even invoking the  a u th o r ity  o f r e l ig io u s  le a d e rs  to
convince the  Muslim M.L.Cs. th a t  i t  would be wrong fo r  them to  vo te
2
w ith  th e  Swaraj p a rty .
By th e  end of June, Huq and Ghuznavi were co n fid en t th a t  they  
had th e i r  m a jo rity  bu t once more the  S w a ra jis ts  outmanoeuvred them.
On 3 Ju ly  Sen Gupta made a su cc e ss fu l a p p lic a t io n  to  the  High Court 
fo r  an in ju n c tio n  to  p reven t th e  P re s id e n t from re su b m ittin g  th e  
s a la r i e s  demand to  th e  C ouncil. Cotton and L y tto n  were fu r io u s  a t  
what they  regarded  as a personal a f f r o n t ,  and, determ ined to  avenge 
th e i r  honour, they prorogued th e  Council as soon as i t  assembled on 
the 7 th  and appealed a g a in s t th e  C o u rt’s ru l in g .  At th i s  p o in t 
Reading in te rv en ed  fo r  he r e a l is e d  th a t  n o th in g  would s u i t  th e  
S w a ra jis ts  b e t t e r  than  a cause c ^ le b re . To the  in te n se  annoyance 
o f L y tto n  who wanted to f ig h t  out the  c a se , he amended th e  Council 
r u le s  to  remove any doubt about the  l e g a l i t y  o f a resubm ission  of 
demands.^
The S w a ra jis ts ' s tra tagem  had secured  them a month’s g race  and 
in  th a t  time they  had managed to  t i p  th e  ba lance  back in  t h e i r
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favour - by a liberal application of silver according to the ministers.^
The four Muslim members who had strayed into Salam*s communal party
had been shepherded safely back to the opposition fold. To clinch
the issue, the party's English-language daily Forward published,
on the morning of 26 August, the day that the new vote was to be taken,
a copy of a letter carrying Huq's signature which offered a bribe
to an unnamed Rai Bahadur in return for his vote. Huq denounced the
letter as a forgery but it undoubtedly had some effect in securing
a majority for the Swarajists. The new demand was rejected by 68 
2votes to 66.
The Ministers immediately resigned and Lytton had no choice but 
to suspend the constitution. The Swarajists claimed a triumph.
'The Lord had given, the Lord has taken away, Blessed be the name of 
the Lord - so thinks the man in the street in regard to the withdrawal 
of dyarchy in Bengal’, wrote Forward.^
Lytton1 s Disillusionment
Lytton was embittered by what had happened. He had come to 
regard the maintenance of the constitution as a matter of personal 
honour and its destruction was a severe blow to his pride. His actions
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A tC
th roughou t th e  preceding' y ear had been su b jec t to  c r i t ic i s m  from a l l
1 -  2p a r t i e s :  S w a ra jis ts , M oderates, European n o n - o f f ic ia ls ,  th e  
Government o f In d ia , the  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  and B r i t i s h  p a rlia m e n ta r­
ia n s .^  He had come out to  In d ia  w ith  a sen tim en ta l d e s ire  to  do 
som ething b ig  fo r  In d ia n s . ' I t  seemed th a t  F ate  was c a l l in g  me, 
and perhaps I  had an exaggerated  id e a  of my own a b i l i t y  to  s te e r  
the  d e s t in ie s  of th a t  country  a t  a c r i t i c a l  m om ent'.^ How th a t  th in g s  
had gone bad ly  fo r  him, he d ism issed  In d ia  as an a l ie n  s o c ie ty  fo r  
which he could never hope to  do any th ing . In  h is  memoirs he w rote: 
'Ih o re a u  once sa id  th a t i t  ta k e s  two to  speak the  t r u th  -  one to  
speak and an o th er to  h e a r . T ru th  in  t h i s  sense i s  ra re  as between 
the  B r i t i s h  and the  In d ia n s , fo r  th e  very  term s in  which th e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro v e rs ie s  are  conducted have very  d i f f e r e n t  meanings
fo r  each. Even, th e re fo re , where s in c e r i ty  and goodw ill a re  p re s e n t,
5
i t  i s  e a s ie r  to  speak tru e  than  to  h ear t r u e ' .  In  e f f e c t  L y tton  
now ab d ica ted  h is  i d e a l i s t i c  aims and y ie ld e d  the  i n i t i a t i v e  to  h is  
I .C .S . o f f ic e r s  who were on hand w ith  a p o lic y .
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Das’ Dilemma
Das was a lso  in  tro u b le . He had su c c e ss fu lly  wrecked dyarchy, 
bu t what had he gained? The B r i t i s h ,  he had always s a id , would be 
fo rced  to  come to  term s. But would they? L y tto n 's  communique 
suspending th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  c e r ta in ly  had g iv en  no h in t  o f any in ­
te n t io n  to  n e g o tia te .
The a c tio n  of th e  L e g is la tiv e  Council has had th e  e f f e c t  
of suspending the  working o f th e  Reforms in  Bengal fo r  th e  
tim e being1. I t  i s  not now p o ss ib le  fo r  th e  Governor to  
o b ta in  th e  se rv ic e s  of any M in is te r s , and His E xcellency  
w il l  h im se lf assume charge of th e  T ran sfe rred  Departments 
under th e  T ran sfe rred  S u b jec ts  (Temporary A d m in is tra tio n )
R ules. The c o n s t i tu t io n  which has been d e l ib e ra te ly  
suspended by the  L e g is la tu re  bo th  co n fe rred  p r iv i le g e s  and 
imposed o b lig a t io n s , and the  e x is ten ce  of M in is te rs  respons­
ib le  to  th e  L e g is la tu re  was an e s s e n t ia l  fe a tu re  o f the  
whole scheme. That e s s e n t ia l  fea tiare  having been destro y ed  
on August 26th , th e  people of Bengal have, through the  
a c tio n  of t h e i r  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s ,  te m p o ra rily  lo s t  th e  
advantages which P arliam ent in tended  to  co n fe r upon them.
U n til such time as the  c o n s t i tu t io n  i s  r e s to re d ,  th e  
L e g is la t iv e  Council w ill  be summoned only  when req u ire d  fo r  
th e  tr a n s a c tio n  o f Government b u s in e s s .1
Das had made a grave m isc a lc u la tio n . The B r i t i s h  could con tinue  
to  govern w ithout th e  reform ed i n s t i t u t i o n s  and obv iously  in tended  
to  do so . What then  was th e  d if fe re n c e  between December 1921, when 
they  had been fo rced  to  sue fo r  peace, and August 1924? In  1921 
they  had been th re a ten e d  w ith  a c o lla p se  of the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  through­
out In d ia  and, a t  the same tim e, they  had faced  a v io le n t  mass 
movement which was re v o lu tio n a ry  in  p o te n t ia l .  In  1924 th e
1
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institutional collapse was limited to Bengal and the Central
Provinces, and there was no mass agitation to support it.
'.That was Das to do in these circumstances? Gandhi, who had
"been released from prison earlier in the year, was urging the Congress
to leave the councils and return to its work among the masses. His
1cry was taken up by his disciples in Bengal. Das, however, knew
that this programme would not be acceptable to the bhadralok, for
2they had had enough of mass politics. Here was the root of his 
difficulty. The Legislative Council as it had been reformed in 
1919> with its entrenched representation for the Muslims and the 
Europeans, was a manifestly unsatisfactory institution for the 
bhadralok, but, if they did not work the political system constructed 
by the British, they had either to engage in popular politics - 
which in Bengal meant inciting the Muslim and low-caste Hindu masses 
and thereby endangering bhadralok social dominance - or resort to 
terrorism - which could be beaten down by the British without great 
difficulty.
Das was on the horns of the dilemma forced upon his class by 
the British determination to extend the electorate and Gandhi’s 
determination to bring the masses into the nationalist movement.
Bor had his seven months in the Council assisted him in any way 
to overcome this difficulty for he had failed, just as the Moderates
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before him had failed, to devise a strategy which would strengthen 
his hold on both sections of the electorate, bhadralok and non- 
bhadralok. He had done no more than to adopt the old bhadralok 
style of opposition to the Government and, by organising his 
followers efficiently, had scored a tactical success.
L Leader being; Led
Speaking at Gaya in December 1922 in advocacy of council entry,
he had lightly dismissed the question of what should be done if
dyarchy were destroyed and the British did not yield. Time enough
to think of that should it ever happen, he had said. ‘What do we do
when it pours with rain? We turn our umbrella in the direction from
which the water comes. It is the same way that we must turn the
direction of our activities whenever the fulfilment of our national 
1life demands it'. When brought face to face with the issue in 
August 1924> he had nothing- more constructive to offer. In fact 
he was losing his grip. His health had been broken by the exertions 
of the preceding five years and the political situation in Bengal 
was going to pieces under him. The seeds of dissension sown in 
the reckless days of 1921-22 had taken root and produced a mass of 
tangled growth.
Hindu-Muslira relations had deteriorated. The Swaraj party's 
pact, that 'monstrous understanding' with the Muslims as it was
_
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described in the Hindu press, had offended the bhadralok and there
were dark predictions that it was ‘the beginning of the end of Das’s
influence with the Hindu community in Bengal’. The Swarajists
had then found themselves in serious difficulties when Musharruf
Husain’s resolution was put to the Council, and, by moving for an
adjournment, they had merely succeeded in giving offence to the
Muslims without in any way pacifying their own community. The All-
India Congress session at Cocanda in December 1923 had refused to
recognise any separate provincial agreement on the communal question
2on the ground that it might impede a later national settlement and 
although Das managed to get his pact ratified at the Bengal 
Provincial Conference at Sirajganj in June, it was clear that his 
authority was weakened.^
The Swarajists had made many enemies through their actions in 
the Calcutta Corporation. By using the municipality as a party 
patronage machine, they had antagonised those who were not provided 
for,^ and even within the party there had been bickering over 
appointments. The outstanding instance v/as the three-cornered fight 
between Bose, Sasmal and Sen Gupta for the highly-paid position of
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C hief Executive O ff ic e r . Sen Gupta was r e l a t iv e ly  unconcerned a t  
B ose’s v ic to ry  but Sasmal was m o rta lly  offended and a r i f t  developed 
in  th e  Das group which was to  s p l i t  th e  Swaraj p a rty  a p a rt a f t e r  i t s  
le a d e r ’ s d ea th .
By August 1924 th e re  were s tro n g  p re ssu re s  w ith in  the  Bengal
Congress fo r  l in e s  of a c tio n  of which Das d isapproved , b u t he had no
ready answer o f h is  own and was fo rced  back to  talking- vaguely of
the  d e l ig h ts  of the  in d e fin e ab le  sw a ra j. A ddressing the  f i r s t  a l l -
In d ia  m eeting of the  Swaraj p a r ty  in  C a lcu tta  he sa id :
I t  i s  asked ”what i s  the k ind  o f Swaraj th a t  you a re  s t r iv in g  
f o r ? ” Some fr ie n d s  o f mine a re  so anxious to  have the d e ta i l s  
of Swaraj th a t  in  t h e i r  a ttem pt to  d e fin e  they  lo se  s ig h t of 
th e  r e a l  p r in c ip le  upon which th e  whole f ig h t  fo r  Swaraj i s  
based , and th a t  i s  th a t  we do not want any p a r t ic u la r  system 
of Government; we want the  r ig h t  to  e s ta b l is h  our own system 
of governm ent.2
Das was bankrupt fo r  id eas  and fo r  th e  p re sen t he could o f f e r  no 
re s is ta n c e  to  those  who knew what they  wanted.
The Hindu communalists had a lread y  dragged him in to  a d isp u te  
over tem ple management. E a rly  in  1924 two Pun jab i swamis,
Biswananda and Sachidananda, who had been a c tiv e  in  the  su cc e ss fu l 
A kali movement in  n o rth -w este rn  In d ia , had come to Bengal to  o rg an ise  
an a g i ta t io n  a g a in s t what they  d esc rib ed  as the  c o rru p t management
1
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of th e  main Hindu s h r in e s . They f a i le d  in  an i n i t i a l  a t ta c k  on
2
th e  p r i e s t l y  h ie ra rc h y  o f th e  K alighat tem ple hu t they then  tu rned  
upon the  mohunt o f Tarakesw ar, a p lace  of p ilg rim age a few m iles 
no rth -w est of C a lcu tta . T h e ir accu sa tio n s  o f im m orality  and f in a n c ia l  
e x to r t io n  from p ilg rim s caused a g re a t s t i r  in  th e  B engali press'^ 
and Das* orthodox Hindu fo llo w ers  urged him to  in te rv e n e . He was 
r e lu c ta n t  to  do so hut h is  hand was fo rced  hy a re s o lu t io n  a t  th e  
S ira jg a n j  P ro v in c ia l Conference c a l l in g  fo r  sa tyag raha  a t  Tarakeswar 
to  d isp o sse ss  the  mohunt. ^
In  June v o lu n tee rs  were e n l is te d  and the  two swamis le d  a march
on the  tem ple. The mohunt had brought in  Gurkha durwans to  p ro te c t
h is  p ro p e rty  and th e re  was v io len ce  when th e  dem onstrato rs  reached
Tarakesw ar. In  th e  weeks th a t  follow ed the  p o lic e  in te rv en ed  on a
number of occasions to  b reak  up f ig h ts  and to  remove p ic k e ts . There
were many a r r e s t s  and a few l iv e s  were l o s t ,  e i th e r  through r io t in g
5
o r p o lic e  f i r i n g .  Das had l i t t l e  c o n tro l over th e  a f f a i r  bu t he 
was c r i t i c i s e d  by one f a c t io n  fo r  encouraging p o l i t i c a l  in te r fe re n c e  
in  m a tte rs  o f r e l ig io n  and by an o th er fo r  not su p p o rtin g  the
1
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v o lu n te e rs  more w holehearted ly , When he succeeded in  p a tch in g  up
a compromise between the  mohunt and th e  sv;amis in  September, he was
1
accused by bo th  p a r t ie s  of d ish o n es ty  and s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  The
episode served only to  d is c r e d i t  him.
The t e r r o r i s t s ’ a c t i v i t i e s  had a lso  become an embarrassment.
T heir s a m itis  were now o v e r tly  communal and a t the  same time they
claim ed th e  support o f the Swaraj p a r ty . Das dared  not deny th i s
fo r  te r ro r ism  was g e n e ra lly  approved by th e  bhadra lok . His d i f f i c u l t i e s
were brought to  a head by th e  execu tio n  o f Gopinatli Saha, a s tu d en t
who in  an attem pt to  murder th e  C a lc u tta  Commissioner of P o lice
had m istaken ly  shot an E ng lish  businessm an. He had caused a se n sa tio n
a t h is  t r i a l  by ex p ressing  sorrow a t having k i l l e d  the wrong man.
’He was g lad  to  pay w ith  h is  l i f e  and hoped th a t  every drop o f h is
2blood would sow the  seeds o f freedom in  every In d ian  home'. He 
was hanged and th e  bhadralok  had a new m arty r.
A re s o lu t io n  was moved a t  th e  S ira jg a n j Conference ex p ress in g  
ad m ira tio n  fo r  h is  p a tr io tis m  and s p i r i t  of s a c r i f i c e ,  a lthough  a t  
th e  same tim e d is c r e e t ly  re a ff irm in g  C ongress' adherence to  the  
p r in c ip le  of n o n -v io len ce .^  Das -  a le a d e r  be ing  le d  -  spoke fo r  
th e  r e s o lu t io n .  By doing t h i s  he p ro te c te d  h is  p o s it io n  w ith  h is
1
IIP, Ju l-S ep  1924.
2
In d ia n  S tru g g le , p. 146.
.bun,; In d ia , 1924-1926, p. 878.
, 1  • •
3
r
own community but h is  a c tio n  offended the  Muslims who were growing
in c re a s in g ly  apprehensive of Hindu v io le n c e . I t  a lso  provided
the p ro v in c ia l Government w ith  th e  f in a l  argument i t  needed to
persuade the  Government o f In d ia  to  arm i t  w ith  e x tra o rd in a ry  powers
2to  deal w ith  the  t e r r o r i s t s . “ A fte r some months o f c a re fu l p re p a ra t io n , 
i t  s tru c k  a co -o rd in a ted  blow a t  th e  re v o lu tio n a ry  sam itis  th roughout 
Bengal on th e  n ig h t o f 24 O ctober 1924* A ll the  r in g le a d e rs  were 
a r r e s te d ,  in c lu d in g  S.C. Bose and two S w a ra jis t M .L .C s., Anil Baran 
Ray and S atyendra Chandra M itr a .^
Back to  th e  Council
The L e g is la t iv e  Council d id  not meet between August 1924? when 
th e  demand f o r  th e  M in is te rs ' s a la r ie s  was r e je c te d  fo r  th e  second 
tim e , and January  1925» When i t  d id  resume th e  Swaraj p a r ty  was 
w ithout i t s  le a d e r ,  who was confined  to  a s ic k  bed,^ and i t s  two 
p o l i t i c a l  d e ten u s , Ray and M itra , who were s t i l l  in  p riso n , «'/hat was 
w orse, i t  could no lo n g e r r e ly  upon i t s  Muslim su p p o rte rs  and i t  had 
made no p ro g ress  towards a new p o lic y . I t  was m erely r e tu rn in g  a f t e r  
f iv e  months fo r  a rep ea t perform ance of d e s tru c t io n .
1
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Das d id  a tte n d  the  f i r s t  d a y 's  p roceedings (7 Jan  1925) in  a wheel 
c h a ir  under th e  care  of h is  d o c to r , B.C. Ray. (K.P. Thomas:
Dr B.C. Roy, p. 124*)
a
I t  achieved an immediate success in  r e je c t in g  a Crim inal Lav;
Amendment B i l l  w ith  which th e  Government had hoped to  re p la ce  th e
sp e c ia l o rd inance under which th e  O ctober a r r e s t s  had been made
b u t in  February  i t  f a i l e d  to  d e fe a t a re s o lu t io n  moved by Rahim fo r
2p ro v is io n  to  be made in  the  budget fo r  M in is te r s ’ s a la r i e s .  The
Government had shrewdly held  out th e  p rospect o f o f f ic e  to  a number
of groups but had not appoin ted  M in is te rs  be fo re  the  vo te  was taken .
In  t h i s  way i t  had succeeded in  d iv id in g  th e  Independent R a t io n a l is ts
3
from the  S w a ra jis ts .
When L y tton  d id  make h is  choice e a r ly  in  March, th e  g en era l
o p in io n  was th a t  he had gained two f r ie n d s  and a h o st of enem ies.^
His new M in is te rs  were M oderates, Nawab A li Chaudhuri and a fe llow
zamindar from Mymensingh, Manmathanath Ray Chaudhuri, Raja of
5
Santosh . The Independent R a t io n a l i s ts  had been d isap p o in ted  once
ag a in  and Das appealed to  them to  s tan d  w ith  th e  S w a ra jis ts .
The c ry  everywhere i s  what nex t?  The q u e s tio n  adm its o f but 
one re p ly  -  R atio n a l Honour and Sw araj. There can be no 
Row and Rext in  our n a tio n a l f i g h t ,  c e a se le s s  bu t determ ined , 
u n t i l  th e  goal i s  achieved . To r e fu s e  to  f ig h t  the  e v i l  i s  
d ea th . To re fu s e  to  d e s tro y  th a t  which i s  d e le te r io u s  to
1
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,?a. r
our p rogress i s  d ishonour . . . .  The Bureaucracy d iv id e s  to  
r u le .  S h a ll we not g a th e r  to  ach ieve?  Let our people 
young and o ld , r ic h  and poor jo in  under the  Congress "banner 
and v in d ic a te  I n d ia ’s honour and manhood. Our d isu n io n  i s  
the  cause of Bureaucracy. The u n ite d  l i f e  of the  people i s  
i t s  only cure."5
Ten days of h e c tic  lobbying- fo llow ed during- which i t  became
«
ev iden t th a t  F azlu l Huq and h is  e ig h t fo llo w ers  were a v a ila b le  to
the h ig h e s t b id d e r. Huq suggested  to  th e  Government th a t  i t  might
2co n sid er th e  appointm ent o f two more M in is te rs  w hile a t  th e  same
time he was n e g o tia tin g  w ith the  S w a ra jis ts  fo r  a ’personal
3
c o n s id e ra t io n '.  He kept bo th  p a r t ie s  in  suspense u n t i l  the  l a s t
day and th en  d ec la red  a g a in s t the M in is te rs . His vo tes gave the
S w a ra jis ts  a m a jo rity  of s ix ,  and on 23 March they  once more re je c te d
th e  demand fo r  sa la rie s .^ "  L y tton  had no h e s i t a t io n  in  suspending
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n ,  and th i s  tim e he made i t  c le a r  th a t  he would not
a ttem pt to  r e s to r e  dyarchy u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  next general e le c t io n
13
which was scheduled fo r  l a t e  1926.
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The L ast Bid
Das f e l t  th a t  th e  s i tu a t io n  was s lip p in g  away from him. He 
dared  not leave  the  Council again  w ithou t a p o s i t iv e  p lan  o f a c tio n  
fo r  h is  p a r ty , fo r  i t  was obvious th a t  he would lo se  h is  le a d e rs h ip  
to  extreme elem ents u n le ss  he could  keep h is  fo llo w ers  engaged. Nor 
was i t  sim ply a q u estion  o f narrow p o l i t i c a l  advantage. Das had 
r e a l i s e d ,  a l l  too l a t e ,  th a t  he had to  curb th e  tendency towards 
p o l i t i c a l  and communal extremism i f  i t  was not to  lead  Bengal to  
d i s a s t e r .  V iolence would beget v io le n c e , and the  sharp  h a tre d s  o f 
r a c e , community and c la s s  would te a r  in to  th e  f a b r ic  o f p ro v in c ia l 
s o c ie ty .^
The h o rro r of the  s i tu a t io n  fo r  Das la y  in  the  knowledge th a t  i t  
was p a r t ly  the  r e s u l t  o f h is  own a c t io n s .  A s t r a ig h t  l in e  could be 
tra c e d  from the  boyco tts  and p ic k e ts ,  th e  s t r ik e s  and h a r ta l s  o f 
the  n o n -co -o p era tio n  movement in  1921, th rough the neg ativ e  campaign 
of d e s tru c t io n  pursued by the  S w a ra jis ts  in  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council 
and Das' equivocal a t t i tu d e  to  v io len ce  in  th e  p a s t y e a r , to  th e  
extrem es o f te rro r ism  and communalism which now c h a ra c te r is e d  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  in  Bengal.
I f  Das was to  re v e rse  the  tre n d , he had to  o f f e r  something- 
c o n s tru c tiv e , bu t what could he o f fe r?  One p o s s ib i l i ty  was c o -o p e ra tio n
1
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•with the  B r i t i s h :  to  work th e  c o n s t i tu t io n  in s te a d  of o b s tru c tin g  i t .  
Das knew th a t he would je o p a rd ise  h is  p o p u la r ity  w ith  th e  bhadralok  
i f  he suggested  t h i s ,  bu t h is  p o s i t io n  was a lread y  d esp e ra te  and he 
had to  make some move. The r i s k  would be worth ta k in g  i f  th e re  
were a reaso n ab le  chance of th e  B r i t i s h  responding  w ith  an o f f e r  o f 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  concessio n s , fo r  he would th en  be ab le  to  claim  th a t  
S w a ra jis t o b s tru c tio n  in  the  Council had achieved i t s  purpose.
There were in d ic a tio n s  th a t  th e  B r i t i s h  might be w il l in g  to  
n e g o tia te .  In  August 1924 a committee had been  appointed by the  
Government o f In d ia  to  examine the working o f the  re fo rm s, and i t s  
re p o r t  which had ju s t  been published  emphasised the  d e fe c ts  o f dyarchy. 
A lthough the  m a jo rity  of th e  com m ittee 's  members recommended no 
immediate c o n s t i tu t io n a l  advance, a m in o rity  m inute of d is s e n t  en tered
-j
a s tro n g  p lea  fo r  a quick  s te p  forw ard. The V iceroy, Lord Reading,
was making- p re p a ra tio n s  fo r  a v i s i t  to  England and i t  was g e n e ra lly
b e lie v ed  th a t  he was going home to  d isc u ss  the  q u estio n  o f In d ian
2reform s w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  Government.
With th e  h e lp  o f two European f r ie n d s  in  C a lc u tta , Das arranged 
a s e c re t  m eeting w ith  L y tto n  a t  th e  Ramakrishna M ission a t  B elur 
and d iscu ssed  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of a compromise. L y tton  had ju s t
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re tu rn e d  from D elhi where he had gone to  rece iv e  a b r ie f in g  so th a t  
he could take over the  V icero y a lty  w hile Reading was in  England. I t  
seems l ik e ly  th a t  he had been empowered by th e  V iceroy to  hold out 
th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of concessions to  Das, i f  he were w ill in g  to  d i s -  
s o c ia te  h im se lf p u b lic ly  from th e  t e r r o r i s t s .  This was ask ing  a 
l o t  of any bhadralok  p o l i t i c i a n  bu t Das was ready to ta k e  th e  p lunge, 
fo r  he had to  make some g a in . On 29 March he pub lished  a bold 
re n u n c ia tio n  o f v io len ce :
I  have made i t  c le a r ,  and I  do i t  once ag a in , th a t  I  am 
opposed on p r in c ip le  to  p o l i t i c a l  a s s a s s in a t io n s  and 
v io len ce  in  any shape or form. I t  i s  a b so lu te ly  abhorren t 
to  me and to  my p a rty . I  co n sid e r i t  an o b s ta c le  to  our 
p o l i t i c a l  p ro g ress. I t  i s  a lso  opposed to  our r e l ig io u s  
teach in g  . . . .  As a q u estio n  o f p r a c t ic a l  p o l i t i c s  I  fe e l 
c e r ta in  th a t  i f  v io len ce  i s  to  tak e  ro o t in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  of our coun try , i t  w il l  be the  end of our dream of 
Swaraj f o r  a l l  tim e to  come. I  am, th e re fo re ,  eager th a t  
t h i s  e v i l  should not grow any f u r th e r ,  and th a t  th i s  
method should cease a l to g e th e r  as a p o l i t i c a l  weapon in  
my country* ^
This brought an immediate response from th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te ,  
Lord B irkenhead. Speaking in  th e  House of Lords on 31 March in  a 
deb a te  on the  Bengal o rd in an ce , he welcomed Das* announcement and 
d e c la re d  th a t  i t  opened th e  way fo r  th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f fu r th e r  
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  advance fo r  In d ia . This was encouraging fo r  Das
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b u t he needed something' more d e f i n i t e .  He th e r e f o r e  ap pea led  to
1
th e  B r i t i s h  on 4 A p ril f o r  a c l e a r  s ta te m e n t o f  t h e i r  p o s i t io n .
He re c e iv e d  no r e p ly .  T h is p u t him in  an e x c e ed in g ly  d i f f i c u l t
p o s i t io n .  The P ro v in c ia l  C onference was to  he h e ld  a t  F a r id p u r
in  fo u r  weeks tim e and i t  was known t h a t  he would fa c e  an a t t a c k
2
from th e  p r o - t e r r o r i s t  g roup . He had hoped to  he a b le  to  c o n fro n t
them w ith  a d e f i n i t e  B r i t i s h  o f f e r  o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n c e ss io n s ,
th e re b y  ju s t i f y i n g  h is  condem nation o f  v io le n c e .  As i t  was he would
have to  go empty handed. However th e re  co u ld  be no q u e s tio n  o f a
w ithd raw al and he dec ided  f o r  a b o ld  l i n e .  He would make an o u tr ig h t
o f f e r  o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  to  th e  B r i t i s h .  In  h is  p r e s id e n t i a l  speech
on 2 May he a g a in  condemned te r r o r i s m  and c a l l e d  upon th e  C ongress
to  r e a f f i rm  i t s  b e l i e f  in  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m ethods. He was w illin g -,
he s a id ,  to  work w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  i f  th e y  would g iv e  r e a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
to  th e  In d ia n  p eo p le . The tim e had come f o r  a change o f  h e a r t .
I  se e  s ig n s  o f  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  everyw here. The w orld i s  t i r e d  
o f  c o n f l i c t s ,  and I  th in k  I  see  a r e a l  d e s i r e  f o r  c o n s t r u c t io n ,  
f o r  c o n s o l id a t io n .  I  b e l ie v e  t h a t  I n d ia  has a g re a t  p a r t  
to  p la y  i n  th e  h i s to r y  o f th e  w orld . She has a message to  
d e l i v e r ,  and she i s  anx ious to  d e l iv e r  i t  i n  th e  C ouncil 
Chamber o f th a t  g re a t  commonwealth o f  n a t io n s ,  o f w hich I  
have spoken. W ill B r i t i s h  s ta te sm en  r i s e  to  th e  o cca sio n ?
To them I  say i you can have peace today  on term s th a t  a re  
h o n o u rab le  b o th  to  you and to  u s .  To th e  B r i t i s h  community 
in  I n d ia ,  I  say : you have come w ith  t r a d i t i o n s  o f freedom , 
and you cannot re fu s e  to  c o -o p e ra te  w ith  us i n  our n a t io n a l
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s tru g g le , provided we recognize your r ig h t  to  be heard  in  
th e  f in a l  s e ttle m e n t. To th e  people of Bengal I  say : you have 
made g re a t s a c r i f ic e s  fo r  d a rin g  to  win p o l i t i c a l  freedom, 
and on you has f a l l e n  the  b ru n t of o f f i c i a l  w rath. The tim e 
i s  not y e t fo r  putting; a sid e  your p o l i t i c a l  weapons, f ig h t  
h a rd , bu t f ig h t  c lean ; and when th e  time fo r  se ttlem en t comes, 
as i t  i s  bound to  come, e n te r  th e  peace con ference , not in  a 
s p i r i t  of arrogance , but ’with becoming’ h u m ility , so th a t  i t  
may be sa id  of you th a t  you were g re a te r  in  your achievement 
than  in  a d v e rs ity . ^
Das had staked  every th ing  on th i s  o f f e r  and i t  was d e sp e ra te ly
im portan t to  him th a t  the  B r i t i s h  should respond. W aiting im p a tie n tly
fo r  the  re p ly  th a t  had to  come, he w rote to  M o tila l Nehru on 13 June:
I  do not know whether you w ill  agree w ith  me o r n o t, bu t I  
b e lie v e  something- may come out o f the  Reading-Birkenhead 
co n v ersa tio n s  which a re  going on about In d ia . I  f e a r  th a t  
you do not a tta c h  any im portance to them. You may be r ig h t  
bu t som ething t e l l s  me th a t  they  w il l  make some kind of 
p roposal to  us -  whether i t  w ill  be of any r e a l  valjie to  us 
i s  an o th er m a tte r , bu t the Hindu-Mahommedan q u estio n  must 
be s e t t le d  b e fo re  the y ea r i s  out . . . .
The most c r i t i c a l  tim e in  our h is to ry  i s  coming. There 
must be so lid  work done a t th e  end of th i s  y ea r and th e  
beg inn ing  of th e  nex t. A ll our re so u rce s  w ill  be taxed  and 
h ere  bo th  o f us are i l l .  God knows what w ill  h a p p e n .2
No proposal came from the  E r i t i s h  fo r  they  were p lay in g  th is
game w ith  Das fo r  p a rty  p o l i t i c a l  advantage in  England. The
C onservative Government was concerned m erely to  b u ild  up a case in
favour o f In d ian  reform  so th a t  i t  would have an excuse to  a c c e le ra te
the  appointm ent o f th e  s ta tu to ry  commission which was due to  examine
1
? . C. Ray: L ife  & Times of C.R, D as, pp. 247“ 56«
2
Quoted Jay ak a r, v o l. I I ,  p. 543* Ike  d a te  (23 Jun) which Jayakar 
g iv es  f o r  th i s  l e t t e r  i s  obv iously  wrong-.
Lei _
th e  In d ia n  c o n s t i tu t io n  in  1928, I t  d id  not want the  Labour p a r ty
1
to  have th e  o p p o rtu n ity  o f nom inating th e  members. Das had gambled 
fo r  th e  fu tu re  of Bengal and had l o s t .  His opponents g le e f u l ly  
shouted: co -o p era to r] ‘The S w a ra jis ts  a re  stumbling- down the  in c l in e  
o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  c o -o p e ra tio n  so f a s t  th a t  th e  L ib e ra ls  a re  a lread y  
c la im ing  them as members, even i f  wayward and f ic k le  members, o f 
th e i r  f o ld ’ . The clamour was s ilen ced  by Das' sudden d ea th  on 16 
June.
D espair and. Alarm
’The sky of Bengal i s  o v e rcas t w ith  c louds. God has removed 
from Bengal h e r most n o tab le  le a d e rs  o f men’ . The Nayak o f 8 
September 1925 lam ented th e  d ea th  of f iv e  of B engal’ s forem ost 
p u b lic  f ig u re s  w ith in  18 months: 23 May 1924 Asutosh Chaudhuri,
25 May 1924 Asutosh M ukherjea, 16 September 1924 Bhupendranath Basu,
16 June 1925 CJhitta Ranjan Das and 6 August 1925 Surendranath  B anerjea . 
l iv e  le a d e rs  o f two bhadra lok  g e n e ra tio n s  dead and th e  le a d e r  o f th e  
new g e n e ra tio n , Subhas Chandra Eose, im prisoned by the  B r i t i s h  a t  
Mandalay. 'The most c r i t i c a l  tim e in  our h is to ry  i s  coming’ , Das 
had w r i t te n  th re e  days b e fo re  h is  d ea th . 'God knows what w ill  
h ap p en '.
1
See B irkenhead to  Reading, 10 Dec 1925> S a r i o f B irkenhead:
The L ife  of F.B. Sm ith, F i r s t  E a rl o f B irkenhead , pp. 511-2«
2
Mussalman,* 6 May 1925*
The bhadralok were bereft of their leadership at the worst possible 
moment. Politically there was no clear route ahead and the politicians, 
the lesser men who remained, were divided and uncertain. Socially the 
class was face to face with a fearful challenge from below. The 
ferment of the non-co-operation years had aroused a new self-awareness 
in the masses of rural Bengal, and awakened political and social 
aspirations which could be satisfied only at the bhadralok* s expense.
And the masses now had potential leaders, for the Muslim politicians 
had at last realised that power was available to them in the advocacy 
of peasant interests and the organisation of the rural electorate. They 
and they alone could combine the appeals of community and economic 
interest. Lying- ready to hand was the instrument they needed to attack 
the privileged position of "the classes'* in the name of "the masses": 
the Legislative Council with its reserved seating for Muslims and low- 
caste Hindus.
To the bhadralok it seemed that their economic security, their 
culture, their religion, their whole way of life was endangered. They 
had privileges but they had not the power to protect them, for their 
land was ruled by a foreign Government. In this Government they could 
place no trust for it made no secret of its aversion to their preten­
sions, and they knew that it would not scruple to use religious or 
class divisions against them. They had their evidence in the Council 
resolution to destroy the Hindu-Muslim pact. 'The sky of Bengal is 
overcast with clouds'. The mood was one of despair and alarm, and it 
gave rise to internal faction and extremism.
The S w a ra j is ts  were a t ta c k e d  a s  th e  c r e a to r s  of th e  t r o u b le .  They
had dragged th e  C ongress ' i n t o  th e  m ire  o f  th e  C o u n c ils ' where communal
1
d is s e n s io n  f lo u r i s h e d .  V/ith t h e i r  w e s te rn  id e a s  o f p a r lia m e n ta ry
p o l i t i c s  th e y  had m isled  th e  ed u ca ted  c la s s e s  and l o s t  to u c h  w ith  th e  
2
m asses. T h e ir  vaun ted  p a c t had m ere ly  ag g rav a ted  communal te n s io n .
Busy as th e y  were a d v e r t i s in g  them se lv es  in  th e  C ouncil and l i n i n g
t h e i r  p o ck e ts  in  th e  C o rp o ra tio n , th e y  had n e g le c te d  a l l  work in  th e
m o fu s s i l . The D i s t r i c t  C ongress o rg a n is a t io n  had f a l l e n  to  p ie c e s .
P o l i t i c i a n s  such as th e se  would n ever f r e e  In d ia  from f o r e ig n  o p p r e s s io n .“'
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  know what th e  S w a ra j is t s  r e a l l y  a re  and 
what a c tu a l ly  i s  t h e i r  programme. They a re  no t non- 
c o o p e r a t io n is t s ;  khaddar i s  m ere ly  a c lo a k  to  h id e  t h e i r  
h y p o c r isy . They have no d e f i n i t e  p la n  o f  a c t io n ;  th e y  
m isgu ide th e  people by means o f an a r t i f i c i a l  e x c item en t.
They have f a i l e d  in  t h e i r  c o u n c il programme, f a i l e d  in  
th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f th e  C o rp o ra tio n  and t h e i r  underhand 
p o lic y  in  re g a rd  to  T arakesw ar had been  th o ro u g h ly  
exposed, how th e  hoax o f v i l l a g e  r e c o n s t r u c t io n  i s  b e in g  
t r i e d  on th e  p eo p le . The B en g a lis  a re  n o t f o o l i s h ,  
ig n o ra n t p eo p le . They w il l  no t b l in d ly  a cc ep t a n y th in g  
from th e  S w a ra j is t s .  4
A s u c c e s s io n  s t ru g g le  had begun in  th e  Bengal C ongress. Gandhi 
was in  C a lc u tta  when Das d ie d  and he s ta y e d  f o r  some months to  a s s i s t  
w ith  th e  problem s o f t r a n s i t i o n .  He u rg ed  th e  p ro v in c ia l  C ongress to
1
Ananda B azar P a t r i k a ,* 13 Oct 1925«
2
S e r v a n t 10 Aug 1925«
3
Ananda B azar P a t r i k a ,* 8 Oct 1925» A tm asak ti,* 16 Oct 1925»
4
S a n jiv a n i ,*  17 Sep 1925»
a c c e p t Sen Gupta as i t s  new le a d e r  b u t th e  o th e r  a s p i r a n t s  f o r  th e
p o s i t io n  b rushed  a s id e  h is  a d v ic e . Sen G upta would have to  f ig h t  f o r  th e
crown i f  he wanted i t .  H is main r i v a l s  w ere S.C . Bose, B.N. Sasmal
and Byomkes G h a k ra v a rti . B ose, s t i l l  i n  p r is o n  i n  Burma, was no t an
im m ediate t h r e a t  b u t he was m a in ta in in g  h i s  c o n ta c ts  and would have
2
pow erfu l su p p o rt when he r e tu rn e d .  C h a k ra v a rti had an advan tage  in  h av in g  
n ev e r su b sc r ib e d  to  th e  Hindu-M uslim p a c t ,  b u t he threw  away h i s  
chance by d e c la r in g  fo r  'r e s p o n s iv e  c o -o p e ra t io n ' w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  and
3
c a l l i n g  f o r  th e  u n i ty  o f a l l  p a r t i e s ,  M oderates a s  w ell as Congressm en."
He was swimming a g a in s t  th e  t i d e ,  w hich was flo w in g  tow ards se p a ra tism
and ex trem ism . The o th e r  c o n te s ta n ts  a l l i e d  th em se lv es  w ith  Hindu
communal and t e r r o r i s t  g ro u p s , and adopted  a d e f ia n t  l i n e  tow ards th e
E r i t i s h . 7 At th e  B .P .C .C . e le c t io n s  in  November 1925? Sen Gupta
d e fe a te d  Sasmal b u t h is  ho ld  on power rem ained in s e c u re  f o r  h i s  r i v a l s
5
co n tin u ed  to  work a g a in s t  him. N rip en d ra  Chandra B a n e r je a , a fo rm er 
n o n -c o -o p e ra to r  r e tu rn in g  to  Bengal a t  t h i s  tim e a f t e r  two y e a rs  as 
e d i to r  o f th e  Rangoon M a il, was a p p a lle d  by th e  s t a t e  o f p ro v in c ia l  
p o l i t i c s !
1
H.N. Das G upta: Subhas C handra, pp. 90-1»
2
S.C . Boses The M ission  of L i f e , p. 19ff*
3
HP, 5 £*e0 1925« D ain ik  nasum ati ,* 11 Apr 1926•
4
B i.-jali ,* 13 Nov 1925.
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I  went ou t on a to u r  to  N orth  Bengal tow ards th e  end o f 
1925: some o f th e  s i t t i n g s  o f th e  Bengal P ro v in c ia l  C ongress 
Committee which I  had a t te n d e d  had f i l l e d  me w ith  g r e a t  
m isg iv in g s  about th e  in t e r n a l  d i s c i p l i n e  and s t r e n g th  o f  
th e  Congress in  Bengal and I  w anted to  judge f o r  m yself how 
th e  o rg a n is a t io n  was w orking in  th e  d i s t r i c t s  . . . .  I  found 
an  aw ful " r o t ” in  th e  r u r a l  c e n tre s  o f C ongress: in  many 
p la c e s  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  had ceased  to  e x i s t .  In  some o th e rs  
i t  was a fak e  and I  found a lo c a l  Muslim le a d e r  (who had 
been  a c t iv e  on th e  S w a ra j-cu m -K h ila fa t f r o n t  in  1921) 
w earing’ B r i t i s h  c lo th  and no t f e e l in g  he was do ing  a n y th in g  
a n t i - n a t io n a l . ’ 1
The m ain concern  o f  b h a d ra lo k  p o l i t i c i a n s  o f a l l  shades was now
th e  p r o te c t io n  o f th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e i r  c l a s s .  There were demands in
th e  Hindu p re s s  f o r  th e  e x c lu s io n  from  Government appo in tm en ts  in  Bengal
2
o f  a l l  c a n d id a te s  from o th e r  p ro v in c e s  and f o r  th e  p ro v is io n  i n  th e
3
l e g i s l a t u r e s  o f communal r e p r e s e n ta t io n  f o r  H indus. When th e  Government 
in tro d u c e d  a Tenancy Act Amendment B i l l  to  th e  L e g i s la t iv e  C ouncil in  
December 1925 every  means was used  by th e  zam indar and b h a d ra lo k  
members to  o b s tru c t  i t s  p a ssag e . T h e ir  e f f o r t s  were applauded  by 
t h e i r  community. ’I n  season  and out o f sea so n  Government in d u lg e  in  
v i l i f i c a t i o n  and d e n u n c ia tio n  o f  B o lsh e v ism ', observed  th e  Burdwan 
P a l l i v a s i . ’But i s  no t th e  g ra n t  o f  occupancy r ig h t  to  a k o r fa  r a i y a t ,  
a s  co n tem p la ted  in  th e  Tenancy B i l l ,  an a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  p r in c ip le
A
o f  B o l s h e v i s m ? I n  th e  same month th e  C ouncil re fu se d  le a v e  to  th e
1
N.C. B a n e r j i :  At th e  C ross-R oads, pp. 202-4.
2
A m rita B azar P a t r i k a ,* 10 Oct 1925*
3
UP, Mar 1926.
4
P a l l i v a s i  ,* 3 Feb 1926. Cf. D a in ik  B asu m a ti,* 18 Sep 192p; 
NT, 28 Nov 1925j BIA P u b l ic a t io n s ,  v o l.  X I I I .
Government to  in tro d u c e  a M unicipal B i l l ,  w hich made p ro v is io n  f o r  new
ta x a t io n  o f  p ro p e rty  h o ld e r s .”' O f f i c i a l  p ro p o sa ls  f o r  th e  e x te n s io n
o f  mass p rim ary  e d u c a tio n  in  r u r a l  a re a s  were a ls o  opposed hy th e
b h a d ra lo k . ' I f  we en fo rce  com pulsory p rim ary  e d u c a tio n  on th e  p e a sa n ts
and compel them to  g iv e  up t i l l i n g  and th e re b y  t r y  to  refo rm  s o c ie ty
by g iv in g  them new spaper e d u c a tio n , i t  w i l l  be sim ply  i n v i t i n g  r u i n ' ,
2
w ro te  th e  Atma - a k t i . I n  a l l  th e se  m a t te r s ,  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f th e  
c a s te -H in d u s  and th e  Muslims were in  obv ious c o n f l i c t .  T h is  gave a 
b o o s t to  communalism in  b o th  cam ps.^
They have sown th e  wind
L y tto n  had been ab sen t from Bengal o f f i c i a t i n g  as  V iceroy  in  th e  
fo u r  c r i t i c a l  months fo llo w in g  th e  f i n a l  su sp e n sio n  o f th e  c o n s t i tu t i o n  
in  March 1925* He had no d e s i r e  to  r e tu r n .  ' I  began work a g a in  in  
C a lc u t ta  on August 9th, my 49 th  b i r t h d a y ' ,  he w ro te , 'and  im m ediate ly  
e x p e rien ced  a g a in  th a t  sense  o f s u f f o c a t io n  from th e  fumes o f i n s in ­
c e r i t y ,  in t r ig u e  and s e l f i s h n e s s  o f Bengal p o l i t i c s  from w hich I  had 
en joyed  such  a welcome escape d u r in g  th e  l a s t  fo u r  months among th e  
h i l l s  o f  S i m l a '/ ' ’ He had l o s t  a l l  en th u siasm  f o r  h i s  work and would
_
R ep o rts  on th e  fo rk in g  o f  th e  Reformed C o n s t i tu t io n ,  1927< p . 185.
2
A tm a sa k ti,* 15 May 1925*
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See e .g .  HP, 9 Dec 1925.
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w i l l in g ly  l e t  h is  su b o rd in a te s  have t h e i r  way in  managing- th e  a f f a i r s  
o f  th e  p ro v in c e .
A few days e a r l i e r ,  S i r  Abdur Kahim had ta k e n  up h i s  pen a g a in  
to  rem ind h i s  c o lle a g u e s  th a t  th e y  had u n f in is h e d  b u s in e s s  w ith  th e  
M uslim s. He r e c a l le d  th e  c irc u m sta n c e s  su rro u n d in g  M usharruf H usa in1s 
C ouncil r e s o lu t io n  on Muslim re c ru i tm e n t o f March 1924 and th e  
G overnm ent’s d e s i r e  to  d r iv e  a wedge betw een th e  S w a ra j is t  H indus and 
t h e i r  Muslim s u p p o r te r s .
T h e re a f te r  S i r  Hugh S tephenson  went away on le a v e  /h e  w rote/»
The p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t io n  rem ained u n c e r ta in  and a c u te ,  and 
th e  b e s t  p ro sp e c t o f g e t t in g  su p p o rt f o r  Government seemed 
s t i l l  to  l i e  in  Muhammadan q u a r te r s .  At t h a t  tim e M essrs 
F. Haque and Ghuznavi were th e  M in is te r s  and most members 
o f  th e  Government seemed to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  one means o f  
r a l l y in g  th e  Muhammadans was to  in v e s t ig a t e  th e  ways and 
means o f rem oving t h e i r  g r ie v a n c e s  re g a rd in g  employment in  
p u b lic  s e rv ic e .  Mr D onald, who was th e n  in  charge  o f th e  
A ppointm ent D epartm ent, d is c u s s e d  th e  q u e s tio n  w ith  me a t  
D a r je e l in g  w ith  th e  r e s u l t  th a t  Mr M oberly , who was th e n  
th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry , c a l le d  upon th e  v a r io u s  d ep artm en ts  
o f  Government to  supply  f a c t s  and f ig u r e s  showing th e  
p ro g re s s  made by Muhammadans i n  th e  s e rv ic e  of Government.
The in fo rm a tio n  has now been  c o l l e c t e d ,  b u t I  pu t o f f  
b r in g in g  th e  q u e s tio n  b e fo re  Government a s  i t  r e a l t e d  b o th  
to  th e  d eserv ed  and T ra n s fe r re d  D epartm ents and th e  p o s i t io n  
o f th e  l a t t e r ,  u n t i l  th e  o th e r  day , rem ained u n c e r ta in .
In  th e  c irc u m stan c es  t h a t  I  have n a r r a te d ,  i t  i s  our 
d u ty  to  rev iew  th e  e n t i r e  p o s i t io n  and to  t e l l  th e  
Muhammadans how f a r  we a re  p re p a re d  to  adm it th e  j u s t i c e  
o f t h e i r  c la im s . I  would go f u r t h e r  and say  t h a t ,  h av in g  
re g a rd  to  what happened in  c o n n e c tio n  w ith  M aulvi 
M ushruff H u ssa in 's  r e s o lu t io n ,  we a re  p ledged  to  th a t  
community to  ta k e  s te p s  a t  once to  advance th e  p o a tio n  
o f th e  Muhammadans in  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n .  F o r , th e  
d is c u s s io n s  on M ushruff H u s s a in 's  r e s o lu t io n  amply showed 
th a t  on th e  m e r i ts ,  th e  S w a ra j is t s  a s  a body, th e  
E uropean n o n - o f f ic i a l s  and th e  Muhammadan m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s  
c o n s t i t u t i n g  a l to g e th e r  a la rg e  m a jo r i ty  o f  e le c te d  members, 
gave t h e i r  su p p o rt to  i t .
L c
This question, which has been an open sore on the body 
politic of Bengal for a long time, has now acquired as we 
all know, considerable dynamic political force and it is up 
to us to regard it from the point of view of statesmen and 
not of the appraisers of examination papers."1 2
There was more than a hint of Machiavellianism in this argument.
The Government is desperately in need of support. You suggest where
that support may be found and the terms on which it might be obtained.
You point out that the Government has already committed itself in
some measure to meeting those terms. But the community which you
indicate as a likely source of support is your own and the terms
embody the essence of your community’s ambitions. Moreover it was
you who manoeuvred the Government into the position of making the
first guarded offers to your community, not only by arranging for
the resolution to be moved in the Council and suggesting- the line
that the Government should take, but also, it is confidently asserted
in many quarters, by having a hand in the original Hindu-Muslim pact
2which had made possible the whole machination.
Rahim had played his cards well, and although the British members 
of the Government had no illusions as to his object,"'’ it suited their
1
Minute, 27 Jul 192p> GB, Appointment, 4M—12(1—3)5 A70-71tr>
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Swara.1 ,* 1 Jan 1924« Ananda Bazar ratrika,* 27 May 1926. This 
story was supported by Akram Khan, Das’ chief Muslim negotiator, in 
an interview with the author (Dacca, 14 Feb 19^2).
Englishman,* 10 Mar 1925« -- enpalee,* 1 2 Mar 1925«
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purpose to  d is re g a rd  h is  s le ig h t  of hand. They agreed w ith  him th a t
the  Muslims should have a share  of appointm ents in  the  se rv ic e s
p ro p o rtio n a te  to  t h e i r  p o p u la tio n  ’to  ensure  th a t  the  g en era l in te r e s t s
of th e  community s h a ll  not s u f fe r  and th a t  the  a c t i v i t i e s  of Government
as a whole s h a ll  be fo r  the  b e n e f i t  o f th e  whole p o p u la tio n ’ . A
meeting- of the Executive Council in  October 1925 decided to  in s t r u c t
1
a l l  departm ents to in c rease  th e  tempo o f Muslim rec ru itm en t and in
2December a communique was issu ed  making p u b lic  th i s  o rder -  an a c tio n
which in  i t s e l f  was a t a c i t  adm ission o f th e  Government’s p o l i t i c a l
3
m otive. I t s  e f f e c t  was to  in te n s i fy  communal i l l - f e e l i n g .
The B r i t i s h  had g iven  s u f f ic ie n t  inducement to  o b ta in  Muslim 
support bu t th i s  would be of no p r a c t ic a l  advantage u n le ss  th e  community 
had s u f f ic ie n t  u n ity  and p o l i t i c a l  o rg a n is a tio n  to  ensure th e  e le c t io n  
to  th e  L e g is la t iv e  Council o f r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  who would vo te  c o n s is te n tly  
w ith  the  Government and not d r i f t  away to  Hindu-dominated a l l ia n c e s  
as in  the  p a s t .  In  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f 1925 the  Government decided 
to  take  a hand in  th is  work of o rg a n is a tio n .
The D is t r i c t  O ffice rs  were in s tru c te d  to  throw th e i r  in f lu e n c e  
behind whichever lo c a l Muslim a s s o c ia t io n  was prepared  to  support th e  
Government. They were to  encourage o th e r communal o rg a n isa tio n s  to
1
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am algam ate w ith  t h i s  chosen body and to  b r in g  a l l  th e  com m unity 's
a f f a i r s  in  th e  l o c a l i t y  under i t s  c o n t ro l .  Those groups w hich in s i s t e d
on m a in ta in in g 1 t h e i r  independence were to  be removed from th e
G overnm ent's l i s t  of re c o g n ise d  o rg a n is a t io n s  and th e re b y  d e p riv e d
o f  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  recommend c a n d id a te s  f o r  p u b lic  o f f i c e ,  to
a s s i s t  in  th e  p re p a ra t io n  o f e l e c to r a l  r e g i s t e r s ,  to  be re p re s e n te d  a t
o f f i c i a l  fu n c tio n s  and to  secu re  th e  hund red -an d -o n e  o th e r  m inor form s
o f  p a tro n a g e  norm ally  d isp en sed  by th e  Government.
The o p e ra t io n  was su p e rin ten d ed  by th e  P o l i t i c a l  D epartm ent in
C a lc u t ta  and i t  had no h e s i t a t i o n  in  in te r v e n in g  d i r e c t l y  i f  i t  saw an
o p p o r tu n i ty  to  secu re  a p o l i t i c a l  ad v an tag e . For in s ta n c e  in  O ctober
1925 i t  re c e iv e d  a r e p o r t  from th e  Dacca D iv is io n a l  Comm issioner
re g a rd in g  a new Is la m ia  Anjuman which was se e k in g  r e c o g n i t io n  in  p la c e
o f  th e  D i s t r i c t  Moslem A sso c ia tio n . The Commissioner a d v ised  a g a in s t
t h i s  b u t th e  P o l i t i c a l  D epartm ent o v e rru le d  him , fo r  i t  was im pressed
by th e  aims o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  com m ittee o f  th e  new o r g a n is a t io n .
They say th a t  th e  Anjuman p roposes to  ta k e  a c t io n  to  see 
th a t  s u i t a b le  Muhammadan c a n d id a te s  a re  nom inated fo r  
e l e c t i o n  to  a l l  p u b lic  b o d ies  f o r  w hich th e y  a re  e l i g i b l e  
and to  p rev en t th e  lo s s  o f s e a ts  to  Muhammadans by 
r i v a l r i e s  w ith in  t h e i r  own community. They a lso  p ropose  
to  o rg a n is e  f o r  th e  nex t L e g i s la t iv e  C ouncil e l e c t i o n  
so th a t  Muhammadan c a n d id a te s  may n o t be tem pted  to  
seek  th e  su p p o rt o f th e  Swaraj P a r ty .  They say  th a t  
th e  n o n -re c o g n itio n  o f th e  A s s o c ia tio n  by Government 
may lo s e  them some su p p o rt and ask  th a t  r e c o g n i t io n  may 
now be a llo w ed .^
1
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At th e  same tim e th e  Government was prom oting  r a iy a t  a s s o c ia t io n s
and p easan t c o -o p e ra t iv e  s o c i e t i e s ,  and encouraging- th e  M uslims to  
make common cause  w ith  o th e r  a g r i c u l tu r a l  com m unities. The c ry  was 
ta k e n  up in  th e  Muslim p re s s  and , as  th e  g e n e ra l e l e c t i o n  approached 
in  1926, i t  became a r e g u la r  item  i n  i t s  l i s t s  o f su g g e s tio n s  to  
c a n d id a te s .  ’Those who a re  ready  to  c o n te s t  f o r  th e  C ouncil s e a ts  
t h i s  y e a r  shou ld  b e s t i r  them selves to  p r o te c t  th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s  in  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s ’ , w rote  th e  D a in ik  Taraqqee o f  
18 August 1926. ’Tiae enormous sum o f  money th a t  th ey  spend f o r  e l e c t i o n  
shou ld  be employed to  o rg a n ise  th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s  and found co­
o p e ra t iv e  b a n k s ’ . That th e  ad v ice  d id  n o t go unheeded was shown by 
th e  a p p reh e n siv e  comments in  th e  b h a d ra lo k  p a p e rs . The B a r is a l  H i ta i s h i  
o f  14 J u ly  1926 w ro te :
From th e  speeches d e l iv e re d  i n  th e  v a r io u s  mass m eetings h e ld  
a t  d i f f e r e n t  p la c e s  e i th e r  j o i n t l y  by th e  Muhammadans 
and th e  Namasudras o r by th e  Muhammadans a lo n e , i t  i s  
ap p are n t th a t  th e  Namasudras and th e  Muhammadans a re  u n i t in g  
a g a in s t  th e  upper c la s s e s .  ve sho u ld  be c a r e fu l  o f  th e  
Moslems whose m otive in  making- a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  low er 
c l a s s  H indus i s  to  opp ress th e  u p p er c l a s s  on th e  one 
hand and to  co n v ert th e  low er c l a s s  H indus in to  Muhammadanism 
on th e  o th e r .
The Government had one more job to  do. I t  had to  ex ten d  th e  
f r a n c h is e .  Even i f  th e  p e a sa n try  w ere o rg a n ise d  and p ro v id ed  w ith  
’l o y a l ’ l e a d e r s ,  i t s  s t r e n g th  would be  no a s s e t  to  th e  Government 
u n t i l  a la r g e  number o f i t s  members had th e  v o te .  The M ontagu-Chelm sford
1
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reform s had en franch ised  only the  w e ll- to -d o  c u l t iv a to r  in  r u r a l
Bengal and, b e s id e s , i t  had g iven  th e  urban e le c to r s  a w eightage o f 
1
f iv e  to  one. Lost of the  w itn esses  b e fo re  th e  Reforms Enquiry  
Committee of 1924 had in s is te d  th a t  t h i s  arrangem ent should  be main­
ta in e d  because of the  i l l i t e r a c y  of th e  r u r a l  m asses. In  1925 the  
Government of Bengal undertook an enquiry  in  an attem pt to  prove 
them wrong. The Chief S e c re ta ry , Leonard B ir le y ,  wrote on 27 May:
My own im pression  i s  th a t  in  Bengal too much i s  made of 
t h i s  theo ry  of i l l i t e r a c y  . . . .  I t  i s  th e  fa sh io n  to  decry  
th e  e le c to ra te  as ig n o ran t and i l l i t e r a t e  and some of the  
w itn e sse s  who gave evidence b e fo re  th e  Committee even 
wanted to  reduce th e  numbers o f th e  e le c to r a te .  I t  i s  in  
th a  in te r e s t s ,  of .the«, iddd le*c lass  to  d e p re c ia te  th e  
q u a li ty  o f the  e le c to ra te  and r e s t r i c t  th e  f ra n c h is e  to  
t h e i r  c la s s .  I t  i s  in  the i n t e r e s t s  of the  c u l t iv a t in g  
c la s s  th a t  the Bengal e le c to r a te  should  not be sadd led  
w ith  a r e p u ta t io n  fo r  i l l i t e r a c y ,  which i t  p o ss ib ly  does 
not deserve .
I t  i s  c le a r ly  in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f (1) democracy and o f 
(2 ) the  e s tab lish m en t o f a system of p a rty  Government th a t  
th e  c u l t iv a t in g  c la s se s  should have as much re p re s e n ta t io n  
as t h e i r  co n d itio n s  deserve .
Rahim f u l ly  agreed:
I  would even go fu r th e r  th an  C hief S e c re ta ry . Even i f  
th e re  i s  a g re a t deal o f i l l i t e r a c y  among the  c u l t iv a t in g  
c la s s e s  they  should have th e  vo te  in  Bengal and we should 
not countenance the  a ttem pt of any members of the m iddle 
c la s s  (Bhadralogue) to  monopolise the  f ra n c h is e . O therw ise 
we should have to  face  even a g re a te r  p o l i t i c a l  d i s a s te r  
in  the  fu tu r e .^
1
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The Divisional officers were instructed to report on the percentage 
of literate voters in sample electorates throughout rural Bengal. The 
figures were ready early in 1926 and they were a severe disappointment 
to the Government. In the Muslim constituencies 62 per cent of voters 
were illiterate and in the Hindu constituencies 47 per cent. Birley's
only consolation was that these figures could he used in support of
1the Government's campaign for extended primary education.
And they shall reap the whirlwind
Writing to the Secretary of State, Lord Olivier, in 1924> Reading
lamented the enmity existing between Hindus and Muslims. 'It is a
menace to the peace of the country. Some, doubtless, think that this
is to our advantage, but, if so, they fail to realize how grave the
position might become if the feeling between the two communities
continues to grow more antagonistic and fails to be alleviated by some 
2compromise'. Every action of the Government of Bengal from 1924 to 
1926 was aimed at preventing1 such a compromise. Rahim, a communalist 
to the finger-tips, was the helmsman and he was aided and abetted 
by the British officials. It was a short-sighted and irresponsible 
policy which led Bengal to disaster in 1926•
Rahim's term on the Executive Council expired late in 1925 and 
he was then free to play out his chosen role on a wider stage. His
GB, Appointment, 6R-450-25) of 1925? A92— 116, Mar 1926.
Reading1, vol. II, p. 306.
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first act was one of outright provocation to the Hindus. Speaking 
in December as president of the All-India Muslim League session at 
Aligarh, the spiritual home of resurgent Indian Islam, he told his 
community that the time had come for an organised fight for Muslim 
rights. The political existence of the community was endangered by- 
Hindu ambitions, he said, and the Muslims must resist their achieve­
ment with every weapon available. The Hindus were a menace to the 
British and Muslims alike. If the British would willingly concede 
the Muslims’ just demands, they would have the Muslim community as their 
ally in the coming battle.
2This raised a storm in the Hindu press throughout India but for 
Bengal it was just a beginning. Rahim entered the Legislative Council 
at a by-election in January 1926 and took the lead of a Muslim group. 
Apart from the Swaraj party, which had retained a few of its Muslim 
members, there were now no inter-communal parties remaining in the 
Council. To encourage the trend, Abdul Gafur, a former Swarajist, 
moved a resolution when the Counsil resumed in mid-February for the 
amendment of the Bengal Electoral Rules to provide for the representation 
of communities in proportion to their population. This displeased the 
Europeans and Anglo-Indians, whose representation in the Council was
_
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a lread y  f a r  g re a te r  than  t h e i r  p o p u la tio n  e n title m e n t. To save the  
s i tu a t io n ,  Rahim suggested an amendment to  th e  re s o lu t io n  by the  
a d d itio n  of the  words: ’w ith  ju s t  and proper re p re s e n ta t io n  o f 
m in o r it ie s  and commercial i n t e r e s t s ’ . The S w a ra jis ts  o b jec ted  to  the  
adm ission o f th e  amendment and, when th e  P re s id e n t o v e r-ru led  them,
Sen Gupta le d  them out of th e  Chamber. The amended re s o lu t io n  was 
c a r r ie d  w ithou t a d iv is io n  and an o th er n a i l  was d riv en  in to  th e  c o f f in  
o f communal am ity.^
Rahim 's main work la y  o u ts id e  the  l e g i s l a tu r e .  His aim was to  
p lay  on th e  ex isting- s ta t e  o f communal te n s io n  so as to  persuade the  
Bengal Muslims to  o rgan ise  an e x c lu s iv e ly  communal party  under h is  
le a d e rs h ip  to  co n te s t the  e le c t io n s  a t  th e  end o f th e  y e a r . He had 
taken  over a C a lcu tta  newspaper, the  H anafi, and i t  b roadcast h is  
message:
Like the  p re sen t Council th e  next Council a lso  w ill  tram ple 
on the  r e l ig io u s  and communal r ig h t s  o f the  Musalmans i f  
s e l f i s h  and weak-minded members be e le c te d  from th e  Moslem 
c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  through th e  in flu en c e  of the  Congress, s o le ly  
dominated by th e  Hindus. I t  i s ,  th e re fo re ,  incumbent on 
the  Moslem community to  e x e r t them selves beforehand and, 
independent of the  Congress, to  persuade every Moslem con­
s ti tu e n c y  to  e le c t  persons who have th e  i n te r e s t  o f the  
community forem ost in  t h e i r  m in d s .2
Rahim was a s s is te d  in  h is  ta s k  by th e  f i e r c e ly  communal tone which
c h a ra c te r is e d  a l l  w ritin g  in  th e  Muslim p re ss  a t th e  t im e .“" In  March
1
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th e re  were a ls o  r e p o r ts  t h a t  a g e n ts  p ro v o c a te u rs  were a c t iv e  in  th e  
p ro v in ce  t r y in g  to  foment s t r i f e  betw een Hindus and M uslim s. T h e ir  
ta s k  was a l l  too  easy  fo r  th e  le a d e r s  o f n e i th e r  community were con­
ce rn ed  to  r e s t r a i n  them , and th e  Government, busy w ith  a rrangem en ts  
f o r  th e  annual move to  th e  h i l l s ,  f a i l e d  to  heed th e  s ig n s  o f  im pending 
d i s a s t e r .
On 2 A p ril the  Arya Samaj h e ld  i t s  annual p ro c e s s io n  in  N orth  
C a lc u t ta ,  w ith  p o lic e  p e rm issio n  and accom panied by th e  u su a l p o lic e  
e s c o r t .  Led by a band, th e  p ro c e s s io n  wound i t s  way two m ile s  from 
C o rn w allis  S t r e e t  to  H a rriso n  Hoad. I t  reach ed  Dinu M iah 's  mosque 
a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  Azan, th e  c a l l  to  p ra y e r ,  p re p a ra to ry  to  th e  fo u r  
o ’ c lo c k  p u b lic  w orsh ip . A Muslim ra n  ou t o f th e  mosque and c a l l e d  
f o r  th e  m usic to  be s to p p ed . The In s p e c to r  o f  P o lic e  accom panying th e  
p ro c e s s io n  in s t r u c te d  th e  Hindus to  do a s  th ey  were asked and a l l  
s to p p ed  p la y in g  ex cep t f o r  one drummer who k ep t o b s t in a te ly  b e a t in g  
h i s  drum. The Muslims in  th e  mosque grew angry  and began p e l t in g  th e  
p ro c e s s io n  w ith  d e b r is .  There was g r e a t  n o ise  and c o n fu s io n . The 
crowd s tr u g g l in g  in  H a rriso n  Road was q u ic k ly  jo in e d  by men o f  b o th  
com m unities c a r ry in g  l a t h i s  and o th e r  weapons. The r i o t  sp re a d  l i k e  
w i ld f i r e  th ro u g h  th e  neighbourhood and a number o f  tem p les  and mosques 
were d e s e c r a t e d .“
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T his was th e  s t a r t  o f  a f o r tn ig h t  o f  f i e r c e  and b loody communal 
f ig h t in g  th ro u g h o u t C a lc u t ta ,  in  which more th a n  50 p eop le  were k i l l e d  
and 700 in ju r e d .  Shops were lo o te d  and b u r n t ,  and te m p le s , mosques 
and gurdw aras were ra z e d . The p o lic e  cou ld  no t cope w ith  r i o t i n g  on 
t h i s  s c a le  and tro o p s  u s in g  au to m atic  weapons and arm oured c a r s  were 
re q u ire d  to  r e s to r e  a sem blance o f  o rd e r .
The most s i n i s t e r  f e a tu r e  of th e  o u tb re a k  was th e  ev idence  which 
appeared  o f p re m e d ita tio n  and o rg a n is a t io n  on b o th  s id e s .  T here were 
Muslim and Hindu le a d e r s  who though t th a t  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  cause  cou ld  
be advanced by a communal c la s h  i n  C a lc u tta  and th e y  had done t h e i r  
u tm ost to  provoke v io le n c e . Once th e  f ig h tin g -  had begun, th e  news­
p ap e rs  were used  to  fa n  th e  b la z e  and in flam m ato ry  l e a f l e t s  w ere 
c i r c u la t e d .
'M oslems, Beware.' ^
O therw ise th e  Hindus w il l  e a t  you u p 1.
'R is e  u p , 0 Hindus! g i rd in g  up y ou r lo in s  and s tan d  up 
s te a d f a s t  on th e  a ren a  o f th e  f i g h t ;
On t h i s  h o ly  p la in  o f  K u ru k sh e tra  e i t h e r  g e t k i l l e d  o r  
g a in  v ic to r y .
Having g iv e n  up t r u s t  in  t h i s  or th a t ;  
te a c h  S h iv a 's  te a c h in g .
L et a l l  th e  h ig h e r  and low er c a s te s  u n i t e  and e x h ib i t  
th e  g lo ry  of th e  H i n d u s ' . ^
L ife  i n  th e  c i t y  was a p p a re n tly  back  to  normal by 15 A p ril b u t 
th e  le a d e r s  on b o th  s id e s  reg a rd ed  t h i s  m erely  a s  a b re a th in g  space
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and a chance f o r  r e o rg a n is a t io n .  On th e  24th  a drunken “braw l in
C otton  S t r e e t  in  C en tra l C a lc u tta  sp ark ed  o f f  a n o th e r  f o r t n i g h t ’ s
b i t t e r  c i v i l  war. A method o f k i l l in g -  fav o u red  in  th e  f i r s t  round -
th e  im prisonm ent o f v ic tim s  in  b u i ld in g s  w hich were th e n  f i r e d  -  gave
way to  th e  s ta b b in g  o f in d iv id u a ls  i n  back  a l l e y s  by ro v in g  bands o f
th e  o p p o s ite  community. F irearm s made t h e i r  appearance  f o r  th e  f i r s t
tim e in  In d ia n  communal a f f r a y s  and th e  r io to u s  mobs were sw o llen  by
u p -c o u n try  goondas im ported  by businessm en  to  p r o te c t  t h e i r  p ro p e r ty .
T h is  tim e lo o t in g  was more w idespread  and th e r e  were more d e a th s .
Seven ty  k i l l e d ,  fo u r  hundred in ju r e d .
A lthough o rd e r  was r e s to r e d  i n  th e  c i t y  by 9 May, th e r e  w ere
numerous c la s h e s  in  o th e r  a re a s  o f th e  p ro v in ce  and in  B ih a r th ro u g h o u t
th e  fo llo w in g  two m onths, and i n  th e  m idd le o f J u ly  a d is p u te  o v e r
th e  p la y in g  o f music b e fo re  a mosque a g a in  le d  to  te n  days o f  b loodshed
in  C a lc u tta .  Andrews w rote to  R ab in d ran a th  Tagore on 17 A ugust:
. . .  fo r  th e  l a s t  th re e  o r  fo u r  months th e  In d ia n  p re s s  has 
no t been  in t e r e s te d  in  anything- a t  a l l  o u ts id e  In d ia .  I t  
has been  too  d e s p e ra te ly  engaged w ith  th e s e  t e r r i b l e  r i o t s  
and communal q u e s tio n s .  C a lc u tta  h as  been  l i k e  an armed 
g a r r is o n  c i t y  . . . .  Every day came f r e s h  news o f  o u tra g e s ,  
m u rders , r i o t s ,  and th e  f lo o d  o f  h a t re d  ev e r m ounting 
h ig h e r .  C h itp u r Road j u s t  by D w arkanath Tagore house has 
been  g a r r is o n e d  n ig h t and day w ith  s o ld ie r s  w ith  r i f l e s  and 
b ay o n e ts  in  charge o f  a European f o r  over th r e e  m onths, 
llo o n e ’ s l i f e  has been s a fe .  ^
1
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LI  .
R ahim 's S uccess
'The venom o f th e  u n reaso n ab le  demands o f  Rahim has sp read  th ro u g h
th e  whole s o c ia l  b o d y ', w ro te  th e  bandhya o f 5 A p ril 1926. How lo n g
must th e  r io tin g -  go on to  se rv e  i t s  p u rp o se , demanded Forward a t  th e
end o f  th e  month. 'How lo n g , th e  p u b lic  a s k , w i l l  i t  ta k e  to  en su re
th e  s a fe  r e tu r n  o f  S i r  A bd-ur-Rahim *s t h i r t y  fo llo w e rs  a t  th e  nex t
e le c t io n s ?  I s  n o t th e  subm erging o f  n a t io n a lis m  by communalism y e t
co m p le te ? ' Among th e  b h ad ra lo k  i t  was g e n e r a l ly  b e l ie v e d  a t  t h i s
tim e th a t  th e  r i o t s  had been o rg a n ise d  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  pu rp o ses  by Rahim
2
and h is  s o n - in - la w , H .S. Suhraw ardy, who was known to  have b u i l t  up
3
a fo llow ing- among th e  lo w e r -c la s s e s  in  C a lc u t ta .  The Hindu p re s s  
saw th e  d an g er o f  a s o l id  Muslim communal b lo c  c o n tro llin g -  th e  n ex t 
C ouncil th ro u g h  an a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  E u ropeans, and i t  u rged  i t s  own 
p o l i t i c i a n s  to  ta k e  a l e a f  ou t o f  th e  M uslim s' book and o rg a n is e  th e  
Hindu com m unity.^
No su g g e s tio n  o f compromise would be to l e r a t e d .  Sen Gupta as 
Mayor of C a lc u tta  was b i t t e r l y  a t ta c k e d  f o r  a p p o in tin g  Muslim o f f i c e ­
b e a re r s  in  th e  C o rp o ra tio n  and e s p e c ia l ly  f o r  a llo w in g  Suhraw ardy to
5
rem ain  as  D eputy-M ayor. At th e  P ro v in c ia l  C onference a t  K rish n a g a r
1
4
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l a t e  in  May th e re  was an uproar when Sasm al, as p re s id e n t ,  c r i t i c i s e d
th e  t e r r o r i s t s .  He was hounded out of th e  panflal and in  h is  absence
th e  Hindu-Muslim pact was resc in d ed . The o ld  S w a ra jis t le a d e rsh ip
was obviously  in  danger from th e  e x tre m is ts , and Sen Gupta decided
th a t  he must take a stand  on th e  p a c t. At a m eeting of th e  B .P.C .C .
in  June he managed to  have the  C onference 's  d e c is io n  rev e rsed  but
th i s  brought upon him the  wrath of th e  Hindu p re s s ,  which accused
2him of s e l l in g  out Hindu in te r e s t s  to  th e  Muslim communali s t s .
Congress u n ity  in  Bengal ”?as s h a tte re d  and th e  Hindu p o l i t i c ia n s  wasted 
the  rem ainder of the y ear in  a f u t i l e  f a c t io n  f i g h t .^
Everything' was working in  Rahim's favour. The Congress was too 
invo lved  w ith  i t s  in te rn a l  d isp u te s  to  be ab le  to  devote any tim e to  
the  Muslims, and, b e s id e s , by a llow ing  th e  Hindu e x tre m is ts  to  g a in  
th e  upper hand in  i t s  a f f a i r s  i t  had s tren g th en ed  h is  case fo r  Muslim 
u n ity . The r i o t s  had l e f t  a legacy o f b i t te r n e s s  in  Muslim h e a r ts  
and Rahim had only to  remind h is  c o - r e l ig io n is t s  o f the ro le  played in  
th e  d is tu rb a n ce s  by o rg a n isa tio n s  such as the  Arya Sarnaj and the  
Hindu Mahasabha to persuade them to  eschew a l l  co n tac t w ith  th e  Congress.
1
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His positive advantages were the possession of a programme -
the domination of the Council by a Muslim party with the purpose of
enacting legislation to improve the economic and social condition of
the Muslim community - and the existence of pro-Government and anti-
Hindu communal organisations throughout the mofussil. The Government
had done its work well and the consolidated District associations gave
Rahim a firm foundation on which to build his election platform.
He had still to contend with the factional rivalries among the
Bengali Muslim leadership, but for the time being at least the bitter
experience of the Calcutta riots had eradicated one old vices the alliance
of factions with Hindu parties in order to gain a temporary advantage.
Rahim knew the value of organisation and well before the elections
he had formed a Council party with a salaried organiser: Abul Kasem,
a former Congress worker who had long experience in political journalism
2and on representative bodies. Rahim also knew the value of communalism. 
He went to the electors with a simple religious appeals ’Musalmansi who 
are you going to vote for? For the servants of Rahim (Worshippers of 
God) or for the slaves of Rama (Hindus)’.'" The voters gave a clear 
answer. Of the 39 Muslim representatives returned to the new Council,
1
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on ly  one was a S w a ra j is t .  The o th e r  3 p ledged  them se lv es  to  work th e
1
c o n s t i t u t i o n  in  t h e i r  com m unity 's i n t e r e s t s .  T h e ir  r e s o lv e  was ap­
p lauded  by th e  Government and by th e  European n o n - o f f i c i a l s ,  who a ssu re d
2them o f t h e i r  su p p o rt.
?he 2nd o f an E ra
The s ta g e  was s e t  f o r  a new a c t  in  th e  drama o f Bengal p o l i t i c s .
Up u n t i l  t h i s  tim e th e  b h a d ra lo k  had p lay ed  th e  leading- r o l e \ now i t  
was ta k e n  by th e  M uslim s. At f i r s t  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  see  what was 
happen ing  f o r  th e  a c t io n  was co n fused . Rahim was ap p o in ted  as  a 
M in is te r  in  Jan u ary  192'7 b u t had to  r e s ig n  b ecau se  no Hindu would se rv e  
w ith  h im .J H is s u c c e s s o rs ,  A.K. Ghuznavi and Byomkes C h a d ra v a r ti ,  
su rv iv e d  f o r  on ly  seven  m onths, and t h e i r  s u c c e s s o r s ,  M usharruf H usain  
and P.C . M itr a ,  f o r  n in e  m onths.^  S u p e r f i c i a l l y  th e re  seemed n o th in g  
novel in  t h i s  and c e r t a in l y  th e  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f th e  m i n i s t r i e s  was th e  
r e s u l t  o f th e s e  communal d iv is io n s  i n  th e  C ouncil which had been a 
so u rce  o f  t r o u b le  e v e r  s in c e  1921. There were new e le m e n ts , how ever, 
w hich were to  be o f fundam ental im portance in  p ro v in c ia l  p o l i t i c s  
th ro u g h o u t th e  fo llo w in g  20 y e a r s .  Because o f  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f 
th e  Muslims to  s ta n d  a p a r t  from n a t i o n a l i s t  p o l i t i c s ,  th e r e  had been
1
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a decisive shift in power in the Council away from the bhadralok,
The ministries were now led by Muslim politicians and supported in 
the Council by Muslims, low-caste Hindus, Europeans, Anglo-Indians 
and a handful of MresponsivistM bhadralok members. Moreover, despite 
their instability these ministries pursued a common aim: the enactment 
of legislation to benefit the Muslim masses. Agrarian reform and the 
extension of elementary education became the main planks in the 
platform on which all ministries were formed in Bengal up to 1947»
The Muslim politicians had made a discovery of profound significance: 
they had no need to serve two masters. If they dispensed with national­
ism, they could also dispense with the bhadralok, for Muslim communal 
representation gave them an assured base from which to operate in 
the Council and Muslim numerical superiority gave them power in the 
community at large. Any extension of the electorate and any develop­
ment of general political awareness, worked in their favour.
A solution had been found to the main problem involved in working 
the reformed institutions in Bengal but for the bhadralok it was a 
disastrous solution. They had lost the initiative in politics and 
until the province was partitioned 20 years later they were condemned 
to a course of frustrating opposition. The legislature was being' used 
against them by the Muslims and the British, and their only recourse 
was to communalism and terrorism. It was the end of an era.
CHAPTER IX
THE FRUSTRATION OF THE BHADRALOK
In conclusion let us focus our attention upon the central problem 
of this thesis: why did the bhadralok fail in their search for a 
satisfying means of political self-expression? 'iThy was the theme of 
these years, 1912 to 1926, one of hope frustrated?
Our point of departure is the nature of the bhadralok in the 
second half of the nineteenth century: a high-caste, westernised elite, 
which had gained its ascendancy through the opportunities for education 
and professional employment which had been provided by the establishment 
of British trade and British rule. As western education was extended 
more widely, and as other sections of society began to demand a share 
in professional employment, the 'elite would be forced to consider its 
relationship with these aspiring groups. It would have to choose 
between alternative courses of action: between an attempt to maintain 
its monopoly of western education and the professions, and to keep its 
culture as an exclusive possession; or an attempt to accommodate other 
sections of society to its culture by opening wide the doors of schools, 
universities and offices.
This choice between exclusion and accommodation is one with which 
every westernised colonial elite is faced at some stage, and it has
only a limited time in which to make its decision. If it chooses to 
remain exclusive, or if it attempts to avoid a decision, which amounts 
to the same thing', it will never again have an opportunity to change 
its mind, for the ambitious lower classes on which it has slammed the 
door, will, in their anger, identify it with the western imperial 
rulers, and reject its culture as alien.
The bhadralok elite was faced with the need for a decision on this 
issue by the beginning of the twentieth century, and it had to be a 
quick decision, for the sphere of bhadralok opportunity, which previously 
had extended over the whole of northern India, was contracting rapidly 
with the growth of educated groups in other provinces. Exercising 
hindsight we can see that the main factor working in favour of the 
bhadralok’s choosing the course of accommodation was their political 
ambition. They talked of a liberal, secular nationalist movement 
embracing all communities and classes in India. To give substance to 
this vision, they might have been willing to come to terms with the 
lower classes, and admit them freely to the privileges and advantages 
of western education and professional opportunities. The bhadralok 
also talked of parliamentary self-government. Had they been given a 
parliament, based on a territorial franchise which initially they could 
control but which was to be extended progressively, they would have 
been forced to appeal to an ever widening section of society in order
to maintain their political power.
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Whether the elite would have chosen to accommodate the lower 
orders of Bengali society, either in respect of their power as electors 
or of their potential contribution to the nationalist movement, we 
shall never know, for it was given no chance to make a choice. At the 
moment of decision it was struck by the British a staggering blow - 
the partition of Bengal - which broke the even flow of its political 
and social development. The partition shook the bhadralok's faith in 
liberal, secular nationalism. It drove them in protest to extremes of 
racial and cultural violence. It forced the elite into premature 
contact with the lower orders at a time of crisis and disorder, and 
thereby destroyed its confidence in its ability to control any political 
order that was not limited to its own class. To protect its identity 
it turned in upon its privileges and its culture.
This introversion was encouraged by the form of the legislative 
institutions which the British established in 1909» These institutions 
were based on a narrow sectional and communal franchise, they had little 
power, and they were not intended to develop along parliamentary lines. 
They provided the bhadralok with no incentive to reach out to the 
lower classes or to abandon their extreme anti-Government agitation in 
favour of their old liberal, nationalism.
Why did the British act in this way? Because of their desire to 
preserve their romantic ideal of India: a static India; Fitzjames 
Stephen's 'frozen river'; the 'true India' of noble princes, honest 
peasants and loyal martial races. An India in which the I.C.S. would
a r*
still have its benevolent mission to perform and over which it could 
feel confident of maintaining control. The bhadralok and similar 
westernised elites offended this vision. They were too obviously part 
of a new India which the British did not wish to see, and they were 
promoting change. To prevent this - to restore stability - Curzon ran 
a new jjrovincial boundary through the bhadralok heartland, just as he 
preserved a provincial boundary between Nagpur and the Chitpavan 
Brahmans’ capital, Poona. For the same reason - to hold India steady - 
communal and sectional electorates were made the basis of the 1909 
legislative councils: ’to secure the representation of landed proprietors, 
and of those who have a stake in the country, and of communities'.
After the upheaval of the anti-partition agitation, the transfer 
of the Imperial capital to Delhi and the reunification of Bengal in 
1912 were two further attempts to restore stability. The bhadralok, 
however, misinterpreted them as signs of a new willingness on the part 
of the British to recognise and assist Indian mobility. The group's 
false hopes were encouraged by Carmichael, who saw that Bengal was 
moving and considered it sensible to assist it to move in the right 
direction. It was in this belief that he clashed head-on with Craddock, 
who was determined to maintain a steady India. If Bengal had got out 
of line with the other provinces, then (in his view) it had to be put 
back, even if this required the use of force.
Although Carmichael did not explicitly challenge the idea of a 
static India, Lyon did. Face reality, he said to the Government of India
in September 1916. We are already being dragged along behind a 
rapidly accelerating nation and unless we take our proper place in the 
driver’s seat India may run to disaster. It was the reluctance of 
the Government of India to acknowledge that people like Carmichael and 
Lyon were right, which delayed for so long- the redefinition of Imperial 
policy, thereby intensifying the bhadralok’s distrust of the British.
Montagu’s declaration of August 1917 horrified the I.C.S., for it 
destroyed once and for all their romantic ideal of the unchanging India - 
’the Indian civil servants were very sorry that their day was done’.**
With their basic assumption shattered, they cast desperately around 
for a new principle from which they could draw confidence for their 
frightening task of controlling a changing India. Lying ready to hand 
was the doctrinaire Whig view of parliamentary representation as a 
social stabiliser. The stability of English society had been preserved, 
so the Whigs asserted, by the involvement of the lower classes in 
parliamentary politics through a progressive extension of the franchise. 
Applying this principle indiscriminately to Bengal, the British 
officials increased the electorate a hundredfold at one stroke. The 
effect was revolutionary. The old political class had neither the 
confidence nor the technique to meet such a demand, and for nearly 
a decade there was no one who could control the new mass electorate.
1
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At th e  same tim e as th e  b h ad ra lo k  e l i t e  was co n fro n te d  w ith  t h i s
a la rm in g  p ro sp e c t o f  a h o p e le s s ly  unm anageable e l e c t o r a t e ,  i t  was fa c e d  
w ith  two stro n g ' c h a lle n g e s  from below . The f i r s t  was from th e  M uslim s. 
T h is community, s e p a ra te  in  r e l i g i o n  and s u p e r io r  in  num bers, had 
alw ays been  th e  main s tu m b lin g -b lo c k  in  th e  way o f a b h a d ra lo k  a tte m p t 
a t  a s s im i la t io n .  I t s  Is la m ic  c u l tu r e ,  and i t s  proud memories o f  i t s  
fo rm er p o l i t i c a l  dom inion, gave i t  an  a s su re d  i d e n t i t y  which th e  
b h a d ra lo k  la c k e d . With i t s  s u p e r io r  co h es io n  and a r t i c u l a t i o n ,  i t  was 
b e t t e r  p la ced  th a n  were th e  b h a d ra lo k  to  secu re  i t s  demands i n  th e  
scram ble f o r  c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  p r iv i le g e s  from 1917 to  1920. M oreover, 
th e  grow ing a s s e r t iv e n e s s  o f i t s  low er s t r a t a  was a so u rce  o f  s t r e n g th  
f o r  i t s  le a d e r s h ip ,  f o r  th e re  was n o t th e  c u l tu r a l  d is ju n c tu r e  betw een 
th e  upper and low er o rd e rs  o f Muslim s o c ie ty  a s  th e re  was betw een th o se  
o f Hindu s o c ie ty  in  B engal.
The o th e r  t h r e a t  to  th e  b h a d ra lo k  e l i t e  came from th e  f r u s t r a t e d  
sm all b h a d ra lo k , whose p o l i t i c a l  en th u siasm  o u tra n  th a t  o f  th e  e l i t e  
l e a d e r s  i n  th e  tu rb u le n t  y e a rs  o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e c o n s tr u c t io n .  The 
e l i t e  m ight have h e ld  i t s  own, had i t  n o t been  f o r  th e  i n t r u s i o n  upon 
B engal p o l i t i c s  o f  G andhi, w ith  h is  p ro fo u n d ly  d is tu r b in g  id e a s  o f  
mass a g i t a t i o n .  These appea led  g r e a t ly  to  th e  sm all b h a d ra lo k , who 
im p a tie n t ly  d ism issed  th e  c a u tio n s  o f  th e  e l i t e  le a d e r s h ip  as p ro o f 
o f  i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w ith  th e  B r i t i s h .  To sav e  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n ,  
th e  e l i t e  had to  swim w ith  th e  c u r r e n t ,  w hich sw ept i t  i n  1921 in to  
th e  v o r te x  o f mass p o l i t i c s .  I t  was w h irle d  around f a s t e r  and f a s t e r ,
scarcely able to keep its head above water, until in 1922 it found an 
opportunity to clamber back to safety. It survived the ordeal, but only 
at the expense of further alienating the lower classes, who felt they 
had been deserted.
The elite leaders returned to their old stamping' ground, the 
Legislative Council, in 1924 hut only to find that they were faced with 
an extraordinarily difficult problem of control in an institution which 
was divided into groups responsible to separate communal and sectional 
electorates, and in which the Muslims and Europeans between them occupied 
nearly half the seats. The bhadralok leaders tried to bridge the gap 
which separated them from the Muslims but the Government of Bengal 
sabotaged their attempt. The British officials were determined to 
prevent the bhadralok from gaining power in the new institutions, for 
they regarded such an outcome as the main threat to the realisation of 
the vision of a ’truly democratic’ India, which they now cherished in 
place of the old vision of a static India. Their aversion to the 
bhadralok politicians was reinforced by the latter’s continual extreme 
attacks on the Government and its policies.
With the same purpose of blocking the bhadralok’s access to power, 
the officials assisted the Muslims to organise the peasantry, and, on 
this base of mass support, to form a communal bloc to command the 
Legislative Council. By 1927 the bhadralok had lost their hold on 
political life in Bengal and were dispossessed of the institution to 
which they had looked for a satisfying means of political self-expression.
In their frustration they turned away from liberal secular nationalism 
to new forms of political and communal extremism.
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I. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS
These interviews were conducted in India in the period November 
1960 to March 1962. A note has been appended to each name to indicate 
the nature of the contribution.
CALCUTTA
Ayyub, Abu Sayeed
Muslim intellectual 
Bose, Professor Nirmal Kumar 
Congress worker from 1921 
Bryden, W.D.
Secretary, Bengal Chamber of Commerce 
Burdwan, Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of
Uday Chand Mahtab son of Bijay Chand Mahtab, Bengal M.L.C. from 1907 
Ghose, Hemendra Prasad
Calcutta newspaper editor from 1908 
Griffiths, Sir Percival Joseph
Bengal I.C.S. officer from 1922 
Husain, Nawab Khan Bahadur Musharruf 
Bengal M.L.C. from 1913 
Llewellyn, J.L.
Bengal I.C.S. officer from 1929 
Maher, R.J.N.
Anglo-Indian sub-editor of the Statesman 
Mozumder, Harendrenath
Honorary Secretary, Indian Association 
Mukherjea, Ajita Ranjan
Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly 
Mookerjee, B.N.
Librarian, Indian Association 
Mukerji, Dhirendra Narayan 
Congress politician 
Pal, Jnananjan
Son of Bepin Chandra Pal 
Platel, R.E.
President, Anglo-Indian Association, Calcutta 
Ray, Dr Bidhan Chandra
Bengal M.L.C. from 1924 
Ray, Biren
Nephew of Surendranath Ray, Bengal M.L.C. from 1913 
Ray, Siddharta Shankar
Grandson of C.R. Das 
Sanyal, Dr Nalinaksha
Vice-President, Indian Association 
Singh Ray, Sir Bijoy Prosad 
Bengal M.L.C. from 1921
DACCA
Hashim, Abul
Son of Abul Kasem, Bengal M.L.C. from 1913 
Huq, Fazlul
Bengal M.L.C. from 1913 
Huq, Saiyid Azizul
Nephew of Fazlul Huq 
Khan, Akram
Politician and newspaper editor 
Nazimuddin, Sir Khwawja
Bengal M.L.C. from 1924 
Sarkar, Abu Hossain
Terrorist during anti-partition agitation 
Shamsuddin, Abul Kalam
Dacca newspaper editor
DELHI
Anthony, Frank
President, All-India Anglo-Indian Association 
Chaudhuri, Nirad C.
Bengali author
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II. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES 
PRIMARY
A. Government Records 
i. Bengal
The following records of the Government of Bengal held in the West 
Bengal Record Office, Calcutta, and the East Pakistan Government 
Record Office, Dacca, for the period 1909-1930*
Report on Native Papers in Bengal
A weekly report on political comment in the vernacular and English- 
language press prepared for the Government by its Bengali translator. 
The most important single source.
Departmental proceedings - Appointment
Commerce
Education
Finance
Jails
Judicial
Legislative
Local Self-Government
Municipal
Political
The relative importance of the proceedings of the various departments 
can be judged from the frequency of their citation in footnotes.
ii. India
The following records of the Government of India held in the National 
Archives of India, New Delhi, for the period 1892-1922;
Departmental proceedings - Education
Home Establishment 
Home Judicial 
Home Police 
Home Political 
Home Public 
Reforms Office
B. Institutional Records
i. British Indian Association, Calcutta
Proceedings of the Committee, 1904-1937» 
MS, seven folio volumes.
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Publications, 1905-1927»
Four bound volumes of all papers printed by the Association.
ii. Indian Association, Calcutta
Proceedings of general meetings, 1905-1927»
Proceedings of the Committee, 1912-1927
Both extremely valuable for the period up to 1921.
Manuscripts
A few papers including one important letter, A.C. Majumdar to 
P.N. Banerjea, 13 May 1913»
C. Private Papers
i. C.F. Andrews MSS, Rabindra-Sadana, Santiniketan 
Letters, 1912-1926.
Invaluable reflection of bhadralok sentiment.
ii. Hemendra Prasad Ghose papers, Calcutta
Books of newspaper clippings and comments, 1903-1930.
iii. Gokhale papers, Servants of India Society, Poona 
Letters to and from G.K. Gokhale, 1898-1912.
iv. Fazlul Hug papers, Dacca
Speeches, 1913-1943) collected by Azizul Huq.. Typescript, 466 pages.
v. Raoro.ji MSS, Bombay Presidency Association, Bombay 
Correspondence and papers of Dadabhai Naoroji, I89O-I9O6.
vi. Pearson MSS, Rabindra-Sadana» Santiniketan
Letters of W.W. Pearson, Rabindranath Tagore’s private secretary, 1915~ 
19 27*
vii. Sapru papers. National Library of India, Calcutta
Correspondence and papers of Tej Bahadur Sapru, 1920-1933»
Important.
457
viii. Tagore MSS, National Archives of India, New Delhi 
Correspondence and papers of Rabindranath Tagore. Microfilm.
ix. ffacha papers, Bombay Presidency Association, Bombay 
Letters from Dinashaw Wacha to Dadabhai Naoroji, 1890- 1907.
SECONDARY
A. Theses
Crane, R.I.: The Indian National Congress and the Indian Agrarian 
Problem, 1919—1939•» an Historical Analysis.
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1951» Microfilm. Valuable for 
comparisons with the United Provinces.
Drummond, J.G.s The Working of the Bengal Legislative Council under 
the Government of India Act, 1919.
Ph.D. thesis, Christ's College, Cambridge University, 1938-9» Microfilm. 
A narrative by a retired Bengal I.C.3. officer. Some shrewd 
observations.
Park, R.L.: The Rise of Militant Nationalism in Bengal: A Regional 
Study of Indian Nationalism.
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 195^» Microfilm.
Reeves, P.D.: Agrarian Legislation and Rural Society in Uttar Pradesh, 
India.
M.A. thesis, University of Tasmania, 1959» Useful comparative 
information on revenue administration.
B. Papers
Kumar, R.: "Peasant Indebtedness in India, 1879-1915» An Inquiry into 
its causes and effects on British policy".
Seminar paper, Australian National University, 1961. Typescript, 14 
pages.
Low, D.A.: "Colonial Authority".
Seminar paper, Australian National University, 1962. Typescript, 14 
pages.
Mukherjea, A.R.: "The Development of the office of Speaker in the 
Indian Legislatures".
Personal memorandum by Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly. 
Typescript, 33 pages.
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Mukherjea, A.R.: "History of the Legislative Development in India”.
Typescript, 46 pages.
Mukherjea, A.R.: ”Role of Political Parties in Opposition in a 
Parliamentary Democracy”.
Typescript, 24 pages.
Reeves, P.D.: "Landed Interests and the End of Empire: Landlords and 
politics in the United Provinces after 1921".
Typescript, 29 pages.
Reeves, P.D.: "Landlord Associations in U.P. and their role in Landlord 
Politics, 1920-1937”.
Seminar paper, Australian Rational University, 1961. Typescript, 27 
pages.
Reeves, P.D.: "Lionel Curtis: Dyarchy".
Seminar paper, Australian National University, 1960. Typescript, 15 
pages.
Rothermund, D.: "Reform and Repression, 1907-1910* An analysis of 
British-Indian policy".
Typescript, 8 pages.
459
I I I .  PUBLISHED SOURCES 
PRIMARY
A. Government Records 
i .  Bengal
The A d m in is tra tio n  o f Bengal under th e  E arl of Ronaldshay« 1917-1922« 
C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t ,  1922.
Bengal D is t r i c t  A d m in istra tion  Committee, 1913-1914» R ep o rt, C a lc u tta , 
Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t ,  1915*
V aluable fo r  i t s  d isc u ss io n  o f hhadra lok  economic d is c o n te n t.
Bengal L e g is la t iv e  Council Manual« 1916, C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t ,
3rd  c o n f id e n tia l  e d n ., 1916.
C a lcu tta  G a ze tte , C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t .
O f f ic ia l  n o t i f ic a t io n s  of Bengal Government, pub lished  weekly.
C onsulted fo r  period  1912-1920. V aluable b u t tim e-consum ing sou rce . 
Government G aze tte . E as te rn  Bengal & Assam, S h illo n g , E a s te rn  Bengal & 
Assam S e c r e ta r ia t .  Published  weekly, 1905-19”! 2.
Jac k , J .C .:  F in a l Report on the  Survey and S e ttlem en t O perations in  th e  
Bakargan.j D i s t r i c t ,  1900-190^« C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t ,  1915* 
Im portant fo r  comments on su b in feu d a tio n .
O’M alley , L .S .S .:  Bengal D is t r i c t  G a ze tee rs , C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c re ta r ia t
1906- 18.
38 volumes covering  West Bengal D i s t r i c t s  on ly .
P roceedings o f th e  Bengal L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, C a lc u tta , Bengal 
S e c r e ta r ia t .
C onsulted fo r  the p e riod  1905-1927» In  two s e r ie s :  1905-1920, 
v o ls . XXXVII-LII, and 1921-1927, v o ls . I-XXVII. A b a s ic  source. 
R eport on the  A dm in istra tion  o f B engal, C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t .  
Annual.
C onsulted fo r  period  1855-56 to  1926-27*
R eport of the  Land Revenue Commission, B engal, A lip o re , Bengal 
Government, 1940»
Floud Commission. U seful d is c u s s io n  o f th e  e f f e c ts  o f the 
Permanent S e ttlem en t.
Swan, J .A .L .: Report on th e  I n d u s t r ia l  Development o f B engal« C a lc u tta , 
Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t ,  1915»
R evealing in fo rm ation  on f a i l u r e  o f swadeshi in d u s t r ie s  in  
p a r t i t i o n  p eriod .
F.G. Wigley: The Bengal Code, C a lc u tta , Bengal S e c r e ta r ia t ,  4 th  ed n .,
1913-15.
Bengal Acts and Ordinances to  1914»
i i .  In d ia
A b strac t of th e  Proceedings of the  Council o f th e  Governor-General o f 
In d ia ,  assembled fo r  th e  purpose o f making Laws and R e g u la tio n s , 
C a lc u tta , Government of In d ia .
Consulted fo r  period  1902-1920.
Census o f In d ia , 1911* v a rio u s  p la c e s , Government of In d ia , 1913-14«
Census o f In d ia ,  1921, C a lc u tta , Government o f In d ia , 1923-24«
Census of In d ia , 1951< D elh i, Government o f In d ia , 1952-54«
D iso rd ers  Enquiry Committee, 1919-1920. R ep o rt, C a lc u tta , Government o f 
In d ia ,  1920.
Evidence taken  b e fo re  the  Reforms Committee (F ra n c h is e ) , C a lc u tta , 
Government o f In d ia , 1919«
Government o f I n d i a n  Despatch o f March 5 th , 1919» and connected papers. 
F i r s t  Despatch on In d ian  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Reform s, C a lc u tta , Government 
o f In d ia , 1919«
Im p eria l G azeteer o f I n d ia , London, O.U.P. fo r  S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  fo r  
In d ia ,  new e d n ., 1907-9«
In d ia n  I n d u s t r ia l  Commission, 1916-18, R ep o rt, C a lc u tta , Government of 
In d ia ,  191Ö.
Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924« R ep o rt, London, H.M .S.O., 1925«
R eports of the  F ranch ise  Committee and th e  Committee on D iv is io n  of 
F u n ctions; F ourth  Despatch on In d ian  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Reforms (D iv is io n  
of F u n c tio n s); Revised l i s t s  of a l l - I n d i a  P ro v in c ia l and T ran sfe rred  
S u b jec ts ; F i f th  Despatch on In d ian  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Reform s, C a lc u tta , 
Government o f In d ia , 1919«
Report on In d ian  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Reforms, C a lc u tta , Government o f In d ia ,
191Ö.
Montagu-Che1msford r e p o r t .  E s s e n tia l  so u rce .
R eports on th e  Working of the Reformed C o n s ti tu tio n , 1927, C a lc u tta , 
Government o f In d ia , 192Ö.
V aluable.
S e d itio n  Committee, 191b. R eport, C a lc u tta , Government o f In d ia , 1918« 
P r im a rily  concerned w ith  Bengal te r ro r ism .
i i i .  Great B r i t a i n
In d ia  O ffice  L i s t , London, H arrison  & Sons. Annual to  1947*
In d ia n  S ta tu to ry  Commission. Report /e tc .7 >  London, H.M .S.O., 1930« 
In v a lu a b le .
P a rliam en ta ry  D ebates.
P a rliam en ta ry  Papers.
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B. I n s t i tu t io n a l  Records
i .  A nglo-Indian  A sso c ia tio n , C a lcu tta  
Annual Report
Consulted fo r  period  1877-1910.
i i .  A nglo-Indian League of In d ia
A New C o n s ti tu tio n  fo r  In d ia . The Problem of the  E le c to r a te s , C a lc u tta , 
Nem an, 1919»
i i i .  Bengal N ational Chamber o f Commerce 
R eport, 1913-1915» C a lcu tta , 1916.
iv .  C en tral N ational Mahommedan A sso c ia tio n , C a lcu tta
O ctenn ia l Report fo r  1917-1924* C a lc u tta , 1925*
Extrem ely v a lu ab le .
v . In d ia n  A sso c ia tio n , C a lcu tta  
Annual R eport
Consulted fo r  period  1870-1935* Im portant sou rce.
v i .  In d ia n  Chamber o f Commerce, C a lcu tta  
Report o f th e  Committee fo r  1926, C alcu tta ,- 1927*
v i i .  In d ian  N ational Congress
Congress P r e s id e n t ia l  A ddresses, from th e  S i lv e r  to  the Golden J u b i le e , 
1911-1934» Madras, N atesan, 1934*
Report of th e  C iv il D isobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922, Madras, Tagore, 
1922.
In c lu d es  debate on council e n try .
Report of the  Commissioners appoin ted  by the Punjab Sub-committee of 
th e  In d ia n  N ational Congress, Lahore, K. Santanam, 1920.
Report of th e  Committee of Enquiry appoin ted  by th e  Bengal P ro v in c ia l 
Congress Committee to  enquire  in to  the  a lle g ed  p o lic e  oppressions 
a t  Char Manair in  F aridpur D is t r i c t  in  B engal, C a lc u tta , H.P. Mazurader,
1923.
R eport o f th e  S pec ial S ession  of th e  In d ian  N ational Congress he ld  a t 
Bombay on 29th, 30th, 31st August & 1st Septem ber, 1918» Bombay,
In d ia n  N ational Congress, 1918*
46;:;
v i i i .  Moderate P arty
R eport o f the  Proceedings of th e  A ll- In d ia  Conference of th e  
Moderate P a r ty »
F i r s t  s e s s io n , Bombay, 1918. Second s e s s io n , C a lc u tta , 1919-20»
ix . R atio n a l L ib e ra l League, C a lcu tta  
Annual R eport, 1918-1919» C a lc u tta , 1919»
x . R atio n al L ib e ra l F ed e ra tio n  of In d ia
R eport o f the  Proceedings of the  Third S essio n  of the R atio n a l L ib e ra l 
F e d e ra tio n  o f In d ia  held a t  Madras, 1920«
x i .  R o n -O ffic ia l Commission on th e  C a lcu tta  D is tu rb an ces , 191Ö
R ep o rt, C a lc u tta , Bengal P eo p les’ A sso c ia tio n  & Bangiya Jana Sabha, 1919» 
Im portan t.
C. new spapers. Bates in d ic a te  period  co n su lted .
B engalee , C a lcu tta  d a i ly .
1912- 1930
C a p i ta l , C a lcu tta  weekly .
1911-1922.
Commerce, C a lcu tta  weekly.
1910» 1913-1922.
Em press, C a lcu tta  b i-m onth ly .
1913- 1915»
Englishm an, C a lcu tta  d a i ly .
1913-1914. 1921-1923.
Fau.ji Akhbar, Simla weekly.
19 23-1928.
In d ia n  M essenger, C a lcu tta  weekly.
1912-1923.
In d ia n  World, C a lcu tta  weekly.
1912-1913.
Madras Times, Overland e d i t io n ,  Madras weekly.
1911-1912.
S ta tesm an , C a lcu tta  d a ily .
1911-1927.
Young I n d ia , Ahmedabad weekly.
1919_1922. 1924-1926. In  c o lle c te d  e d i t io n s ,  Madras, Ganesan,
1922 & 1926.
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D. P e r io d ic a ls
C a lc u tta  Review 
Contemporary Review 
Edinburgh Review 
F o r tn ig h tly  Review
Im p eria l and A s ia tic  Q u arte rly  Review
In d ia n  Annual R eg is te r
Kosmos
Men and 7/omen of In d ia  
Modern Review 
N ine teen th  Century
E. Newspaper and P e rio d ica l A r t ic le s
i .  Bengal
”A B achelor B u reau c ra t”: ”The T roubles o f S i r  A. B u reau c ra t” , C a lcu tta  
Review, 3rd s e r ie s ,  v o l. I I ,  1922, pp. 112-5«
S a t i r e  on a lleg ed  p a r t i a l i t y  of Government of Bengal fo r  U n iv e rs ity  
o f Dacca.
”Bengal Council and U n iv e rs ity  C o n stituency” , C a lcu tta  Review, 3rd 
s e r i e s ,  v o l. IX, Oct-Dec 1923» P« 529«
Bose, S: ’’P a r t i t io n  and A fte r” , In d ian  World, v o l. XV, Jan  1912, pp. 71-7«
’’The C a lcu tta  U n iv e rs ity  and the Bengal L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil” , C a lcu tta  
Review, 3rd s e r ie s ,  v o l. I ,  1921, pp. 177-90«
C h ak rav a rti, T . : ”P arliam en tary  P r iv i le g e  (Freedom from a r r e s t  and i t s  
a p p lic a t io n  to  the  L e g is la tu re s  o f I n d ia ) ” , C a lcu tta  Review, 3rd 
s e r i e s ,  v o l. XIV, Jan-Mar 1925, pp« 279-98.
C h a tte r j i ,  M.M.: ’’The R evolu tionary  S p i r i t  in  B engal” , C a lc u tta  Review,
3rd s e r i e s ,  v o l. XIV, Jan-Mar 1925» pp« 15-28.
Of l i t t l e  im portance.
”E duca tiona l B ifu rc a tio n  in  B engal” , Modern Review, v o l. XI, no. i i i ,
Mar 1912, pp. 323-42.
G anguli, S .C .: ’’The P a r t i t io n  o f B engal” , Modern Review, v o l. X, no. 5» 
Nov 1911, pp. 494-501.
I n te r e s t in g .
^/Ghose, H .P ./s  ’’R evolu tionary  C a lc u tta . A G reat C ity  as a P o l i t i c a l  
Weapon” , S ta tesm an , 29 Nov 1949«
Very s tim u la tin g .
Marshman, J .C .:  ”Bengal as i t  i s ” , C a lcu tta  Review, v o l. I l l ,  Jan -Jun  
1845» PP« 165-210.
’’The M o d ifica tio n  o f th e  P a r t i t i o n ” , Modern Review, v o l. XI, no. 1,
Jan  1912, pp. 111-18.
M ookherjee, S i r  Asutosh: "Democratic C ontrol o f U n iv e r s i t ie s ” , C a lcu tta  
Review, 3rd s e r ie s ,  v o l. X, Jan-Mar 1924* pp. 193-206.
Speech a t  Lucknow U n iv e rs ity , 8 Jan  1924*
"N.A.K. "Some P roposals of Reform” , C a lcu tta  Review, 3rd s e r i e s ,  
v o l. I ,  1921, pp. 124-28.
Comment on Bengal L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil’ s a t t i tu d e  to  th e  U n iv e rs ity  
o f C a lc u tta .
N orton, E . : "The A fflo recence of a P ee r" , Amrita Bazar P a t r ik a ,
21 Aug 1919.
An u n fr ie n d ly  comment on Lord S in h a’s e le v a tio n  to  th e  peerage. 
S t r e a t f e i l d ,  H .C.: "A Bengal C iv i l ia n ’s View of th e  In d ian  D ep o rta tio n s" , 
N ineteen th  C entury , v o l. LXVI, Ju l-B ec 19^9» PP* 18-28.
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i i .  In d ia
A rundel, A .T .: "D e c e n tra lis a tio n  of Government o f In d ia " , N ineteen th  
C entury , v o l. LXV, Jan -Jun  1909» PP* 810-25» & v o l. LXVI, Jul-B ec 
1909, pp. 143-57*
C ritiq u e  of D e c e n tra lis a tio n  Commission re p o r t  by s e n io r  I .C .S . 
o f f ic e r .
B arin g , E . : "Recent Events in  In d ia " , N ine teen th  C entury , v o l. XIV 
Jul-D ec 1883, pp. 569- 89.
V aluable comments on I l b e r t  B i l l  co n tro v ersy  and R ipon’s lo c a l -  
government reform s.
" B r i t ." :  "The Evacuation o f A sia" , C a lcu tta  Review, new s e r i e s ,  no. 290, 
Oct 1917, PP* 366-89.
Good r e f le c t io n  of C a lcu tta  European op in ion  of n a t io n a l i s t  
a s p i r a t io n s .
C o lv in , E .G .: "E ffec ts  of B r i t i s h  Rule in  In d ia " , N ineteen th  C entury , 
v o l. LXVI, Jul-D ec 1909, pp* 527-41*
C otton , H .E .A .: " P a r tie s  and P o lic ie s  in  In d ia " ,  Contemporary Review, 
v o l. CXIX, Feb 1921, pp. 170-76.
C o tton , H .E .A .: "The V icero y alty  o f Lord Chelm sford", Contemporary 
Review, v o l. CXIX, Jun 1921, pp. 764-70.
Cox, E .C .: "The E f fe c ts  o f B r i t i s h  Rule in  In d ia " ,  N ineteen th  C entury , 
v o l. LXVI, Jul-D ec 1909, pp. 542-48.
"C .S .R .": "Gandhi and Tagore", C a lcu tta  Review, 3rd s e r i e s ,  v o l. I ,
1921, pp. 14-29.
E l l i o t t ,  C .A .: VLord M orley’s In d ian  Reforms", N ineteen th  C entury , 
v o l. LXV, Jan -Jun  1909» PP* 177-90.
V aluable c r i t iq u e  by form er L ieu tenan t-G overnor of B engal.
F ra s e r ,  A .H .L .: "The P ress  Law in  In d ia " , N in e teen th  C entury , v o l. LXVII, 
Jan -Ju n  1910, pp. 227-37*
F u l le r ,  B .: "The Foundations of In d ian  L o y a lty " , N ineteen th  C entury , 
v o l. LXVI, Jul-D ec 1909, pp. 181-94.
Im portan t co n se rv a tiv e  comment on M orley-Minto reform s.
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P u l le r ,  B .: "The In d ian  R e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f L ib e ra l P o l i t i c i a n s ” , 
N ineteen th  C entury , v o l. LXVII, Jan -Jun  1910, pp. 1-13*
P u l le r ,  B .: "Quo Vadis? A P rospect in  In d ia n  P o l i t i c s ” , N ineteen th  
C entury , v o l. LXV, Jan-Jun  19^9> PP* 711-24*
G i lc h r i s t ,  R .N .: "Ind ian  N a tio n a l i ty ” , C a lcu tta  Review, new s e r i e s ,  
nos. 295- 9 f  Jan  1919-Ja n  1920.
F ive a r t i c l e s  d iscu ss in g  the  d iv is iv e  fa c to r s  in  In d ian  s o c ie ty .
H am ilton, S i r  D.M.: " In d ia : h e r p re se n t and h e r  f u tu r e ” , C a lcu tta  Review, 
new s e r i e s ,  no. 285, Ju l 1916, PP* 291-300*
"H otspur”: "Evolution of European P o l i t i c a l  A g ita tio n  in  In d ia ” ,
C a lcu tta  Review, v o l. CXXXIV, 1912, pp. 134-43*
Lang, E .E .: "The A ll- In d ia  Moslem League” , Contemporary Review, v o l. XCII, 
Jul-D ec 1907> PP* 344-52*
D e ta ils  of the  League’s fo u n d a tio n .
Massy, C .P .: "In d ia  R e v is ite d ” , N in e teen th  C entury , v o l. LXV, Jan -Jun  
1909, PP* 375-85*
M itra , S.M .: "Ind ian  Reforms: a Hindu View", N ineteen th  C entury , 
v o l. LXV, Jan -Jun  1909> PP* 170—76*
O liv ie r ,  Lord: "The In d ian  P o l i t i c a l  Atmosphere” , Contemporary Review, 
v o l. CXXXII, Jul-D ec 1927, PP* 159-67*
P ann ikkar, K.M.: "The Psychology o f th e  Hindu-Muslim R io ts ” ,
Cont emporary Review, v o l. CXXXI, no. 2, Feb 1927> PP* 230-36.
A very  i n t e l l i g e n t  a n a ly s is .
R itc h ie , G .: "C o n stitu tio n a l and A d m in is tra tiv e  Changes in  In d ia ” ,
Im peria l and A s ia tic  Q u arte rly  Review, 3rd s e r i e s ,  v o l. XXVIII,
Jul-Oct 1909> PP* 76- 89.
S eeso d ia , T .S .J . :  " Ind ia  and th e  B r i t i s h  P a r t i e s ” , Modern Review, 
v o l. XIV, no. 1, Ju l 1913, PP* 62- 64.
Sen, K .N ., Basu, P .K ., & Ghosh, H .C .: "Dyarchy: a study in  ’S p e c ific  
D ev o lu tio n ’ ", C a lcu tta  Review, 3rd s e r i e s ,  v o l. XI, Apr-Jun 1924?
pp. 364-75*
S harrock , J .A .:  "Some M isconceptions about th e  U nrest in  In d ia ” ,
N ine teen th  C entury , v o l. LXVI, Jul-D ec 1909> PP* 361-76.
"Signs o f th e  Times in  In d ia ” , Edinburgh Review, v o l. CCVI, no. 422,
Oct 1907> PP* 265--305.
S tephen, J . P . :  "Foundations of th e  Government o f In d ia ” , N ineteen th  
C entury , v o l. LXXX, Jul-D ec 1083, pp. 541-68.
E x c e lle n t sta tem en t of the  co n se rv a tiv e  v iew poin t.
"Sutor U l t r a ”: "Reform Scheme and Europeans. I s  th e re  any th ing  to  f e a r ? ” , 
C a lc u tta  Review, new s e r ie s ,  no. 294» Oct 1918, pp. 439-46.
His answer : no.
Wood, V5T.H. Arden: "The Report on In d ian  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Reforms” ,
C a lcu tta  Review, new s e r ie s ,  no. 294» Oct 1918» PP* 365-87»
A nglo-Ind ian  on th e  reform scheme.
F. L e t te r s  and Speeches
B an erjea , 3 .N .: The Trumpet Voice o f Ind ia«  The Speeches of Babu 
S urendranath  B anerjea , d e liv e re d  in  England, 1909, M adras, Ganesh, 
1910.
Bose, S .C .: The M ission of L i f e , C a lc u tta , Thacker & Spink , 1953* 
Speeches, l e t t e r s  and w r i t in g s , 1923-29» Im portant*
Burdwan, M ahara jadh ira ja  ofs The In d ian  H orizon , London, Benn, 1932. 
Speeches in  America, 1931- 32.
C arm ichael, Lord: Speeches d e liv e re d  by His E xcellency  the  Right 
Hon’b le  Thomas David Baron Carmichael o f S k irlin g «  Governor of 
B engal, 1912-1917« C a lc u tta , Bengal Government, 1913-17- 
In  f iv e  volumes.
Curzon, Lord: S ub jec ts  o f the  Bay. B e im  a s e le c t io n  of speeches and 
w r i t in g s , (ed . D.M. Chapman-Huston), London, A llen  & Unwin, 1915- 
In c lu d es  s ix  speeches on In d ia , 1906-13.
Darbhanga, M ahara jadh ira ja  o f: Speeches of th e  Hon!b le  S i r  Rameshwar 
S ingh, M arh ara jad h ira j o f Darbhanga, (no p lace  o f p u b lic a tio n  or 
p u b lish e r  named), ^7928/.
Bas, C .R .: About Bengal, P r e s id e n t ia l  A ddress, Bengal P ro v in c ia l 
C onference, 1917< C a lc u tta , L.M. Sen, 1917*
Very im portan t.
Das, C .R .: In d ia  fo r  In d ia n s , M adras, Ganesh, 2nd e d i t io n ,  1913- 
Speeches, 1917-18.
Ghose, A .: Speeches, C a lc u tta , Arya P u b lish in g  House, 2nd re v ised  
e d i t io n ,  1948.
H ardinge, Lord: Speeches, C a lc u tta , Government o f In d ia , 1913-16.
In  th re e  volumes.
Karim, A .: L e tte r s  on Hindu Muslim P a c t , C a lc u tta , O rie n ta l P r in te r s  
and P u b lish e rs , 1924-
L e t te r s  to  a newspaper o r ig in a l ly  pub lished  3-27 Jan  1924- Very 
u s e f u l .
L y tto n , Lord: Lord L y tton  in  Bengal; be ing  a s e le c t io n  from His 
E x ce llen cy ’s speeches as Governor o f B engal, 1922- 1927, C a lc u tta , 
Government o f Bengal, 1929•
Montagu, E . : Speeches on In d ia n  Q u estio n s , M adras, N atesan , n .d .
M orley, Lord: In d ian  Speeches, 1907-1909, London, M acm illan, 19^9-
M ukherjea, T .N .: S e le c tio n s  from th e  w ritin g s  and speeches o f the  l a t e  
Peary Moham Mukher.jea, C a lc u tta , a u th o r , 1924»
Nehru, J . : A Bunch o f Old L e t te r s  w r i t te n  m ostly  to  Jaw aharla l Nehru 
and some w r it te n  by hirnT Bombay, A sia , 2nd e d i t io n ,  i 960 .
Im portan t.
P a l ,  3 .C .; Bengal P ro v in c ia l Conference S ess io n , B a r is a l ,  1921. 
P r e s id e n t ia l  A ddress, C a lc u tta , S r i  Gourganga P re s s , 1921.
V aluable.
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R ale ig h , T. e d . : Lord Curzon in  India» Being a S e le c tio n  from h is  
speeches, 1898-1905» London, M acm illan, 1906.
Very u s e fu l .
Roy, B. e d . : Speeches and Addresses o f S i r  John Anderson, Governor of 
Bengal 1 1932 - 1937 , London, M acmillan, 1939- 
S arv ad h ik a ry , D .P .: Phases in  P ub lic  L i f e , C a lc u tta , N.C. S arv ad h ik ary ,
n .d .
Speeches, 1919-34*
Tagore, R .N .: Glimpses of Bengal s e le c te d  from the  L e t te r s  o f S ir  
R abindranath  Tagore, 1885-1895» London, M acm illan, 1921.
Tagore, R .N .: L e tte r s  to  a F r ie n d , London, A llen  and Unwin, 1928.
L e t te r s ,  mainly to  C.F. Andrews, 1913-23. Extrem ely v a lu ab le . 
T e g a rt, S i r  Charles* Terrorism  in  In d ia , London, Royal Empire S o c ie ty . 
1932.
Address to  the S oc ie ty  by an ex-Commissioner of P o lic e , C a lc u tta . 
A good review  o f B engali te r ro r ism .
Vivekananda, Swami; Complete Works, Almora, A dvaita Ashrama, 1946-47•
In  s ix  volumes. Volume I I I  c o n ta in in g  h is  "Lectures from Colombo 
to  Almora" i s  of sp e c ia l im portance.
Z e tlan d , Marquess o f: In d ia : re tro s p e c t  and p ro sp e c t, Nottingham, 
U n iv e rs ity  C ollege, 1935*
Cust Foundation L ec tu re , 1935*
G. Memoirs and A utobiographies
Aga Khan* The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time, London, 
C a s s e ll ,  1954.
Azad, A .K .: In d ia  ^ in s  Freedom. An A utob iograph ical N a r ra t iv e , Bombay, 
O rien t Longmans, 1959*
B an erjea , S .N .: A N ation in  Making: being; th e  rem in iscences o f f i f t y  
y e a rs  o f p u b lic  l i f e , London, O .U .P ., 1925*
A b a s ic  source.
B a n e r j i ,  N.C. j At the  Cross-Roads, 1835-1946. The A utobiography, 
C a lc u tta , A. Mukherjee & Co. , 1950»
Im portan t.
Beames, John: Memoirs of a Bengal C iv i l ia n ,  London, Chatto &  Windus,
1961.
D e lig h tfu l comment on I .C .S . l i f e  in  pe rio d  1858- 79«
B ir la ,  G .D .: In  the  Shadow of the Mahatma. A P ersonal Memoir, Bombay, 
O rien t Longmans, 1953«
Bose, S .C .: An In d ian  P ilg rim  o r  th e  au tob iography  o f Subhas Chandra 
Bose, 1897-1920, C a lc u tta , Thacker, Spink & Co., 194Ö.
Contains some u se fu l l e t t e r s  w r i t te n  in  1921.
Bose, S .C .: The In d ian  S tru g g le , 1920-1934, C a lc u tta , Thacker, Spink Sc 
C o., 1948.
A b a s ic  source.
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Cadogan, E.: The India We Saw, London, Murray, 1933«
Campbell, Sir George: Memoirs of my Indian Career, London, Macmillan,
1893.
Important account of period 1842-74» In two volumes.
Carstairs, R.: The Little World of an Indian District Officer, London, 
Macmillan, 1912.
Outstanding picture of District Officer’s work in Bengal, 1874-1903»
Casey, R.G.: An Australian in India, London, Hollis & Carter, 1947»
Casey, Lord: Personal Experience, 1939-1946, London, Constable, 1962.
Useful section on his period as Governor of Bengal, 1944-46.
Chakravarty, M.K.: A Back Bencher's Autobiography, Calcutta, author, n.d.
Chaudhuri, N.C.: The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, London,
Macmillan, 1951»
Invaluable.
Chaudhuri, N.C.: A Passage to England, London, Macmillan, i960.
Dwarkadas, K.: Gandhi.ji. Through my diary leaves, 1913-1948, Bombay, 
author, 195*3»
Fraser, Sir Andrew: Among Indian Rajahs and Ryots, London, Seeley & Co., 
1911.
Important. Fraser was Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 19*33-8.
Fuller, Sir Bampfylde: Some Personal Experiences, London, Murray, 1930.
The bitter and not wholly accurate reminiscences of an old man.
Gandhi, M.K.: An Autobiography or the Story of my Experiments with Truth, 
Ahmedabad, Narajivan, 2nd English edition,1948.
Hardinge, Lord: My Indian Years, 1910-1916, London, Murray, 1948.
Disappointing.
Jayakar, M.R.: The Story of My Life, Bombay, Asia, 1958-9»
In two volumes. Important for the story of the Swaraj Party.
Lytton, Lord: Pundits and Elephants, being the experiences of five years 
as Governor of an Indian province, London, Peter Davies, 1942.
Extremely valuable subjective analysis.
Minayeff, I.P.: Travels in and Diaries of India and Burma, Calcutta,
Eastern Trading Co., n.d.
Shrewd observations by a Russian gentleman on India in 18S0 and
1885-6.
Montagu, E.S.: An Indian Diary, (ed. Venetia Montagu), London,
Heinemann, 1930.
Indispensable. Unfortunately poorly edited.
Morley, Lord: Recollections, London, Macmillan, collected works, 
de luxe edition, 1921.
In two volumes, the second of which concerned with India. Invaluable.
Nehru, J.: Toward Freedom. The Autobiography, New York, John Day, 1941»
Pal, B.C.: Memories of My Life and Times, Calcutta, Modern Book Agency 
and Yugayatri Prakashak Ltd., 1932 & 1951»
In two volumes. Important for growth of nineteenth-century 
Bengali nationalism.
Ray, P.C.s Life and Experiences of a Bengali Chemist, London, Kegan Paul, 
1932.
Reed, Sir Stanley: The India I Knew, 1897-1947» London, Odhams, 1952» 
Templewood, Lords Line Troubled Years, London, Collins, 1954*
Tuker, Sir Francis: While Memory Serves, London, Cassell, 1950»
Zetland, Marquess ofs Essayez, London, Murray, 1956«
As Lord Ronaldshay, Governor of Bengal 1917-22. Invaluable.
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H. Contemporary Polemics
Andrews, C.F.s The Indian Problem, Madras, Natesan, 2nd edition, 1923» 
Speeches and writings on political and social questions, 1920-1. 
Important.
Barton, Sir Williams India's Fateful Hour, London, Murray, 1942.
Basu, B.N.s Why India is heart and soul with Great Britain, London, 
Macmillan, 1914*
Bose, P.N. s The Illusions of Rev/ India, Calcutta, Newman, 1916.
Bose, P.N.: Swara.j - Cultural and Political, Calcutta, Newman, 1929«
Byron, R.s An Essay on India, London, 1931«
Chatterjee, B.C.s The Reform Proposals; a retrospect and an attempt to 
understand, Calcutta, Indian Association, 1919*
Chowdhry, S.N.A.: Views on Present Political Situation in India,
Calcutta, author, 1920.
Of great contemporary importance.
Curtis, L.s Papers relating to the application of the principle of 
Dyarchy to the Government of India, London, O.U.P., 1920.
Das, G.s The Governance of India; as it is and as it may be, Madras, 
Natesan, 1917»
Dutt, A.C.s Bengal Council and its work, 1921-1923» Calcutta,
R.P. Mitra & Son, 1923.
Kuque, M.A.: A Plea for Separate Electorates in Bengal, Calcutta, author, 
1931.
Majumdar, A.C.s Indian National Evolution. A Brief Survey of the Origin 
and Progress of the Indian National Congress, Madras, Natesan, 1915*
Meston, Sir James: Indian Constitutional Reform. A Brief Narrative 
of the Government of India1s Proposals, London, author, 1919»
Five hundred copies only printed. To put Government of India's 
views before members of Parliament.
Mitter, P.C.s Indo-British Co-operation - whether conducive to mutual 
Self-interest, Calcutta, Sanskrit Press, 1920.
Mitra, S.M.: Indian Problems, London, Murray, 1908.
Mookerji, C.L.s The Durbar, Goari, Sarasvati Press, 1903.
O’Donnell, C.J.s The Partition of Bengal, London, author, 1906.
Pal, B.C.s Nationality and Empire. A Running Study of Some Current 
Indian Problems, Calcutta & Simla, Thacker, Spink & Co., 1916.
An important collection of newspaper articles originally published
1910 & 1913-14.
Pal, B.C.: Swadeshi and Swara.j: the Rise of New Patriotism, Calcutta, 
Yugayatri Prakashak, 1954»
Writings and speeches, 1902-7.
Pal, B.G.s Writings and Speeches, Calcutta, Yugayatri Prakashak, 1954« 
Period 1887-1922.
Prasad, R.: India Divided, Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1946.
Rahman, S.: Why Pakistan?, Calcutta, Tabligh Publishing Syndicate, 1946. 
Rai, L.s Young India. An Interpretation and a History of the
Rationalist Movement from Within, London, Home Rule for India League, 
1917.
Roy, M.M. 2 Lav; and Legislation in India, Calcutta, Englishman, 1890. 
Sarvadhikari, Sir Devaprosads Thoughts and Problems, Calcutta, author, n.d. 
Some interesting articles written in 1920s and 1930s by Bengali 
member of the Council of State.
Stokes, R.: The Moral Issue in India, London, Murray, 1931.
Short statement of the diehard view.
Tagore, R.N.: Towards Universal Man, London, Asia, 1961.
Collection of speeches and writings on social matters. Important.
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I. Collected Documents
Banerjee, A.C. ed.: Indian Constitutional Documents, 1757-1939* Calcutta, 
Mukherjee, 2nd revised edition, 1948.
In three volumes. Valuable.
Gwyer, Sir Maurice, & Appadorai, A. eds.: Speeches and Documents on the 
Indian Constitution, 1921-1947» London, O.U.P., 1957«
In two volumes. Excellent.
Keith, A.B. ed.: Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1730-1921, 
London, O.U.P., 1922.
In two volumes. Excellent preface on British rule in India.
SECONDARY
A, Biographies
Azam, M.A.s Life of Maulavi Abdul Karim, Calcutta, no publisher given,
1939.
Birkenhead, Second Earl of: The Life of F.E. Smith, First Earl of 
Birkenhead, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959«
Useful.
Brecher, M.: Nehru: A Political Biography, London, O.U.P., 1959» 
Important.
Buchan, J.: Lord Minto. A Memoir, London, Nelson, 1924»
Important.
Carmichael of Skirling, Lady Mary: Lord Carmichael of Skirling.
A Memoir, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1929»
A basic source.
Chaturvedi, B. & Sykes, 1.: Charles Freer Andrews« A Narrative,
London, Allen & Unwin, 1949- 
Valuable.
Las Gupta, H.N.: Leshbandu Chittaranjan Las, Lelhi, Government of India,
1960.
Useful collection of material, but not reliable.
Las Gupta, H.N.: Subhas Chandra, Calcutta, Jyoti Prokasalaya, 1946.
Important for facts on Bengal Congress in 1920s.
Lesai, M.: Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad. The President of the Indian
National Congress. A Biographical Memoir, London, Allen & Unwin, 1941» 
Lutt, P.N.: Memoirs of Motilal Ghose, Calcutta, Amrita Bazar Patrika,
1935.
Gupta, J.N.: Life and Works of Romesh Chunder Lutt, C.I.E., London,
Lent, 1911.
Important.
Masani, R.P.: Ladabhai Naoroji; The Grand Old Man of India, London,
Allen & Unwin, 1939*
Mersey, Lord: The Viceroys and Governors-General of India, 1737-19475 
London, Murray, 1949*
Minto, Lady: India, Minto and Morley, 1905-1910, London, Macmillan,
1935.
Extremely valuable.
Mosley, Leonard: Curzon. The End of an Epoch, London, Longmans, 1960.
Not well balanced.
Pal, B.C.: Character Sketches, Calcutta, Yugayatri Prakashak Ltd., 1957» 
Extremely valuable.
Parikh, N.L.: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Ahmedabad, Narajivan, 1953*
Ray, P.C.: Life and Times of C.R. Las, London, O.U.P., 1927«
Of mixed quality. Contains important material.
Reading, Lord: Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading, London, Hutchison, 
1942 & 1945.
In two volumes. Liscerning. Contains important material.
Ronaldshay, Lord: The Life of Lord Curzon, London, Benn, 1928.
In three volumes. Extremely valuable.
Thomas, K.P.: Lr B.C. Roy, Calcutta, West Bengal Provincial Congress 
Committee, 1955«
Uncritical but useful.
Toye, H.: The Springing Tiger. A Study of a Revolutionary, London, 
Cassell, 1959*
Biography of Subhas Chandra Bose, which concentrates on his later 
years.
Wolpert, S.A.: Tilak and Gokhale: revolution and reform in the making 
of modern India, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California, 1962.
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B. D ir e c to r ie s  and B io g ra p h ic a l D ic t io n a r ie s
B in a n i, G.D. & Rao, T.V.R. e d s . :  In d ia  a t  a G lan ce , Bombay, O rie n t 
Longmans, r e v is e d  e d i t io n ,  1954»
B uckland, C .E .: D ic tio n a ry  o f In d ia n  B io g rap h y , London, S onnenschein  
Sc C o ., 1906.
C o tto n , C .W .E .: Handbook o f Commercial In fo rm a tio n  f o r  I n d i a , C a lc u t ta ,  
Government o f  I n d ia ,  1924«
A Handbook o f  U se fu l In fo rm a tio n  R egard ing  Burdwan, C a lc u t ta ,
M a h a ra ja d h ira ja  o f Burdwan, I 918.
H industhan  Year-Book and Who's Who, C a lc u t ta ,  M.C. S a rk a r  & Sons, an n u a l. 
C o n su lted  e d i t io n s  o f 1933, 1935, 1937, 1940 & 1949.
The In d ia n  N ation  B u ild e rs ,  P a r t  I , M adras, Ganesh, se v e n th  e d i t io n ,  n .d .
The In d ia n  Year Book, Bombay, C a lc u tta  & London, Times o f  I n d ia ,  a n n u a l. 
C o n su lted  a number o f e d i t io n s  f o r  th e  y e a rs  betw een 1914 Sc 1949»
K abad i, W .P.s In d ia n  Who’ s Who, 19351 Bombay, Y eshanand, 1935»
Lok Sabha. Who’ s Who, Rew D e lh i, Lok Sabha S e c r e t a r i a t ,  1947 Sc 1957»
R alanda Year-Book and Who's Who in  In d ia  and P a k is ta n , 1950-51,
C a lc u t ta ,  Nalancla, 1951«
R a tio n a l  Y ear Book, C a lc u tta ,  no p u b l i s h e r  named, 1938.
P h i l i p s ,  C.H. ed . : Handbook o f O r ie n ta l  H is to r y , London, Royal H is to r i c a l  
S o c ie ty ,  1951»
Sharm a, J .S . s  In d ia n  R a tio n a l C ongress. A d e s c r ip t iv e  b ib l io g ra p h y  o f  
I n d i a 1s s t ru g g le  f o r  freedom , D e lh i, S . Chand & C o ., 1959»
In c lu d e s  a le n g th y  ch ronology . Rot w ho lly  r e l i a b l e .
Some D oted In d ia n s  o f Modern Tim es, M adras, C h r is t i a n  L i t e r a tu r e  S o c ie ty ,
1395.
U se fu l.
S tep h en , L. e t  a l .  e d s . :  D ic tio n a ry  o f  R a t io n a l  B iography , London, O .U .P ., 
r e p r in t e d  e d i t io n ,  1937- 1959*
W ith supplem ents in  27 volum es.
T h ac k er’ s C a lc u tta  D ir e c to ry , C a lc u t ta ,  T hacker, Spink  & C o ., a n n u a l. 
C o n su lte d  e d i t io n s  o f 1910, 1923-8.
T h ac k e r’ s In d ia n  D ir e c to ry , C a lc u tta ,  T hacker, Spink  Sc C o ., a n n u a l. 
C o n su lted  e d i t io n s  o f 1912, 1917-8, 1920, 1923 Sc 1927.
Trade D ire c to ry  o f  P a k is ta n  and Who’ s Who, 1954» K arach i, A n sa r i,  1954*
Who’ s Who, London, A. Sc C. B lack , a n n u a l.
C o n su lte d  e d i t io n s  o f 1923-47*
Who * s Who in  I n d i a , Lucknow, Rewul K ish o re  P re s s ,  1911-1914*
Who’ s Who in  I n d ia ,  Burma and Ceylon, 1938, Poona, Sun, 1938.
Who Was Who, London, A. Sc C. B lack , 1920-51*
In  fo u r  volum es.
W ilson , H.H. e t  a l . :  A G lossary  o f J u d ic i a l  and Revenue te rm s and o f  
u s e f u l  words o c c u rr in g  in  o f f i c i a l  docum ents r e l a t i n g  to  th e  
A d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  Government o f  B r i t i s h  I n d i a , C a lc u t ta ,  E a s te rn  
Law H ouse, e n la rg e d  e d i t io n ,  1940*
In d is p e n s a b le .
C. Learned Journals
Bengal Past and Present
Comparative Studies in Society and History
Current Sociology
Dissertation Abstracts
Economic Weekly
Encounter
European Journal of Sociology 
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Geographical Journal 
Geographical Review of India 
Historical Journal 
History Today
Indian History Congress. Proceedings
Journal of Asian Studies
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies
Journal of Economic History
Journal of Indian History
Journal of Modern History
Journal of the Pan.jah University Historical Society-
Journal of Politics
Journal of Southeast Asian History
Journal of World History
Pacific Affairs
Pakistan Review
Parliamentary Affairs
Political Quarterly
Political Science
Political Science Quarterly
Public Opinion Quarterly
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Royal Central Asian Journal
Seminar
Sociological Bulletin 
Vigil
D. Journal Articles
i. Bengal
Bhattacharya, S.: "Lord Carmichael in Bengal. Proposal for his 
recall", Bengal Past and Present, vol. LXXX, pt. ii, no. 148> 
Jul-Dec i9 6 0 , pp. 67-70.
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B ose, N .K .: "S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l  L ife  o f  C a lc u t ta " ,  G eog raph ica l 
Review  o f  In d ia ,  v o l .  XX, Dec 1958» pp . 1-46.
S tim u la t in g .
B ro o m fie ld , J .H .s  "The P a r t i t i o n  o f B engal: a problem  in  B r i t i s h  
A d m in is tra tio n , 1830- 1912",  In d ia n  H is to ry  C ongress, P ro ceed in g s  o f  
th e  23 rd  S e s s io n , A lig a rh  -  1960, p t .  i i ,  pp . 13-24*
B ro o m fie ld , J .H .:  "The Vote and th e  T ra n s fe r  o f  Power: a s tu d y  o f  th e
Bengal G eneral E le c t io n ,  1912-1913") J o u rn a l  o f  A sian S tu d ie s , v o l .  
XXI, no . 2 , Feb 1962, pp. 163-Ö1.
C haudhuri, N .C .: "Subhas Chandra Bose -  H is Legacy and Legend",
P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s , v o l .  XXVI, 1953, pp . 349-57*
O u ts ta n d in g ly  good.
L as, M .N .: "C u rzo n 's  S u ccesso rs  and th e  P a r t i t i o n  o f B engal: A C o n f lic t
in  C o n sc ien ce" , J o u rn a l o f  In d ia n  H is to r y , v o l .  XXXIX, p t .  i i i ,
no . 117) Lee 19619 pp . 393-400.
G eddes, A rth u r  A .: "The P o p u la tio n  o f  B engal, i t s  L i s t r i b u t i o n  and
Changes: a C o n tr ib u tio n  to  G eog rap h ica l M ethod", G eograph ica l J o u r n a l , 
v o l .  LXXXIX, Ja n -Ju n  1937) PP* 344-68 .
G hose, B . : "The C o lo n ia l B eg inn ings o f  C a lc u t ta :  U rb a n is a tio n  w ith o u t 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n " ,  Economic W eekly, v o l .  X II , no . 33) 13 Aug 1960,
pp. 1255- 60.
Ghosh, S . :  "The B r i t i s h  In d ia n  A s s o c ia t io n ,  1851-1900", Bengal P a s t and 
P r e s e n t ,  v o l .  LXXVII, no . i i ,  Ju l-L e c  1958*
Roy, R . : " I n d ia ’ s Problem  C ity " , F ar E a s te rn  Economic Review, v o l .  
XXXIII, no . 10, 7 Sep 1961, pp. 467-9*
Sen, S .N .: " C a lc u t ta ’ s L onely  Crowd", Economic W eekly, v o l .  X I, no . 8 ,
21 Feb 1959.
W einer, M .: "Changing P a tte rn s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  L ea d ersh ip  in  West B engal" , 
P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s , v o l .  XXXII, no . 3, Sep 1959*
W einer, M .: "V io lence and P o l i t i c s  in  C a lc u t ta " ,  Jo u rn a l o f  A sian  
S tu d ie s , v o l .  XX, no . 3 , May 1961, pp . 275-81 .
I n t e r e s t i n g  o b s e rv a tio n s  b u t e x p la n a tio n s  s u p e r f i c i a l .
i i .  In d ia
B ahadur, L . : "M o tila l N ehru -  an E s tim a te " ,  J o u rn a l o f In d ia n  H is to ry , 
v o l .  XXXVIII, p t .  i ,  Apr 196O, pp. 167-73.
B a ile y , F .G .: "P a r lia m e n ta ry  Government in  O r is s a ,  1947-1959")
J o u rn a l  o f  Commonwealth P o l i t i c a l  S tu d ie s , v o l .  I )  no . 2 , May 1962,
pp . 112-22.
B a i le y , F .G .: " P o l i t i c s  in  O r is s a " ,  Economic W eekly, v o l .  X I, n o s . 35 & 
37-45 , Aug-Nov 1959*
S tim u la t in g .
B a ile y , F .G .:  " T ra d i t io n a l  S o c ie ty  and R e p re s e n ta tio n . A Case S tudy  in  
O r is s a " ,  A rch iv es  o f European S o c io lo g y , v o l .  I ,  1960, pp. 121-41* 
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THE OLD HOUSE OF COMMONS AND ITS MEMBERS 25
probably not alone in preferring a small attendance, for when 
the House was exceptionally full there was so much noise that 
people could be heard only with difficulty. And the suggestion 
that a new semi-circular Chamber would be superior to the 
oblong design was criticized, not on the modern ground that 
it would undermine the traditional two-party system and bring 
in the multiple-party system prevailing on the Continent, but 
because it would do little to enable the Speaker to keep order 
more easily. “ I wish”, said Peel, “that, as long as possible, our 
debates should be carried on in this ancient apartment.”
A new Chamber might have meant a removal to another 
site. This was considered and rejected in 1835, following the 
destruction of the old House. There was a long discussion by 
the Select Committee on the 6th March of that year as to 
whether St. James’s Palace or Marlborough House should be 
taken over. But the Queen was found to have a life interest at 
Marlborough House after the King’s death, and Peel thought 
it would be a mistake for the House to be too near the Clubs 
in St. James’s Street: members would not attend the debates 
so regularly. So the Committee decided to retain the old site, 
partly too because of its comparatively retired situation and 
the easy communication by river, especially in the hot weather, 
with the Law Courts and the City.
(To be continued)
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A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF THE INDIAN 
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES
HE Bengali author, Nirad Chaudhuri, dedicates his
first and most famous book, The Autobiography of an
Unknown Indian, “To the memory of the British Empire 
in India which conferred subjecthood on us but withheld 
citizenship; to which yet every one of us threw out the chal­
lenge : ‘Civis Britannicus Sum’ because all that was good and 
living within us was made, shaped, and quickened by the same 
British rule” .1 This would serve equally well as the dedication 
for a history of an Indian legislature. Here is a monument, 
more or less enduring, to British rule. Under that rule the 
legislatures could be nothing other than subordinate, but their 
very existence encouraged the Indian to claim the citizenship 
which was withheld, and trained him in the political ways of 
his rulers. Whether this was, in itself, good is a matter of 
opinion, but there can be no doubt that the political awakening 
of twentieth-century India was a response to British stimulus 
and that its tutelage was in British schools.
In view of the mass of writing on modern Indian history, it 
may well be asked, why the need for further study in Indian 
politics ? The answer is that the Indian legislatures have been 
neglected, despite their importance, and that this neglect has 
impoverished Indian historiography. Sir Lewis Namier, dis­
cussing the contribution of his school to eighteenth-century 
studies, once remarked that weather-maps are most regular 
and pleasing to the eye when they are constructed from few 
observation-points. Add detail by multiplying the points of 
view and the attractive simplicity is lost. The gain in accuracy, 
however, is invaluable and the pattern which finally emerges 
may be significantly new. At present, the map of modern
1 N. C. C h au d h u ri: The Autobiography o f an Unknown Indian (London, 
1951), p.v.
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Indian constitutional and political history is being drawn in 
just such a regular and simple pattern. The lines run decep­
tively straight and two of them are ruled much more firmly 
than the others. One, political, leads from the foundation of 
the Indian National Congress in 1885 to its triumph in 1947; 
the other, constitutional, from the establishment of the Indian 
legislative councils in 1861 to the Independence Act of 1947. 
Undoubtedly, these have been the main lines of development 
but to limit study to them, as has been done to a large degree, 
is to give a false perspective. The danger of a whig interpreta­
tion of Indian history is very real. The remedy lies in a change 
of view point and a closer study of neglected detail.
That Indian historians should have devoted so much of 
their attention to the rise of Congress is not surprising. This is 
a success story and success stories make good reading. The 
constitutional theme can be regarded similarly by the British, 
but here the historian, as a craftsman, is attracted equally by 
the great milestones which stand along the way. From the 
assumption of direct parliamentary control of British India in 
1858, there is a series of historic documents inviting study: the 
Indian Councils Act of 1861, which established provincial 
legislative councils, and which introduced non-official members 
into both the provincial and Imperial councils; the 1892 Act, 
which enlarged the provincial councils, extended their powers 
of discussion and introduced a form of indirect election; the 
Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, which gave to the provincial 
legislatures an unofficial majority and extended indirect elec­
tion to the Governor-General’s legislative council; Edwin 
Montagu’s famous declaration of British policy in 1917 as the 
development of self-governing institutions in India; the 
Montagu-Chelmsford report of 1918 and the Government of 
India Act of the following year, which implemented its pro­
posals, increasing the number of legislatures, enlarging their 
membership, widening the franchise and introducing dyarchy 
to the provinces; the report of the Simon Commission published 
in 1930; the papers of the Round Table Conferences of 1930-32; 
the White Paper and the proceedings of the parliamentary 
committee of 1933 which examined its proposals; the Govern-
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ment of India Act, 1935, under which India might have 
become a federation, with a large measure of provincial auto­
nomy and dyarchy at the centre; the reports of the Cripps’ 
Mission in 1942 and of the Cabinet Mission four years later; 
and, finally, the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Much 
excellent historical work has been done on these documents, 
particularly by Reginald Coupland, Arthur Berriedale Keith 
and A. C. Banerjee, but the detailed study of Indian political 
history, which is needed to set them in perspective, is lacking. 
This groundwork should include research on the legislatures, 
particularly the provincial legislatures.
Emphasis needs to be placed on the provinces for a number 
of reasons. In the first place because this is the most neglected 
part of the field. In spite of the strength of Indian provincial 
feeling, the interest of modern writers has been in the struggle 
for independence at the national level. Yet it is in the pro­
vinces that the birth and early growth of Indian nationalism 
can best be traced. It is here, too, that the earliest constitu­
tional concessions were won, and the principles of representa­
tion, election, and representative and responsible government 
first applied. It is here that most of India’s statesmen and 
politicians gained their early experience in the legislative, 
municipal and district councils, and it was to elect these 
councils that the Indian people were first enfranchised. Even 
the Congress party, the most centralized of all Indian organiza­
tions, enjoyed twenty years of provincial and municipal legisla­
tive and administrative experience before it came to power 
in Delhi. Yet no significant work has been done on this 
background.
The study of a province offers the student of Indian politics 
a manageable area. Here he can sift some of the mass of un­
touched detail; his boundaries are defined, his problems rela­
tively localized. The politicians whom he must study lived 
within those boundaries and most of the documents which 
illuminate their activities are to be found there. By limiting 
himself to one province he can become acquainted with its 
political history over a considerable period, thus gaining con­
tinuity, without losing a grasp of detail. The geography of
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India -  its immense distances and its climate -  hamper the 
historian as they do the invader, and the former like the latter 
must concentrate on one area if he is not to dissipate his 
strength. The history of the central legislature is yet to be 
written, but, in this field at least, let the local work precede 
the national.
The question which must now be asked is, why a legisla­
tive study ? One may answer that this is the ground on which 
the British have chosen that their rule of India in the twentieth 
century should be judged. Indeed the judgment extends beyond 
India. As J . W. Davidson has written: “The whole justification 
of the colonial system rests, in fact, upon the assumption that 
self-government, though it is the utlimate objective, can be 
established beneficially only if there is careful preparation, and 
if the time and the circumstances of its inauguration are care­
fully calculated.”1 From the war of 1914-18, the declared 
British policy in India was to train Indians for self-rule. The 
establishment of legislatures and the progressive widening of 
their powers was the pivot of that policy. The end in view was 
not only self-government but parliamentary self-government. 
The historian is fully entitled, therefore, to enquire how well 
these institutions fulfilled their educative role. Such an enquiry 
is the raison d’etre of the series of studies on colonial legislatures 
edited by Margery Perham,2 and alone it is sufficient to justify 
the examination of the Indian legislatures.
That is not to say that the historian may accept this as the 
whole story. Obviously the legislative councils had functions 
other than the training of Indian politicians. They existed 
primarily to legislate, and, until 1909 at least, their non-official 
membership was valued chiefly as a source of local advice and 
opinion; not as the germ of some future Parliament.3 Nor may
1 J .  W . Davidson: The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council (Studies in 
Colonial Legislatures, ed. M argery Perham , Vol. I l l ,  L ondon, 1948), 
p. 131.
2 M argery Perham  (e d .) : Studies in Colonial Legislatures (5 vols., London, 
1946-50).
3 E.g., see V iscount M orley : Indian Speeches, ig o y-igog , (London, 1909), 
pp. 91-2. This was, of course, general British colonial p ractice; see ed ito r’s 
introduction  to Jo a n  W heare: The Nigerian Legislative Council (Studies in 
Colonial Legislatures, ed. M argery  P erham , Vol. IV , London, 1950), p. vii.
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the declared British policy of full self-government for India, 
apparently fulfilled in 1947, be accepted uncritically. K. M. 
Panikkar, one of the most able of contemporary Indian 
historians, can write:
“The old ideal of imperial domination had disappeared 
with the first war, and all the political manoeuvring of the 
period between 1920-9 was in the nature of delaying rear­
guard actions. The British authorities hoped to be able by 
their superior political knowledge and experience to modify 
and limit the independence which they knew India would 
ultimately acquire; they tried to do this by creating classes 
and interests which would support their position.”1
Perhaps Gandhi was right in 1931 when he described the 
British as having an unequalled faculty of self-delusion. “I 
know, if the time comes to concede the equality I want for 
India”, he said, “they will say that that is what they have all 
along desired.” 2
Even if it is shown (as the writer believes it can be) that 
the end desired by the British was fully responsible parliament­
ary government for India, it is not necessary to accept this as 
a good end. Is the British parliamentary system really suitable 
for India? This is a question which the legislative historian 
must ask and to which his work may suggest an answer. How 
strange did the Indians find this exotic institution, and how 
well did they master the subtleties of its working ? Were the 
British right to import a system which had proved suitable in 
its place of origin and in the white colonies overseas, or should 
they have developed something indigenous ? In the opinion of 
John Stuart Mill, writing in 1861, Britain could succeed in her 
task in India only
“through far wider political conceptions then merely 
English or European practice can supply, and through a 
much more profound study of Indian experience, and of 
the conditions of Indian government, than either English
1 K . M . P an ikkar: Asia and Western Dominance (London, new edn. 1959), 
pp. 207-8.
2 Q uoted  M ichael Brecher: Nehru, A Political Biography (London, 1959), 
p. 174.
A STUDY OF INDIAN PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES 3 1
politicians, or those who supply the English public with 
opinions, have hitherto shown any willingness to under­
take.”1
Such warnings were heard frequently before 1914, but rarely 
afterwards. It may be that there was no Indian alternative to 
a parliamentary system, and, had the British offered one, 
paradoxical as it may seem, none would have been harder to 
convince of their good faith than the educated Indian.
Added point is given to this enquiry into the suitability of 
the institution, by its retention after Independence in both 
India and Pakistan, and by its subsequent abandonment in 
the latter. Is its early demise in the Muslim state an indication 
of its unsuitability, or, perhaps, of some failure in the training 
which the British gave their wards? Here again there is a 
profitable line of investigation: did the British pay enough 
attention to the training of political leaders and the organiza­
tion of parties on which the system depends, or were they too 
concerned with legislative forms? Research on the legislative 
councils will reveal, perhaps, which political groups were 
favoured with British support and which had their opposition. 
Where the British put their weight may, however, have been 
immaterial. Possibly the issue was settled once Congress had 
gained the initiative and, indeed, the explanation of the sur­
vival of the parliamentary system in post-Independence India 
may perhaps be found in the unity gained by Congress in the 
fight against the British, rather than in Indian legislative 
experience as such.
These are some of the questions with which the student of 
the legislatures will grapple and, in themselves, they are a 
justification for his study. All this, however, is reading history 
backwards, and it must not be thought that the only reason for 
the research is to find answers to current problems. That the 
legislatures existed in the late nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries as an important part of India’s governmental struc­
ture, is surely sufficient to warrant their examination. Here is 
a segment of Indian history and a well documented one.
1 Considerations on Representative Government (Oxford, edn. edited by 
R. B. McCallum, 1946), p. 334.
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What are the elements of this study? First, and basic to 
the whole, there must be an examination of the structure and 
composition of the legislature at its various stages of develop­
ment. This will reveal, of course, the changing balance be­
tween official, nominated unofficial, and elected members in 
which constitutional progress lay. It will include an investiga­
tion of the forms of proceeding and the conventions evolved to 
keep the legislative machine in motion. In the period in which 
there were two Chambers (from 1937 in most provinces) the 
relations, both formal and informal, between them must also 
be observed. It will require consideration of the changing 
electoral provisions -  the nature of the constituencies and the 
franchise -  and of the relations between the members and their 
electorates.
Secondly, there must be a detailed analysis of the member­
ship of both Houses. Who were the men and women nominated 
and elected? What were their ages, occupations, classes and 
castes? From what areas of the province or beyond did they 
come, and what were their connections and their means ? Were 
they educated and did they have an experience of village or 
municipal administration? Such questions may, and indeed 
should, be multiplied tenfold. “Scratch a politician and you 
find a landlord,” they say in Orissa.1 So far very few Indian 
politicians have been scratched and it is high time they were.
On this foundation, the structure of parties and other 
political groupings, both with in the legislature and outside it, 
may be examined. Here again there is much work to be done. 
The main organizations in Indian politics today -  particularly 
the Congress Party, the Socialists and the Communists -  have 
been analysed, but the parties which fell by the way have 
either been disregarded, or, what is perhaps worse, seen only 
as discredited rivals of the victorious Congress. These include 
the Liberals, the leaders of Indian nationalism at the turn of 
the century, who were still important for their moderating 
influence even in the 1930’s; the Zamindari and industrial 
groups, which were so powerful in many of the provinces in
1 F. G. Bailey: “ Politics in Orissa” , Economic Weekly, Vol. XI_ (Bombay, 
1959) P- 1372-
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the 1920s and 1930s; and, indeed, the Swarajists, the men 
within the National Congress who favoured participation in 
the legislatures and who split with their more orthodox 
Gandhian colleagues in 1939 on the issue of Indian support for 
the British war effort. Surprisingly enough, even the Muslim 
League has received scant attention, despite its leading role 
in the separation of Pakistan.
What were the links that bound the members of these 
parties together, and the barriers which separated their 
groups? The enquiry will involve careful attention to the 
issues debated in the legislature and to the opinions expressed 
by members inside and outside the council Chamber. It will 
involve an analysis of the division lists and the examination of 
electoral activities, particularly of alliances. At one level this 
investigation of parties, as also the study of legislative member­
ship, will illuminate to some degree the relationship between 
the provincial capital and the countryside; a relationship 
which is full of interest in a land which is overwhelmingly 
agrarian but which, apparently, was dominated politically by 
the cities. At another level it will reveal the struggle for power 
and prestige between the new group of westernized intellect­
uals, born of British rule, and the old influential interests, 
whose authority was based largely on landholdings. These 
phenomena are linked, of course, and they have their parallels 
in other parts of the British Empire, particularly Africa.
The discussion will also throw light on the European com­
mercial groups within the legislatures. From the first, British 
interests were represented in the councils and in a few of them 
had considerable power. In Bengal, for example, where from 
1937 their representatives number twenty-five in a lower House 
of 250, they held the balance of the shifting and uneasy coali­
tions from which the provincial governments were drawn. 
Equally interesting will be an enquiry into their attitude 
towards constitutional advance. Was the British business com­
munity as illiberal as common report has it, or was it, in fact, 
aware of which horse had the running and fully determined 
not to back a loser?
The study of parties must also open up the thorny question
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of the rival religious communities. The friction between these 
communities, particularly the Hindu-Muslim clash, was the 
greatest problem faced by the British raj and the Indian 
nationalists alike in the transfer of power. The gravity of the 
problem is measured by its solution: the division of India. In 
colonial territories the struggle for independence is always 
accompanied by a contest between rival groups to succeed to 
the power which is being relinquished by the imperial ruler. 
This contest was unusually bitter in India because of the sharp 
religious divisions in the community, and the consequent fear 
of the minority groups that their corporate privileges, and even 
their existence, were endangered by the British withdrawal. 
Naturally, pre-Independence Indian politics were bedevilled 
with these religious divisions and a consideration of the com­
munal question must be central to any Indian legislative 
history.
In 1909 communal representation was introduced to India 
to give the minorities a voice in the legislatures. Two questions 
must be asked -  what was the motive which underlay this, and 
what was its effect ? Is it in communal representation, as Hindu 
nationalists maintain, that the source of India’s tragic division 
is to be sought ? The findings of the Donoughmore Commission 
of 1928 on Ceylon certainly lend colour to this assertion:
“ . .  . we have come unhesitatingly to the conclusion,” says 
its report, “ that communal representation is, as it were, a 
canker on the body politic, eating deeper and deeper into 
the vital energies of the people, breeding self-interest, 
suspicion, and animosity, poisoning the new growth of 
political consciousness, and effectively preventing the de­
velopment of a national or corporate spirit.”1
This may have been true of Ceylon, but how true was it of 
India where the communal problem was so much greater? If 
the minorities were to retain their identity, was there any 
alternative to communal representation?
In 1934 Lady Minto, in her India, Minto and Morley, quoted
1 Report o f  the Special Commission on the Constitution, 1928. Parliamentary 
papers. Great Britain, Cmd. 3131, p. 39.
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a letter of 1906 describing the Viceroy’s sympathetic response 
to a Muslim deputation demanding communal representation 
as “A work of statesmanship that will affect India and Indian 
history for many a long year. It is nothing less than the pulling 
back of sixty-two millions of people from joining the ranks of 
seditious opposition” .1 This revelation was hailed by many 
Hindus as confirmation of their belief that the motive under­
lying the introduction of separate electorates for the minorities 
was divide and rule. How far this is true, the historian of the 
Indian legislatures must enquire. Undoubtedly his work will 
throw light upon the effects of communal representation and 
possibly upon this more complex question of British motive.
There are other lines which must be followed: for example, 
the relations of the legislative council and its members with 
subordinate bodies. The municipal councils and rural district 
boards, in particular, are of importance, for these were (in 
Lord Minto’s words) “the initial rungs in the ladder of self- 
government” .2 The modern system of local government in 
India was founded in the 1860s and 1870s, and extended by 
Lord Ripon a decade later. From the first, some of the members 
of these boards were directly elected, and it was on them that 
a large number of Indian politicians gained their first admini­
strative experience. This was true even in the 1920s and 
1930s for Congressmen, who could not countenance participa­
tion in the legislative councils, entered municipal corporations 
where, they considered, there was greater freedom of action. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Chairman of the Allahabad municipality, 
was just one among many. Consequently these local organs 
had an extraordinary importance in provincial politics.
Also to be considered are the relations between the pro­
vincial legislative council and superior bodies, particularly 
the Indian central legislature and the British Parliament. 
These defined the limits within which the provincial legisla­
tures could act. No less important is an examination of the 
contacts with Government, both at Viceregal level, and, more
1 Mary, Countess of Minto: India, M into and Morley, J g o g - ig io ,  
(London, 1934) pp. 47-8.
2 Ibid, 47.
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immediately, in the provinces. Here the development of the 
institution will be traced from its birth as a small group of 
Government officials, presided over by the provincial Governor 
or Lieutenant-Governor and assisted in the work of legislation 
by a number of Governor’s nominees, to a two-Chamber 
legislature with a total membership, in the larger provinces, of 
more than 300, from which the Governor’s ministers were 
drawn and to which they were responsible. Between the two 
lay the daring experiment of dyarchy, “ the technical term for 
handing over the steering-wheel and retaining control of the 
accelerator, the gear-lever and the brake” , as Philip Mason 
has described it.1 The effects of this division of authority, from 
1921-37, between ministers responsible to the legislature and 
those responsible to the Governor alone, will form a most 
fascinating and important part of any Indian legislative study.
Again, secondary issues suggest themselves. On the one 
hand there will be interest in observing the part played by the 
legislature in social and economic reform, an important aspect 
of all colonial development in this century and particularly 
significant in India where the departments concerned with 
social and economic welfare were among the first handed over 
to Indians. On the other hand will be seen the difficulties of 
nationalist politicians in office, trying to reconcile (with greater 
or lesser success) the independence struggle with the day-to- 
day burdens of administration; the old loyalties of the fight 
with the growing, though reluctant, loyalties to a Government 
which they now saw through new eyes. The dangers of their 
position were grasped by Nehru in 1938 when he wrote: 
“They are trying to adapt themselves far too much to the old 
order and trying to justify it. . . . What is far worse is that we 
are losing the high position that we have built up, with so 
much labour, in the hearts of the people. We are sinking to the 
level of ordinary politicians.”2
Another profitable line of enquiry will concern the attitude 
of the council members to the civil service and their opinions
1 Philip Woodruff (Mason’s pseudonym): The Men Who Ruled India, 
(London, 1954), Vol. II, p. a n .
2 Nehru to Gandhi, Apr. 1938, J. Nehru: The Unity of India (London, 
3rd Impression 1948) p. 106.
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on the increase in its Indian membership. Did they, for 
instance, concur with the Calcutta Statesman in regarding it 
as “a file-flattened bureaucracy” P1
Lastly, attention must be given to the relations between 
the legislature and the press. As early as the second quarter 
of the nineteenth century the Indian press was flourishing. In 
1830, for example, Bengal alone had no fewer than forty-nine 
newspapers and periodicals.2 Although political journalism 
was hindered by the restrictions imposed in the interests of 
British rule, it proved of hardy growth and was of major 
importance at all stages of the independence movement. Every 
leading party, and even many of the smaller provincial groups, 
used the press to advantage. It provides the historian of Indian 
politics with an invaluable source of evidence, as well as 
forming an important part of his research in its own right.
This is the structure of the study but, of course, structure 
alone is insufficient. To determine the shape of the human 
ant-hill and to map the beaten tracks along which the ants 
scurry is important, but the final purpose is to discover why 
they hurry in these long lines and to what end they build. 
Motive must be sought; the lasting issues which give meaning 
to the whole must be distinguished. It is difficult as yet to say 
what those issues will be, for the documents lie unexplored, 
their clues hidden. At this stage can be seen only a few of the 
threads which may be significant, and most of these have been 
suggested already. Obviously the development of the constitu­
tion is one. What pressure did the legislative councillors exert 
to win constitutional concessions? Which was the more im­
portant at various stages in forcing advance, local demand 
or the influence of the British House of Commons and elec­
torate? How did the councillors regard the changes once 
gained? Did these alter the relations of the political groups 
with their rival parties on one side, and the British on the 
other? Another significant theme concerns the part played 
by communal ties in Indian politics. There must be an esti­
mate of the importance of caste, class, occupation, locality
1 Quoted Woodruff, II, 335.
2 Margarita Barns: The Indian Press (London, 1940), p. 189.
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and religion in determining political behaviour. No less 
important is an examination of the nature of political leader­
ship. Who were the outstanding figures? What were their 
techniques and how able were they? Were they men of city 
or countryside? Has there been in India (as Myron Weiner 
suggests) a slow but certain shift in political power over the 
last fifty years from the former to the latter? 1 The record of 
the Indian ministers in office must be examined, their success 
or failure weighed against the difficulties which they faced. 
Their part in social and economic reform, and in handling the 
growing problems of industrialization, must be measured. This 
is the reverse side of the coin: how did the Indians use the 
power transferred by the British ? As yet we have only questions 
and no answers.
In conclusion, one note of caution should be sounded. The 
historian must beware of the temptation to exaggerate the 
importance of the legislature. Working within its walls, sur­
rounded by its voluminous records, and communing with its 
members, dead and alive, he will find it all too easy to forget 
the wider community of which it is but a small part. Through­
out, he must attempt to evaluate its place in the community, 
even if this finally involves the admission that the part played 
by the institution was not as great as he first thought.
1 Myron Weiner: “Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in West 
Bengal” , Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXII (New York, Sep. 1959), pp. 277-83.
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preserved by the British themselves which often give a different story 
of many events which British historians treated from an Imperial stand­
point of their own. For example, it was stated by Gait in his History 
of Assam that the Khasi Uprising of 1829 was caused by the boasting 
taunts of a Bengali Chaprassi accompanying the British Officers into the 
Hills, to the effect that the Khasis who had allowed the British to build 
a road through their territory would soon be treated as British subjects and 
subjected to taxation. But a study of contemporary records relating to 
the incident, records left by the British themselves, reveal that bad faith 
on the part of the British was the cause of the rising as shown in my 
paper on the subject contributed to the last session of this Congress. 
There are other instances of British writers stressing only one side of 
the picture and suppressing things unpalatable to them. And what is 
true of Assam may be true of other regions of India also.
I have devoted a few paragraphs in this address to Assam in anti­
cipation of your indulgence, because in British days Assam was a back­
ward province and used often to be designated as the ‘Cinderella Province’ 
of India. She suffered from negligence of the outside world. In 1948 
Shri Rajagopalachariar, then Governor-General of India, had an occasion 
to tell this humble self that nobody could neglect Assam if she did not 
neglect herself. The interest shown by this august body in Assam during 
its last session there has led us to believe that at least the historians will 
not neglect Assam.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you heartily for having listened to 
my address with so much patience and I shall earnestly count upon your 
whole-hearted co-operation in conducting the deliberations of this Section 
of our Congress. Once again I express my gratitude to you all.
THE PARTITION OF BENGAL:
A Problem  in  B r it ish  A dm in istra tion , 1830-1912 
J. M. B room field
Why was Bengal partitioned in 1905 and repartitioned in 1912? This 
is a question which has engaged Indian historians, particularly Bengalis, 
in recent years. I should like to approach the enquiry from a different 
angle. Why, I should like to ask, was it in 1905 and 1912 that Bengal 
was partitioned, and not, for argument’s sake, in 1895 or 1875? This 
is a pertinent question, for Bengal had been a problem to the British
14 INDIAN HISTORY CONGRESS
Government in India for more than 80 years before Lord Curzon took 
his fateful decision in 1903. There had certainly been earlier attempts 
to grapple with the problem, but it was not until the first decade of the 
twentieth century that anyone ventured to grasp it firmly. The aim of 
this paper is to suggest some of the reasons why a decision was so long 
delayed, and why it was taken when it was. I must emphasise that 
1 can offer no more than suggestions, for this aspect of the Partition of 
Bengal awaits detailed investigation. I am convinced that such an 
investigation would provide answers that are at present being sought 
elsewhere.
It will have been observed that the subtitle to the paper is “a 
problem in British Administration”. It is important to realise that to the 
British Government in India Bengal presented a knotty administrative 
problem throughout most of the nineteenth century. This area first 
came under British control after the battle of Plassey (1757) and Buxar 
(1764). In 1765 Emperor Shah Alam was induced to grant to the East 
India Company the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, but it was not 
until 1772, when Warren Hastings became Governor, that the Company 
took direct control. Two years later Hastings became Governor-General, 
with some authority over Madras and Bombay, and immediate responsi­
bility for Bengal. Each addition to the Company’s territories in northern 
India saw the expansion of the boundaries of Bengal, and by 1826 the 
Presidency extended well beyond Delhi in the west, and into the Valley 
of Assam in the east. The stage was set for a play that ran for more 
than 80 years ending in grim tragedy. Bengal was too large for its 
Government—either it had to be reduced in size, or its Government 
had to be reconstructed. These, we shall find, were the alternatives 
with which the British worked throughout the century.
The first move was territorial: in 1836 the Presidency was divided, 
a separate Lieutenant-Governorship of the North-Western Provinces, 
extending from the Bihar frontier to the Sutlej, being created. This was 
followed by the reform of the Bengal Government. In 1843 a provin­
cial secretariat was established, and in 1854 the Governor-General was 
provided with a subordinate to relieve him of immediate responsibility 
for Bengal. The charge of the new Lieutenant-Governor was consider- 
ble. It comprised Bengal proper, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, Arakan, Chota 
Nagpur, and tributary states, with a total area of approximately 2,53,000 
square miles.1 This may be compared with the area of the present 
state of West Bengal, viz. 33,928 square miles. The population was 
estimated at the time at four crores but it may have been a crore more. 
That of Calcutta was probably between four and five lakhs.2
The Government of Bengal at this time differed in a number of 
important respects from the Governments of Bombay and Madras, the 
two other Presidencies. They were headed by full Governors, men 
selected from English public life who might communicate directly with
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the Board of Control in England, and who were assisted by Executive 
Councils. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, a Civilian, governed 
alone, and was responsible, in the first instance, to the Governor-General. 
This position, though apparently anomalous in view the importance of 
the province, may be understood if it is remembered that the Lieutenant- 
Governor of Bengal was only one of two Lieutenant-Governors in the 
Presidency, and that his capital was also that of the Governor-General, 
but it placed the Government of Bengal in a peculiar relationship to 
the Government of India throughout the period under review. The two 
were so intimately associated, and the Imperial establishment so over­
shadowed the provincial, that there was little hope that suggestions for 
major reforms in Bengal would be judged primarily in terms of local 
needs.
The history of the Bengal Administration in the half-century after 
1854 reveals three great watersheds: the Mutiny of 1857; the Orissa 
Famine of 1866-67; and the latter years of Lord Curzon’s Viceroyalty 
from 1902-5. The Mutiny precipitated reforms which had long been 
under consideration. There was, of course, the fundamental change 
effected by the Crown’s assumption of direct control of India in 1858. 
This was followed immediately by the codification of Indian law, and 
in Bengal by a reform of the judiciary. The Lieutenant-Governor was 
given powers of legislation and a council to assist him in their exercise, 
while the lower administration in the province was brought into line 
with the greater part of British India by the union of the offices of 
Collector and Magistrate. Some attempt was made to establish a system 
of local government, and there was a reform of the police organisation. 
In addition, the Lieutenant-Governorship was reduced in size by the 
transfer of Arakan to the new Province of British Burma formed in 1862.
Arakan was neither populous nor important. Its transfer did little 
to lighten the burden of the Bengal Government,—and by the 1860’s 
the weight of that burden was crushing. The population of this huge 
and fertile region was increasing at the rate of some five lakhs a year, 
but its administration remained virtually unchanged. The Government 
was fighting a spirited but losing battle to meet the growing demands 
for its services. This was revealed with stark clarity by the famine 
which struck Orissa in 1866. The Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Cecil 
Beadon, broken in health by the impossible demands of his office and 
served by an inadequate Administration, was unequal to the colossal 
task of relief with which he was confronted. Lakhs of people died, 
and the Secretary of State and the Government of India awoke too 
late to a realisation that all was not well with the constitution of Bengal.
The result was a full-scale enquiry into the Government and 
Administration of the Province. Its scope was very wide, and the 
minutes, memoranda and reports produced form a file of extraordinary 
proportions.3 In terms of practical reforms, however, the achievement
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was negligible. The blame for this lay chiefly with the Secretary of 
State, Sir Stafford Northcote. Had he laid proper emphasis upon the 
two questions which he rightly regarded as fundamental—whether the 
province should be divided, and whether its Lieutenant-Governor (or 
Governor) should have the assistance of an Executive Council4—this 
excellent opportunity of solving the Bengal problem might not have 
gone begging. The immediate need was for reforms inj Bengal, but 
Northcote allowed discussion to wander over every aspect of Indian 
administration, and to dissipate itself in profitless argument.
Exasperated by the resultant stalemate, Sir Bartle Frere, ex-Governor 
of Bombay who had sat as a member of the enquiry committee, wrote 
a masterly expose of the inadequacy of Bengal’s administration. Analys­
ing the number of civil servants provided for the province, he said:
“We find that for every five millions of people inhabiting a 
country larger, richer, and more important in every way, except 
fighting power, than most third class European sovereignties, we 
have one-eight of a Lieutenant-Governor, about 28-'- English gentle­
men, Covenanted Civilians, and about 112 Uncovenanted gentlemen”.
It must be borne in mind that these numbers comprise the 
whole of the administrative machinery of this vast province, with 
the most trifling exceptions. The duties which the great feudal 
chiefs perform in other parts of India, and in most parts of Europe, 
or which the unpaid administration performs in our own country,
are not fulfilled by any class in Bengal...........
„ With these facts before us, can we say that Bengal has anything 
but the shadow of an administration? Can we wonder at a break­
down like that of Orissa? or that of the late Lieutenant-Governor’s
two predecessors?.......It is true that of late years there has been a
nibbling at improvement, both in police and judicial administration; 
but what has been attempted bears no proportion to the wants of 
the country, and Bengal is still practically ungoverned for that is 
the long and short of the Commission’s report on it, and all that 
we have seen and heard during the late famine.5 
Frere had the wholehearted support of the Lieutenant-Governor, 
Sir William Grey, who declared that his Government was the greatest 
anomaly existing in India. Bengal was the largest and most important 
province, and should, in his opinion, be at least on a par with Bombay 
and Madras. “I have no hesitation in affirming, that at present the 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal is overweighted, to an extent neither fair 
to the individual nor (which is of more importance) to the interest of 
the province, or rather provinces, which constitute the Lieutenant 
Governorship,” he wrote.6 Five years later his successor, John Campbell, 
was echoing his words. “It is totally impossible” , he declared, “that 
any man can properly perform single-handed the work of this great 
Government.”7
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Despite these eloquent appeals no major reform was undertaken. 
Assam was constituted a separate province, certainly, but even this was 
delayed seven years, in spite of its recommendation by all connected 
with the famine enquiry. In addition, another secretary was provided 
for the Bengal Government, but the suggestion of an Executive Council 
to assist the Lieutenant-Governor was shelved, in deference to the con­
victions of that confirmed Punjab paternalist, the Governor-General Sir 
John Lawrence, and his supporters, who held firmly to their belief that 
council government was inferior to personal government. The enquiry 
was of great importance in the history of Partition, nonetheless, for it 
represented the first major attempt to grapple with the Bengal problem. 
The file produced in 1867 was henceforth the textbook on Bengal to which 
all referred.8
Sir Henry Durand, military member of the Viceroy’s council, writing 
in that book of wisdom, observed that the problem was not to be solved 
by administrative readjustments: “This top dressing, so to speak, does
not touch the root of the evil,” he said.9 By the end of the century it 
was painfully clear that Durand had been right. Since 1854 Bengal had 
been reduced in area by nearly a quarter, but despite this its population 
had risen from four or five to almost eight crores. It is astonishing to 
realise that that was well over a quarter of the population of the entire 
sub-continent.10 Add to this the immense expansion in Governmental 
activity in the second half of the nineteenth century,11 and some apprecia­
tion will be gained of the colossal task confronting the Lieutenant- 
Governor. “Bengal is unquestionably too large a charge for any single 
man”, wrote Curzon early in 1902.12 This statement had by then become 
a cliche dishonoured by 70 years of official inaction. What followed must 
therefore be regarded as remarkable. Within ten years Bengal was twice 
partitioned; its Government was provided with an Executive Council; the 
Lieutenant-Governor was replaced by a Governor; and the capital of 
India was removed from Calcutta to New Delhi.
The details of these developments are well known, and therefore 
we can proceed to a consideration of the questions : why was a solution 
to the Bengal problem so long delayed, and why was it attempted in 
1905? The answer to the first question is the key to the second. It has 
been observed that the alternatives—the division of the province, or the 
expansion of its Government—were understood by the British from the 
first. Why was one or the other not applied? Firstly, it appears, because 
there was a reluctance to share, or even on occasions to delegate, authority, 
and this extended right down the line from Governor-General to District 
Officer. It may be pointed out quite correctly, that this statement runs 
counter to the great bulk of writing on the I.C.S., but the evidence on 
Bengal leaves the writer in no doubt as to its validity for that province 
at least. The opposition of successive Governors-General and their coun­
cillors to the provision of an Executive Council for Bengal exemplifies
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it. A major reason for this was, undoubtedly, the periodic disagreements 
between the Government of India and the rather independent Governors 
and Executive Councils of Madras and Bombay, and (less frequently), 
between those Governors and their Councils. The Government of India 
argued, rather illogically, from this that a Governor (or Lieutenant- 
Governor) was weakened by the delegation of power to Councillors. In 
rejecting a Bengali suggestion in 1904 for a reconstitution of Government 
rather than the partition of the province, Curzon and his advisors declared 
that the idea of giving the Lieutenant-Governor a Council “must be set 
aside absolutely and without hesitation as a solution of the present
difficulty...........personal methods of government are better suited to the
circumstances of India, and produce superior results.”13
The unwillingness to delegate authority is also reflected in the rela­
tions between the Government of India and the Government of Bengal. 
In the discussions which followed the Orissa tragedy, and in those which 
preceded the removal of the capital to Delhi, it was generally agreed that 
the Government of India pressed so heavily upon the Government of 
Bengal as at times to render the latter a mere cypher.14 In 1868 the 
Governor-General, John Lawrence, disagreed with this opinion, but pro­
ceeded to give the lie to his argument by recommending the abolition of 
the Bengal Legislative Council. The affairs of the province could be 
adequately handled by the Imperial Council, he declared, and the 
Lieutenant-Governor would be better occupied as a member of that 
Council than in managing one of his own.15 Curzon once complained 
that a sparrow could not twitter its tail without this being attributed to 
direct orders from the Viceroy.16 One may surely ask: “Whose fault—
sparrow or Viceroy?” It was typical of Curzon—and indeed of the 
normal relations between the Governments of India and Bengal—that it 
was he who made the tour of Eastern Bengal in February 1904 to enlist 
support for Partition, and not the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Andrew Fraser. 
Why should not his Government have been encouraged to handle this 
domestic affair?
At the provincial level the failing is seen in the attitude to Lord 
Ripon’s famous local self-government resolution of 1882. Ripon was a 
notable exception to the rule, for he emphasised the need to share the j 
increased burdens of administration, and drew attention to the growing J 
number of educated Indians who were willing and able to play their part. 
His work, however, was frustrated by the opposition of provincial govern­
ments, who had little desire to expand representative institutions. The 
resolution was implemented in Bengal in 1884-5, but for the rest of the 
century there were repeated attempts by that Government to reduce the 
elected membership and curtail the powers of local boards. This cul­
minated in the notorious 1899 Calcutta Municipal Act, which returned 
the Corporation to the control of Government nominees.
The District Officers also failed to make proper use of representative
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boards. There was general agreement, e.g. among those who gave 
evidence to the Royal Commission on Decentralisation in 1907-8, that 
these bodies had failed because the District Officers had given them no 
say in determining policy.17
It is important that we should ask why there was this failure to make 
proper use of subordinates. One reason, it seems, was the desire to 
preserve efficiency. The argument was that control had to be kept in 
the hands of those whom one knew to be capable. Carried to its extreme, 
this meant oneself. There are indications in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries of an “efficiency cult” in the I.C.S.: as long as Govern­
ment was efficient nothing else was thought to be of major importance.18 
This is the ground on which many Conservative opponents to the Morley- 
Minto reforms took their stand.19 To a degree it was a confusion of 
means with ends.
The second reason that may be suggested for this unwillingness to 
share authority, and one which is linked with the first, was a tendency 
to govern for the sake of the Government, not the governed. Too often 
in the discussion on the Bengal issue, both in 1867-8 and 1902-3, it 
seemed to be the convenience of the Administration which was of primary 
importance. One of the main purposes of the letter of 3 December, 1903, 
in which the Government of India informed the Government of Bengal 
of its plans for the province, was to warn the officials that they must 
not think too exclusively in terms of their own losses or gains from 
partition.20 That it was thought necessary to emphasise this point surely 
indicates that Government for the sake of the Government was a very
real danger. “ ...........there is a dead wall of official resistance always
ready to obstruct anything which can be twisted into meaning interference 
with British official rights,” complained Lord Minto, when struggling with 
opposition to his reform proposals a few years later.21 Here is an im­
portant clue to an understanding of the violent Bengali hatred of Partition. 
The measure was pushed through by the British in the name of admini­
strative convenience against unprecedented protest. The argument of 
administrative convenience was considered all sufficient, and opposition 
was characterised as ignorant or (more often) selfish and subversive.22 
Bengal was shocked into the realisation that the British were willing 
to perpetrate such measures—no matter how unpopular—to benefit the 
Administration.
If the first reason for delay was a reluctance to delegate authority, 
then the second was an aversion in the Civil Service to major reforms, 
either territorial or Governmental. If the status quo could be preserved, 
so much the better; if not, small adjustments were to be preferred to a 
thoroughgoing revolution. This explains that “nibbling at improvement” 
of which Frere complained. To suggest any change was to court wide­
spread opposition. A territorial adjustment, for example, ran headlong 
against vested interest, as was clearly shown in 1905. It was proposed
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by the Government of India that Chota Nagpur should be transferred to 
the Central Provinces, but the Bengal Chamber of Commerce was interested 
in its mining and industrial potential, and successfully blocked the move. 
Similarly, deference was shown to the tea industry in the choice of a 
name for the new province. It was to have been called the “North- 
Eastern Provinces” but it became “Eastern Bengal and Assam”; so that 
Assam, known throughout the commercial world, would not disappear 
from the map. The officials also had their objection. It was the Govern­
ment of Madras, for instance, which prevented the union of the Uriya 
speaking people by refusing to transfer to Bengal the Uriya areas under 
its control.23 It is clear that provincial boundaries developed related 
interest groups as much within the Civil Service as without, and in this 
respect language was a most important factor. An ambitious Civilian 
faced with a choice of vernaculars, would usually concentrate upon 
mastering the language of the metropolis—to which he hoped one day 
to be promoted—in preference to that of a remote district. In Bengal 
this meant the neglect of areas such as Orissa and Bihar.24 One of 
Curzon’s main arguments in favour of the 1905 re-adjustment was that it 
offered a solution to Assam’s perennial staffing problem, for civilians 
would be more willing to serve in that province if it were united with 
Eastern Bengal.23
Here is a key to an understanding of the form of the Partition. To 
the Administration it seemed important that a Bengali-speaking area 
should be included in every new subdivision of the province, and hence 
its adamant rejection of demands for linguistic union. This re-emphasises 
the weight given to administrative as against popular convenience. 
Bengali and particularly Calcutta interests were severely affected by the 
Partition—but it was for the Europeans, official and non-official, that 
adjustments were made.
A reform in the structure of Government raised as many difficulties 
as a change of area. The secretariat was always ready with the objection 
that any contemplated reform had no precedent. In 1867, when an 
Executive Council for the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was suggested, 
they replied that Executive Councils were for Governors and Governors- 
General; men with little knowledge of India and in need of advice. 
Lieutenant-Governors were Civilians and therefore well acquainted with 
the local scene. Their argument was accepted, but the Council advocates 
attempted to overcome the difficulty by giving Bengal a Governor. This 
proved to be equally objectionable. How, it was asked, could the exist­
ence in Calcutta of a Governor and Council, be reconciled with that of 
the Governor-General and Council? An Executive Council a thousand 
miles distant was bad enough but to have one in Calcutta would bring 
chaos. The only answer was to move the Government of India else­
where. This was as far as the argument got in 1868 for no one was 
willing to face the task of moving the Imperial capital.26
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Why, it may be asked? Because of the uproar which this would 
have occasioned in Calcutta. Bombay and Madras, on the other hand, 
were heartily in favour of the proposal, for they believed the Government 
of India to be inordinately influenced by Calcutta opinion. That they 
were right in their belief, there is no doubt.27 Besides the secretariat 
wallahs, for whom Calcutta was a stronghold in the nineteenth century, 
there was the European business community. Through the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce and through private influence, it could put strong 
pressure on Government, and if checked its displeasure found expression 
in the columns of the Englishman, Capital and Commerce. It had a 
powerful lobby both in Whitehall and at Westminster, and its opinion 
was always sought on matters of importance. It is significant that in the 
early discussions on the establishment of legislative councils, one of the 
arguments in their favour was that this group should have a say in 
legislation. John Lawrence’s proposal to abolish the Bengal Legislative 
Council was rejected on the same ground that it would not be fair to 
the Calcutta Europeans.28 They continued to enjoy considerable over­
representation in the Imperial and Bengal Legislative Councils well into 
this century,29 and the latter was given an elected majority in 1909, more 
than a decade ahead of the rest of India, because the same Europeans 
could be relied upon to support the Government through thick and thin. 
Lord Crewe aptly characterised them in 1912 as “spoilt children in many 
respects, full of their historical and social importance, anti-Indian au 
fond, and keen to scent out “disloyalty” in any independent expression 
of opinion, hidebound too in class prejudices.”30
The influence of Calcutta was the lion in the path of a solution to 
the Bengal problem. Any attempt to partition the province was seen as 
a threat to Calcutta as a metropolis; any suggestion to shift the Imperial 
Capital was seen as a threat to non-official European influence. Both the 
Government of India and the Government of Bengal, it seems, were bound 
hand and foot by Calcutta until they were freed by the growth of counter 
forces in the late nineteenth century. One was an awakened interest in 
Indian affairs in Britain, and a new determination to control Indian policy 
from at Home. The other was the development of educated Indian 
opinion, especially in Bengal, constituting a challenge to old vested 
interests, although it too was centred on Calcutta. These two forces 
came to maturity in the first decade of the twentieth century,31 making 
possible bold measures, despite continued I.C.S. hesitation and Calcutta 
hostility. The British Liberal Party’s electoral victory of January, 1906, 
in particular, heralded a new era of Home control of Indian affairs. 
Significantly, the provision of an Executive Council for the Liuetenant- 
Governor of Bengal in 1910 was the result of a recommendation of the 
Royal Commission on Decentralisation and the work of John Morley,32 
both of whom were regarded by many Civilians as intruders. Similarly, 
the reunion of Bengal under a Governor and the transfer of the Imperial
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capital followed suggestions in the parliamentary debates on the 1909 
Reforms; suggestions implemented by Lords Hardinge and Crewe.'13 
They were aware of the furore this would create in Calcutta, and hence 
the secrecy with which the operation was planned. That the Viceroy 
and Secretary of State were willing to invoke the wrath of European 
Calcutta, indicates how the strength of the latter had declined. Thirty 
years earlier European opinion had forced the Government of India into 
important and shameful retreat over the Ilbert Bill; now its protests could 
be ignored.34
This goes a long way towards explaining why 1905-1912 were the 
years of action: Calcutta had lost its powers to obstruct unwelcome in­
novation. There were two other factors of prime importance. One was 
the legacy which Bengal had inherited from seventy years of procrastina­
tion. Her administrative malaise was by them so acute that to have post­
poned a cure any longer would have been fatal. The disclosures of the 
Indian Police Commission in 1903, on the neglect of eastern Bengal had 
left no doubt on this point.33 The other was the personality of the 
Viceroy. In Curzon, India had a reformer of extraordinary vigour and 
unswerving purpose, who would brook no opposition when once convinced 
of the efficiency of a course of action. He set his heart on solving the 
Bengal problem and unfortunately chose partition as the way. It was 
left for his Liberal successors to repair the damage.
An answer can now be offered to the question; why 1905-12 and 
not 1895 or 1875? In the nineteenth century the antipathy of the Civil 
Service to major change and to the delegation of authority, and the strength 
of the Calcutta non-officials, were barriers to any comprehensive reform 
in Bengal, but with each year of delay the situation grew appreciably 
worse. At the same time the devlopment of educated Indian opinion 
and of interest in India in the United Kingdom gradually freed the Viceroy 
and his Councillors from the toils of Calcutta. Curzon, determined to 
leave his mark upon India, saw his opportunity in Bengal and carved the 
body politic into two neat administrative portions, but his handiwork 
was rapidly undone by Indian opposition and British interference. The 
old province was broken into three, and Calcutta was given a Governor- 
in-Council to compensate for its lost Viceroy. By 1912 the problem of 
the structure of Bengal’s Administration was solved, and a new chapter 
opened in Bengali history.
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T> EPRESENTATIVE Government was an institution dear to the hearts of 
JA. nineteenth-century Englishmen. It was their pride and, they affirmed, the source 
of their national strength that they lived under this form of constitution. They were 
eager that others, especially their colonies, should enjoy its benefits. There were few 
obstacles in the way of the establishment of representative institutions in the white 
colonies: the land was different but the people were the same. But in India neither 
the land nor the people resembled those of England. Nonetheless, the British de­
termined to train an educated, Westernized elite which would make possible the 
establishment of representative institutions there.
This is the classical British interpretation of the development of representative 
government in India.* 1 I am not concerned here with its validity but with its effects 
upon the historiography of the Indian legislatures. Because of the acceptance of this 
interpretation, the legislatures have generally been discussed in terms of those men 
who held as their political ideal the constitutional advance of India to parliamentary 
self-government, and who are seen as proteges of the British. Furthermore, the model 
and most of the evidence for these histories has been taken from the reports upon the 
working of the Indian constitution which were periodically submitted to the British 
Parliament. It is my belief that the result has been an overemphasis upon constitu­
tional history and a consequent misconstruction of the part played in the legislatures 
by the advocates of constitutional advance. I am also of opinion that their social posi­
tion has been misunderstood. I argue my case in this paper from an analysis of the 
first general election for the Legislative Council of reunited Bengal, held in December 
1912 and January 1913.
The Banerjea Group
The immediate background to this election was the Morley-Minto reforms, which 
attempted to conciliate nationalist opinion by associating Indians more closely with 
the Government of their country. Membership in the Governors’, Viceroy’s and 
Secretary of State’s Councils was now granted to them; they were conceded the right 
to elect to the legislative councils; and non-officials were placed in a majority in those 
of the provinces. We must “do our best to make English rulers friends with Indian 
leaders,” wrote the Secretary of State, John Morley, “and at the same time . . .  to
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train them in habits of political responsibility.”2 In Bengal the concessions were coldly 
received by the politicians. Grateful we are, they replied, but your friends we cannot 
be while the partition of Bengal remains. This was the province which Lord Curzon 
had found in greatest need of administrative reform, but it was also the province 
which he had antagonized most. His efforts to reorganize the Calcutta Corporation 
and University, and to reduce the province to manageable size had driven the Bengali 
leaders into unequivocal opposition. Co-operation with the Government was impos­
sible, they declared, while the partition remained. The unrest which attached to this 
question was a continuing embarrassment to the British Administration and at length 
it was decided that it must be removed. In April 1912 Bengal was reunited. This was 
hailed as a triumph by those who had led the opposition. Now, they said, the way was 
clear for them to enter the legislative councils and work the reforms in the spirit in 
which they were given. They would contest the general election at the end of the year.
This political group can be readily identified (in terms of the classical analysis) as 
that educated, Westernized elite on which the legislatures were to depend. All its 
members were graduates of Calcutta University and a number had received higher 
education in England.3 They were middle-class professional men from various parts 
of the province, and, apart from two Muslims, they were high-caste Hindus. They 
had the backing of the most influential of the Indian-owned English and vernacular 
Calcutta newspapers. Two of them had achieved the high honor of the presidency 
of the Indian National Congress and all had won reputations for their opposition to 
the partition and their agitation for constitutional concessions. They were liberal in 
the best British tradition. The political future which they foresaw for India would be 
marked by steady constitutional advance to parliamentary self-government. Abdul 
Rasul, Oxonian and Professor of International Law at Calcutta University, in his 
election manifesto accepted the view that the legislative councils were the proving 
ground for further concessions and emphasized the importance which his group 
attached to these bodies:
To the people of India has been granted the right of increasing participation in the 
work of framing laws for themselves, and to prove ourselves worthy of this right we must 
return the best of our men. Laws that are passed in the Legislative Councils affect the in­
terests of all. . . . Great responsibilities we have before us and if we do not exercise our 
votes in favour of the best man, the “Hon’ble” members who may go to the Council will 
not be the sufferers, but we alone shall be left to suffer. Our interests will remain uncared 
for for three years to come.4
The principal political asset of this group was its leader, Surendranath Banerjea. 
Sixty-four years old, with three decades of political achievement behind him, he was 
the recognized elder statesman of Indian nationalism. His was a commanding figure, 
for he was a well-built man with strong features and a striking white beard. With 
the emotional fire characteristic of the Bengali, a command of English which few 
Englishmen could surpass and an Augustan delivery, he could sway a crowd of 
thousands with his oratory or win the astonished admiration of the Oxford Union.
2 Morley to Lord Minto, April 2, 1909, John Buchan: Lord Minto. A Memoir (1924), p. 289.
3 The greater part of the analysis in this paper is based on biographical information on the individual 
candidates, collected from various sources.
4 Government of Bengal. Appointment Department proceedings. File 18L-3. B427-33. July 1914. (Sub­
sequent references to proceedings of this department give only the file number and date.)
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His career epitomizes the forces which shaped Indian nationalists of the nineteenth 
century. Son of a Westernized doctor, born at mid-century into Calcutta Brahmin 
society astir with the excitement of a religious reformation and a revival of learning, 
he spent his school days among the British boys at Doveton College. Having taken a 
B.A. in English literature from Calcutta University, he went to London and in 1869 
passed the Indian Civil Service examination, only one Indian having ever done so 
before. His elation was short-lived, for the India Office declared that he and another 
successful Indian candidate had falsified their ages. Their names were struck from 
the list. Banerjea challenged the decision in Queen’s Bench, won his case and re­
turned to Bengal, unwelcome in a service which until then had been the exclusive 
preserve of the British. Three years later he was dismissed for a minor and (what was 
almost certainly) an accidental error in the return of a law case. Banerjea the official 
was finished; Surendra Babu the nationalist was born.
His heart was now set upon the political regeneration of India. With his material 
worries allayed by a chair of English literature provided at a Calcutta college by an 
Indian benefactor, he campaigned his cause through the columns of the Bengalee, an 
English language newspaper for which he built an international renown in the half- 
century of his editorship. He founded as his political platform the Indian Association, 
a Hindu high-caste middle-class organization, which had only one influential rival 
in Bengal in the following forty years. At the end of the seventies he toured northern 
India firing his audiences with his gospel of nationalism; in the eighties he established 
himself as a dominant personality in Congress; in the nineties he visited England to 
seek support for Indian demands, and he took the lead of the radical elements in the 
Calcutta Corporation and the Bengal Legislative Council. Then came his clash with 
Curzon. In 1899 the Viceroy reduced the number of elected members of the Corpora­
tion and Banerjea led out 28 commissioners, swearing not to return until unofficial 
control was restored. In 1905 he stigmatized Curzon’s decision to partition the prov­
ince as an attack on the growing political consciousness of the Bengali. From plat­
form and press he thundered his condemnation and the extraordinarily vociferous 
response which it evoked surprised him little less than it did the British. His political 
star was at its zenith.
The popular enthusiasm waned with the years but Banerjea and the Indian As­
sociation kept alive the partition agitation. In 1911 they sent Bhupendranath Basu to 
press their case in England5 and their memorial to the Government of India on the 
subject provided much of the wording, if not the idea, for Lord Hardinge’s dispatch 
recommending the repartition.6 Banerjea and his men were victorious; surely political 
Bengal lay at their feet. “The future is ours,” sang the Bengalee. “The world-wide 
forces of progress are with us and the sympathies of civilized mankind will support 
us in our constitutional efforts for the realization of our destinies which can only be 
accomplished by a measure of self-government that will help forward the development 
of all that is best and noblest in us. Then will indeed England have fulfilled her high 
mission in the East.”7
5 Indian Association, General Meeting proceedings, April 1911.
6 Ibid., Annual Report 1911, Appendix E, pp. 19-42; & Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1911, 
[Cd. 5979], Vol. 55, pp. 582-98.
7 July 19, 1912, p. 4.
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The Reasons For Electoral Defeat
In fact, the immediate future was not theirs at all. The electors to whom they came 
as conquering heroes treated them shabbily. Banerjea personally had a resounding 
victory but, of the remaining twenty-seven elected seats, only three were won by his 
followers. This caused widespread surprise and much heartsearching.8 Why did the 
group fail when it was (with good reason) so confident of success, and when ac­
cepted theories of nationalist politics would suggest that it should have succeeded ? A 
solution to this problem holds a number of important lessons for an understanding of 
Indian politics of the period.
First, Banerjea’s group was not a party in any real sense. There was agreement on 
political aims, certainly, but there was no formal party structure nor discipline. The 
Indian Association, to which all the members of the group belonged and which 
might impress the superficial observer as a workable organization, was in reality a 
political club, well suited to preparing memorials to Government and for organizing 
public meetings of protest, but quite unfitted for the management of an election cam­
paign. Lesson number one: Indian politics of the second decade of this century were 
not party politics. For Banerjea and his men, this meant disorganization and con­
fusion at the polls. Personality and local influence (as we shall shortly see) counted 
for considerably more than political allegiance, and it must have been difficult for the 
group, as such, to make political capital from its victories of the preceding five years. 
The lack of discipline resulted, in one place, in three of the group contesting one 
double-member constituency, as it had resulted in earlier years in the desertion of a 
number of Banerjea’s followers of the principle of non-participation in the legislative 
councils. A more serious consequence was the electoral malpractices indulged in by 
at least one of the group in a personal bid to gain a seat. “The popular party has ex­
hibited a weakness or want of organization which is really lamentable,” wrote the 
Indian World. “It lacks cohesion: it lacks discipline. Half-a-dozen candidates scram­
bled for a seat as starving beggars do after a piece of bread. The party is a bundle of 
disjointed units which cannot resist the slightest pressure from without.”9
The second factor in their disfavor may have been the self-denying ordinance of 
which they were so proud. Except for the backsliders among them, they had been in 
the legislative council wilderness for seven years. Their opportunity of dominating 
the first elected councils in 1909 had been lost and when they returned it was to find 
others firmly entrenched. Surely it is significant that all but one of their number who 
were defeated, suffered at the hands of sitting members. Here, I would suggest, is a 
clue which should not be forgotten when the Swarajists are observed, hastening back 
to the legislatures ten years later.
The third, and more fundamental, fact was that the partition of Bengal disrupted 
provincial society. The outcry against the partition, which certainly was loud and 
sustained, came in the first place from the great Hindu metropolis of Calcutta, aghast 
at the prospect of losing its economic domination of the rich rice and jute lands of
8 Englishman, January 14, 1913, p. 4; Capital, January 16, 1913, p. 154; Indian World, January 15, 
1913, p. 2; Indian Empire, January 14, 1913; Report on the Native Papers in Bengal, January 18, 1913, 
Vol. 2, 45. (In subsequent references, this Report is cited simply as Native Papers.)
9 January 22, 1913, p. 2. The Indian World was a Calcutta English weekly edited by a prominent 
member of the Indian Association, Prithwis Chandra Ray.
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Eastern Bengal; it came secondly from the Hindu entrepreneurs of the Eastern 
Bengal towns, now to be a minority in India’s first Muslim province, who feared that 
their links with Calcutta would be broken; it came from the Muslims of Western 
Bengal, whose minority position would be even more disadvantageous. The most 
serious division created was between these three sections on the one hand and the 
Eastern Bengal Muslims, who saw the partition as a heaven-sent opportunity to pros­
per. It was also of advantage to the Biharis and Uriyas, inhabitants of the West and 
South-West of the province, who were elated to find themselves for the first time 
outnumbering the Bengalis, whose domination of the professional and commercial 
life of their towns they resented as an alien intrusion. Partition was currently be­
lieved to be the elixir and they were soon demanding that it be applied to them.10
The surprisingly strong support which the anti-partition campaign obtained from 
the Hindu middle-class (the bhadralo\) revealed a degree of discontent more intense 
than the British had believed possible, and it is fairly certain that its basis was eco­
nomic. The partition coincided with a sharp rise in the price of rice, Bengal’s staple, 
due mainly to the failure of the crops in 1905. The harvests in the following three 
years were all poorer than normal and by 1907 the cost of rice had risen by 58 per cent. 
The agricultural classes benefited, if anything, from this and urban laborers were 
compensated by increased wages, but the bhadralol\ were severely hit. Most bhadralo\ 
families (the family, not the individual, being the economic unit) derived their in­
comes partly from land rents and partly from professional salaries or fees. Neither of 
these sources was sufficiently flexible to meet such an abnormally sharp rise in the 
basic cost of living as occurred in 1905-6. Already the economic pressure on the 
bhadralo\ was considerable, for members of the three leading castes (the Brahmins, 
Baidyas and Kayasthas), of which it was mainly composed, despised non-professional 
occupation and the professions in Bengal and elsewhere in India could no longer 
accommodate all who thought themselves fit to be accommodated. “. . .  the greater part 
of the economic difficulty at present is, that many young men rate the value of School 
or College English education much higher than does the average employer.”* 11 Un­
employment was one cause of discontent; uneven distribution of wealth was another. 
While a minority of the bhadralo\ enjoyed considerable riches, a large proportion 
lived in grinding poverty and many were hopelessly indebted to money-lenders. In 
1906 this source of supply ran dry. At the time there was widespread belief in the 
“drain theory” and very naturally the impoverished bhadralo\ blamed their plight 
upon their British “exploiters.”
The result was an outburst of anti-Government violence. Revolutionary samitis 
were formed from groups of young men—mainly students—excited by the anti­
partition speeches, incited by extremist vernacular newspapers and organized by dedi­
cated leaders, who used the less pacific doctrines of Hinduism to convince their im­
pressionable followers of the divinity of their cause. This was more than many of the 
anti-partitionists had bargained for. The great landholders, in particular, were quick
10 E.g. presidential address by a Bihari, Dweep Narain Sing, to the Bengal Provincial Conference at 
Berhampore, 1907, Bande Mataram, April 2, 1907, (H . P. Ghose collection, Calcutta).
11 Bengal District Administration Committee, 1913-^4, Report, p. 13. This report; the Census of 
India, 1911, Vols. 1, 5 & 6; and J. C. Jack: The Economic Life of a Bengal District ( r9 i6 ), were the 
source of this paragraph.
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to realize that they had far more to lose from a challenge to law and order than from 
any readjustment of boundaries. As a body they disassociated themselves from the 
agitation.12 Within the movement itself there were soon disputes over means, and 
Banerjea and his followers found themselves losing the initiative to radical elements. 
“Moderates are always at a disadvantage,” commented Morley, as he watched the 
struggle from the India Office. “The same forces that begin the move, continue their 
propulsive power.”13 By early 1907 things were so far out of hand that Banerjea 
joined with the zemindars and the Muslims in a delegation to ask for the Viceroy’s 
intervention. “It was simply marvellous,” wrote Lord Minto, “with the troubles and 
anxieties of a few months ago still fresh in one’s memory, to see the ‘King of Bengal’ 
sitting on my sofa with his Mahommedan opponents, asking for my assistance to 
moderate the evil passions of the Bengali, and inveighing against the extravagances 
of Bepin Chandra Pal.”14
Banerjea had caught a disease which has infected so many nationalist politicians 
since his day: he had become a moderate despite himself. When the Government 
struck at the revolutionary leaders in 1908, it was not Banerjea who suffered the 
martyr’s exile in the Andamans—and young Bengal did not forget.
After 1908 prices fell and with them the interest in politics. Victory in the anti­
partition struggle was another three years in coming and by the time it did come 
there were vested interests in Eastern Bengal which were grievously hurt. Dacca and 
Chittagong (the capital and port respectively of the new province) had enjoyed a 
mushroom growth,15 and now they were to face once more the impossible competition 
of Calcutta. The Muslims of the area were to lose their favored position. Even for 
Calcutta the repartition had a sting in its tail: the capital of India was to be shifted 
to Delhi. The departure of the Government of India and its entourage gave much 
anxiety to the owners of city house property, many of whom were leading public 
figures.16 All in all then, the Banerjea group’s victory was neither as illustrious nor as 
universally welcome as they imagined or as at first sight it appears. The electoral im­
plications of this fact are easily drawn. Lesson number three: there can be no great 
political event in India (not even the departure of the British) which is not attended 
by serious disadvantages for some sections of the community.
The fourth factor in the group’s failure was the date. Politics were out of season. 
Bengal was reunited, the harvest was excellent, prices were comparatively low, trade 
was booming17—what was the sense in bothering with nationalist politics of the sort 
that Banerjea and company harped upon? Better to look to personal, communal, or 
local interests. A. C. Mazumdar, himself a defeated Legislative Council candidate, 
lamented in May 1913:
12 Edinburgh Review, Vol. 206, October 1907, pp. 290-1.
13 Morley to Minto, October 11, 1906, John Viscount Morley: Recollections (collected works, 1921),
Vol. 2, 153.
14 Minto to Morley, March 19, 1907, Lady Minto: India, Minto and Morley, 1905-1910 (1935), p. 109.
16 E.g. in the decade 1901-11 the population of Dacca rose by 21% and that of Chittagong by 30%. 
The increase for Greater Calcutta was only 11.9% and for Bengal as a whole only 6%. (Census of India, 
1911, Vols. 5 & 6).
10 Lord Crewe to Lord Carmichael, January 15, 1912, Lady Mary Carmichael of Skirling: Lord Car­
michael of Stirling. A Memoir (1929), p. 151.
17 Capital, November 28, 1912, p. 1255; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst: My Indian Years, 1910-1916 
(1948), p. 67.
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It is useless and what is more perhaps positively harmful to disguise the fact that ever 
since the modification of the Partition of Bengal public enthusiasm in our own province 
has been on the wane, and that the people of Bengal has been slowly and silently relapsing 
into a state of political torpor. It is not my intention to create an alarm, but I am afraid 
our public men would be guilty of culpable neglect if they fail to take timely notice of the 
actual situation in the country and in any way contribute to their own deception as well as 
to the growing demoralization of the public. Even the reformed councils will be of no 
avail to us if there is not a volume of living, healthy public opinion behind them actively 
working up to the end which these councils are intended to achieve. Some practical meas­
ures should therefore be taken without loss of time to revive the drooping spirit of the 
public, to infuse fresh enthusiasm in the country and on every important question to make 
the whole country vibrate with a common burning impulse as was happily the case during 
the anti-partition agitation in this province.18
Lesson number four: Indian nationalists were always in danger of losing the attention 
of their following to the powerful counter attractions of personal, local, and com­
munal affairs. At elections, in particular, there were always at stake many issues to 
which nationalist aspirations were barely relevant. W hat follows will underscore this.
The Vote as a Source of Power
Before proceeding, a point of fundamental importance must be made. The grant 
of the vote introduced a new form of power to Indian society. From the British view­
point this was one stage (some thought an advanced stage) in the development of 
representative institutions; from the Indian angle it was the chance for a person, 
community, or political group to gain power and increased status at the expense of 
other sections of society. The Anglo-Indian Association, struggling for enfranchise­
ment in 1908, grasped this point: “For any community of British descent in India to 
be excluded from any scheme of reform in which the franchise is conferred upon 
others, is not merely to leave it alone in its depressed condition, but actually to lower 
it further.”19 To be given the vote or to be denied it; to be successful or unsuccessful 
at an election were henceforth important factors in the relations of Indian social 
groups. A new power game was to be played. Those who played it well were to in­
herit the future.
This can be illustrated by the scuffle which occurred in 1912 when it was proposed 
that the Indian commercial community in Bengal might be enfranchised. In 1909 the 
Government had rejected this suggestion on the ground that the trading classes were 
“despised, weak and disorganised.”20 Instead it had nominated the Secretary of the 
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, Maharaj-Kumar Hrishikesh Law, as their 
representative. On February 23, 1912, the Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal wrote to the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and to the Marwari 
Association, the two leading Indian commercial bodies in Calcutta, asking their opin­
ion on the composition of a commercial electorate. Both replied that there should be 
two commercial representatives, but whereas the Marwari Association suggested that 
one should be chosen by each body, the Chamber of Commerce preferred that it alone 
should have the right to elect. It emphasized that the question was one of prestige. In
18 Mazumdar to Pramathanath Banerjea, Hon. Assistant Secretary, Indian Association, May 13, 1913, 
Indian Association MSS.
19 Anglo-Indian Association, Calcutta, Annual Report 1908, pp. 6-7.
20 File 18L-23. A120-8. August 1913. This is also the source for the subsequent two paragraphs.
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framing the election rules, wrote Law, “I hope you will be pleased not to put our 
Chamber in the same category with the associations of shopkeepers, petty dealers and 
other people whose ways are not our ways and whose ideas are not our ideas, other­
wise it will lower us in public estimation, and the boon granted under such circum­
stances would not at all be appreciated by us.” 21
The news was abroad, however, that there was a seat on the Legislative Council 
to be had for the asking, and the “people whose ways are not our ways” hastened to 
assure the Government that their particular organization represented Indian com­
merce more truly than any other. The prize for ingenuity went to our old friends at 
the Indian Association. The fact that few, if any, of them were businessmen, they re­
garded as a minor consideration when a seat in the Legislative Council was at stake; 
so they formed their own commercial body—the Society of Merchants and Traders 
of Bengal—and offered it as a suitable electorate. “As must be well known to Gov­
ernment the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce is a one family show,” they 
wrote, “and that family [the Laws] the most sincerely hated in the country. For the 
Chamber to exercise the right and privilege of franchise is to abuse it.” There were 
several other bodies which should participate in any election, particularly the new 
Society “which under the aegis of Babu Suendra Nath is likely to be an important 
factor in the national life.” 22
All this served to convince the Government that its earlier analysis had been cor­
rect and that the franchise could not yet be granted to Indian commerce.
His Excellency [the Governor, Lord Carmichael] thinks that it will probably be necessary 
to nominate this year again; but he was much impressed by the view expressed by the 
Maharaj -Kumar Hrishikesh Law that if the franchise were given to the National Chamber 
of Commerce, it will increase the reputation of that body to such an extent that all Indian 
merchants would come within its influence and the National Chamber of Commerce would 
then represent Indian commerce in the same way as the Bengal Chamber of Commerce 
represents European commerce.
His Excellency was also impressed by the Maharaj-Kumar’s view that the National 
Chamber of Commerce would rather not be asked to nominate along with the other 
Chambers, because if the Government did not accept the National Chamber’s nomination 
and did accept the nomination of another body, the Chamber would be lowered in the 
eyes of the Indian merchants, and much of its influence might be lost. I understand that 
the Maharaj-Kumar would prefer that Government should not call for nominations, but 
should choose a man direct.23
This was done and Law was the representative chosen.
A number of points emerge. It is clear that a seat in the Legislative Council and 
the right to elect or nominate to it was highly valued by several persons and organi­
zations. It is also clear that there was sufficient prestige and, perhaps, practical value 
attached to the grant of the franchise, to make the manner of its disposal important. 
The vote was, as I have suggested, a new means of raising one’s relative standing in 
the community.
The part played by the Banerjea group in this episode throws new light on their 
failure in the election. It demonstrates that theirs was a sectional group competing
21 Law to W. R. Gourlay, Private Secretary to Governor, May 24, 1912, ibid.
22 H. Dutt to same, May 11, 1912, ibid.
23 Minute by Gourlay, July 18, 1912, ibid.
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with other sectional groups, and this indicates the need for an analysis of its structure. 
Instead of our accepting these men at face value as representative politicians, we shall 
learn more by determining the features which distinguished theirs from other groups. 
Obviously, shared political ideals were one of their distinctive features; but it is of 
equal importance to know that, apart from journalist Banerjea, they were all lawyers; 
that those few among them who held land had only small holdings; that, apart from 
the two Muslims, they were all Brahmins or Kayasthas; that they were untitled with 
one exception; and that all had won their professional and political reputations in 
Calcutta. Clearly, there were large sections of the community (for example, commerce, 
the large landholders, and the Muslims) with which the Banerjea group had little 
contact and which it could not hope to represent if those sections put forward repre­
sentatives of their own—as they did. Lesson number five: one must beware of ac­
cepting Indian political groups as “universally representative” on their own testimony 
alone. The structural analysis of these groups (especially of the Congress) and of their 
support may open new doors in Indian political history.
The Gilbertian manner in which the Indian Association politicians attempted to 
gatecrash the trading community affair draws attention to another important reason 
for their election defeat. The basis of the distribution of seats was sectional and 
certain of the electorates were mutually exclusive. This was considered policy. The 
British believed that the Indian community was divided into many compartments, 
separated one from another by strong social bulkheads. For a legislative council to 
be truly representative, they argued, it must be composed of members drawn from as 
many as possible of the most important of these segments. This, it must be admitted, 
was a logical argument at the Morley-Minto stage, when the aim was for the legisla­
tive councilors to represent to their British rulers the various needs of India. The 
crucial issue, however, was the definition of what were the “important” sections of the 
community. On this question there could be no hope of a consensus.
Judging by the number of seats allocated, the Government of India considered 
the important sections of the community in Bengal in 1912 to be the Civil Service (14 
seats), mofussil local bodies ( n ) ,24 European trade and commerce (7), the Muslims 
(5), landholders (4), the Corporation of Calcutta (2), and Calcutta University and 
Indian commerce (1 each).25 Of these, the Indian Association lawyers could hope to 
gain only the local body, the University and, at most, two of the Muslim seats. From 
the remainder they were excluded. Their reaction was natural. They declared that the 
dice were loaded against them:
Whatever may be the other defects of the Council regulations, want of a sense of humour 
is certainly not one of them, though one would not naturally look for humour at Simla 
Government Secretariats. In every civilized country, the rule seems to be to allow educated 
men to come to representative institutions, but here out in India, though the expansion 
of the Councils themselves has been due to the persistent agitation of the educated com-
24 “Local body” was not a term used in India but, for convenience, it is employed here to include 
municipalities and district and local boards, the members of which were grouped to form electorates for 
the Legislative Council.
25 The Council comprised, in addition, the three members of the Executive Council and three nomi­
nated Indian non-officials, and was presided over by the Governor. (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 
1913 [Cd. 6714], Vol. 47, 199). Discussion in this paper is confined to the non-official members.
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munity, it is they alone who have been effectively kept out from any active participation 
in the reformed Councils.26
This was hyperbole but it was true that the Government had purposely formed some 
electorates from which the educated middle-class would be excluded. It recognized 
that the legislative councils were modifying the structure of Indian society; it feared 
that the small Westernized Hindu urban middle-class had been given too much 
influence in the councils formed under the 1892 Act; and it was determined that other 
“important” sections of the community should be better represented in future.27 In 
particular, it wanted more landlord and Muslim representatives.
The Government of India regarded the large landholders as the traditional leaders 
of Indian society and as the group which had suffered most from the composition of 
the old councils. They were valued as a conservative body, a stable counterweight to 
the emergent middle-class. It was considered essential to provide separate electorates 
for them; so that their most illustrious members could be persuaded to offer them­
selves as candidates without compromising their prestige. As was emphasized in a 
memorial to the Government of Bengal in 1909, it was not for them to be begging 
their inferiors for the favor of election:
These great zemindars actuated as they are by oriental ideas of social dignity would 
consider themselves greatly humiliated if they are forced to canvass for votes among their 
subordinate tenure-holders, tenants, retainers and persons of inferior status. If by any 
chance they be obliged to stoop to such infamous practices, their positions would be low­
ered in the eyes of the people, their influence would be greatly reduced and their sphere of 
usefulness become extremely limited.28
In deference to this feeling the franchise for the four zemindari seats was restricted 
to approximately 500 substantial landholders.29 As a result, three at least of their four 
elected representatives in 1913 conformed very well to the pattern of pillars of con­
servative society. They were titled; they were Brahmin; each came from the leading 
landed family of his district; they were influential members of their local landholder 
associations; and they could pride themselves that they had been forced to engage in 
no professional or commercial venture. The fourth member, Byomkesh Chakravarti, 
however, was rather a black sheep. He was returned for the Presidency division, an 
electorate dominated by Calcutta landlords, many of whom had made their money 
in trade. Although a large zemindar, he was also a London educated lawyer practicing 
in the Calcutta High Court. He was Honorary Secretary to the Bengal Landholders’ 
Association, a rival body to the aristocratic British Indian Association to which the 
great hereditary landholders belonged. He held radical political views and was 
regarded as a rival to Banerjea as a leader of liberal opinion.30
Four seats were specially provided for the zemindars but a glance at the composi­
tion of the Bengal Legislature in 1913 reveals that no fewer than 17 of the 26 Indian 
non-official members were landholders. Three of these were Government nominees:
26 Indian World, January 15, 1913, p. 2.
27 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1907 [Cd. 3710], Vol. 58, 457.
28 Prodyar Coomar Tagore to British Indian Association, Oudh, January 18, 1909, enclosure, British 
Indian Association records, Lucknow.
29 Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary, November 23, 1912.
30 Nayak, January 14, 1913, Native Papers, January 18, 1913, Vol. 1, 60; Hindoo Patriot, January 
20, 1913, ibid., February 1, 1913, Vol. 2, 83-4.
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Law, representing Indian commerce; Dr. Nilratan Sarkar, an eminent physician; 
and Sir Kwhaja Salimulla Bahadur, Nawab of Dacca, “for no Legislative Council for 
Bengal would be complete without the uncrowned king of the Muhammadans of 
East Bengal.” 31 This leaves ten zemindars. Three, we find, were returned by Muslim 
electorates, one by the Calcutta Corporation and six by mofussil local bodies. This 
caused much perturbation at the Indian Association. The Indian World complained: 
“The Government is full of paternal solicitude on behalf of the Zemindars. But if 
one thing is more clear than another it is this that the Zemindars do not stand in need 
of any special protection. If protection is at all needed, it is not for them but against 
them.” It spoke of “their long purse and still longer following” and continued: “The 
elections in Bengal were fought more or less on personal issues. Votes were given on 
personal considerations, rather than on considerations of public policy or principle. 
The position of a candidate, not his capacity to work, or the quality of work he would 
turn out, was looked into. Truly we are in the elementary stage of public life. We 
blame the Government for the Regulations, none the less should we blame our­
selves.” 32
This underlines what was said earlier about the issues at stake in elections of the 
period. The length of a candidate’s rent roll, his local prestige, his religion, caste and 
family, his connections, his wealth, his benefactions, were in most electorates of 
greater importance than his education or political beliefs. The influence of landhold­
ing, the traditional source of power in India, was under siege from the rising urban 
middle-class; the battle may already have been decided in the latter’s favor, but there 
were still many weapons in the zemindari arsenal.
This can be demonstrated by examining the course of the 19 1 2 -1 3  election in one of 
the Bengal electorates. The Rajshahi division District and Local Boards electorate 
may be taken as an example. Rajshahi division comprised the whole of Northern 
Bengal and the majority of its population was Muslim.33 The candidates came from 
four of the five southern and most populous districts. They were Jogesh Chandra 
Chaudhuri, M.A., member of the Pabna district bar and son-in-law of Surendranath 
Banerjea; Maharaja Girija Nath Roy Bahadur, a large landholder in both the 
Dinajpur and Rajshahi districts, an influential member of the British Indian Associa­
tion and a member of the old Legislative Council of Eastern Bengal and Assam; 
Raja Mohendra Ranjan Roy Chaudhuri, also a member of the Eastern Bengal and 
Assam Legislative Council and of the Eastern Bengal Landholders’ Association, and 
a titleholder in the Rangpur district; and Maulvi Hafizar Rahman Chaudhuri, a 
young man, the only Muslim candidate, who was a small landed proprietor from 
Bogra.
Jogesh Chandra Chaudhuri, hoping to win the favors of the Muslim voters, per­
suaded two Muslims to propose and second his nomination but this did him no good. 
The Muslim community in this area had bitter memories of communal rioting during 
the anti-partition boycott agitation six years before and for this they blamed Chaud- 
huri’s father-in-law, Surendranath Banerjea. Besides, Chaudhuri had chosen unwisely 
in selecting his seconder. This man, Maulvi Emaduddin Ahmed, proved to be the
31 Hindoo Patriot, ibid, p. 83.
32 January 22, 1913, pp. 2-3.
33 Census of India, 1911, Vol. 5, 257.
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chief electoral agent of the Raja of Kakina, Mohendra Ranjan Roy Chaudhuri, and 
he did his level best to wreck Jogesh Chandra’s chances. To this end he used a 
standard ploy of the period: he informed the voters that the Rajshahi District Magis­
trate was opposed to Jogesh Chandra’s candidature and that his wrath would be felt 
by any who voted for him. The Raja was an invalid but his “following and his purse” 
were indeed long. Reputedly he spent Rs.2000 on “inducements” to voters; he offered 
traveling expenses to many; and Emaduddin, on his behalf, provided those who 
came to vote in Rajshahi town with hospitality “much above his own and their 
ordinary style of living.” It was the Raja, not Babu Jogesh Chandra, nor even Maulvi 
Hafizar Rahman, who caught the ear of the Muslims. He let it be known that he was 
willing to pay off the local Muhammadan Association’s debt amounting to Rs.1500 
and, better still, he received public support from the Nawab of Dacca. Where the 
Nawab went many Bengali Muslims were accustomed to follow. The Raja was 
elected.34
The strongest impression left by this story is how little it resembled a twentieth- 
century British election, with its emphasis on politics and parties, and how much more 
it had in common with, for example, eighteenth-century contests. It must by now 
be clear why any attempt to explain the 1912-13 election solely in terms of the 
Banerjea political group was bound to be unsatisfactory.
Communalism and Corruption
In this Rajshahi contest, communal questions were obviously of major importance 
and this was true of most electorates. We have already remarked the Government of 
India’s desire to provide the Muslims with special representation. Considering that 
they were in a small majority in Bengal, this must appear rather strange. The ex­
planation is that the Muslim community here was economically and educationally 
inferior to the Hindus, who held most of the land and who dominated the profes­
sions and commerce. The bulk of the Muslims were peasant cultivators.35 The Islamic 
community throughout India had been less ready than the Hindus to grasp the 
opportunities offered in the nineteenth century by the provision of English education 
and it had been outdistanced by its rivals. Early in the twentieth century, however, 
there was a resurgence of Islam in India (as in other areas of the Islamic world36) 
and the Muslims began to demand, among other things, a larger share of Government 
appointments and increased representation in the legislative councils. This new spirit 
was encouraged by the British and the community was promised separate electorates 
and the reservation of a proportion of administrative appointments. This provoked 
Hindu hostility, already aroused by the formation of a Muslim majority province in 
Eastern Bengal and Assam. The Muslims of the area regarded the partition as a great 
boon. The obvious discomfiture which it gave to the local Hindus, and broad (though 
somewhat irresponsible) hints from members of the I.C.S. that the opportunity would 
be used to advance Muslim at the expense of Hindu interests,37 raised unreal hopes.
34 Bengalee, December 29, 1912, p. 4; File 181^-4. B444-62. October 1913.
35 E.g. the Muslims formed 52% of the total population of Bengal but only 30% of its urban popula­
tion (Census of India, 1911, Vol. 5); only 10% of those qualified to vote as landholders were Muslims 
( Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary, November 23, 1912).
36 See Wilfred Cantwell Smith: Islam in Modern History (Mentor Books, 1959), pp. 58-9.
37 E.g. see Sir Bampfylde Fuller: Some Personal Experiences (1930), pp. 140-1.
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Dacca and Chittagong boomed; there were more “jobs for the boys”; the Nawab of 
Dacca held regal sway over the new capital. It was an Indian summer which came to a 
sudden and frosty end with the announcement of the repartition in December 1911. 
This cut the Muslims to the quick. The British, it seemed, had performed a volte-face 
to pacify Hindu extremists. Muslim resentment was tempered only by the determina­
tion to gain as many concessions as possible as indemnity for British treachery.88 The 
Hindus were equally determined to oppose any suggestion of compensation,89 for 
they believed that the British were systematically favoring the Muslims. When the 
Legislative Council regulations were revised in 1912, for example, the Hindus de­
manded that they too should enjoy the right of direct election which had been 
granted to the Muslims in 1909, and the Government’s reply—that they must be 
content with what representation they could secure through the local body constit­
uencies—convinced them of its prejudice.40
The strained relations between the communities were naturally reflected in the 
1912-13 elections. The Hindus did what they could to dissuade Muslim candidates 
from contesting local body seats. These, the Bengalee informed them, were meant for 
the Hindu middle-class. The Muslims were provided with special electorates and 
“They cannot in all fairness have both.”41 Only five of the 41 candidates for the local 
body seats were Muslims and only one managed to secure election. Even this was 
resented by the Hindus. It was the result, they hinted, of infamous collusion between 
the zemindars and the Muslims of the area.42 The Hindus had little cause for com­
plaint: in a Legislative Council of 51 members, only eight were Muslims and, of 
these, two were Government nominees.
The Muslims, for their part, were determined that only staunch communalists 
should occupy their five reserved seats. It was to Abdul Rasul’s extreme discredit, for 
example, that he was a follower of Hindu Banerjea; and even though he devoted the 
greater part of his election manifesto to his aspirations for the Muslim community, he 
was discounted as “not being a good Mussulman.” 43
How much of this mutual rancor was due to the existence of communal elec­
torates ? This is an extraordinarily difficult question to answer, for there were so many 
contributory factors. Certainly the Hindus were suspicious of British motive—this 
looked to them very like a policy of divide and rule44—and any redistribution of jobs 
was bound to foment hard feelings on both sides. On the other hand, it is equally 
certain that had the Muslims not been provided with special seats they would have 
gone virtually unrepresented in the Bengal Council in 1913. It was unfortunate for the 
future of representative institutions in Bengal that it was found necessary to build 
into the initial constitution the communal divisions which were the greatest bar to its
38 Crewe to Carmichael, January 15, 1912, op. cit., p. 152; Statesman, January 2, 1912, p. 7; ibid, 
January 23, 1912, p. 11.
39E.g. consider their reaction to the decision to establish a new university at Dacca; Statesman, Feb­
ruary 4, 1912, p. 10.
40E.g. see Statesman, June 5, 1912, p. 7; & Native Papers, November 23, 1912, Vol. 1, 1370-1.
41 October 29, 1912, Native Papers, November 2, 1912, Vol. 2, 679.
42 Indian World, January 22, 1913, p. 2; Proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Council, April 2, 1913, 
Vol. 45, 536.
43 Indian World, January 15, 1913, pp. 2-3.
44 “The British wished for and tried to create an Ulster among the Mohammedans of India.” Lajpat 
Rai: Young India (1917), p. lxxv.
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satisfactory operation. With the transfer of more power in the 1920’s, these communal 
divisions were to paralyse the working of the Legislature.
It must not be presumed from Rasul’s case, that the Muslim contests were marked 
by general agreement among the faithful. If anything, they were more keenly fought 
than those for the mixed electorates, for the Muslim community in Bengal was rent 
by factions, a factor which was to be of consequence in the subsequent history of the 
province. The Dacca division seat was filled simply by the nominee of the Nawab 
(a young man of destiny, Maulvi Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq45) but there were seven­
teen candidates to squabble over the other four Muslim seats—and squabble they did. 
“The tactics and methods which some of the candidates for election to the various 
Legislative Councils in the country had recourse to in order to secure votes is painful,” 
lamented Rasul after his defeat, “and the manner in which some of the voters con­
ducted themselves in the matter of exercising their franchise were, to use a mild ex­
pression, simply abominable.”46
Rasul, in contesting the Presidency division seat, had become involved in a vendetta 
of some years standing. It illustrates the disunity of Bengal Muslim society. There 
were at first six candidates for this seat, but one withdrew in favor of Golam Husain 
Cassim Ariff, and it was between Rasul and him that the contest lay. The Presidency 
division comprised Calcutta and the electorate was dominated by merchants. Ariff, a 
silk manufacturer, was one of a rich group of Surati momins, who vied for social and 
commercial preeminence with an equally prosperous, though smaller, group of Delhi- 
wallahs. The vendetta had begun in 1909 at the first elections for the reformed Bengal 
Council, when Ariff secured nomination as a delegate to vote for the Muslim member 
of Council, on the understanding that he would support Maulvi Badruddin Haider, 
Khan Bahadur, who was the nominee of the Delhiwallahs. Instead, he arranged for 
himself to be surreptitiously nominated and used his votes to secure his own election. 
The fury of the outwitted was unbounded.47 1912 gave them an opportunity to avenge 
the defeat and they chose Rasul as their candidate. Ariff proved as wily as ever. As we 
have seen, he whispered in many ears that Rasul was not a good Muslim. He also had 
a number of Rasul’s graduate friends warned that the Government was angered at 
the support Rasul was receiving and that there would be no further hope of official 
employment for any who voted for him. Ariff made a close study of the electoral 
register and on election day fortuitously received the votes of men who, it was after­
wards revealed, had been as far afield as Colombo, Mecca, and Paradise on that day. 
According to Rasul, he also “had most costly and sumptuous dishes” ready in a room 
close to the polling booth and it was suggested to voters on arrival, that they might 
care to partake after “satisfactorily” fulfilling their electoral functions.48 He distributed 
money to voters in the name of travelling expenses and he promised large sums for 
the construction and maintenance of Muslim institutions in many parts of the di­
vision.49 All this undoubtedly helped, but the determining factors were almost cer-
45 “The Nawab was very good to me,” was Huq’s comment on his political debut. (Interview with 
the author, December 11, i960.) He was subsequently Chief Minister of both Bengal and East Pakistan.
46 Mussulman, January 17, 1913, Native Papers, January 25, 1913, Vol. 2, 63-4. The Mussulman 
was a Calcutta English weekly of which Rasul was joint editor.
47 File 18L-42. B1650-55. June 1910.
48 File 18L-3. B427-33. July 1914.
49 Muhammadi, January 10, 1913, Native Papers, January 18, 1913, Vol. I ,  53-4.
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tainly his influence as one of the Surati community and as the sitting Legislative 
Council member for the electorate. His victory was clear cut. He secured 367 votes 
to Rasul’s 159.50
Again we see how politics (to use that word in the modern Western sense) were 
overshadowed by the more important questions of personality, connection, and wealth. 
Corruption also played its part and this was by no means an isolated instance nor was 
it the worst. In the neighbouring division of Burdwan, for example, a candidate used 
his position in the local Muhammadan Association to retain the names of absent and 
dead voters on the electoral roll and, by illegally obtaining possession of a number of 
voting papers, arranged for votes to be cast on his behalf in their names. Reporting 
this to the Government, the District Officer remarked: “The whole record makes 
melancholy reading for anyone who has at heart the interests of local self-government 
or the Muhammadan community in Burdwan.”61 It is important to realize why 
there was such corruption. The superficial answer is that the electoral regulations 
were badly framed, a fact which the Government was forced to admit.52 Besides, the 
electoral registers were inaccurate and this is always likely to encourage malpractice.53 
There were more fundamental reasons. The franchise was novel and exotic. It was 
introduced to an illiterate and poverty-stricken society, which was politically inex­
perienced and for which representative institutions certainly had no intrinsic value. 
These disadvantages were tempered, to a degree, by the restriction of the vote to a 
minute fraction of the population (1 in 4650s4) but the result was small electorates in 
which a handful of votes could determine contests—and a handful of votes can often 
be bought. Corrupt practices were restrained by neither party nor strong political 
principle, and the community was unlikely to look askance at the adaptation, to this 
new struggle for prestige and power, of the accustomed methods of that time-hon­
ored Bengali institution, doladoli—intrigue and conflict among factions. In this there 
were ominous portents for the future. As more power devolved upon the Legislature, 
the stakes of the game became correspondingly bigger. Unless the game itself came to 
be valued more highly than the stakes, there was the ever-growing danger that it 
would cease to be played.
Another reason for the failure of Banerjea’s men has been revealed. Their political 
ideal—the desire that the Indian electors and legislators should worthily exercise the 
franchise—was a positive handicap when corruption was sanctioned by public opinion 
and unpunished by law.
Earlier we observed that this group could contest only the local body, University 
and two of the Muslim electorates. We have seen that they were excluded from the 
commercial, the zemindari and the remainder of the Muslim seats, but this still leaves 
those of the Calcutta Corporation and the European non-officials. The commissioners 
of the Corporation were mostly businessmen and city landlords. Their two repre-
50 The two groups fought another round in 1916 when Ariff and a Delhiwallah, Abdur Rahim, con­
tested the Presidency and Burdwan divisions seat in the Imperial Legislative Council, but on that occasion 
Ariff was defeated. The candidates indulged in such blatant corruption that the Government of India was 
persuaded (at long last) of the need for an improvement in the electoral regulations. (Calcutta Gazette, 
May 9, 1917, Part I A, pp. 363-80.)
61 File 18L-10-1-29. A105-33. September 1913.
52 File 18L-61. A33-8. December 1913.
53 See Thomas Edward Smith: Elections in Developing Countries (i960), p. xi.
54 Report of the Franchise Committee etc. (1919), p. 48.
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sentatives in 1913 were John Apcar, a lawyer member of the rich Armenian com­
munity which owned much Calcutta house property, and Rai Radha Charan Pal 
Bahadur, whose interests were also in Calcutta landholding.
The European non-officials were provided with seven seats in the Legislature, five 
by election and two by nomination. For a community of 25,000 persons in a total 
population of 46,500,000 they were palpably over-represented but this had not pre­
vented their attempting to gain another five seats on the grounds of social and com­
mercial pre-eminence.55 As a Bengali newspaper remarked, they were in danger of 
forgetting that India was inhabited by Indians.56 In 1912 they were smarting from the 
blow to their influence and pride which had been dealt by the transfer of the capital 
to Delhi. It confirmed them in the belief, born of the admission of Indians in greater 
numbers to the councils, that the Government was giving way “before the attacks of 
a democracy of literati, who have a sense of nothing beyond their own importance.”57 
The Government of India, they feared, had put its foot on a slippery decline which 
might slide British rule, and with it British commerce, into the sea. Hold was their 
watchword. Their representatives went to the legislatures determined to see that no 
further concessions were granted. They were drawn from various sections of the 
European community—Calcutta trade, the mofussil tea and jute industries, the ports 
of Calcutta and Chittagong—but all fought under the banner of the Bengal Chamber 
of Commerce, the best organized, most influential and one of the most rigid com­
munal associations in India. To the Chamber of Commerce, the failure of the Indian 
Association group in the 1912-13 elections came as a welcome surprise. It proved, they 
said, that most Indians were as tired as they were of all this nonsense about nationalism 
and reforms.58 Not only did the Europeans add one more to those communal blocs 
which were to hamper the smooth working of the Legislature, but they were also 
actively hostile to the ideal of progressive constitutional advance for India.
The groupings in the Legislative Council which resulted from the 1912-13 elections 
were revealed when the non-official members proceeded in February 1913 to select 
their two representatives on the Imperial Legislative Council, and the result, inci­
dentally, provides a final demonstration of the basic problem which confronted the 
Banerjea group. Its two nominees were Bhupendranath Basu, a sitting member of 
the Imperial Legislative Council, and Banerjea himself. The great zemindars and the 
Europeans jointly sponsored the Maharaja of Nashipur, Ranajit Sinha; while the 
Muslims, revealing their disunity, put forward three candidates: Dr. A. Al-Mamun 
Suhrawardy (the man who had clandestinely nominated Ariff for the Bengal Council 
in 1909), Z. R. Zahid Suhrawardy (who also had Ariff’s support) and Nawab 
Badruddin Haider, Khan Bahadur, (Ariff’s opponent in that affair). A compromise 
must have been reached for the two Suhrawardys withdrew to give the Muslims the 
appearance of a united front.59
In the lobbying which preceded the election, Banerjea and Basu between them 
received the promise of 39 of the 68 total votes and these they arranged to divide 
evenly so that both might be returned. The plan misfired for Banerjea received 22 of
55 Statesman, February 3, 1912, pp. 6-7; Capital, November 7, 1912, pp. 1067-8.
56 Ananda Bazar Patri\a, November 7, 1912, Native Newspapers, November 16, 1912, Vol. 1, 1345.
57 Englishman, December 25, 1913, p. 4; see also ibid, March 6, 1913, p. 4.
68 Englishman, January 14, 1913, p. 4.
59 File 18L-56. B1891-1906. December 1913.
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the votes and Basu was left with only 1 7 , thereby allowing the Maharaja of Nashipur 
to squeeze between them with 1 8 . There were a number of reasons for this misad­
venture but the most important, it seems, was the reluctance of some Brahmin mem­
bers to support Kayastha Basu when there was a Brahmin candidate available in 
Banerjea.60 Here is an example of sectionalism conflicting with nationalism. Banerjea 
and Basu, as distinguished nationalists, could command the support of the majority 
of the Legislative Council members including even some Muslims and many of the 
landholders, but they could not escape the effects of sectional interests. Indian na­
tionalists were always in danger of having their plans frustrated by these forces.
The British Withdrawal and Indian Society
So far I have emphasized the divisions among the Legislative Council members. 
It must be realized, however, that as a body they had much in common and much 
that distinguished them from the bulk of the community. For one thing, they were 
English speakers and, for another, they were educated, many having attended uni­
versities in Bengal and Britain .61 The Hindus were all Brahmins or Kayasthas, with 
the exceptions of Sarkar, who was a Brahmo, and Law and Pal, who were from trad­
ing castes. Only four among the Indians were not either landholders or lawyers and, 
of the non-officials as a whole, only four were not city or town dwellers.62 Compare 
these figures with those for the province in general and it is immediately obvious how 
select was the senate. Only two per cent of Bengali men spoke English and fourteen 
per cent were literate. Seventy per cent were peasants and only six per cent were town 
dwellers. Of the twenty-one million Hindus, less than two and a half millions were 
Brahmins or Kayasthas.63
Clearly there were large sections of society which were not directly represented, 
among them the lower castes and the outcastes; the agricultural tenantry and 
peasantry; orthodox Hinduism and Islam, to which Western learning and Western 
ways were anathema; and the Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians, who formed a 
small but not inconsequential minority .64 These and others were excluded from the 
Legislative Council. Some had no desire to be represented, but most realized, however 
vaguely, that a new source of power had been gained by others and they were ap­
prehensive of its being used to their disadvantage. Wrote the N aya\, a Calcutta 
Bengali daily that advocated a H indu revival:
The right of voting is one of the serious evils which, in the guise of boons, English rule 
has introduced into this country. The Municipalities and District Boards and similar 
institutions have really nothing to do with the country and with society, either Hindu or 
Moslem. . . . Only men who have money and possess influence and can manipulate the 
voters get into these bodies, which again return members to the Legislative Council. . . . 
These Babus who are briskly canvassing for votes, whom do they represent? There is no 
telling what would have been the outcome of Mr Basu’s Marriage Bill, but for the presence 
of the Maharaja of Burdwan on the Council.65 Why should such iconoclast Babus be
60 Englishman, February 28, 1913, p. 7; & March 5, 1913, p. 8.
61 Of the 26 Indian non-officials, 16 were university men of whom 5 had been educated in the United 
Kingdom. None of the European non-officials had attended university.
63 Of the 34 non-officials, 16 resided in Calcutta and another 3 had town-houses there. Dacca/Naryan- 
gung and Chittagong each supplied three members.
63 Census of India, 1911, Vol. 5.
64 There were 20,000 Anglo-Indians and 100,000 Indian Christians in Bengal. (Ibid.)
65 Special Marriage Amendment Bill introduced to the Imperial Legislative Council in 1911 by
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permitted to pass as representatives of the Hindus? These Babus, who are utterly without 
religion, may be likened to poison thrown out by the churning of Hindu society by the 
English, and it is for the English like another Nilf^antha60 must grapple with them. Why, 
instead of doing that, do Englishmen allow this poison to scatter itself over the whole 
framework of Hindu society ? 67
We have reached the antipode of our starting point. Those men who were then to 
be the leaven of society have become its poison. This brings us up short against the 
realization that the training of a Westernized elite could look very different through 
Indian eyes. At the basis of this criticism there lies an obvious conflict of ideals. The 
Naya\ did not want babus, it wanted pundits. The British aim, it said in a later edi­
torial, was to Anglicize India. “If India is to get Home rule, her people must lose 
their present national individuality, and approximate to the ruling race before self- 
government can be granted her.” 68 It is true that there was an assumption of this sort 
underlying British policy towards the Indian legislatures and it is essential that this 
assumption be made explicit when their history is written. If it is not, it may disguise 
the fact that there could be, and was, legitimate disagreement at this basic level.
The Naya\ criticism also reflects a conflict of interest. Even at this elementary 
stage, with the grant of the vote, power was being transferred by the imperial rulers. 
Certain persons and certain sections of the community were gaining and certain were 
losing relatively. There was a contest for this power and inevitable dissension as to 
how it should be distributed and, even, whether it should be distributed. This strug­
gle was particularly severe because of the segmented nature of Indian society. To 
reduce conflict to a minimum, the British had to attempt to distribute as fairly as 
possible the power which they were relinquishing. They endeavored to control the 
pace of devolution and to maintain their own position, by balancing interests. This 
could retard but could not prevent a revolution in Indian society. It is in this context 
that communal strife in twentieth-century India is to be understood. The clash of 
Hindu and Muslim was the most fierce for these two communities were more sharply 
divided than any others; but this must be regarded as a part of the readjustment 
which took place at every level of Indian society as the British withdrew—between 
caste and caste; between great landlord and small; between zemindar and ryot; be­
tween capital and labor; between province and province. The reaction of British 
commerce is also explicable in these terms. Theirs was one of the communities which 
stood to lose from the devolution of power: they were haves who might become 
have-nots. Admittedly they were most closely involved with the Imperium but they 
were as much a part of, for example, the Bengal complex as were the Marwaris or the 
Armenians with whom they vied for the riches of the province—and only slightly 
more alien. There were struggles within groups for leadership and, as power settled 
more securely in one or two locales, there were alliances (not all holy) between the
Bhupendranath Basu. It was opposed by orthodox Hindus and Muslims as it would have made possible 
inter-creed and inter-caste marriages, by providing for civil weddings. (Proceedings of the Legislative 
Council of the Governor-General of India, Vols. 49 & 50.)
66 The allusion is to the God Siva, who drank the poison raised by the churning of the ocean by gods 
and demons and thus saved the universe from its effects. The poison stuck in his throat, which became 
blue and he himself to be known as Nilkantha—the god with the blue throat.
67 December 3, 1912, Native Papers, December 7, 1912, Vol. 1, 1419.
68 June 14, 1913, ibid., June 21, 1913, Vol. 1, 570.
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successful and the farsighted. Does this not explain the presence of the industrialist 
Birlas in Gandhi’s camp—despite \hadi?
This was the political situation in which the advocates of constitutional advance 
were involved. Their ideals and whatever aspirations the British had for their train­
ing are of great importance but they are not the whole story nor can the history of the 
legislatures be written in those terms. The constitutionalists must be understood as a 
group among groups, possibly standing in a peculiar relationship to the imperial 
rulers because of some ideals held in common, but sharing the general concern about 
the devolution of power. It is no disparagement of their idealism to recognize that 
they saw themselves as successors to the British in the seats of authority. Had they 
not done so, they would not be ruling now.
